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2Abstract
This thesis explores the everyday experiences of foreign contract workers and 
international students in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1949 to 1990. 
Starting with an overview of immigration policy in the socialist state, it demonstrates 
that this was influenced by older German police traditions as well as by Soviet practice. 
Although the state aimed at maximum control of foreigners’ lives, its system of control 
and surveillance was never fully effective. As “subjects of social action”, foreign 
workers and students were capable of recognising the extent and limits of state authority 
and could use the political, economic and social conditions in the GDR to their own 
advantage. Many foreigners saw the GDR as an opportunity to secure a better future or 
to explore social activities frowned upon or unavailable in their home countries. The 
pursuit of their own sense of identity and economic interests generated a mixed 
response from the East German public and the authorities. Racism did exist in the GDR 
but the state consistently denied this, claiming rather that East Germany embodied the 
principles of proletarian internationalism and solidarity. There was positive interaction 
between foreigners and East German citizens, demonstrated by the existence of social 
contact and binational relationships. Viewed with disdain by the general public, the 
authorities implemented extensive measures to prevent marriages taking place, 
effectively blocking any progress towards a multicultural society. These restrictive 
practices, along with the inbuilt shortcomings of the planned economy and the 
controlled media, served to reinforce popular misconceptions about foreigners, leaving a 
society ill-equipped to deal with minorities since the collapse of the state in 1989.
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In 1989 the number of foreigners in the GDR reached a highpoint of 190,000, which 
represented just over 1.2 percent of the overall population. Of this number, 
approximately 93,000 were contract workers while nearly 13,500 were international 
students. The remainder were either long-term residents of the GDR (mainly foreign- 
born spouses of East German citizens) or foreign workers employed by foreign 
construction companies working on specific projects. In addition to this number, 
approximately 400,000 Soviet soldiers were garrisoned in the GDR, bringing the total 
foreigner population to almost 600,000.
This thesis deals with the East German experiences of contract workers and 
international students. Over the forty year history of the state, the cumulative number of 
foreign workers and students was considerable. Between 64,000 and 78,400 students 
from 126 counties graduated from East German third-level institutions from 1951 to 
1989 (see chapter 3). More significant was the total number of contract workers and it 
may be estimated that between 1967 and 1989 approximately 210,000 contract workers 
were employed in East German factories. (For a statistical breakdown and explanation 
of these figures, see diagrams 1 and 2).
The presence of foreigners in the GDR was as old as the state itself. The most 
numerous group in the 1950s were the “stateless” citizens (in the majority displaced 
persons) who decided to remain in eastern Germany after the Second World War. In the 
aftermath of the Greek Civil War in 1949/50, the fledgling state took in 1,800 Greek 
child refugees.1 In 1951, Leipzig University was the first college to enrol foreign 
students. The proposal to employ foreign labour was first mooted in July 1961, one 
month before the erection of the Berlin Wall. This plan, which never materialised, 
envisaged recruiting 50,000 Soviet, Bulgarian, and Polish workers for fixed periods of 
contract.2 Commuting daily between Poland and East Germany, Polish women transit 
workers began employment in a number of factories along the eastern Oder-NeiBe 
border in 1965/66. Contract workers, who lived and worked in the GDR for periods 
ranging from three to five years, first arrived in 1967 from Hungary. They were
1 See Stefan Troebst, “Evacuation to a cold country: child refugees from the Greek Civil War in the GDR, 
1949-1989”, in: Nationalities Papers 32:4 (2004), 675-691.
2 See Dierk Hoffmann, Aufbau und Krise der Planwirtschaft. Die Arbeitskraftelenkung in der SBZ/DDR 
1945 bis 1963, Munchen, 2002, 530-535.
followed by workers from Poland (from 1971), Algeria (from 1974 to 1984), Cuba 
(from 1978), Mozambique (from 1979), Vietnam (from 1980), Angola (from 1985), and 
North Korea and China (from 1986).
Post-Wende research has failed to capture the variety of foreigners’ experience. An 
interpretative analysis which draws on the totalitarian tradition and which takes party, 
state, police, and Stasi orders and directives at face value will invariably portray 
foreigners as having endured a miserable, oppressed existence in the GDR. While the 
subjective experiences of some foreigners serve to confirm this depiction, other 
testimony challenges or contradicts this view. Life in the GDR could mean different 
things to different people. As research in other areas of GDR history demonstrates, 
neither the image of the GDR as a peace-loving, socialist state (as cultivated by its 
apologists) nor as a massive concentration camp (as painted by its most ardent 
detractors) corresponds to the subjective experiences of many of its citizens. The 
particular experience of foreigners, in many ways a microcosm of the larger situation, is 
also ill-suited to the straitjacket of totalitarian interpretative models. An examination of 
foreigners’ experience using historical sources over the forty year history of the GDR 
reveals a more differentiated and contradictory picture than has been portrayed. While 
the state sought to limit the freedoms of foreigners, they proved capable of pursing their 
own interests.
Before the Wende little attention was paid in the West towards the situation of 
foreigners in the GDR. Articles of questionable accuracy appeared occasionally in 
Deutschland Archiv and other journals. By and large, these accounts were based on a 
mixture of official GDR news and Western conjecture,3 but at times provided useful 
perspectives from labour delegating countries.4 Articles on foreigners in the mainstream 
GDR media were by and large laudatory and self-congratulatory contributions.5
Neither did the situation of foreigners in the GDR attract the attention of East 
German writers. There are a few notable but largely forgotten exceptions, and as such, 
they deserve particular mention. In the 1970s, the novelist Hannelore Lauerwald 
addressed the problems faced by the women transit workers from Poland, who worked 
in East German factories along the Oder-Neibe border. The short story Wanda deals 
with the difficulties faced by a young Polish worker of the same name on account of her
3 See Konstantin Pritzel, “Gastarbeiter in der DDR”, in: DA 3:1 (1970), 92-96, and W olf Oschlies, 
“Polnische ‘gastarbeiterzy’ in der DDR. Rechtsgrundlagen und Alltag”, in: DA 16:10 (1983), 1084-1091.
4 Sandor Kiss, “Ungarische Gastarbeiter in der DDR”, in: Osteuropaische Rundschau 16:1 (1970), 16f.
5 For example: DDR rufen die Trommeln. Kollegen aus Afrika undAsien uber unsere Republik, Bemau, 
1964, or Siegfried Forster, “30 Jahre Auslanderstudium in der DDR”, in: Das Hochschulwesen 29:12 
(1981), 339-344.
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engagement to Frank, an East German.6 A news feature entitled “Polish Women”, 
commissioned but later rejected by the DFD, looked at the everyday expectations, 
worries, and difficulties of the Polish women transit workers employed in a capacitor 
plant in Gorlitz. Despite its veiled references to xenophobic sentiment among the 
majority GDR population, the article eventually found publication in the Sdchsische 
Zeitung in 1975 or 1976 its author recalls.7
Another valuable source is Landolf Scherzer’s Die Fremden, which is based on 
interviews carried out in 1982 and 2002 with a number of East Germans associated with 
the Fajas factory in the city of Suhl, which employed 175 Mozambican workers. The 
book was only published in 2002 as it had failed to receive a publication licence in the 
GDR. His interviewees come from a variety of backgrounds -  workers and their 
neighbours, hostel wardens, party secretaries, factory officials and restaurant owners -  
and they provide a far more complex picture of East German attitudes towards 
foreigners than many commentators or even the book’s blurb and author suggest. 
However, Scherzer’s interviews must be treated with some caution as they are not 
verbatim transcripts but edited for the purposes of publication and the author provides 
no indication on his interview technique or on whether he chose to exclude any 
material. In addition, although Scherzer sought the views of a dozen East Germans in 
1982, there is no evidence that he spoke to any Mozambicans then and the volume only 
contains six short accounts of interviews with Mozambicans living in Germany in 
2002.®
Published memoirs composed by foreigners who studied in the GDR are rare and 
non-existent in the case of contract workers. This research has found only one 
significant account written by a former international student. A Cold War response to an 
East German publication which extolled the system of international studies in the GDR, 
Studium bei Freunden? (1962) by Indian student Vijoy Batra paints a bleak picture of 
international studies in the GDR by claiming it was characterised by political 
indoctrination, repression and poor living standards. Yet he suggested that the
6 Hannelore Lauerwald, “Wanda”, in: An einem Donnerstag oder Der Duft des Brotes. Erzahlungen, 
Berlin, 1975.
7 The article mentions the rudeness o f checkout staff in Gdrlitz, who criticised Polish women for 
purchasing goods, such as flour, in the GDR. My thanks to Esther v. Richthofen, who made me aware of 
Lauerwald’s contributions, filed in: SAPMO-BArch, DY 31/1096, fos. 212-227. Interview with 
Hannelore Lauerwald, Oct. 2003.
8 Landolf Scherzer, Die Fremden, Berlin, 2002. The author had intended the Suhl material to appear in his 
earlier book Das Camp von Matundo. 132 Tage Afrika, Berlin, 1986.
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interaction with the East German public was extensive and commonplace.9 In two 
books, the Indonesian-born Chinese Xing-Hu Kuo illustrates the systematic surveillance 
he was placed under by the MfS. Kuo studied journalism at the KMU from 1958 to 
1961 before taking a job as a translator at the Chinese embassy in East Berlin. In 1965 
he was arrested and sentenced to the Bautzen II jail for seven and a half years on a 
trumped-up espionage charge.10
Since 1989/90, a considerable amount of material (of varying quality) on foreigners 
has been published. In the immediate aftermath of the events of the Wende of 1989/90, 
publications tended to compensate for the information deficit caused by decades of 
silence and secrecy surrounding contract labour by publishing basic information on the 
labour exchange agreements and general conditions.11 A repository of valuable insights 
into the everyday lives of foreigners is Runge’s 1990 book Ausland DDR. 
Fremdenhafi}2 The book’s title is somewhat misleading, as racism does not feature 
predominantly in the testimony of the many foreigners interviewed by the book’s 
researchers. Indeed, as the interviewees indicated, life in the GDR as a contract worker 
did not just entail misery but also had its benefits. Schmidt also provides extracts from 
interviews, conducted in early 1991, with eleven foreigners from five different countries 
who described their varying experiences of interaction with the German population.13 A 
more comprehensive account by Kriiger-Potratz appeared in the same year, which 
contrasted the official pronouncements of the SED on internationalism and solidarity 
with the unsavoury reality of 1989/90. The volume also contained a chapter on the 
history of foreign labour migration to the GDR.14
A post-communist, at times rather uncritical but nonetheless useful account of the 
GDR’s involvement with foreigners is provided in the series of single and joint 
publications written by Lothar and Eva-Maria Eisner, who in GDR times were involved 
in the centre for migration studies at Rostock University, which it must be added
9 Vijoy Batra, Studium bei Freunden? Das Auslanderstudium an den Universitaten der Sowjetzone, 
Bonn/Berlin, 1962.
10 Xing-Hu Kou, Ein Chinese in Bautzen II and Wodka in Sektglasem, Boblingen, 1990 and 1993 
respectively.
11 Hanns ThomS-Venske, “Notizen zur Situation der Auslander in der DDR”, in: Zeitschrift fiir  
Auslanderrecht und Auslanderpolitik 10:3 (1990), 125-131. Also Andrzej Stach and Saleh Hussain, 
Auslander in der DDR. Ein Ruckblick, Berlin, 1991.
12 Irene Runge, Ausland DDR. Fremdenhafi, Berlin, 1990.
13 Schmidt, Ines, “Erlebnisse und Ansichten ausl&ndischer Burger in Ostdeutschland”, in: BISS public 1:3 
(1991), 76-100.
14 Marianne Kriiger-Potratz, Anderssein gab es nicht: Auslander und Minderheiten in der DDR, Munster, 
1991, and also the article in the same volume by Dirk Jasper entitled “Auslanderbeschaftigung in der 
DDR”, 151-190.
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focused exclusively on migration to the West.15 They argued that the GDR could have 
created a real socialist alternative to the migration policies of the Federal Republic but 
that this opportunity was squandered by the SED elite and its commando-style 
application of socialism. While the couple made (at times critical) use of archival 
material, their line is essentially apologetic of GDR practice and largely dismissive of 
Western criticisms of GDR policy on foreigners. Indeed, they blamed the increase in 
right-wing extremism in the new Lander on the eastwards expansion of the “racist and 
nationalist” policies of the Bonn government along with the forced collapse of the state- 
run economy.
A detailed overview of how the terms of the bilateral labour contracts signed 
between the GDR and its foreign partners affected contract workers was attempted in 
1995 by Andreas Miiggenberg. He argued that 1985/86 marked the point when SED 
policy on foreign labour moved from an ideological basis, motivated by notions of 
solidarity, to an economic footing, which envisaged increasing productive output.16 
Sextro’s work published the following year covered similar territory, used the same 
secondary sources but contained no original research.17
Many 1990 publications were teleological attempts to explain the rise in violent and 
open racism in the East. Taking state directives and labour agreements at face value and 
focusing on the situation in the late 1980s, they have produced an unrepresentative 
picture of the historical experience of foreigners in the GDR. In more recent years a 
number of monographs have explored in greater detail particular groups of foreigners 
within certain environments (such as children’s’ homes, universities, factories or 
regions), and have aided in the reconstruction of historical labour and social 
environments. Feige examines Vietnamese students and workers chiefly in the context 
of their surveillance at the hands of the Stasi.18 Uta Riichel has written two short but 
well-researched studies on the homes for Namibian and Mozambican children and 
teenagers in Beilin and StraBfurt,19 while Freytag examines the life stories of 
Vietnamese children who worked and studied in the GDR in the 1950s.20
15 Eva-Maria and Lothar Eisner, Zwischen N ationalism s und Internationalisms: iiber Auslander und 
Auslanderpolitik in der DDR, 1949-1990. Darstellung undDokumente, Rostock, 1994. This was the final 
book of many published by the couple on this topic.
16 Andreas Miiggenburg, Die auslandischen Vertragsarbeitnehmer in der ehemaligen DDR, Berlin, 1995.
17 Uli Sextro, Gestem gebraucht - heute abgeschoben: die innenpolitische Kontroverse um die 
Vertragsarbeiter der ehemaligen DDR, Dresden, 1996.
18 Michael Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten und Arbeiter in der DDR und ihre Beobachtung durch das 
MfS, Magdeburg, 1999.
19 Uta Riichel, ‘...auf deutsche sozialistisch zu denken... ’ -  Mosambikaner in der Schule der 
Freundschaft, Magdeburg, 2001, and ‘Wir hatten noch nie einen Schwarzen gesehen Das 
Zusammenleben von Deutschen undNamibiem rund um das SWAPO-Kinderheim Beilin, 1979-1990,
13
A considerable larger body of work exists on contract workers. In a book and a 
number of articles that have not attracted the attention they deserve, Riedel treats the 
experiences of the Algerian workers from a sociological perspective, which allows 
former workers narrate their own life stories. As she shows, many Algerians recall their 
East German past fondly.21 Rohr examines the experience of Polish transit and contract
99workers in the regions west of the Oder-NeiBe, Gruner-Domic has looked mainly at 
Cuban workers,23 while Schule has focused on the experiences of workers from Angola, 
Mozambique and Vietnam in a Leipzig textile plant.24 Budde has analysed in great 
detail the internal procedures drawn up by the Interior Ministry and the Deutsche 
Volkspolizei (DVP) which were explicitly designed to hinder binational marriages.25
While the first Bundestag Enquete Commission on the “appraisal” of GDR history 
heard no contributions on foreigners (an omission that reflected the general social 
marginalisation of foreigners in the East in the first few years after the Wende), three 
useful papers were submitted to the second Enquete hearings on “overcoming” the GDR 
past some years later. These covered the crude economic and political rationale that 
governed the labour exchanges and how this impacted on the workers, with Doring 
looking at the Mozambican example, Nguyen van Houng covering the Vietnamese case,
9 fkwhile Lindemann deals briefly with the Cuban experience.
Yet, despite these numerous detailed micro studies and monographs, the history of 
foreigners in the GDR awaits a detailed study. A number of overviews on contract
Schwerin, 2001. See also: Constance Kenna (ed.), Die DDR-Kinder’ von Namibia. Heimkehr in ein 
fremdes Land, Gottingen, 1999.
20 Miijam Freytag, Die ‘Moritzburger ’ in Vietnam: Lebenswege nach einem Schul- und 
Ausbildungsaufenthalt in der DDR. Vermitteln in interkulturellen Beziehungen, Frankfurt/M, 1998.
21 Almut Riedel, Erfahrungen algerischer Arbeitsmigranten in der DDR: ‘...batten ooch Chancen, 
ehrlich!’, Opladen, 1994, and “Doppelter Sozialstatus, spate Adoleszenz und Protest. Algerische 
Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR”, in: Kolner Zeitschriftfur Soziologie undSozialpsychologie 53:5 (2001), 
76-95.
22 Rita Rohr, Hoffnung. Hilfe. Heuchelei. Geschichte des Einsatzes polnischer Arbeitskrafte in Betrieben 
des DDR-Grenzbezirks Frankfurt/Oder 1966-1991, Berlin, 2001.
23 Sandra Gruner-Domic, Kubanische Arbeitsmigration in die DDR 1978-1989. Das Arbeitsabkommen 
Kuba-DDR und dessen Realisierung, Berlin, 1997.
24 Annegret Schule, ‘“ Proletarischer Intemationalismus’ oder ‘okonomischer Vorteil fUr die DDR’? 
Mosambikanische, angolanische und vietnamesische Arbeitskrafte im VEB Leipziger Baumwollspinnerei 
(1980-1989)”, in: Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte 42 (2002), 191-210. This volume o f the AfS also contains 
articles by R6hr and Gruner-Domid on their respective areas o f interest.
25 Heidrun Budde, Voyeure im Namen des Sozialismus. Ehe Ost-West nach 1972, Berlin, 1999.
26 Hans-Joachim Ddring, “Zur Politik der DDR gegeniiber der Dritten Welt am Beispiel von Athiopien 
und Mosambik unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der AuBenwirtschaftsbeziehungen”, 997-1168, 
Nguyen van Houng, “Die Politik der DDR gegeniiber Vietnam und den Vertragsarbeitem aus Vietnam 
sowie die Situation der Vietnamesen in Deutschland heute”, 1301-1363, and Hans Lindemann, “Die 
Politik der DDR gegeniiber der Dritten Welt am Beispiel von Kuba, Nicaragua und Angola sowie die 
Konsequenzen ftir das Verhaltnis der Bundesrepublik zu diesen Landem”, 1840-1965. All in: Deutscher 
Bundestag (ed.), Materialien der Enquete-Kommission ‘Uberwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im 
Prozefi der deutschen Einheit’, VIII/2, Baden-Baden, 1999.
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workers exist but are now dated, or are marred by a deficit of original research.27 The 
issue has yet to be incorporated into the broader social and economic history of the 
GDR and of the history of migration and foreigners’ experience in Germany. For 
example, the GDR is dealt with in a mere page and a half in Ulrich Herbert’s otherwise 
outstanding 442-page study of the history of foreigners in modem German society since 
1871.28
The Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn research group of the Potsdam Zentrum fur 
zeithistorische Forschung (ZZF) has attempted to place the subject under more scholarly 
analysis. While dealing with a much broader range of outsiders (such as post-war 
communist resettlers from the Sudentenland and adolescent youth), and contexts (such 
as foreigners’ policy in the early Soviet Union), the Fremd und Fremd-Sein in der DDR 
anthology is most disappointing in its coverage of foreigners in the GDR, with many of 
the contributions having already appeared elsewhere, often simultaneously. Kuck’s 
attempt at an historical overview of foreign contract labour contained no original 
research.30
The area has attracted little attention of English-speaking academics. A recent 
general study of ethnic minorities in 19th and 20th century Germany provides only a 
superficial overview, relying on post -Wende secondary material, as does an article 
dealing mainly with foreigners in the new Lander.31 Recently, the article’s author, Eva 
Kolinsky, and Mike Dennis have commenced a research project on the Vietnamese 
contract workers and a volume is planned.
While relying chiefly on original archival research, this thesis seeks to reappraise 
foreigners’ testimony contained but underutilised in existing secondary literature by 
applying the methodological and interpretative devices that have been employed so 
fruitfully in other spheres of GDR research. The greatest, but yet most problematic,
27 In the former case, Sandra Gruner-Domid has published three such articles, most recently 
“Beschaftigung statt Ausbildung. Auslandische Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen in der DDR (1961-1989)”, in: 
Jan Motte et al. (eds), 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik - 50 Jahre Einxvanderung. Nachkriegsgeschichte als 
Migrationsgeschichte, Frankfurt a.M., 1999, 215-40. Typifying the latter is Susanne Paul, “Inseldasein im 
fremden Land: der rechtliche und soziale Status der Arbeitsmigranten in der DDR”, in: Zeitschrift des 
Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat, 7 (1999), 59-67.
28 Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Auslanderpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, 
Gastarbeiter, Fliichtlinge, Miinchen, 2001.
29 Jan C. Behrends et al. (eds), Fremd und Fremd-Sein in der DDR. Zu historischen Ursachen der 
Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Ostdeutschland, Berlin, 2003. See contributions by Riichel (see fh. 19), Rohr (fh. 
22), and Schule (fh. 24).
30 Dennis Kuck, ‘“Fur den sozialistischen Aufbau ihrer Heimat’? Auslandische Vertragsarbeiter in der 
DDR”, in: ibid., 271-81.
31 Panikos Panayi, Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany. Jews, Gypsies,
Poles, Turks and Others, Harlow, 2000. Also Eva Kolinsky, “Multiculturalism in the making? Non- 
Germans and civil society in the new Lander”, in: German Politics 7:3 (1998), 192-214.
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source for reconstructing the historical experiences of foreigners in the GDR are the 
files generated by the numerous organs of the state, party, and mass organisations. This 
thesis is based on extensive research in the holdings of the Berlin Bundesarchiv, which 
includes relevant files of the GDR Interior Ministry (in particular the DVP), the State 
Secretariat (later Ministry) of Higher Education (SHF/MHF), and the State Secretariat 
for Labour and Wages (SAL). The associated SAPMO holdings were extensively 
consulted, including the SED Politburo, Central Committee and its departments (in 
particular the International Department, the Department of Planning and Finance, and 
the Science Department), the FDGB (including its academy, the Hochschule der 
deutschen Gewerkschaften or HSDG), and the FDJ. The holdings of the GDR Ministry 
of External Affairs (MfAA) were not consulted as these remain subject to the thirty year 
rule. This restriction is somewhat alleviated however by the copious copies of MfAA 
correspondence in the Bundesarchiv holdings.
Research was also undertaken in the Federal Commission for the Records of the 
State Security Service of the GDR (BStU) at Berlin of files emanating from the central 
Stasi archive as well as from the regional branches (.Aufienstellen). These consisted 
mainly of situation and yearly reports, operational files, as well as some reports 
submitted by East German and foreign unofficial informers on foreigners. They also 
included the dissertations on foreigners written by MfS trainee officers which are 
instructive in reconstructing the internal state perceptions of foreigners in the GDR. 
From 1965 to 1989, fifteen such theses dealing with a broad range of foreigner-related 
issues were submitted to the Humboldt University Berlin and later the MfS High School 
of Jurisprudence in Potsdam mainly by MfS officers with operational experience in 
monitoring foreigners.33
Generally, as these archival sources were written by functionaries, they reflect the 
heterogeneous range of East German perceptions of foreigners. As with all sources, they 
are tinted with bias, prejudice, and ignorance, resulting from an unquestioned 
ethnocentricity on the one hand and by the typical blinkered vanguardism and self- 
righteousness of all political systems based on all-encompassing ideologies on the other. 
Yet, subjective tints are not objective taints, and despite the obvious problems 
associated with such material, which apply to its use in any context, it represents the 
best available source for the critical and historical reconstruction of foreigners’ 
experience.
321 am indebted to Prof. Mike Dennis for sharing some o f the BStU material he has gathered with me.
33 A complete list is included at the end o f the bibliography.
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No systematic oral research (either with East Germans or foreigners) was carried 
out for this thesis as the intention of the thesis is to recreate historical contexts rather 
than to examine contemporary attitudes towards the past. In her research on Algerian 
contract workers, Riedel has shown that their retrospective interpretation of the GDR 
can vary immensely and does not always concur with the portrayals contained in some 
secondary literature. By and large, those who returned to Algeria before 1989 view the 
GDR in positive terms and believe that it represented a biographical highpoint in terms 
of employment, earnings, and social interaction. On the other hand, the opinions of 
those who remained in Germany after the Wende are largely dismissive of the GDR, 
which is contrasted negatively with the united Germany, their current domicile. Thus, 
present circumstance determines the level of retrospective reworking and blurring of 
any historical context.34 This also applies to the testimony of Mozambican workers 
interviewed by Scherzer in 2002 and their heterogeneous treatment of their GDR 
biographies reflects the broad diversity found among former East German citizens.35
The subject of foreigners in the GDR has been treated largely in isolation from 
broader historical, political, economic and social contexts. No sooner had the GDR 
collapsed a long debate on how to historicise East Germany began among historians, 
politicians and other commentators. This debate produced a number of theoretical and 
practical methodologies, which have been fruitfully applied in a wide variety of areas of 
historical writing on the GDR. As these have been documented elsewhere, this section 
will discuss those of particular relevance for the topic under consideration.36
Much of the existing literature subscribes (perhaps unwittingly) to the “de­
differentiated” societal modal developed by Sigrid Meuschel. Her one-dimensional and 
uncritical “power-theoretical analysis” (Lindenberger) purports that the SED succeeded 
in its aim of taking total control not only of the political and economic spheres, but that 
of society, destroying its various social sub-systems in the process. This analysis, 
which overdraws on official party commentaries and reports, sees the party as the sole 
historical protagonist, and suggests that the everyday social reality encapsulated the 
verbatim aims of its totalitarian architects. Preoccupied with and over reliant on official 
announcements and the terms of contract agreements and conditions in the workers’
34 Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus”, 79.
35 Scherzer, Die Fremden.
36 See Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation o f  the 
GDR, London, 2002, esp. chaps. 2 and 3.
37 Sigrid Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft. Zum Paradox von Stabilitat und Revolution in der 
DDR, Frankfurt a.M., 1992. As critiqued by Thomas Lindenberger in his “Die Diktatur der Grenzen. Zur 
Einleitung” in his edited volume Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Studien zur 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR, Koln, 1999, 13-44, here 16.
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hostels, one could challenge much of the existing literature on foreigners for 
overestimating the ability of the state to control foreigners’ lives and to determine their 
everyday behaviour.
Jessen has challenged the claim that there was a “shut down” of society in the GDR, 
proposing that society retained “relative autonomy” from official rule. As he argues, the 
SED had to accommodate to existing conditions, traditions, and milieus, and in pursuing 
its political goals actually produced unintended social phenomena. He proposed that the 
democratisation of society in 1989/90 be matched by the decentralisation and 
desegregation of perspectives which should lead the historian into the relative 
autonomous zones of everyday life in factories, rural districts, and even the 
bureaucracy, and to the realm of “individual and collective biographies of everyday
•> o
experience of working, shopping, living, and raising children”. His latter observation 
is certainly relevant in this context. The concept of a society “ruled through and 
through” (durchherrschte Gesellschaft), as advocated by Kocka, is more in line with 
Meuschel’s arguments and claims that all social processes in the GDR were in effect 
moulded by the power of the party but stops short of claiming that this relationship 
between state and society was total.39 With their “limits of dictatorship” model, Bessel 
and Jessen have conjured up an image of a border dispute between two clearly-defined
40territories.
This thesis tries to avoid such clear-cut divisions between rulers and ruled, but for 
convenience uses labels such as state, East German public, and foreigners throughout, 
while recognising and providing ample evidence that all groups were far more 
heterogeneous than these labels suggest. The approach of Alltagsgeschichte, or “the 
history of everyday life” as advanced by Ludtke, allows for a greater appreciation of the 
internal dynamics and social relations of foreigners.41 Foreigners are in many respects 
the “ordinary people” referred to by Ludtke, who have traditionally been excluded from 
mainstream historical writing owing to the fact that they left little behind in terms of 
traditional sources. They are similar to the dead generations, whose historical narratives 
exist only in “blurred or (numerous) encoded forms” such as reports written by the
38 Ralph Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus. Problem einer Sozialgeschichte der DDR”, in: 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 21:1 (1995), 96-110.
39 Jiirgen Kocka, “Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft”, in Hartmut Kaelbe et al. (eds), Sozialgeschichte der 
DDR, Stuttgart, 1994, 188-213.
40 Richard Bessel and Ralph Jessen, Die Grenzen der Diktatur: Staat und Gesellschaft in der SBZ/DDR, 
Gottingen, 1996.
41 See A lf Liidtke’s introduction “Was ist und wer treibt Alltagsgeschichte” in his edited volume 
Alltagsgeschichte. Zur Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen undLebensweisen, Frankfurt a.M., 1989, 
9-47, here 17.
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police, teachers and priests, as well as other external observers.42 Applying Ludtke’s 
arguments, party and police reports on the problems with foreigners in the GDR can be 
utilised for information on migrants’ experiences. Considering the dearth of accounts 
and narratives composed by foreigners as well as the fact that the vast majority of the 
GDR’s foreign residents no longer live in Germany, such decoding is essential to 
retrace a variety of details and singular facets of foreigners’ existence in the GDR.
A new methodological and theoretical approach developed by the ZZF project 
group Herrschaft and Eigen-Sinn, and outlined by the historian Thomas Lindenberger, 
advocates a move away from bipolar interpretative models focusing on the 
“unassailable mechanisms of control and repression” and grassroots autonomy, to an 
analysis of the reciprocal interdependence between rulers and the ruled43 This is 
possible he argues by modifying and combining the concepts of Herrschaft als soziale 
Praxis (authority as social praxis) and Liidtke’s idea of Eigen-Sinn or the “meaning and 
production of meaning in individual and collective behaviour in social relations”. This 
approach allows for the treatment of a wide range of behaviour, interaction and rule in 
the GDR without de-legitimising any, stretching to encompass “the overzealousness of 
the red-hot idealist”, opportunists, the outwardly loyal with inner reserve, through to 
“passive forms of refusal, dissidence, and resistance”.44 The approach recognises no 
clear division between historical subjects or objects, identifying the need to appreciate 
the agency of all historical protagonists, at both individual and collective levels, at all 
tiers of society 45 Thus, it rejects the notion that society in the GDR was reduced to “just 
a lingering rump”, pointing to the “persistence of vividness and bustle in social relations 
in the mundane social spheres”.46 Although the party had total claims, its authority was 
in effect the product of mutual interdependence and interaction between rulers and the 
ruled at all levels in society. Lindenberger’s dual approach, which he argues explains 
“the subjective dimension of the continual limitation of SED rule”,47 has clear 
advantages for the topic under examination. His rejection of a clear state/society divide 
would certainly make sense to many of the foreigners who lived in the GDR, especially 
as they encountered hostility from the arms of the state and sections of the population. 
Another major advantage of the synergic use of the two approaches is that it helps us to 
examine the complex role of GDR and foreign functionaries -  especially those at the
42 Ibid., 19f.
43 Lindenberger, “Die Diktatur der Grenzen”, 23.
44 Ibid., 23.
45 Ibid., 14.
46 Ibid., 36f.
47 Ibid., 18.
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lower organisational strata -  in interpreting, translating, and applying the directives and 
orders of their superiors. Foreign officials such as the factory supervisors, embassy 
officials, and even security officials, were in regular if not daily contact with foreign 
workers and students, as were their GDR counterparts, such as the hostel wardens, 
brigade leaders, factory managers, party and trade union secretaries, and police and state 
security officers. As was the experience in society in general, local conditions and the 
personal characters of office holders were instrumental in how rigorously state policy 
was implemented.
As social protagonists in their own right, possessing a particular set of individual 
and collective identities, the subjective dimension of foreigners’ experience deserves far 
more attention than it has been given. If it has been observed that the smallest units of 
society, such as family, personal relationships, rural communities and factory
48collectives, were capable of negotiating power and authority, then it is not beyond the 
realm of possibility that foreigners too with their distinct languages, cultures, and 
networks were similarly empowered. To what extent did foreigners attempt to protect 
their social realms from unwanted intrusion, and more importantly, how successful were 
they in this endeavour? If the broader population was empowered by a repertoire 
“power and control competences” owing to their intrinsic knowledge of the run of the 
invisible borders of behaviour in the state,49 it is relevant to ask how this applied to 
foreigners. While they may not have been at first au fait with the unwritten social and 
political rules and regulations of the GDR, foreigners may have relied on social skills 
and strategies acquired during their own particular socialisations and which they viewed 
as legitimate. At any rate, arriving in the GDR put foreigners on a learning curve. They 
could benefit from a transfer of experience from longer-serving contract workers or 
students, and like East Germans, they could model their “own living and working 
behaviour to compensate for the deficits of dictatorial social management” common in 
the GDR.50 As early as 1994 Riedel demonstrated this latter aspect with Algerian 
contract workers, highlighting how they resorted to conspicuous or ostentatious 
consumption and benefited from the perception that they possessed Western attributes 
to compensate for their relative low workplace status in the GDR.51 Indeed, Neubert’s 
description of GDR society as a “hotchpotch of social devices which had to be acquired 
in order to live and survive” must have been apparent to foreigners too, especially when
48 Ibid., 31.
49 Ibid., 31.
50 Ibid., 25.
51 Almut Riedel, Erfahrungen algerischer Arbeitsmigranten, 14-16.
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he argues that: “In his/her daily behavioural patterns and in the planning of one’s 
biography, it was incumbent on everyone to plumb the limits and possibilities of the 
socialist standards on offer.”52
The failure to feature foreigners as subjects in historical writing on the GDR is 
symptomatic of a much broader problem evident in traditional studies of migration and 
racism which, Bojadzijev argues, has failed to treat migrants “as protagonists of social 
struggle”. She attributes this to a perception that views minorities and migration as 
being essentially a problem for the indigenous or “host” society and which thus 
examines migration in the context of right-wing extremism, racism and xenophobia. 
This, she criticises, serves only to draw the “presence of migrants, their daily ways of 
life, their numbers or their external appearance and looks into a causal relationship with 
racism”.53 Echoing Ludtke, she attributes this to the paucity of conventional sources 
produced by the foreigners themselves (such as diaries, photos, newspapers and 
magazines), and she argues that greater flexibility is required in order to incorporate the 
subjective experiences of foreigners into the historical narrative. In the same journal, 
Schule (who has published on the experiences of contract workers in a Leipzig cotton 
mill) suggests that future research must afford foreigners the status of “subjects of social 
action” and should take greater account of their forms of resistance (Widerstandigkeit) 
in maintaining their own way of life, the circumvention of state-imposed guidelines, and 
open protest.54 While Schule’s proposals are welcome, they subscribe to the outdated 
view that there was a neat dichotomy between rulers and the ruled. In addition, a focus 
on forms of protest excludes those foreigners, who may, for whatever reason, have 
conformed to political conditions in East Germany. Any discussion on the everyday 
experience of foreigners should not confine itself to the heroics of resistance and 
opposition but must examine conformity. As Lindenberger points out, tension and 
conflict in GDR society was not always viewed by social protagonists as political.55
The structure of the thesis is in part chronological, in part thematic. The following 
chapter examines the legal position of foreigners in East Germany and identifies some 
of the historical continuities in East German police practice towards them. Chapters
52 Quoted in Lindenberger, “Die Diktatur der Grenzen”, 41.
5-1 Manuela Bojadzijev, “Antirassistischer Widerstand von Migrantinnen und Migranten in der 
Bundesrepublik: Fragen der Geschichtsschreibung”, in: 1999 Zeitschriftfur Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 
21. Jahrhunderts 17:1 (2002), 125-52, here 130 and 125.
54 The term was originally coined by Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk. See Annegret Schule, 
“Vertragsarbeiterinnen und -arbeiter in der DDR: ‘Gewahrleistung des Prinzips der Gleichhaltung und 
Nichtdiskriminierung’?”, in: 1999 Zeitschrift fur Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts 17:1 
(2002), 80-100, here 97-100.
55 Lindenberger, “Die Diktatur der Grenzen”, 28.
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three and four take a separate look at international students and contract workers and are 
thematic as they are chronological in approach. The former looks at students, focusing 
on the 1950s and 60s when they represented the main group of foreign residents living 
in the GDR on temporary residency permits. The latter, looks at contract workers in the 
final two decades of the GDR.
Chapter five looks at the general social and recreational experiences of international 
students and workers beyond the university and factory walls and addresses the types of 
recreational and avocational activity they engaged in. This is followed by chapter six 
which addresses the issue of contact and binational relationships between foreigners and 
East Germans, showing how these were confronted by official and public hostility. 
Chapter seven turns to the subject of racism in the GDR and how this affected the 
everyday lives of students and workers from the 1950s to the 1990s. Chapter eight, the 
conclusion, sums up the main arguments of the thesis, addressing these in some wider 
contexts.
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Chapter 2. Socialist law and immigration
In the immediate post-war period in the SBZ (Soviet Zone of Occupation), a number of 
traditions relating to foreigners were adopted by the new political order. On the one 
hand were the socialist and communist traditions. After 1945, these were in no way 
identical, with clear differences in approach and opinion existing among the new 
KPD/SED elite that was consolidating its power within the SBZ. Western communist 
emigres had spent their years in exile working closely with citizens of other countries, 
and this was especially the case with veterans of the Spanish Civil War. Emigrants to 
the Soviet Union, however, had experienced at first hand the bloody excesses of 
Stalinism where nationalist considerations overrode any ideological convictions. This 
resulted in the disbandment and liquidation of a number of communist parties. The 
Polish Communist Party serves as the most tragic example, but the KPD also fared 
terribly with many of its members falling victim to the terror. In addition, older German 
bureaucratic traditions in dealing with and perceiving foreigners seeped into the organs 
of the new state. What developed was an unusual mixing of Stalinist and traditional 
German values towards foreigners which was concealed behind the charade of 
proletarian internationalism proclaimed by the new state.
The change in attitudes of SED functionaries towards foreigners is easily 
discernible in the SED’s treatment of a group of Spanish political exiles during 1947/48. 
This saw the ideals of internationalism, nurtured during the Spanish Civil War and later 
in Western emigration, overcome by the cynical and distrustful perspective engendered 
in the Soviet Union of the 1930s. The post-war Spanish community in the SBZ was 
relatively small. Numbering about thirty people in total, most had fallen into Nazi hands 
after the fall of France in 1940, ending up as forced labourers in Germany, while some 
had made their own way to the SBZ after the war. By all accounts, their financial 
situation was precarious and most found it impossible to find employment. As former 
forced labourers, their previous “employers” had disowned them after the war fearing 
that their continued employment even on a legal and fair basis would provide enough 
evidence to the new authorities to confiscate their factories as part of the denazification 
programme.
Initially, the Spanish could rely on the help provided by some of their former 
German international brigade comrades. For example, Fritz Johne, appealed to the
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Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (VVN) in Sachsen-Anhalt in late 1947 for 
a more generous stance towards two Spaniards he knew on the grounds that: “In 
countries all over the world tens of thousands of German anti-fascists were political 
emigrants. And it was in Republican Spain that they enjoyed full civil rights and 
support.” Yet, alongside his desire to repay the Spanish for past favours, Johne wrote 
apprehensively that the Spanish could fall into the hands of the enemy if nothing was 
done to help them.1
Despite the best intentions of some former Spanish Civil War veterans, others were 
less sympathetic and far more suspicious. Within the SED an atmosphere of mistrust 
was developing which aimed to rid the party of perceived ideological opposition. The 
fact that Kurt Schwotzer, another KPD and Spanish Civil War veteran, was now the 
Central Committee functionary with responsibility for political immigrants did not 
auger well for foreign political refugees within the Zone. In November 1947, 
Schwotzer ordered the regional SED leaderships to provide information on the 
Spaniards living in their areas, detailing their wartime activities and why they failed to 
move to France in 1945 as requested by the Spanish government in exile. While the 
archival evidence is scant on the response to this directive, it is unlikely that the arrest 
of the members of the Leipzig-based Republican Espanol Delegation one month later 
(on the implausible charge of aiding the flight of German Nazis to fascist Spain by 
issuing forged passports) was mere coincidence.4
Both the deterioration of relations between the former Allies and Tito’s break with 
Stalin exacerbated an already precarious situation. Attending a meeting of the Spanish 
in July 1948 in his role as liaison officer for the immigrants, Johne had grown extremely 
cynical of his charges. “Among the Spanish emigration, clarity has to be achieved as 
soon as possible on who is really a reliable anti-fascist”, he argued, in order to separate 
them from “doubtful elements”. Unless they were allowed to integrate and provided 
with meaningful employment, he believed they would continue to derive money from
1 SAPMO-BArch, SgYl 1/V237/12/196, fo. 188. Johne to LV VVN Sachsen-Anhalt, 1 Nov. 1947.
2 Kurt Schwotzer (1897-19??). Under the nomme-de-guerre Karl Hess, he led the Effektivbiiro o f the 
International Brigades, attended officer school and later became cadre officer of the first battalion. In 
1936/37, he served as KPD Comintern secretary and as a member o f the party’s ‘Kleine Kommission’, 
played a significant role in the cleansing o f the KPD in the Soviet Union. Ironically, he was accused of 
having Trotskyist sympathies in the mid-1930s, when as manager of the Moscow ‘Club o f International 
Workers’, he allowed the critical views o f some Spanish workers go unchallenged during a meeting. See 
Schwotzer’s handwritten autobiographical notes: in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/1 l/v.2821. Also Herbst, 
Andreas et al. (eds), Die SED. Geschichte, Organisation, Politik. Ein Handbuch, Berlin, 1997, 1080.
3 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/1 l/v.2821, fo. 179. Schwotzer to SED Landerorganisationen, 28 Oct.
1947.
4 Ibid., fo. 103. n.d. [ca. Dec. 1947].
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“uncontrollable sources” and would invariably degenerate into “adventurers” or
“lumpen proletarians”.5
In February 1949, the SED undertook the final measures to separate the ideological
wheat from the chaff and ordered the dissolution of the existing representative body of
the Spanish exile community, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Spanische Emigration of the
VVN, and the incorporation of politically-reliable members into the party’s own
Spanish Aid Committee. The proponent of this plan (an unidentified member of the
SED’s western commission) added:
Insofar as we are dealing with suspect or unclear elements, I would suggest that they be investigated 
by the Interior Authority. The list o f screened Spanish emigrants in the SBZ is in our possession and 
could be provided to Comrade Fischer [of the Interior Authority] with some characteristics to aid 
him in his work.6
While the file on the Spanish ends there, the factors of SED policy on foreigners are 
discernible at this early stage. The political and ideological inheritance of the Soviet 
Union would play a major role in forming this policy. The police were entrusted with its 
traditional role of supervising and expelling unwanted foreigners. In terms of personnel, 
some of the individuals involved in dealing with the Spanish in 1947/48 remained in 
their posts for a considerable period. Schwotzer was responsible for foreign political 
immigrants, students and workers until his retirement in the early 1960s, while Fischer 
of the Interior Ministry (mentioned in the quotation above) remained the key figure 
within the Hauptabteilung PaB- und Meldewesen (HAPM), the immigration unit of the 
DVP, until the late 1980s.7
Yet, the fact that former refugees were now responsible for immigrants to the GDR 
did not mean there was unanimity of opinion. Tensions existed between the various 
state organs involved with foreigners. At times, the diplomatic interests of the MfAA 
and the political interests of the SED clashed with the security interests of the MfS, 
which did not always have the support of the DVP. These tensions can be found in the 
attitudes towards granting asylum to Algerian refugees (mainly from West Germany) in 
the late 1950s. On 14 November 1958, and with the authority of the GDR government, 
the MfAA (under former emigre Lothar Bolz) invited Algerians fleeing colonial 
oppression and to those suffering repression in West Germany to seek asylum in the 
GDR. The East Germans clearly wished to capitalise on the actions of the Bonn
5 Ibid., fo. 263. F. Johne, "Sonderbericht iiber die Tagung spanischer Emigranten . . .“, n.d. [ca. 18 July 
1948],
6 Ibid., fo. 301. Westdeutsche Kommission to Dahlem, 15 Feb. 1949.
7 BArch, DO 1/11/1610, fos. 32, 72, 79, 88, 98. Gunter Fischer, (1924-). Joined the DVP on 1 July 1945, 
SED 1 May 1949. Around 1951 he was made head o f the Abt. PaB- und Meldewesen. In 1958 promoted 
to the rank of Oberst and head of the HAPM.
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government, which in support of French policy, had launched a crackdown on the 
Algerian independence movement, arresting and deporting a number of Algerian 
student activists.
By the end of the year, 87 Algerians (including 52 students) had responded to the 
East German appeal. The students were sent directly to Leipzig by the SHF, incensing 
the HAPM. The latter felt they should have been “cleared”, possibly meaning that they 
should have been processed at the Mdl reception camp for refugees at Furstenwalde, 
where the other Algerians had been taken. Both the HAPM and the Central 
Committee’s International Department (under former emigre Grete Keilson)8 were in 
favour of granting asylum to suitable Algerians applicants. However, another former 
emigre, Erich Mielke, then just over a year in his position as minister for state security, 
was of the firm opinion (which went unheeded) that all Algerians be deported back to 
West Germany.9
The legal basis for the GDR’s laws on foreigners initially rested on the 
Auslanderpolizeiverordnung (1938), later the Auslanderverordnung (1956), and finally 
the Auslandergesetz (1979). However, the latter two were incredibly vague in their 
remit and ostentatiously gave the impression that GDR law resembled that of other 
European states. Yet, as was characteristic for the GDR, these pieces of legislation were 
supplemented by a raft of meticulously detailed classified ordinance issued by the 
police (DVP) and state security (MfS). Despite the importance of law in determining the 
legal position of foreigners in all states, the existing literature has failed to deal with this 
aspect in any great detail.10 Heidemarie Beyer’s article on the development of 
foreigners’ law in the GDR is an exception and it stresses that many of the rights 
afforded to foreigners in legislation were all but contradicted by the terms of the 
contract labour agreements.11 Her analysis requires re-evaluation for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, while she discusses the importance of Soviet legislation, she fails to 
mention the German traditions that shaped GDR theory and practice. Secondly, 
although she acknowledges that the vague public legislation was supported by internal,
8 A KPD member since 1925, Keilson was in exile in France and the Soviet Union during the Nazi 
dictatorship.
9 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/355, fo. 11. Memo of the Abt. fur Kaderfragen, 31 Dec. 1958.
10 Shortly after the Wende, two articles appeared discussing the legal position o f contract workers. See 
Hanns ThomS-Venske, “Notizen zur Situation der Auslander in der DDR”, in: Zeitschriftfur 
Auslanderrecht und Auslanderpolitik 10:3 (1990), 125-31 and Eva-Maria Eisner’s more apologetic, “Zur 
Rechtsstellung der auslandischen ArbeitskrSfte in der DDR”, in: Zeitschrift fur Auslanderrecht und 
Auslanderpolitik 10:4 (1990), 157-62.
11 Heidemarie Beyer, “Entwicklung des Auslanderrechts in der DDR”, in: Heftier, Manfred (ed.),
Zwischen Nationalstaat und multikultureller Gesellschaft. Einwanderung und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin, 1993, 211-29.
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unpublished directives she offers no examination of their content. Thirdly, she tends to 
take the totalitarian aims of the party as verbatim. This and future chapters will show 
the practical impossibility of totally controlling all aspects of foreigners’ existence 
completely, due to both the human weaknesses of the system and also the power of 
foreigners as social individuals.
1945 did not see either the abolition or suspension of the existing German legal 
system, which had been extensively Nazified under the twelve years of Hitler’s rule. 
There was a desire among the Allies for continuity and a reluctance to nullify all post- 
1933 legislation and thereby return to the norms of the Weimar Republic. Laws of a 
clearly fascist nature were excised, while others not exclusively national-socialist in 
character were purged of Nazi terminology and were no longer applied in the spirit 
intended by their authors. In the SBZ/GDR, a number of laws enacted after 1933 were 
retained in a modified form as they were considered to contain “fascist ideas” only in 
part. As Hilde Benjamin ominously pointed out, this applied to “parts of criminal and 
civil law as well as certain regulations on the simplification of the legal process, which 
was the result of earlier liberal and progressive reforms”, and to modified legislation
1 9that was required to “protect the democratic construction”, if only provisionally.
Foreigners’ legislation was one such area. While Beyer argues that socialist systems 
were naturally mistrustful of legislation that distinguished foreigners from native 
citizens on the grounds that the concept of a special legal status for foreigners was 
ultimately a product of 19th century bourgeois conceptions,13 the readiness of the GDR 
to retain Nazi legislation on foreigners discounts this view.
Until 1954, the DVP operated on the basis of the Auslanderpolizeiverordnung 
(APVO, or Aliens Police Regulation), which was one of several measures undertaken 
by the Nazis to centralise and standardise police control of foreigners within Germany.14 
The August 1938 legislation represented a further tightening of an already centralised 
and bureaucratic system responsible for all aspects of emigration, in particular economic 
migration, which was already in place when the Nazis came to power in 1933.15
The APVO stipulated that residency permits should only be issued to foreigners 
whose “personalities” guaranteed that the “hospitality” of the German state would be 
respected, and furthermore that the permits could be withdrawn at any time at the sole
12 Hilde Benjamin et al., Zur Geschichte der Rechtspflege der DDR. 1945-1949, Berlin, 1976, 190f.
13 Beyer, “Entwicklung”, 213.
14 Auslanderpolizeiverordnung (APVO) o f 22 Aug. 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938/1, 1053-56.
15 Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Auslanderpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, 
Gastarbeiter, Fliichtlinge, Miinchen, 2001, 126.
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discretion of the police.16 It highlighted nine categories of foreigner whose presence in 
the Reich was to be prevented. It is important to list the categories here, as similar 
categories repeatedly surfaced in subsequent internal DVP and MfS documents, albeit 
minus the national socialist vocabulary. The APVO gave Kreis police authorities the 
power to exclude or deport persons:
- whose behaviour endangered the interests o f the national community [ Volksgemeinschaft] ;
- involved in activities abroad which would result in criminal conviction in a German court;
- committed to detention in an institution of any kind either in Germany or abroad, and those ordered
to be castrated;
- guilty o f transgressions o f customs, tax, monopoly or currency laws;
- guilty o f breaking the terms o f work contracts in Germany;
- guilty o f transgressing any o f the regulations o f the aliens police or registration authorities;
- who make false declarations about his person, family, language, citizenship, racial categorisation,
job or financial position to any state body;
- fitting the category o f vagrants, tramps, Gypsies or other travellers, and prostitutes;
- unable to guarantee the adequate financial upkeep for themselves or their families.17
While the APVO was only formerly repealed in the GDR in 1954, its exclusionary 
spirit and wording lived on with remarkable consistency in subsequent internal DVP
1 ftand MfS orders and regulations. In the mid-1960s, a draft police regulation on the 
“admission, registration and surveillance of foreigners” contained many of the same 
categories as the APVO, referring to the physically and mentally ill, “asocial elements 
(vagrants, beggars, prostitutes etc)”, and those unlikely to “pursue regular work”.19 
Secret ordinance issued in 1977 and 1979 specified particular categories of foreigner 
who were to be prevented by police from taking up residence in the GDR, namely:
- those hostile to socialist society or unable to adapt to it;
- the mentally or seriously physically ill;
- those o f advanced age, incapacitation and without family or friends prepared to provide care and
assistance;
- or any other cases where societal or state interests are against permanent residence.20
The retention of the APVO on the East German statute books was not simply a 
formality but served as the basis for everyday dealings between the police and 
foreigners in the new state. Unlike other policy areas such as administration, political 
organisation, education and industrial planning, the operations of the HAPM did not
16 §§ 1 and 9 of the APVO.
17 §5 o f the 1938 APVO. §7 (5) allowed for ‘deportation custody’ which has remained a controversial 
element in German law to the present day.
18 In the FRG, the APVO remained on the statute books until 1965. See Karin SchonwSlder, ‘“ 1st nur 
Liberalisierung Fortschritt?’ Zur Entstehung des ersten Auslandergesetztes der Bundesrepublik”, in: Jan 
Motte et al., 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik. 50Jahre Einwanderung. Nachkriegsgeschichte als 
Migrationsgeschichte, Frankfurt a.M., 1999, 127-44.
19 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27730. Art. 3.13 o f a draft Dienstvorschrift tiber die Aufhahme, die Erfassung und 
Kontrolle von AuslSndem, n.d. [ca. 1962/3].
20 Sec. 3.2.2 o f DV 041/77 and DV 041/79 des Ministers des Innem und Chef der DVP. Cited in Patrice 
Poutrus, “Mit strengem Blick. Die sogenannten Polit. Emigranten in den Berichten des MfS”, in: Jan. C. 
Behrends et al. (eds), Fremd und Fremd-Sein in der DDR. Zu historischen Ursachen der 
Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Ostdeutschland, Berlin, 2003, 231-50, here 239f.
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require Sovietisation -  existing traditions were suited to the needs of the new socialist 
state. Indeed, the retention of NS police policy towards foreigners (albeit in a modified 
version) is an example of legislative and procedural continuity in a police force that in 
personal and organisational terms represented an almost unique break with the Nazi 
past.21
Indeed, the first head of the Interior Ministry department responsible for foreigners, 
Erich Lust, was a key figure in re-establishing old police practice towards foreigners in 
the SBZ and the GDR. Bom in 1910, Lust had not been a member of a political party 
before 1933. A qualified lawyer, he was employed in this capacity at the DVI from 
1946, joining the SED in 1947. On January 1, 1949 he was appointed head of the 
administrative police ( Verwaltungspolizei), the forerunner of the Hauptabteilung Pafi-
und Meldewesen (HAPM) or Passport and Registration Branch of the DVP, the main
22task of which was the surveillance and registration of foreigners and stateless persons. 
The cadre department of the Mdl noted his professional competence, but also his 
shallow political knowledge, his suspicion of “new working methods”, his inclination 
towards a “false humanism” and a lack of the “necessary toughness” required for his 
position.23 Yet, this weakness or lack of resolve cannot be detected in the role he played 
in the campaigns against the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the early 1950s.24 Indeed, in June 
1949 Lust forwarded proposals to the SMAD calling for the expulsion within three 
months of all foreigners and displaced persons residing in the SBZ without any formal 
authorisation. As mass deportations failed to materialise, it is likely that the Soviets 
ignored his plan.25
A training manual, published in September 1951, features as the first mission 
statement of the HAPM.26 This document claimed that foreigners were not defenceless 
and without rights, but enjoyed the protection of the state as long as they obeyed the 
law, which was in effect an affirmation of the hospitality principle contained in the
21 As Thomas Lindenberger points out, the DVP represents one o f the “rare experiments in history” to 
construct a police force with people “totally unfamiliar with its work”. “Die Deutsche Volkspolizei 
(1945-1990)”, in: Torsten Diedrich et al. (eds), Im Dienste der Partei. Handbuch der bewqffheten Organe 
der DDR, Berlin, 1998, 97-152, here lOOf.
22 Pafi- und Meldewesen was originally a Referat in the Abt. Verwaltungspolizei. By January 1951, it had 
been elevated to the status o f a main department or Hauptabteilung.
23 BArch, DO 1/11/1610, fos. 61-64. Aufstellung der Chefinspekteure der HVDVP, 23 Jan. 1951. Quoted 
in Thomas Lindenberger, Volkspolizei. Herrschaftspraxis und djfentliche Ordnung im SED-Staat 1952- 
1968, Koln, 2003, 216. Lindenberger adds that Lust was “professionally competent yet unsatisfactorily 
qualified in political and social terms”.
24 See Hans-Hermann Dirksen, ‘“Keine Gnade den Feinden unserer Republik’. Die Verfolgung der 
Zeugen Jehovas in der SBZJDDR 1945-1990, Berlin, 2001, esp. 193, 210, and 233f.
25 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27870, bundle 1. Lust, Zur Losung der Frage der Staatenlosen und Auslander in der 
SBZ (Entwurf), 28 June 1949.
26 Hauptverwaltung der DVP, Das Auslanderwesen. Das Ausweiswesen, Berlin, 1951, 3 and passim.
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APVO. The manual confirmed many of the clauses of the APVO, such as the right of 
the police to prevent particular people from entering and taking up residence in the 
GDR, and to take any foreigner into unlimited custody pending deportation without a 
warrant. Deportation custody remained on the East German statute books until 1979, 
but continued in practice until 1989. In addition, the manual sought to clarify who the 
enemy was in the new Cold War order.27 In the post-war scenario that was divided into 
the “peace camp” and the “warmongers”, the HAPM manual sought to differentiate 
between foreigners from the East and West. It deemed Eastern European citizens 
reluctant to return to their homelands as a threat to the GDR, stressing that the “enemies 
of people’s democratic regimes are simultaneously enemies of the antifascist- 
democratic order of the GDR”. Just as dangerous for the security of the state were the 
citizens of Western states who could be used for espionage and sabotage efforts in the 
GDR. Evidence that aliens’ policy was now going to be closely linked to the political 
demands of the state was the singling out of former Yugoslav citizens with relatives still 
living in Yugoslavia, whom the manual feared were being used by the “Tito gang” to 
pursue criminal acts.28
Interestingly, the manual sought to provide a new legal definition of a foreigner and 
included clear instructions on how to deal with particular types of foreigners, such as 
dual citizenship holders and stateless persons. Although it reminded police officers that 
the citizenship law or Staatsangehdrigkeitsgesetz of 1913 (constructed on the blood 
principle of jus sanguinis) was still in force, it attempted to draw distinctions between 
nationality and citizenship, with Stalin’s definition of nationhood accepted as the basis 
for GDR practice:
A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis o f a common 
language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.29
This definition notwithstanding, the manual stressed that flexibility was required in 
defining someone’s nationality. It claimed for example that German nationality could be 
awarded to the children of Italian or French parents living in Germany for years and 
who had “lost all contact with their former nation”.30
The surveillance and registration of foreigners was also covered by the manual. In 
the GDR, the bureaucratic apparatus laid down by the APVO was centralised and the 
police at Kreis level were stripped of much of their autonomy to rule on residency
21 Ibid , 12-16.
2* Ibid , 3.
29 “Marxismus und nationale Frage”, in J.W. Stalin, Werke, vol. 2, Berlin, 1950, 266-333, here 272. 
Quoted in: Hauptverwaltung der DVP, Das Auslanderwesen, 8.
30 Ibid , 8.
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issues.31 This not only allowed for greater state control of the movements of foreigners, 
but also undoubtedly allowed for a more rigorous application of political and 
ideological agendas. Police at Kreis level were responsible for the initial processing of 
residency permit applications, which could only be granted with the authorisation of the 
HAPM in Berlin. Every Kreis police station was also required to maintain a detailed 
register of all foreigners and stateless persons living in their districts, as well as a more 
detailed Auslanderakte for each individual foreigner. As the HAPM training manual 
stressed: “In order to provide a comprehensive overview of the person, this file must 
serve as a dossier of all correspondence relating to him” as well as contain details on his 
“reputation, friends, and behaviour”.32 The police were expected to compile these 
character assessments by means of routine surveillance checks in the foreigner’s 
neighbourhood and workplace.33
The enactment of the 1954 Pafi-Gesetz (Passport Law) finally repealed the APVO 
in its entirety in the GDR.34 This new law was primarily designed to restrict movement 
between the two German states by compelling travellers to present passports and visas 
at the German-German border. Significantly, it did not include any details on how 
foreigners were to apply for residency or on whether the police had a duty to register 
them or to keep them under surveillance. In fact, the law only stated that foreigners who 
entered or planned to leave the GDR illegally could be expelled. Indeed, the DVP was 
quick to complain that a legal vacuum had been created, with police chief and interior 
minister Karl Maron claiming that this represented a considerable threat to the GDR. 
Maron, himself a wartime emigrant to Denmark and the USSR, believed that the repeal 
of the APVO had left the police powerless in the face of the increasing numbers of 
foreigners entering the GDR, many of them taking up residency without any formal 
police approval. He demanded that the DVP be restored with the traditional police 
powers over foreigners, especially the authority to expel undesirables “whose
^ c
personalities offer no guarantee that the principles of the constitution will be upheld”.
31 Verordnung iiber die Ausgabe einheitlicher Personalausweise an die Bevolkerung der SBZ of 18 Nov. 
1948, Zentralverordnungsblatt 1948/1, 548-50, and the accompanying Durchfiihrungsverordnung of 1 
Dec. 1948, ibid., 554-56. The subsequent internal DVP Order 142/50 built on this and stated that the 
decision to grant residency permits for foreigners or stateless persons was the responsibility o f the 
regional police authorities (Landesbehorden der DVP) but required the authorisation o f the HAPM. 
Hauptverwaltung der DVP, Das Auslanderwesen, 10 and 16.
32 Hauptverwaltung der DVP, Das Auslanderwesen, 13.
33 Ibid , 11.
34 Pafi-Gesetz der DDR o f 15 Sept. 1954, GBl. 1954/1, 786. §11 (2) (e) stipulated that the 1937 APVO 
was being replaced.
35 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27730. Karl Maron, Vorlage fur den Ministerrat, 13 June 1956.
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The result of Maron’s efforts was the 1956 Auslanderverordnung (AusVO, or 
Aliens Order), which reequipped the police with the arbitrary powers it enjoyed under 
the APVO, including the authority to take foreign nationals into deportation custody 
without a court warrant.36 Foreigners, now defined as those without German citizenship, 
were once again required to formally apply for permits if they wished to reside in the 
GDR. The order claimed foreigners could enjoy equality with German citizens if they 
respected the constitution and “socialist legality”. Yet, it empowered police the right to 
cancel any residency permit, to impose restrictions on the freedom of movement of 
foreign residents, and to arbitrarily extend these measures to their family members. 
Under the terms of the order, foreigners could have their permits summarily revoked if 
they left the state permanently or illegally or if they were found guilty of any crime or 
offence in the GDR or abroad including, most importantly, transgressions of the GDR’s 
currency, registration and identification regulations.
In 1979, the SED state revised its foreigner legislation for the last time, 
ostentatiously in order to bring its laws in line with international standards. The 
background to this law illustrates the attitudes towards foreigners held by the party, 
police, and political elite. Clearly motivated to increase the authority of the state rather 
than to enhance the legal standing of foreign residents, the Politburo ordered the state 
security organs and the MfAA to review existing legislation in late 1978. As a 
representative of the Central Committee’s Department for State and Law remarked, the 
Politburo wished to see a strengthening of “socialist law” regarding foreigners and 
“effective measures taken to combat the malevolence [and] hostile conduct of foreigners 
in the GDR and the negative behaviour of GDR citizens abroad”.38 During the spring of 
1979, the interior, justice, foreign and state security ministries as well as the Central 
Committee’s Department for State and Law and Security Department drafted the new 
law. That text was presented to the SED Secretariat in early June, but only after 
Honecker gave his prior approval. The wording of the document reflected the policy of 
the SED to remove all references to a German nationality. Where foreigners were once
- IQ
defined as non-Germans, they were now “non-holders of GDR citizenship”, which in 
effect advanced West Germans from de facto to de jure foreigners.
36 Verordnung iiber den Aufenthalt von Auslandem im Gebiet der DDR, 14 Dec. 1956, GBl. 1957/1, 1-2.
37 Gesetz iiber die Gewahrung des Aufenthaltes fur Auslander in der DDR and the accompanying 
Anordnung iiber den Aufenthalt von Auslandem in der DDR of 28 June 1979. GBI. 1979/1, 149f. & 154.
38 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41611. Fischer, notes on a meeting in the Abt. Sicherheitsfragen des ZK der SED, 18 
Apr. 1979.
39 §1 of the 1956 Verordnung and §2 o f the 1979 foreigners’ law.
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As was the intention, the new law resembled legislation in other Eastern and 
Western European states. The exclusive power of the police to deport foreigners was 
abolished and the police were now obliged to seek court orders before taking someone 
into deportation custody. The law granted foreigners awaiting deportation the right to 
appeal the decision to a higher court. However, in reality, little changed. Indeed, 
officials in the Justice Ministry were between two minds on whether foreigners destined 
for deportation were even entitled to legal representation. Some officials argued that 
because such cases were of a “special character” involving an “administrative measure” 
and not a criminal procedure, this made the presence of a solicitor at the deportation 
hearing unnecessary.40 Thus, while the law was drafted to give the impression to the 
outside world that the GDR adhered to international conventions, it effectively 
strengthened the arbitrary powers of the state.
The Volkskammer approved the law unanimously with no debate on June 28, 1979. 
Only its constitutional and legal affairs committee was afforded the chance to discuss 
the document at a closed sitting three days previously which was also attended by the 
heads of the HAPM. Describing the new law as an “excellent and benevolent” piece of 
legislation and one in which the deportation procedure met the terms of international 
conventions, Prof. Dr. Poppe (KB and SED) expressed delight that the all-German 
“language of fantasy” (Fabukular) of the previous aliens’ legislation had been 
eradicated. Indeed, his only criticism was that the law, which in paragraph four stated 
that non-nationals enjoyed the same rights as GDR citizens, was too generous when 
compared to international treaties. Dr. Giel of the HAPM responded that this was not 
the case, pointing out that the paragraph in question represented basic principles and 
would be made more precise in special legislation,41 undoubtedly a reference to the 
internal DVP regulation (Dienstvorschrift 041/79) that was issued less than two weeks 
later to accompany the new law.
The legislation relating to foreigners in the GDR was vague in its remit and 
therefore offered the police extensive powers over non-nationals. Yet, police 
involvement with foreigners did not just end at the registration stage or the issuing of 
residence permits. Rather, the DVP, and increasingly the MfS, attempted to construct a 
comprehensive network of surveillance and supervision. While this apparatus never 
achieved the efficiency intended by its operators, it is important to describe both the
40 The official claimed this procedure was permitted under §4 (1) o f the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz o f 27 
Sept. 1974, GBl. 1974/1,457.
41 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41611. Fischer, notes o f meeting o f Verfassungs- und Rechtsausschusses der 
Volkskammer on 25 June 1979.
33
attempts undertaken to monitor foreigners and the rationale used to justify these 
measures. This requires an analysis of the secret ordinance on Auslanderkontrolle 
issued by these organs, which were far more representative of official thinking on 
immigration than the laws discussed above. An internal directive brought in to 
accompany the 1956 Auslanderverordnung confirmed the key role of the HAPM in the 
“permanent control of foreigners residing in the GDR”.42 Foreigners were viewed in 
extreme terms: either as guests worthy of state protection or as essentially dissident 
elements, capable of undermining the efforts of the “working people of the GDR” to 
construct socialism. The text argued (and no doubt exaggerated) that in “hundreds of 
cases” they had participated in the “subversive activities” of the enemy. Thus, HAPM 
officers were instructed to “focus on operational work and to take preventative action in 
the struggle against crime by organising circumspect, well-organised investigative work 
to protect the GDR in the area of immigration”.43
The bureaucratic device upon which the surveillance of foreigners rested was the 
foreigners’ file or Auslanderpersonalakte, which was to be “opened for every foreigner 
in possession of a residency permit or registered stateless individual regardless of 
whether his period of stay is caused by professional or private reasons”. If a foreigner 
moved to another district in the state, the local police forwarded his file to their 
counterparts at his new address. The file was to contain not only information on the 
individual concerned but also on his family and relations and was to be supplemented 
by regular reports or Ermittlungsberichte compiled by the ABVs (or local police 
plenipotentiaries) in the districts where foreigners resided 44 While most information 
could be gathered from normal police work -  such as applications to travel to the West 
or incident reports -  the DVP realised that broader social support was needed to 
enhance the files. Thus, HAPM officers relied heavily on the eyes and ears of the ABVs 
who, from as early as 1954, were involved in compiling and filing “character 
assessments” on all foreigners residing in their precincts 45 The frequency of reporting 
varied -  half-yearly for foreigners from non-socialist countries, and yearly for citizens 
of the socialist bloc as well as stateless persons 46 The ABVs usually obtained their
42 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27730. Instruktion Nr. 1 des Leiters der HAPM zum Befehl des Chefs der DVP Nr. 
/57, n.d. [ca. Apr. 1957].
45 Ibid., If.
44 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27730. Instruktion Nr. 1, n.d. [ca. Apr. 1957], 5.
45 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27870. VPKA Bautzen to HAPM, 16 Feb. 1957.
46 BArch, DO 1/8.0/32546. This procedure was set out in police Dienstvorschrift IX/2 o f 1 Mar. 1965. In 
1979 the requirement to file reports on citizens from socialist countries was dropped.
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information from the neighbours and friends of foreigners, as well as factory managers,
local government officials and party functionaries who knew them.
As the number of foreigners rose throughout the 1960s and 1970s the procedure of
maintaining individual files on foreigners and compiling regular reports on them came
under strain. A conference of police immigration officials from across the GDR held in
May 1978 discussed some of the problems in maintaining such an extensive web of
surveillance, indicating that executing regulations was always more difficult than
formulating them. Clearly, the regulations were overambitious and not taken seriously
by all police officers. As an officer from the BDVP Frankfurt/Oder explained in detail,
the police were expected to gather a considerable amount of information on foreigners
under the following headings:
Personal details; details o f jobs and workplace (when commenced, entrusted with which duties, 
whether carried out, level o f access to confidential material, quality o f the work); societal behaviour 
and political attitudes, members and functionaries of which organisations? Expression o f political 
attitudes (involvement in factory, residential area), reactions to political events, discussions on local 
and societal problems or disinterest as the case may be; intelligence level; associates; schooling, 
qualifications, recreational interests; way of life, family situation, alcohol; relationship with spouse; 
raising o f children; Are there family problems which can be traced back to these? Information on 
possessions and income (car, valuable industry products, bungalows or house owner), where are 
these located? Has the person possession o f hard currency, information on purchases at Intershops? 
Does expenditure correspond to available income? Expertise such as foreign languages, wireless 
operator, flying license; existence o f contacts with other foreigners or citizens o f the GDR 
(befriended with whom, personal details); maintenance of socialist law and morals, work ethic, work 
discipline; details on travel, departures and arrivals as well as trips within the GDR; cause and 
reasons for regular absence from domicile; contacts with native embassy, evidence o f visits to 
embassy; have diplomatic vehicles been observed in the residential area? Maintenance o f validity 
and timely extension o f long or short-term residency permit; behavioural attitudes during contact 
with state organs o f the GDR, including the security organs; important findings beyond these targets, 
criminal offences and other legal infringements.
Yet, the same officer had to admit that successful implementation of this police duty 
floundered on the disinterest of his subordinates, arguing that only “permanent and 
precise ideological work” could guarantee against the widespread “underestimation of 
the monitoring of foreigners”.47 Other areas reported similar trends. Officers from the 
VPKA and BDVP Erfurt pointed out that many police officers produced routine reports 
that were of “minor significance”. Another problem was the frequency at which 
foreigners changed address, as well the frequent turnover of ABV personnel, which 
prevented consistent surveillance 48 In an effort to hammer home the importance of
47 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41619. BDVP Frankfurt, Diskussionsbeitrag zum Erfahrungsaustausch iiber die 
Kontrolle von Auslandem am 4. Mai 1978, 5f.
48 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41619. VPKA and BDVP Erfurt, Diskussionsbeitrage zum Erfahrungsaustausch iiber 
die Kontrolle von Auslandem am 4. Mai 1978.
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maintaining the regulations, a senior HAPM officer reminded the meeting that: “Every 
file is an individual -  a personality.”49
In addition to the individual files on foreigners kept by local police, card indexes of 
all foreigners were maintained in the relevant central, regional and county police 
headquarters.50 This index was mechanised in the 1960s by the introduction of a card 
punching system. By the 1980s, the central register of foreigners residing in the GDR 
(and maintained by the BPAA) contained over 100,000 entries, as well as 300,000 
additional names in a secondary register. Each week, the security organs (including 
MfS, police and customs) made an average of 60 requests for information from this 
database.51
In the 1970s, the state’s language towards foreigners sharpened, reflected not only 
in public laws but also in the internal ordinance issued by the minister of the interior 
and DVP chief. Regulation 041/79 aimed to guarantee the “uniform organisation of the 
regime governing aliens”. A document of considerable length, it resembled the APVO 
in that it specified certain groups that were to be excluded from the GDR. Budde’s 
assertion that the regulation granted foreigners a certain level of equality in that they 
were “with certainty placed under the same levels of surveillance if not more than GDR 
citizens” is somewhat misleading as the new regulation abolished the requirement for 
the police to maintain files and compile character reports on foreigners from socialist 
countries. Yet, the order instructed the police to keep all other foreigners “under 
permanent supervision” at all times, exempting only the elderly, infirmed and those who 
were considered to be of a genuinely loyal disposition towards the state.
By the mid-1970s, the GDR was recognised by over 100 countries, had joined the 
UN, had by and large normalised its relations with the Federal Republic, and had signed 
up to the Helsinki Declaration on human rights. In its desire to develop its international 
profile, the GDR sought to attract more foreign visitors to the country. The numbers of 
foreign students and trainees increased, as did the numbers of tourists from the West 
and East. In addition, with labour exchange agreements in operation with Hungary, 
Poland and Algeria, foreign contract workers became a permanent feature in most 
industrial towns and cities during the 1970s. The MfS liked to praise the GDR as a
49 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41619. GrundsStzliche Bemerkungen zum Abschlufl des Erfahrungsaustausches, n.d. 
[ca. 4 May 1978].
50 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27730. Instruktion Nr. 1 des Leiters der HAPM zum Befehl des Chefs der DVP Nr.
/57, n.d. [ca. Apr. 1957], 5-8.
51 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41619. Fiihrung der Zentralkartei iiber Auslander im BPAA, 22 May 1984.
52 Heidrun Budde, Voyeure, 36ff. Appendix five o f Dientsvorschrift 041/79 defined the eleven socialist 
countries as: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the 
USSR, Vietnam and Yugoslavia.
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generous provider of hospitality, a host of international meetings, an esteemed foreign- 
trade partner, as well as being a “cosmopolitan cultural and sporting attraction” for ever-
53increasing numbers of visitors and students.
It was not until the 1970s that the MfS took a major role in the surveillance of 
foreigners. Arguably, there was little need for it to do so earlier, given the existence and 
work of the HAPM. Apart from some hints of operational rivalry over the surveillance 
of Western military deserters in Bautzen in the mid-1950s,54 cooperation between both 
agencies was always close knit. Indeed, from 1957 to 1960, a critical phase in the 
development of foreigner policy in the GDR owing to the increase in the numbers of 
foreign students, trainees and refugees, an MfS general was seconded as deputy head of 
the HAPM.55 As an MfS officer gratefully acknowledged in 1984, the HAPM provided 
a constant supply of information that the MfS otherwise could only obtain “through 
considerable political-operational effort”.56
As Gieseke demonstrates, the relative opening up of the GDR in the 1970s fuelled 
the perennial paranoia of an organisation which believed that the more open and 
accepted the GDR became the more perverse and clandestine the activities of the
cn
Western intelligence services would develop. Political terror and open oppression,
already in decline since the construction of the Berlin Wall, was dropped in favour of
more covert forms of political control and surveillance. This tendency is clearly
illustrated by the increased interest of the MfS in foreigners living in the GDR, typified
in Mielke’s introduction to Order 3/81 on the surveillance of foreigners:
Imperialist secret services and other hostile centres as well as anti-detente powers attempt to abuse 
the increasing number o f foreigners residing in the GDR to organise subversive activities which 
target the GDR and the other socialist states as well as the GDR’s relations with non-socialist 
countries.58
The interest of the MfS in foreigners changed in emphasis over time, moving from 
the political, to the economic, to the comprehensive. In the 1950s and 1960s, its remit
53 See BStU, ZA, BdL, 5566. E. Mielke, Befehl 12/76 zur Bildung einer nichtstrukturellen Arbeitsgruppe 
Ausl&nder, 1 June 1976; BStU, ZA, BdL, 6694. Mielke, Befehl 3/81 zur weiteren Qualifizierung der 
politisch-operativen Sichcrung der sich standig oder zeitweilig in der DDR aufhaltenden Auslander, 25 
Feb. 1981.
54 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27870. VPKA Bautzen to HAPM, 16 Feb. 1957. In 1954 in Bautzen, the MfS stopped 
the local ABV from compiling character reports on the NATO deserters living in the town on the grounds 
that it was intimidating the refugees. The HAPM later ordered the ABV to resume his duties.
55 The officer was Willi SchlSwicke (b. 1917). http://www.bstu.de/mfs/werwar/rst.htm (accessed 19 Apr. 
2003).
56 BStU, JHS, 20131, fo. 36. Steffen Rudiger, Die politisch-operative Bearbeitung von 
ubersiedlungsersuchenden Auslandem/Staatenlosen, 30 Mar. 1984.
57 Jens Gieseke, Mielke-Konzem. Die Geschichte der Stasi 1945-1990, Stuttgart, 2001, 86ff.
58 BStU, ZA, BdL, 6694. Mielke, Befehl 3/81 zur weiteren Qualifizierung der politisch-operativen 
Sicherung der sich standig oder zeitweilig in der DDR aufhaltenden Auslander, 25 Feb. 1981. His 
introduction is almost identical in wording to that of Order 12/76, which it replaced.
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was confined to foreigners of political significance, such as deserters from NATO 
armies who sought asylum in the GDR,59 as well as individual foreigners considered a 
threat to state security. The appearance of two MfS dissertations in the mid-1960s 
dealing with crime and the recruitment of “unofficial informers” among the foreigners 
living in the GDR signalled the growing interest of the Ministry in the area.60 Yet, it 
was only in 1968 that the Stasi began to extend comprehensive surveillance over a 
particular group of non-military foreigners. The encroachment of the MfS into this new 
territory reflected the general trend taking place within the organisation, which from the 
early 1960s was developing into a “ramified, barely manageable security bureaucracy 
with multifaceted tasks, huge numbers of personnel and a network of informants, spies 
and agents”.61 With ever-increasing budgets and staff numbers, the MfS moved beyond 
dealing exclusively with NATO army deserters and asylum applicants, to taking greater 
interest in the role foreigners played within GDR society in general.
The arrival of the first major cohort of contract workers (from Hungary in 
November 1967), and possibly the events of Prague in early 1968, resulted in the 
expansion of MfS surveillance of foreigners. In May 1968, six months after the arrival 
of the first contingent of workers, Mielke ordered all units of the Stasi to ensure the 
“comprehensive political-operational safeguarding of the skilled personnel [...] against 
any hostile and negative influences”. This was justified on the grounds that the workers 
represented a natural object in the “enemy’s attempts” to undermine the state politically 
and economically. Overall responsibility for the “security” of the contract workers was 
placed in the hands of Main Department XVIII, which was ordered to maintain 
permanent contact with organisations such as the FDGB, SAL, as well as factory 
management. Even at this early stage, the MfS had its eye on social interaction, which it 
feared would undermine the economic goals of the labour-transfer agreements. Thus, 
order 18/68 demanded the “permanent” monitoring of social contact between 
Hungarians and GDR citizens using “official and unofficial” means and “operational” 
investigations in cases of contact between Hungarians and East Germans deemed
59 BArch, DO 1/34.0/29099. The deserters were processed at the Heim der Intemationalen Solidaritat in 
Bautzen, established in 1953. By 26 Nov. 1957, 125 deserters from NATO armies had passed through it.
60 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Werner Paulsen, Einige Probleme der Verhiitung von Staatsverbrechen, die 
durch in der DDR lebende Auslander nichtsozialistischer Staaten begangen werden konnen, 5 Dec. 1965; 
and BStU, JHS, MF, 540. Theo Dudek, Einige Besonderheiten bei der Werbung von operativ geeigneten 
Auslandem mit standigem Wohnsitz in der DDR fur die Abwehrarbeit des MfS, n.d. [ca. 1966/67].
61 Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern, 69.
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negative or provocative in character or between Hungarians and other foreigners from 
non-socialist countries.62
The desire to control the other groups of foreigners residing in the GDR was 
expressed in a subsequent order issued in August of the same year, in which Mielke 
instructed all units of his Ministry to assist all state ministries and mass organisations in 
the “safeguarding and monitoring” of all non-GDR citizens. The four aims of MfS 
policy towards foreigners were defined as firstly, to “protect” all groups and to take 
measures if enemy contact was evident; secondly, to register all trips to West Berlin and 
the Federal Republic; thirdly, to record all personal and employment details; and 
fourthly, to keep the party and state organs informed of all relevant developments.63
The MfS Working Group for Foreigners (AGA) was established in June 1976 to 
facilitate the “central coordination of political-ideological work in the prevention of 
abuse of residency by foreigners in the GDR”.64 Composed of representatives of up to 
fifteen main departments and sub-departments of the ministry, the new coordination 
body had a number of tasks, namely:
- the creation o f a central overview o f the foreigner problem [sic] and the development of
suggestions for a unified MfS procedure on work on foreigners;
- combating enemy activities by focusing on the activities o f the enemy with foreigners in the GDR
and the FRG;
- monitoring developments abroad that might be of interest for the political-operative security o f
foreigners in the GDR;
- developing methods for the recruitment and deployment of unofficial operatives;
- developing guidelines on the cooperation with state, party and mass organisations;
- [and] developing guidelines on inter-state cooperation in the area o f foreigners.65
In 1981, Order 3/81 reorganised MfS surveillance structures. The AGA was 
subsumed under Main Department II (counter-intelligence). At all regional MfS offices, 
the new Referate II/5 were responsible for maintaining an overview of foreigners 
residing in their areas. Operational cooperation with the DVP was formalised, with MfS 
agents now instructed to assist the police in the permanent control of foreigners outlined 
under regulation 041/79.66 The operational scope of the MfS was extensive, 
encompassing on the one hand criminal activities such as the drugs trade, 
terrorist/radical activity, and spying carried out by foreigners. On the other hand, and of
62 BStU, ZA, BdL, 1313. Erich Mielke, Befehl 18/68 zum politisch-operativen Absicherung der in den 
verschiedensten Bereichen der Volkswirtschaft der DDR eingesetzten Fachkrafte aus dem sozialistischen 
Ausland, 30 May 1968. The order confirmed the contents of an earlier communication from Mielke to his 
regional subordinates, See BStU, ZA, BdL, 4133. Erich Mielke to BVfS, 6 Dec. 1967.
63 BStU, ZA, BdL, 2479. E. Mielke, Dienstanweisung 4/68 zur Erhohung der Effektivitat der operativen 
Absicherung und Kontrolle der im Gebiet der DDR wohnhaften Auslander und Staatenlosen, 30 Aug. 
1968.
64 BStU, ZA, BdL, 5566, fo. 2. E. Mielke, Befehl 12/76, see fn. 53.
65 Ibid., fos. 3f.
66 BStU, ZA, BdL, 6694. Mielke, Befehl 3/81, see fn. 53.
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particular relevance to this thesis, the Stasi was also interested in keeping the social 
contacts of foreigners with East Germans under surveillance. Thus, the order instructed 
units to identify and monitor foreigners who on the grounds of their position or 
“attitudes or characteristics” had developed contacts with “hostile-negative” or “easily- 
led” GDR citizens. In such cases, the MfS was keen to establish who was the negative 
influence, the foreigner or the GDR citizen.
Covert monitoring of mail posted to foreigners from abroad was a service provided 
by the MfS department M. Just how effective this was is unclear. In 1982, the MfS in 
Magdeburg claimed that there was “permanent mail surveillance” in the student hostels,
67but a year later claimed these measures had either stopped or had become superficial.
Behind the facade of proletarian internationalism and international solidarity, the 
GDR authorities continued and built upon some older German police traditions in the 
treatment of foreigners. The climate of paranoia and suspicion that had developed 
within the communist movement during the Stalin years was also influential. Foreigners 
were seen as a threat, capable of disrupting political and social life in the GDR. As such, 
the police and MfS sought to maintain permanent control (a largely unobtainable goal) 
over foreign residents and relied heavily on the language and procedures established by 
their forerunners. As such, Auslanderkontrolle represents an area of surprising historical 
continuity. Yet, the history of foreigners’ experience in East Germany cannot be 
sufficiently understood by focussing on the systems of rule, surveillance, and coercion 
and it would be wrong to assume that the DVP and MfS determined all aspects of 
foreigners’ lives. It is to the ability of foreigners to circumvent prescribed forms of 
activity and to configure their own lifestyles that we now turn.
67 BStU, ASt Magdeburg, Abt. XX, 4143, fos. 142 and 90. Abt. XX, Stand und Ergebnisse der politisch- 
operativen Sicherung, 31 Aug. 1983 and 19 Sept. 1984.
Chapter 3. Studying in the GDR
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Compared to the contract workers of the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet troops, and 
political refugees, the history of international students in the GDR has been largely 
ignored in post-Wende research. The opposite was the case before 1989 when both 
German states were in competition in the area of providing third level education to 
international students.1 From 1951 to 1989, between 64,000 and 78,400 foreign students 
from over 126 states graduated from third-level institutions in the GDR, which 
amounted to three percent of the total graduate output in the same period.2 Diagram 2 
provides an overview of the growth in the numbers of international students from 1951 
to 1989. Naturally, their presence on the college campus was more apparent: by 1989, 
for example, Berlin’s Humboldt University had 1,200 foreign students from 80 
countries, representing ten percent of the total student population in the university.3
Presented invariably as an expression of socialist solidarity and proletarian 
internationalism by the GDR authorities, international studies also served more 
straightforward diplomatic, political, and foreign trade goals. This was increasingly 
reflected in the expanding heterogeneity of the international student body. Not all 
foreign students came from the socialist states, nor were all students from the non­
socialist world necessarily communist sympathisers. In an effort to promote its image 
internationally, the GDR enabled students from almost every country in the world to 
study at its universities. In 1988, over 13,400 students from 126 countries were enrolled 
in GDR institutions (including four students from the Vatican and 103 from the USA).
Unlike previous accounts, this chapter focuses on the experiences of international 
students rather than on the development of international studies. It looks at four areas, 
namely acculturation, academic performance, diet and religion, and political opinions. 
The period under examination encompasses the first two decades of the GDR. The
1 The last pr e-Wende overview o f foreigners’ studies in the GDR appeared in 1987. See: Roland 
Wiedmann, “Strukturen des Ausl&nderstudiums in der DDR”, in: Hans F. Illy et al. (eds), Studenten aus 
der Dritten Welt in beiden deutschen Staaten, Berlin, 1987, 67-99. For a more recent overview for the 
1970s and 1980s, see Andrea Schmelz, “Bildungsmigration und InterkulturalitSt. AuslSndische 
Studierende aus afrikanischen und asiatischen LSndem in Ostdeutschland vor und nach 1989”, in: DA 
39:1 (2005), 84-91.
2 The lower figure is based on fragmentary SHF/MHF statistics and assumes that 29.3 percent o f the 
foreign student body graduated every year (from 1950 to 1965, the average was 22.3 percent; from 1977 
to 1988, 29.3 percent). The figure is based on the claim that 71,400 graduated up to 1988. (Quoted 
without references in Andreas Herbst et al. (eds), So funktionierte die DDR, Reinbeck, 1994, 675.) On top 
of this comes the students who graduated in 1988 and 1989.
3 Irene Rungc, AuslandDDR. Fremdenhafi, Berlin, 1990, 107.
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reasons for this focus are threefold. Firstly, before the arrival of foreign workers in the 
late 1960s, foreign students represented the largest group of foreigners admitted to the 
GDR on a temporary basis (as opposed to those with permanent residency or the Soviet 
troops). Secondly, many of the principles of GDR policy towards foreigners were 
formulated during these early years and largely in response to the state’s experience 
with foreign students. Thirdly, many of the particular collective and individual 
experiences of foreign students with GDR state and society are instructive in 
understanding the experiences of contract workers in the following two decades. 
Despite their heterogeneity, foreign students shared many common experiences owing 
to their status, allowing for the development of a sense of solidarity that transcended 
cultural distinctions.
After 1945, foreign students were slow in returning to the universities of the SBZ. 
The earliest reference to a foreign student was a citizen from country “562” studying 
medicine at Leipzig University in 1946.4 According to the most extensive GDR account 
of international studies, in March 1947, the regional government in Saxony issued an 
order declaring the equality of foreign with German students, “a ruling” which the 
article claimed was “inconceivable in bourgeois Germany”.5 However this apparent 
eagerness to open the doors of East German universities to international students was 
short lived and was effectively halted by the SED leadership in late December 1949, 
which ruled that “foreign students can only study here with us if a permit has been 
issued by the Central Committee of the relevant brother party and when this has been 
confirmed by the Secretariat of the [SED] Politburo”.6
A group of eleven Nigerians were the first foreign students admitted to a GDR 
university. Unable to return home after attending the 1951 World Festival of Youth in 
Berlin, they enrolled at the workers’ and peasants’ faculty (ABF) of Leipzig 
University.7 Some Eastern European but predominantly North Korean students 
followed, and from the ABF emerged the Institute for International Studies (Institut fur  
Auslanderstudium) in 1956, renamed the Herder Institute (HI) in June 1961. The HI
4 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/986. The author has been unable to establish the identity o f country 562, but as 
country 563 was Vietnam, it is possible that the previous code referred to French Indochina.
5 Erhard Hexelschneider, “Das Herder-Institut der Karl-Marx-Universitat Leipzig”, in: Deutsche 
Aufienpolitik, 26:11 (1981), 101-109, here 104. He based this information on Akte C 2/22, Bd. 1 (1904- 
1912), fo. 55, o f the KMU Archives. This author has been unable to find any reference to this Anordnung 
in the Landesregierungsblatter o f the period.
6 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/698, fos. 8ff. Beschlufi der Kl. Sekretariat des ZK der SED, 28 Dec. 
1949. Abt. Kultur und Erziehung o f the SED PV to the Kulturabteilungen der Landesvorstande, 4 Jan. 
1950 and also the Hauptabteilung Hochschulen und wiss. Einrichtungen of the Min. fur Volksbildung to 
the Volksbildungsministem der Landem, 9 Jan. 1950.
7 Hexelschneider, “Das Herder-Institut”, 102.
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provided intensive language and academic preparation, which lasted from ten months to 
three years depending on an individual student’s performance. Upon leaving the HI, 
students then began their chosen course of study at colleges. By the mid-1960s, 
international students were enrolled at 27 universities and 25 technical and engineering 
colleges across the GDR. In addition, non-academic institutions, such as the FDGB’s 
academy (Hochschule der deutschen Gewerkschaften, HSDG) located at Bemau, 
enrolled foreign trade union activists.
From very early on it was clear that the purpose of international studies was not just 
ideological but was closely linked to economic and diplomatic interests. Initially, most 
students had come to study via the so-called “Parteiweg” or party channels. In 1956, 
officials in the Central Committee’s International Department opposed a proposed 
increase in the numbers of North Korean students and apprentices on the grounds that it 
was a “great extra financial burden” as well as being of limited propaganda value to the 
GDR. As it stood, North Koreans made up 37 percent of the total number of 
international students. The report concluded that: “In admitting foreign students we 
have to find the right balance and work towards political goals.”8 Desperate for 
international recognition, the GDR used international studies to woo foreign 
governments into signing cultural exchange or trade agreements. In the late 1950s, 
diplomatic efforts were focused on Arab countries and India, before expanding to the 
so-called “young nation states” of Asia and Africa in the 1960s. This diplomatic focus 
was reflected in the increase of students from those countries (see diagram 3). The 
number of international students grew rapidly from approximately 1,800 in 1960 to 
4,700 in 1970 and in 1968 alone, 1,200 new students were enrolled.9 It is important to 
stress that the GDR generally did not accept individual applications for college places 
and prospective students were required to apply through their own governments. 
Another defining and unique feature of the system of international studies in the GDR 
was the fact that the state provided scholarships to almost all its international students, 
which in the 1960s was valued at 280 marks per month. In October 1962, the State 
Secretariat for Higher and Vocational Education estimated that international studies cost
8 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/640, fos. 53f. Berufsausbildung der koreanischem Kinder, 29 Nov. 
1956.
9 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht iiber die Situation am Herder-Institut Leipzig, n.d. [5 
Feb. 1969].
43
the GDR 22.4 million marks per annum, which represented a sum of 7,740 marks per 
student.10
There was also a hope that international studies would help increase East German 
exports. In 1956, Wolfgang Hartmann, a leading functionary in the State Secretariat for 
Higher Education, described international students as “the German economy’s 
customers of tomorrow and the precursors of their nation’s friendship with the German 
people”.11 Research carried out in 1963 at the SED’s Institute of Social Sciences 
recommended that the GDR increase the “effectiveness” of international studies and of 
factory-based training programmes. More coordination was needed to ensure that 
foreigners took courses of study that would allow for the development of “future export 
markets in goods, licences and documentation which are in keeping with the export 
structure of the GDR national economy”. In other words, the economic interests of the 
GDR were best served in the production of technical school rather than university 
graduates.12
Until the establishment of the Committee for International Student Affairs (Komitee 
fur Angelegenheiten auslandischer Studierender or KAS) in 1967, there was no central 
coordination of international studies. Previously, a polycratic myriad of up to ten state 
ministries, party departments and mass organisations were all involved in foreign 
student affairs. This situation contributed in no small part to the rather chaotic 
conditions experienced by foreign students during the 1950s and 60s.
Apart from the rigours of academic life, international students faced particular 
challenges resulting from the specific political and social environment in the GDR. The 
problems encountered by foreign students in adjusting to the political climate in the 
GDR were more of a concern to functionaries than the challenges of cultural and social 
acculturation. Many reports dwelled on the difficulty of foreign students in reconciling 
their utopian preconceptions of socialism with the GDR variety. In 1963, the HI 
reported on the difficulties students had in dealing with the “new world” of the GDR 
and its inherent contradictions: “Almost all of them are confronted with an environment 
that to some degree forces them to change their existing opinions, expectations and
10 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1936/1. Aufstellung der Kosten fur ein Jahr fur das Studium der ausl. 
Studierenden, 8 Oct. 1962. However, in the 1980s the GDR began to charge certain countries for college 
places.
11 Wolfgang Hartmann, “Die deutsche Wissenschaft und das Ausland”, in: Deutsche AuBenpolitik 1:6 
(1956), 503-512.
12 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/468/1. Information zu Fragen der Ausbildung afrikanischer Kader 
in der DDR, 27 Nov. 1963.
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1 ^  ** usual behaviour.” The Berlin Institute for Economics (IfO) viewed matters similarly,
arguing that most students arrived with “utopian and idealised expectations of
socialism”, which were not to be found “in our reality”. Yet, it felt that the particular
political situation in Berlin helped in this “clarification process”.14
Ironically, many of these utopian preconceptions were encouraged by the way the 
GDR marketed itself abroad, and in particular how international studies was advertised 
to prospective students. Promotional literature on international studies praised 
conditions in the GDR, and in particular student accommodation. Yet it was precisely in 
the area of student housing that the GDR failed so miserably, particularly in the 1960s. 
Since the early 1950s foreign students were housed in hostels, where conditions 
generally fell far short of the standards set by the authorities. This served to undermine 
the propagation of a positive GDR image abroad which was one of the major aims of 
international studies. As one prominent but critical HI functionary put it in 1967, it was 
possible “to cause a lot of diplomatic and trade difficulties with the kind of 
accommodation provided for foreign citizens [and] we are doing precisely that”.15
The inherent inability of the planned socialist economy to achieve its own goals left 
many students, including Germans, living in less-than-satisfactory conditions. Hastily- 
conceived diplomatic initiatives exacerbated this problem and the GDR was perennially 
unable to house the ever-increasing numbers of new foreign students in conditions 
similar to those enjoyed by East German students. The situation often reached crisis 
point: in 1960, for example, the senate of the Karl Marx University (KMU) in Leipzig 
rejected government plans to take on an additional six to seven hundred international 
students, pointing out that it had secured only 120 of the 1,800 college places required 
for the forthcoming academic year’s intake of new German students.16 Five years later, 
a delegation of professors from the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena protested to 
Kurt Hager directly at the deplorable living conditions of foreign students which were 
set to deteriorate following the decision of the MfAA to enrol hundreds of new students 
from North Vietnam.17 Indeed, by issuing a directive in 1966 calling for foreigners’
13 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/467. Uber die Erziehungsarbeit am Herder-Institut der KMU, 5 
Oct. 1963,4.
14 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/467. Inhalt, Formen und Methoden der Propagierung der 
marxistisch-leninistischen Theorie unter den auslSndischen Studenten und ihre HeranfUhrung an die 
sozialistische Wirklichkeit, n.d. [ca. Oct. 1963], 6.
15 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht an die SED-KL Dresden-Land uber Mangel in 
unserer Einrichtung, 10 July 1968, 3.
16 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1936/1. Verwaltungsdirektors der KMU to the SHF, 15 July 1960.
17 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/17. Aktennotiz uber ein Gesprach mit Prof. Dr. F. Bolck, Prof. Dr. 
Martin und Gen. Lindenlaub, 21 July 1965.
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accommodation to meet GDR norms, the SHF implicitly accepted that international
18students were discriminated against when it came to accommodation.
At the KMU, home to the largest population of foreign students and the HI, the
situation was precarious. Much of the building stock dated from the previous century
and lacked showers and functioning heating systems. In the main international students’
hostel in 1962, corridors remained unlit for a half a year owing to the lack of light bulbs.
As one group of students pointed out, that autumn while the heating system was out of
order for two months, residents were expected to discuss the major political issues of
the day such as the Cuban crisis and important SED documents. Indeed, it was
necessary to complain directly to the SED Central Committee to get even the heating
repaired.19 Neither a 1964 recommendation by the Volkskammer foreign affairs
committee that the existing HI building and hostel be demolished and rebuilt nor an
instruction from the Council of Ministers to the mayor of Leipzig to provide the funds
for renovation had any effect.20 In 1968, a report pointed out that the college’s 1,300
international students were housed in poorer conditions than East German students.
Student hostels were overcrowded, exacerbated by the fact that many of the residents
had married and were now sharing their rooms with their spouses and children. There
were 32 children living in the international student hostels in the city, with one couple
having five children. It was a situation undermining the whole purpose of international
studies, as the HI argued:
We have to admit that the foreign students o f the KMU are in no way accommodated in conditions 
worthy o f socialism. This applies to the capacity as well as the conditions o f the dorms. Only when 
we can at least solve one o f the many problems can we reach a new quality in the political- 
ideological and humanist-moral development o f the foreign students at the university.21
Yet, in many cases, the poor conditions were clearly a result of a conscious policy 
of neglect and discrimination towards foreigners by low-level functionaries. African 
participants at the first course for international students at the HSDG (then located in 
Leipzig) endured terrible conditions in their decrepit hostel. Bathrooms were not 
cleaned for weeks, while students had to wash their own underwear and dry them in
18 BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/B868. §8.1 der Arbeitsrichtlinie [der SHF] fur die Ausbildung ausl. Burger an 
den Universitaten und Hochschulen sowie an den Ingenieur und Fachschulen der DDR vom 1 Nov. 1966. 
In a letter dated 9 Apr. 1968, Dr. Porz, Prorektor fur Studienangelegenheiten der KMU, claimed this had 
not been achieved in Leipzig for many o f the college’s 1,300 foreign students.
19 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/624, fos. 93-103, here 97. Bericht der Hochschulgruppe der 
zypriotischen Studenten, n.d. [ca. Feb. 1963].
20 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Ubersicht iiber Studierende aus den jungen Nationalstaaten 
in der DDR und die Moglichkeiten der Erweiterung dieses Studiums, n.d. [ca. Feb. 1965], 3; Also: DY 
30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht iiber die Situation am HI Leipzig, 5 Feb. 1969, 5.
21 BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/B 868. Einige Probleme der materiellen Lage im Auslanderstudium, 9 Apr. 
1968, I lf.
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their rooms. When they complained, they were accused of being too demanding by the 
East German teaching and cleaning staff. Indeed, the economic director of the institute 
admitted to the director that “we’ll be glad to see the back of them”.22 In 1968 after 
years of complaining about the abject living conditions his students were forced to 
endure, the director of the Hi’s Radebeul branch (which provided language training to 
prospective apprentices from Africa, the Arab world, and Asia) wrote two scathing 
reports on the failure of the relevant authorities to improve conditions. In one of the 
reports, he paraphrased what he believed to be the general line of some functionaries 
towards accommodating international students:
Strict order, strict discipline: the more spartan the buildings, the less damage or destruction can
occur. The people from the jungle should be happy that they even have a roof over their heads.
The director also pointed out that students themselves were becoming increasingly 
intolerant of conditions in the GDR. Whereas in the early 1960s the majority of students 
hailed from humble backgrounds with little schooling, by 1968, eighty percent were 
highly qualified specialists, scientists and high-ranking functionaries who in the main 
came from the “relatively well-off sections of the urban population of their countries” 
and for whom “large apartments, cars, many servants and privileges were only natural”. 
Accustomed to a much higher standard of living than their East German counterparts, 
they were extremely critical of the decrepit state of GDR facilities. One student claimed 
that in his country soldiers lived in better conditions in barracks, while another believed 
that the student hostel was only fit for cattle. Even an otherwise loyal student claimed 
that had he not been raised a communist, he would have abandoned the ideology long
23ago as a result of the conditions in Radebeul.
Accommodation statistics for the 1965/66 academic year (see table 1) provide an 
overview of the room occupancy of foreign students. On average, each student enjoyed 
nine square meters of personal space, with two thirds of foreign students sharing with 
one or more foreigners, while less than a fifth shared rooms with German students.
22 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/2123. Kurzer Bericht uber eine Kontrolle der politisch-ideologischen Arbeit 
am Institut ftir Auslanderstudium der HSDG in Leipzig, 17 Nov. 1960,2.
23 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht an die SED-KL Dresden-Land iiber Mangel in 
unserer Einrichtung, 10 July 1968, 3, RoBler to Giefimann, 11 Dec. 1968; and also Bericht iiber die 
Situation am Herder-Institut Leipzig, n.d. [5 Feb. 1969], 3.
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Table 1. Room occupancy o f international students in the academic year 1965/6624
Rooms Number Percentage
1 212 7.3
2 739 25.6
3 653 21.6
4 553 19.1
In private accommodation 241 8.3
Sharing with German students 521 17.8
Total 2,919
As the table indicates, overcrowding often forced students to seek private 
accommodation, much to the chagrin of college officials. In certain colleges, the 
number of foreign students living in private accommodation was much higher: in 
1967/68 at the HI, 101 students (or 21 percent of the total) were living in private 
accommodation.25 Officials, however, were unenthusiastic about foreign students taking 
rooms in private lodgings, fearing that it allowed for an exchange of unwanted 
ideological influences. On the other hand, some reports suggested that private landlords 
were not keen on taking in foreigners, particularly Africans.26
While the segregation of international from GDR students was not the stated policy 
of the authorities, it developed in many colleges nevertheless. Colleges reported on the 
reluctance of foreign students to share with Germans (whom they commonly perceived 
as spies) as well as the unwillingness of German students to move into the overcrowded 
and rundown hostels where the foreign students lived. Some foreign governments, 
however, explicitly called for segregation. Although GDR officials disagreed with 
segregation, they recognised the right of foreign governments to impose it. In 1961, the 
North Korean embassy requested segregated accommodation for its students. The 
background to this move was the ideological rift between Beijing and Moscow, which 
also fuelled a growing suspicion among other Stalinist regimes of the threat posed to 
their students by contact with others. In October 1961, Albania withdrew all of its 
students from East Germany and in the following years, China radically scaled back its 
student presence. In 1966, the Vietnamese embassy ordered its students to cease all non- 
academic social contact with East German and international students, their East German
24 BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/4067. Statistik Studienjahr 1965/66 (Studenten), n.d.
25 BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/B 868. Einige Probleme der materiellen Lage im Auslanderstudium, 9 Apr. 
1968, 10.
26 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Bericht iiber die Situation im Auslanderstudium an der TH Dresden, 
21 Apr. 1959. Also: DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/1. TU Dresden, Zur Lage unter den auslandischen Studenten, 
n.d. [Jan. 1964].
27 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/3. Protokoll der 1. Sitzung der Kommission fur Auslanderstudium der 
TH Magdeburg, 16 Jan. 1962. The SHF passed on this request to the colleges.
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partner families, and to desist from attending the cinema.28 Vietnamese students lived in 
the most abject conditions, which was most probably tolerated by the Vietnamese 
government, which was desperate for graduates. In 1964, a report from Dresden noted
90that eight Vietnamese students shared a room. During the 1968/69 academic year,
Vietnamese studying at a branch of the HI at Helbra (Bezirk Halle) were housed in
overcrowded conditions in a disused, isolated, and dilapidated mining complex located
in the countryside, which according to one official prevented the students from adapting
to the “social reality” of the GDR and even raised complaints from the otherwise
“modest Vietnamese” students.30
Apart from the control exerted by some foreign embassies, the GDR attempted to
maintain control over international students, particular inside the hostels. The political
and security thinking of officials saw hostels as the best guarantee for effective
supervision and control of German as well as international students. As early as 1953,
the State Secretariat for Higher Education issued an order that prescribed strict norms in
discipline, order, and cleanliness in German student hostels. It instructed that all hostels
were to draw up comprehensive rules and regulations to ensure participation at hostel
meetings, the maintenance of lights-out, visiting hours, rigorous thrift, and the
regulation of the use of electrical goods such as radios and typewriters.31
Just as accommodation standards in the hostels failed to meet expectations, so too
did the security standards envisaged by the authorities. This was due in no small part to
the unwillingness of the foreign students to subject themselves to the attempts to
regulate their daily activities. At the HI, an elected hostel council was entrusted with the
maintenance of “order and cleanliness”. Yet, as a 1963 report suggests, residents
showed little enthusiasm in upholding the norms set down by the authorities:
However, the influence o f the hostel councils in the maintenance o f the rules (visits o f girls, order 
and cleanliness in the rooms) is not always satisfactory. This is caused by the difficulty students have 
in getting used to criticising or being criticised by their fellow students within their first year.32
28 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Einschatzung der politisch-ideologischen Situation im 
Auslanderstudium, n.d. [Summer 1966], 11. See also the reminiscences of a former Vietnamese student in 
Miijam Freytag, Die ‘Moritzburger' in Vietnam: Lebenswege nach einem Schul- und 
Ausbildungsaufenthalt in der DDR. Vermitteln in interkulturellen Beziehungen, Frankfurt/M, 1998, 157f. 
This is the only study o f the experiences o f international students after their return home from the GDR.
29 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/1. Zur Lage unter den auslandischen Studenten, n.d. [ca. Jan. 1964], 10.
30SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht tiber die Situation am HI Leipzig, 5 Feb. 1969, 6 
Also: DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. RoBler to Helbing (MHF), 24 Sept. 1968. Similar conditions existed for 
Vietnamese students at another HI branch at Dollnitz, also in Bezirk Halle.
31 Anweisung Nr. 39 des Staatsekretariats fur Hochschulwesen tiber die Leitung und Betreuung der 
Studentenwohnheime an den Universitaten und Hochschulen vom 24. Dez. 1953, in: Das 
Hochschulwesen (Beilage) 2:1 (1954), 13f.
32 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/467. Uber die Erziehungsarbeit am Herder-Institut der KMU, 5 
Oct. 1963, 10.
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What was more likely was that the students were simply not interested in enforcing 
German norms, especially when they encroached on their personal freedoms.
Reports also frequently bemoaned the unreliability of the East German hostel 
wardens, who were directly responsible for day-to-day supervision. In 1969 almost all 
the wardens employed at the HI were described as old and prone to sickness, leaving the 
porter’s desk unattended regularly. Even when wardens were present, their authority 
was challenged by foreign students, as was the case with Algerians studying in Dresden 
in 1964. Although their public behaviour was deemed unproblematic, officials noted 
their “pronounced feeling for personal rights” and their “aversion towards everything 
bureaucratic and administrative”. This was entirely understandable as wardens had 
attempted to prevent the students inviting German women (in some cases their wives) to 
their rooms.34 College authorities were dismissive of such arguments, and believed 
patemalistically that it was the duty of wardens to guarantee the “residents’ security”. 
Just what they had to be protected against is illustrated by the deliberations of college 
authorities in Jena, who complained in 1968 that the three porters in one hostel had “not 
succeeded completely in eliminating the so-called ‘wild’ overnight stays and the visits 
of certain ‘ladies’, [which has left] the hostel with its bad name”.35
In the lecture halls of the GDR universities and colleges, foreign students 
encountered many of the universal difficulties faced by international students 
everywhere. They had to battle with a new language and, in many cases, had to catch up 
with the subject matter also. What is interesting here is how the GDR maintained the 
balance between enforcing academic standards, advancing its own diplomatic agenda, 
as well as fulfilling its political-ideological commitments to educate members of its 
“brother” parties.
On average, non-European foreign students were less prepared academically for 
university courses than their GDR fellow students. This was due to the underdeveloped 
system of education in their native countries as well as to the fact that the selection of 
students by foreign governments, political parties, and trade unions often served 
political rather than academic concerns. The linguistic and preparatory training 
undertaken at the HI was not always sufficient and in 1963 some universities had to 
introduce additional foundation courses in maths and science subjects for African,
33 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht tiber die Situation am Herder-Institut Leipzig, n.d. [5 
Feb. 1969], 4.
34 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/1. Bericht des Referats Auslanderbetreuung an der TU Dresden, 13 Nov. 
1964.
35 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Vorlage fur die UPL-Sitzung der FSU am 28 Feb. 1968, 6.
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Asian and Latin American students before they could be admitted to regular courses.36 
In the 1965/66 academic year, 16.6 percent of the 2,889-strong cohort of undergraduate 
foreign students failed in one or two subjects and had to retake their exams. Of this 
number, eleven had to repeat a semester, while 95 had to repeat a whole year. In the 
same year, 112 students were expelled: 35 for academic and seven for disciplinary 
reasons. The remainder (70) were recorded as having been expelled at their own 
behest.37 This high figure most likely refers to those students who left the GDR for the 
West. There, the social welfare office of the Federal Students’ Group 
{Bundesstudentenring) assisted former foreign students of the Eastern bloc in finding 
college places, ability permitting. By early 1967, it had processed 1,252 applications. 
Between 60 and 70 percent of the students had left the Eastern bloc for academic 
reasons while ten percent claimed that they absconded owing to their disapproval of 
communism. Notably, the remaining 20 to 30 percent cited the experience of racial 
discrimination as the reason for leaving.38
Demonstrating the uncertainty among officials on whether the purpose of 
international studies was academic, political, diplomatic or developmental in character, 
in 1966 Paul Markowski of the Central Committee’s International Department 
complained to his comrades in the Science Department that the high failure rate in the 
HI served to undermine the agreements made between the SED and its African “brother 
parties” to educate a pool of reliable “proletarian or peasant” cadres, which was 
necessary to aid the removal of “petty bourgeois” elements from their ranks. Criticising 
the recent expulsion of a politically-experienced but academically-weak functionary of 
the Democratic Union of Somalia, he argued that greater consideration would have to be 
given to the more poorly-educated students delegated by leftwing parties.39 At the same 
time, Markowski called for resolute action to be taken against expelled students who 
were not members of communist parties, pointing out that over fifty such students were 
hanging around Leipzig, in some cases for up to two years, burdening student 
accommodation and impacting negatively on political life. Deprived of their
36 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Bericht tiber die politisch-ideologische Situation unter den 
auslandischen Studenten der TU Dresden, 30 June 1967, 2. The course consisted o f sixteen hours a week 
(German (six hours), maths (six hours), physics (two) and technical drawing (two) as well as professional 
experience similar to the polytechnical training given to secondary school pupils.
37 BArch, DR3/2. Schicht/4067. Statistik fur das Studienjahr 1965/66 (Studenten), n.d.
38 Harry B. Ellis, “African students vault Iron Curtain”, in: Christian Science Monitor, 25 Feb. 1967, 9.
The MfS claimed that the social office o f the Federal Students’ Group (Bundesstudentenring) set up a 
reception centre for foreign students in Wickrath near Koln on 1 June 1963 with the support o f the 
Arbeits- und Sozialministerium o f Nordrhein-Westfalen. See BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Werner Paulsen, 5 
Dec. 1965, k.
39 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/467. Schreiben der Abt. IV an die Abt. Wissenschaften, 3 Oct. 
1966.
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scholarships, expelled students could rely on the material support of their compatriots, 
friends and, in some cases, families. With little regard for any possible diplomatic 
fallout, the International Department requested a meeting with the Security Department 
to ensure that measures were undertaken to deport the students and that the “certain 
insecuriiy on how to act towards foreign students” apparent in “the state apparatus and 
particularly in the DVP” be overcome.40 These measures may have led to an increased 
exodus of foreign students to West Germany: indeed the Federal Students’ Group 
recorded its highest yearly intake of African students -  300 from the Eastern bloc in 
total -  that year.41
The reluctance of the police to move against expelled students suggests that the 
authorities were wary of disgruntled former students using the Western media or indeed 
the media at home to criticise the workers’ and peasants’ state. They had good reason to 
be concerned. Over the years, students who had been expelled or who had left in protest 
on their own accord had turned to the Western media to publicise their impressions. 
Newspapers and radio (especially RIAS) also gave them considerable coverage.42
The example of Vijoy Batra from India demonstrates how students could take 
advantage of the GDR’s diplomatic weakness. Batra had arrived in the GDR in August 
1957, spending a year at the HI before enrolling at the TH Dresden. By all accounts he 
was an outspoken character and college officials later purported that he had “conned” 
his way his way into the GDR by falsely claiming he was a member of the Communist 
Party of India. A 1958 report claimed that Batra was a “political fraud, a political 
grasshopper of the worst kind who must be motivated by something”, adding that 
“certain measures should therefore be introduced to make it impossible for him to 
abscond to the West”.43 Despite his outspoken opinions -  or precisely because of them -  
Batra was able to remain in the GDR to complete his studies. In 1961, he left for the 
West and soon afterwards he was on the airwaves lambasting the GDR. His booklet 
Studium bei Freunden?, published by the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs,
40 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Schreiben der Abt. IV an die Abt. Wissenschaften, 6 May 
1966.
41 Ellis, “African students vault Iron Curtain”.
42 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/2168 contains a number o f press clippings, incl. “Ibrahim in der Miihle der 
Burokratie”, Der Abend, and “...aber ich muB doch leben”, Berliner Morgenpost, 30 June and 22 July 
1962.
43 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Bericht tiber den Besuch an der THD am 25 and 26 Nov. 1958.
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attacked the GDR as the “only Nazi state on German soil” and as the “Soviet Zone 
penitentiary”, which oversaw the “brainwashing” of foreign students.44
Living in the GDR also meant international students (and later contract workers) 
had to adapt to a new diet and cuisine. The East German economy proved unable to 
satisfy the dietary needs of its foreign students, although the 1959 prospectus Studium 
bei Freunden claimed that the “management of the [Herder] Institute has successfully 
appreciated the need to attune the nutritional sector to the nationally-conditioned 
peculiarities of the students”. It described the head chef as a “conjuror at the cooker”, 
who was competent in providing for the “religiously-conditioned dietary problems” of 
Indian and Arab students.45
The files however suggest that matters were far from satisfactory. Attempts to 
provide for the culinary tastes of foreign students generally failed owing to material 
shortages, unenthusiastic cooks and the intolerance on the part of officials. As there 
were no general guidelines for colleges on dietary issues and the attitudes of local 
officials generally determined what type of food was served and for how long. In 1953, 
the university canteen in Leipzig provided customary cuisine to North Korean students 
for a daily surcharge of 2.50 marks but after six months they had to adapt fully to 
German fare 46 At the first Day of International Students in 1956, some foreign students 
dismissed German food as tasteless, claiming it was always served with the same sauce 
and lacking in rice 47 Similarly, three years later the International Students’ Committee 
(ISK) in Dresden called for more variety in the types of hot drinks served at breakfast 
(mentioning tea, coffee and cocoa), less butter in the mornings but more in the evenings, 
and the rotation of catering staff from hostel to hostel48
As students came from a wide variety of countries, some colleges argued it was 
impossible to cater for all tastes. Officials at the TH Magdeburg claimed they did what 
they could to help students settle in gradually but felt that equality with German 
students meant that the international students “should adapt to our menu”.49 In some
44 Vijoy Batra, Studium bei Freunden? Das Auslanderstudium an den Universitaten der Sowjetzone, 
Bonn/Berlin, 1962. 4, 6 and 16. Batra lived the rest o f his life in the FRG, joined the SPD and was elected 
a local councillor in Hamburg-Altona.
45 Hans von Oettingen, Studium bei Freunden, n.p., n.d. [Berlin (SHF), 1959], 14f.
46 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/146, fo. 260. Protokoll der 8/53 Sitzung des Kollegiums im Staatssekretariat 
fUr Hochschulwesen am 4. Mar. 1953. This was also the practice in TH Dresden, where Koreans were 
served rice three times a week for an extra charge. See BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Bericht tiber die 
1. Anleitung der Hochschule fur Verkehrswesen in Dresden am 19 Sept. 1957.
47 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/639, fo. 92. Der Tag der Auslandsstudenten vom 20. bis 21. Jan.
1956 in Leipzig.
48 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. An alien auslandischen Freunde, 30 Oct. 1959.
49 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/3. Auslandische Studenten, 12 Feb. 1962; Protokoll der Sitzung der 
Kommission ftir Auslanderstudium der TH Magdeburg am 7 Apr. 1962.
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colleges, foreign dishes were only served on special occasions, such as on Mayday at 
the FDGB’s academy at Bemau, when prominent East German and foreign dignitaries 
were in attendance. Once the latter and the specialist chefs brought in for the day had 
left, the menu and service reverted to its regular monotony, leading one African student 
to comment: “Ah well, we’re just the blacks.”50
The rapid adjustment to the content and volume of a German diet could lead to 
sickness and even scurvy among students, as noted by the TU Dresden in early 1962.51 
An Indian student, who fled to the West shortly after beginning his studies in the GDR, 
found the German diet unbearable. Accustomed to a vegetarian diet in India, he was 
sick from eating so much meat in the GDR. (He also found his room bitterly cold, 
although his German roommates had no problem with it). A prominent scientist at Zeiss 
in Jena, who had arranged for him come to Dresden, wrote that if the GDR intended on 
increasing international student numbers, more consideration would have to be given 
towards the “inevitable” problems which “always arise when members of different 
nationalities and habits come together”.52
If the authorities had little to say about the “religiously-conditioned” diets of foreign 
students, they had even less to say about the religions that informed these. As was the 
case with contract workers in the 1980s, religious practice performed a cultural and 
social function for many foreign students in the GDR. Yet, in early reports, reference to 
religion is more noticeable by its absence. This is not surprising considering that most 
students in the 1950s were from socialist states and were unlikely to be openly religious. 
Matters changed from the late 1950s as more students arrived from non-socialist Asian, 
Arab and African countries. Thus in late 1956 four of the eighteen Syrian students 
enrolled in Leipzig were described as “mostly strict Mohammedans with petty- 
bourgeois backgrounds”.53 There was nothing the authorities could do in this case as the 
students had been sent under the terms of the agreement on cultural cooperation signed 
between the GDR and Syria the previous July. Towards the end of the decade, the TU 
Dresden was aware of one Indonesian student who had attended a seminar organised by 
the Junge Gemeinde. In addition, one of the East German students entrusted with the 
Betreuung or supervision of the North Korean students had links to the church but made 
no attempt to influence the Koreans accordingly. Indeed, unlike most of his fellow
50 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/3373. Einschatzung der Arbeit des Org.-Biiros zur Mai-Arbeit 1964, n.d.
51 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Studenten aus Schwarz-Afrika (aufier Ghana), n.d. [1962] 3.
52 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1520. Indischer Student Bose, 2 Jan. 1958, This student subsequently returned 
to the GDR to visit an Indian friend but was arrested and jailed for “Republikflucht”, See Batra, Studium, 
13f.
53 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/640. Rummler, SHF. Aktenvermerk, n.d. [ca. Nov. 1956].
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minders or Betreuer, he seemed to take his job seriously and was very popular with the 
Koreans on account of his academic performance and his “preparedness to listen”.54
Religious practice among international students was certainly more widespread, but 
what functionaries did not know or care about, they failed to notice, especially when it 
came to non-Christian religions. Officials were on a learning curve in this regard. In 
1964, an official at the Weimar School of Administration, which held courses for 
African local politicians, warned that any underestimation of the “religious-defined 
lifestyles” of “Mohammedans” led to “considerable problems”, pointing out that 
alternatives to pork in meals as well as the daily provision of warm water were 
essential.55 Fourteen years later, the same institute reported on the difficulties caused by 
a group of Libyan local politicians who were “so strongly bound to religion that they 
generally refused dishes containing meat that was not slaughtered according to Islamic 
methods”. As the institute had been confronted with similar problems in the past, this 
ensured that it was possible to lay on “good country-specific catering” for the Libyans.56
As international studies was a form of investment capital designed to bolster GDR 
diplomacy and trade, the authorities shied away from challenging the religious 
expression of foreign students from non-socialist countries. As the KAS instructed 
colleges in 1967, “philosophical problems are to be imparted with great empathy as 
religion constitutes a state religion in many countries”. According to the “Principles on 
improving the political-ideological work with foreigners studying in the GDR”, foreign 
students attending the voluntary course on “theoretical and practical principles in the 
societal development of our age” (in effect a watered-down version of the standard 
curriculum in Marxism-Leninism) were not to be challenged on the issue of religion. 
The principles stated:
Discussions on religion should not be provoked. Whenever they are raised by the students they 
should be discussed in an atmosphere o f principled frankness and tactful respect for other views.57
Naturally, Christian denominations were more easily catered for by the GDR 
churches, which made attempts to reach out to foreign students. In 1970, prominent 
Catholic and Protestant churchmen in Leipzig hosted a meeting in the Protestant 
Student Religious Society {Evangelische Studentengemeinde) on the topic of “socialism
54 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Auslanderstudium, n.d. [ca 1960], 6.
55 SAPMO-BArch, DY 13/3326. Auswertung des Seminarkurses fur afrikanischen Kommunalpolitiker,
20 Oct. 1964, 14.
56 SAPMO-BArch, DY 13/3331. Bericht tiber das Seminar mit Kommunalpolitikem aus der 
Sozialistischen Libyschen Arabischen Volksjamahiriya vom 28. Marz bis 24. April 1978, 4.
57 Endorsed by SED on 22 Feb. and the Ministerrat on 4 July 1967 and adopted at the first meeting of the 
KAS on 31 Aug. 1967. BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/B 1247a/2. Problem- und Beschlufiprotokoll der 
konstituierenden Sitzung des KAS, 2. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Grundsatzen, 7.
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in Africa” which was attended by fifty people, including a dozen Africans. The basic 
tenor of the meeting was that scientific socialism was ill-suited to African conditions 
and that all countries had the right to choose their own developmental path free from 
outside interference, a message well received by most of the African students present.58
Contrary to a widespread and persistent misconception, the SED did not view the 
programme of international studies as a means of political indoctrination. As GDR 
diplomacy was dictated by real-political rather than ideological principles, its policy of 
using international studies to generate diplomatic capital invariably meant that many of 
the delegated students were not always sympathetic towards communism, or the version 
of it supported by the SED. Indeed, many of the GDR’s partners in international studies, 
such as Nassar’s Egypt, were involved in the suppression of indigenous communist 
movements. Thus it was not unusual to find students taking a strong position against 
communism and in 1968, for example, communist students at the HI in Radebeul 
reported that many of their classmates were negatively disposed towards the GDR and 
eager to badmouth it.59
Among the foreign student community there was a constituency of orthodox 
communists who strongly supported the SED and its policies. A 1961 report on 
reactions to the erection of the Berlin Wall claimed that the vast majority of foreign 
students supported the measure and contributed positively to the “ideological debate” 
with apathetic GDR students, with some Vietnamese and Koreans even offering to 
defend the GDR “by force”.60 Six years later, party officials at the TU Dresden reported 
that some foreign students, who were critical of the “political apathy and consumerism” 
of the FDJ and East German students, sought to whip up support for the SED’s 
agricultural and border policy and even approached the university’s institute of 
Marxism-Leninism for suitable argumentation.61 Similarly, foreign students at the 
Institute for Economics in Berlin reportedly supported the GDR “in such an enthusiastic 
way unknown for GDR students, and consider the GDR to be a model”.62 Obviously, 
seasoned party bureaucrats were enticed by the revolutionary enthusiasm if not elan of
58 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Information tiber die EinfluBnahme kirchlicher Kreise auf 
auslandische Studierende, 9 Dec. 1970. The invitations to the meeting were undersigned by Dr. Werner 
Becher, a prominent Catholic theologian, and Reinhardt MeiBner.
59 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht an die SED-KL Dresden-Land tiber Mangel in 
unserer Einrichtung, 10 July 1968, 5.
60 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/638, fos. 118-128, here 119. Informationsbericht, 28 Oct. 1961.
61 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Bericht tiber die politisch-ideologische Situation unter den 
auslandischen Studenten der TU Dresden, 30 June 1967, 3 and 6.
62 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Analyse der Arbeit im Bereich des Auslanderstudiums an 
Hoch- und Fachschulen der DDR im Studienjahr 1968/69, 15 Oct. 1969, 7.
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some foreign students which contrasted with their disaffected East German counterparts 
of the “normalised” 1960s.
Yet, the image of international students as communist zealots is exaggerated. The 
attitudes of foreign students were far more diverse and critical. Even students from 
socialist countries were seen as propagators of Western cultural ideas and they rejected 
attempts made by officials to curtail their cultural activities. In the late 1950s, the TH 
Dresden claimed that Poles were well known for their “political wavering, taking trips 
to West Berlin and the reading and circulation of Western literature”.63 Some years later 
at the same institution, the head Polish student claimed that no one had the right to stop 
him listening to Western radio because he was a “free man”.64 Similarly, the Hungarian 
students at the IS Werkzeugmaschinenbau in Karl-Marx-Stadt were fond of the 
“bourgeois and Western authors (Kafka, Durrenmatt)” and rejected calls for more 
ideological discipline as an affront to their personal freedom.65 Two years later, 
Hungarian students in Dresden argued that freedom meant the “right to all-round 
possibilities in orientation” which encompassed tuning into Western radio.66 Even 
Soviet students were problematic. The KMU claimed in 1973 that the majority were 
politically apathetic, were reluctant to express opinions, ignored the press, and in some 
cases were embarrassed when GDR lecturers extolled the leading role of the Soviet 
Union. They made unconventional comments on the issue of German unity, watched 
Western television in the city’s Gaudeamus Soviet club (but blamed Arab students), 
while a minority maintained “bourgeois or petty-bourgeois lifestyles”.67
Officials were more circumspect when it came to similar behaviour on the part of 
students from non-socialist countries. At the College for Domestic Trade at 
Blankenburg, authorities made no attempts to prevent the college’s 25 English-speaking 
students from tuning into Kennedy’s West Berlin speech on the grounds that as they had 
just arrived in the GDR there would be little understanding for such a move. Less 
indulgent was the local DVP which passed the matter on to the MfS.68 At the KMU, in 
1972, the MfS noted that owing to the fact that “students from the non-socialist world 
without exception tune into West German as well as their own radio stations, GDR
63 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Auslanderstudium, n.d. [ca. 1959/60], 3.
64 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/1. Berichte zur polnischen Studenten, 11 Nov. 1964.
65 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Gruppeneinschatzung Ungam, 21 July 1965.
66 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Bericht tiber die politisch-ideologische Situation unter den 
auslandischen Studenten der TU Dresden, 30 June 1967,4.
67 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV B 2/9.04/136. Zur Arbeit mit den sowjetischen Studenten an der Karl- 
Marx-Universitat, 14 Apr. 1973.
68 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41383. Einschatzung der im Bezirk Magdeburg nach §4 der Meldeordnung 
gemeldeten Auslander und Staatenlosen, 28 Jan. 1964,4.
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students and academics were inevitably confronted with arguments that have objective 
repercussions from the political-ideological aspect”. Yet, the MfS accepted at the same 
time that it was natural for foreign students to listen to Western stations, noting that they 
rarely attempted to “consciously and deliberately” influence GDR citizens with negative 
or hostile attitudes.69
Of greatest concern to the authorities was support for alternative versions of 
socialism. In the late 1960s, voices on the left ranged from those who opposed the 
suppression of the Prague Spring to those who called for war with the West. In its report 
on the 1968/69 academic year, the KAS admitted that many of the South-East Asian, 
African, Latin American and Western students espoused ideas taken “from the arsenal 
of the Mao ideology, the petty-bourgeois western European student movements and to a 
lesser extent the theories of Che Guevara”.70 In 1969, two leftist students from 
Luxemburg and Senegal were deported by the authorities. Allegedly they headed a 
group that had links with the “left sectarian” West Berlin Sozialistischer Deutscher 
Studentenbund (SDS) and Maoist groups and which had distributed leaflets adorned 
with the “images of Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Ho Chi Minh” calling for Westem-style 
student protests against the SED and Ulbricht.71
A 1970 report on reactions to the Stoph/Brandt talks of the same year illustrate the 
wide variety of political opinions among international students as well as their 
perceptions of the GDR. Students from Ceylon and Kenya believed the talks were a 
possible solution to the common interests of all Germans, while the Bulgarians claimed 
that as Germany was one nation, the likelihood of war between the two German states 
was slim. Students from Chile and Venezuela rubbished the talks by claiming that 
“imperialists” only understood the power of the gun. While Malian students believed 
the GDR delegation was under orders from Moscow, Tanzanians felt there was little 
difference between East and West. In their opinion, the recent rent increases for student 
accommodation proved that “capital and exploitation” still existed in the GDR while the 
coercion of youth to undergo the Jugendweihe belied the democratic nature of the 
state.72
Foreign students were not subjected to the same levels of ideological indoctrination 
as GDR students. They were not members of the FDJ, which it must be stressed, never
69 BStU, ASt Leipzig, Abt XX, 145/05, fo. 76. Bericht des Hpt. Leopold, n.d. [ca Autumn 1972].
70 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Analyse der Arbeit im Bereich des Auslanderstudiums an 
Hoch- und Fachschulen der DDR im Studienjahr 1968/69, 15 Oct. 1969,2 and 9.
71 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Storende und gegnerische Aktivitaten im Bereich des 
Auslanderstudiums der DDR, 2 June 1969, 1.
72 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Auszug aus einem Bericht der BL Leipzig, 3 June 1970.
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took much interest in foreign students either at leadership or college level, which was 
symbolised by the rare attendance of the FDJ Central Council delegate to the meetings 
of the KAS. While students from socialist countries were obliged to attend lectures in 
Marxism-Leninism, they frequently stayed away as a result of the tensions in the 
international communist movement and at various points in the 1960s, students from 
China, Albania, Poland, North Korea, Bulgaria, Cuba and North Vietnam refused to 
attend compulsory Marxism-Leninism courses at the behest of their governments. A 
number of reports from the TU Dresden from the mid-1960s illustrate the critical 
positions taken by these students. In late 1964, a Hungarian student claimed that the 
repeated reference to Ulbricht in the Grundrifi der Geschichte der deutschen 
Arbeiterbewegung constituted the cult of personality, while Bulgarian students refused 
to attend compulsory lectures in Marxism-Leninism claiming that they had already 
covered the subject matter at secondary school. In addition, they argued that the SED 
was not a true communist party on the basis of its name (a compromise in their opinion) 
and criticised the high levels of intelligentsia and the persistence of private business in 
the GDR, as well as the bloc party system and church policy. The reporting functionary 
clearly held the students in contempt, dismissing them as “notorious wasters”. 
Hungarian and Polish students were supportive of Ceausescu’s “Romanian way”, 
critical of GDR cultural policy, and opposed to socialist realism. These and other 
differences of opinion meant that even conversations between students from socialist 
countries and the GDR deserved the “utmost attention” of officials, one report 
concluded.74
Students from non-socialist countries, however, were exempted from compulsory 
lectures in Marxism-Leninism and in the 1964/65 academic year, only 30 percent of 
these students attended on a voluntary basis.75 Only from 1969 onwards were these 
international students expected to attend the compulsory three-year exam course entitled 
“theoretical and practical principles in the societal development of our age”.
Yet, the political situation in the GDR was only of secondary importance for most 
foreign students. Not only did foreigners have to “adjust to our climate (especially in 
winter), our diet, our habits, [and] our daily rhythm”, as a report from the Radebeul
73 BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/B 1247a/2. As evident from the attendance lists o f numerous KAS meetings.
74 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/1. Berichte zur polnischen und ungarischen Studenten, 11 and 12 Nov. 
1964. Also SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Bericht tiber das Auslanderstudium an der TU 
Dresden, 27 Jan. 1966, 6.
75 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Einschatzung der politisch-ideologischen Situation im 
Auslanderstudium, n.d. [Summer 1966], 15.
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branch of the HI pointed out in 1968, but they were burdened by the often precarious
troubled political environments in their native countries:
One may not forget that a considerable share o f course participants has left large families behind, 
although it’s not always clear how they are to be provided for. Without the protection provided by 
the head o f the family, families can be exposed to repression in the political tense political climate 
(Ghana, Indonesia, Yemen, Israeli aggression, Nigeria etc).76
Much of the political, cultural and social activities of foreign students took place 
under the aegis of the national students’ unions or Nationale Studentenvereinigungen 
(NSVs). Initially known as Landsmannschaften (a description subsequently dropped to 
avoid confusion with organisations of eastern territory expellees in West Germany), 
they were first established in 1953 with official support for students from socialist 
countries.77 In the following years, students from other countries set up their own 
organisations independently. By 1961, there were fifteen NSVs, mostly wings of 
African political parties and youth organisations, operating beyond any official 
control.78 As the SHF noted the previous year, attempts to compile “sound assessments 
of the ideological situation” in the associations had largely failed. The NSVs of 
communist Asian states too were considered beyond the political influence of GDR 
authorities. Equally worrying was the trend within African unions towards the 
formation of a “unity association of all black African students” which the SHF opposed 
as an expression of “a form of pan-Africanism with a progressive coating, which in 
essence is opposed to the development of sovereign national states”.79 The concern of 
the SHF was shared by the SED which noted that: “The unofficial existence of the 
organisations is a hindrance for the political work with foreign students and skilled 
workers. They are operating beyond our control and illegally.” Yet, in 1961, the SED 
Secretariat moved to legalise them, rejecting proposals to ban them fearing possible 
retaliatory moves against the FDJ in the International Students’ Federation (ISF).80 The
76 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht an die SED-KL Dresden-Land ttber Mangel in 
unserer Einrichtung, 10 July 1968, 2.
77 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/146, fo. 259. Protokoll der 8/53 Sitzung des Kollegiums im Staatssekretariat 
fur Hochschulwesen am 4. Mar. 1953.
78 These organisations were: the Union der afrikanischen Studenten in der DDR, a branch o f the Union of 
the Peoples o f Cameroon (UPC), a branch o f the African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau (PAI), 
Ugandan Students’ Association, UDEAN (Union o f Students from Territories under Portuguese Control), 
JRDA (youth organisation o f the Democratic Party o f Guinea), All African Union, UGEMA (Algerian 
General Student Federation), Organisation o f Sudanese in the GDR, branch of the Iraqi Student 
Federation, Union of Indonesian Students in the GDR, Indian Graduates Association, African Women’s 
Union (president Dr. Bankole), Nucleus (a leftwing grouping dominated by Nigerians), and branches of 
Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese students’ organisations.
79 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/638, fo. 104. Die weitere Entwicklung des Auslanderstudiums in der 
DDR bis 1965, n.d. [I960],
80 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3 A/779. Zulassung von Organisationen afrikanischer, asiatischer und 
lateinamerikanischer Studenten und Facharbeiter in der DDR (BeschluB 21/61 v. 17 Mai 1961), 28 Apr.
1961.
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number of NSVs fluctuated over the years. In the summer of 1966 there were 105 such 
unions, while in 1984 there were 63.81 In some cases, unions formed continental 
umbrella organisations such as the CLARDA (Union of Latin American Students) and 
the UASA (Union of African Workers and Students). In the larger colleges, the 
International Students’ Committees (ISK) also provided some representation.
The NSVs ranged in character: some were chiefly political while others were 
primarily cultural. Activity levels were just as diverse, ranging from the very active -  
usually those representing students from politically-volatile countries -  to the moribund, 
paper organisations. Importantly, the NSVs mostly operated according to democratic 
principles, with annual general meetings held to elect committees. As such, they were 
used by students from different political and social backgrounds to fight out external 
battles in the GDR. Communists, nationalists and Ba’athists fought in the Arab unions 
for example, while African unions were the scenes for political, social and ethnic rivalry 
(for example during the Nigeria/Biafra conflict in 1967). It is important to note that the 
GDR authorities were generally opposed to the NSVs of students from non-socialist 
countries being run by communists as it complicated its diplomatic efforts with the 
states concerned. Thus in 1960 the SHF attacked the “sectarian tendencies” of the 
communist-dominated leadership of the Algerian union for excluding all non­
communists from the organisation.82
Separatist groups were also active in the GDR and set up their own NSVs. In the 
1960s, Iraqi Kurds established a branch of the Organisation of Kurdish Students in 
Europe and participated in Kurdish events in the West. At the 1969 May Day parade in 
Berlin they marched under a “Kurdistan” banner which appeared on GDR television. 
Incensed KAS officials later established that college authorities took little interest in the 
banners the foreigners marched under and were totally unaware of the diplomatic
O '!
explosiveness of the banner in question. Kurdish activity enraged the Baghdad 
government and in 1974, the Iraqi embassy sought the assistance of the MfAA in 
deporting alleged Iraqi dissidents, especially Kurdish students. While the MfS seemed 
enthusiastic to cooperate, the Mdl ruled out any assistance on the grounds that the 1971
81 BArch, DR3/2. Schicht/4067. Statistik fur das Studienjahr 1965/66 (Studenten), n .d ., SAPMO-BArch, 
DY 13/3058. Beratungen mit Leitungen von ausl. Studentenverbanden vom 10. bis 15 Dez. 1984 in Bad 
Kleinen.
82 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/355, fos. 85-90. Niederschrift uber eine Besprechung in der Abt. 
Aufienpolitik beim ZK am 30 Nov. 1960.
83 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Storende und gegnerische Aktivitaten im Bereich des 
Auslanderstudiums der DDR, 2 June 1969, 7.
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agreement on legal relations signed the two countries provided the only legal basis for 
extradition between the two countries.84
The NSVs were also affected by the many coup d’etats, revolutions, and regime 
changes that occurred abroad. Following the coup in Indonesia in 1966, supporters of 
the new rightwing Suharto regime expelled 19 supporters of the deposed left-wing 
Sukamo government from the Indonesian NSV and later collaborated with the attempts 
of the Indonesian embassy in Prague to have them deported home. While some of the 
left-wing students were allowed to remain, the GDR was also interested in maintaining 
relations with the new Indonesian government. This strategy satisfied neither side. The 
pro-Suharto students publicly attacked the GDR for interfering in internal political 
matters in a West Berlin magazine published by Indonesian students. On the other hand, 
pro-Sukarno supporters participated in the May Day parades in Dresden in 1967 
carrying anti-Suharto slogans. As they enjoyed the support of the majority of foreign 
students in the city, college authorities were unable to confiscate the offending banners. 
Two months later, the MfAA presented the Indonesian authorities with an aide-memoir 
protesting in the strongest terms about the behaviour of the pro-Suharto group.85 
Tensions continued between the two factions, and later, among the Soviet and Maoist 
wings of the Indonesian Communist Party.86
Yet, the willingness of the GDR to help leftwing opponents of military dictatorships 
was increasingly restricted by its diplomatic interests. In 1968, for example, the GDR 
was not prepared to afford protection to some Burmese leftist students who had formed 
the Burmese Students’ Union in the GDR in opposition to the idiosyncratic Ne Win 
military regime in Rangoon. When the Burmese government demanded their 
repatriation, the GDR authorities intervened, arrested and forcibly deported the four 
students, despite considerable German and foreign student opposition in the GDR, 
Prague and West Berlin.87
The NSVs of students from communist states also proved troublesome for the 
authorities. In the mid-1960s, Cuban students actively challenged SED policy, attacking 
the theory of peaceful coexistence and the introduction of material incentives designed
84 BArch, DO 1/8.0/51098. Note Nr. 461 der Botschaft der Republik Irak an das MfAA, 30 Aug. 1974, 
and subsequent documents.
85 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/469. Zusammenfassende Kurzinformation tiber die Situation unter 
den indonesischen Studierenden in der DDR, 1 July 1967. Similar banners were carried two years later in 
Leipzig, see SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Storende und gegnerische Aktivitaten im Bereich 
des Auslanderstudiums der DDR, 2 June 1969, 7.
86 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/13001. Bericht tiber den Praktikant E., 25 Aug. 1971.
87 BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/B 1247a/2. Landergruppen-Einschatzung, 10 Apr. 1969, 11-15. The four were 
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to boost production and performance. GDR authorities in turn attempted to suppress the 
“intensive political-ideological subversion” carried out by the Cuban students in support 
of the “petty-bourgeois-nationalist, left-wing radical and anti-Soviet ideas developed on 
the basis of the Che Guevara theory”.88
The situation was more serious in the much larger NSVs of the Chinese, North 
Vietnamese, and North Korean students. With the escalation of Sino-Soviet tensions in 
the 1960s, the GDR placed restrictions on the importation and distribution of Chinese 
publications and increased the surveillance of Chinese students and Maoist 
sympathisers from other countries. In the colleges, relations between the authorities and 
the Chinese students descended into outright hostility. As Chinese students attacked 
Soviet revisionism, GDR lecturers in return lambasted the Chinese and Mao as 
dogmatists. Even at the sixth SED party congress in 1963, the customary stage-managed 
uniformity was channelled into creating a chorus of hecklers to jeer the Chinese 
Communist Party delegate during his address.89 Colleges tried to limit the contact of 
Chinese students by prohibiting them from spending their summer holidays with other 
foreign students. In 1966, for example, the Chinese worked on a summer camp in 
Freiberg with GDR students and one functionary reported that they were
totally isolated and made fools o f themselves with their behaviour in the eyes o f the GDR students.
(The students rose at 6am and read Mao over breakfast, did their work on the collective farm, held a
meeting in the afternoon and went to bed reading Mao).90
This ideological squabble had catastrophic implications for some students, such as 
the Chinese-Indonesian Xing-Hu Kuo, who first came under systematic MfS 
surveillance from mid-1961 onwards. In 1965, he was sentenced to seven and a half 
years imprisonment on a trumped-up espionage charge.91 Yet, Kou maintains that he 
was treated no differently to other victims of the Stasi in that he was labelled with 
unfounded negative moral characteristics, such as being a chain smoker and drinker, 
sexually promiscuous, cunning, arrogant and cynical. Apart from the occasional insult
88 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht tiber das Nationaltreffen der kubanischen 
Studierenden in der DDR vom 12. bis 14 Apr. 1968 in Merseburg, 24 Apr. 1968, 6-8.
89 Protokoll des VI. Parteitages der SED, 15. bis 21. Jan. 1963, Berlin, 1963, 19-30. The SED Politbtiro 
had banned the importation o f the Pekinger Rundschau in Aug. 1960, while Radio Peking was equated to 
Western radio stations. Nevertheless, and to the anger o f the authorities, Mao’s Es lebe den Leninismus 
continued to circulate. In early 1963, the SHF instructed university rectors to crack down on Chinese 
publications under the Ordnung fur die Verbreitung von Publikationen, Dokumentationen und sonstigen 
Materialien ausltindischer Herkunft. See. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/469. Darlegung einiger 
Probleme unserer Arbeit mit den in der DDR befindlichen chinesischen Studenten, Aspiranten und 
Gastlektoren, 10 Jan. 1963, 5.
90 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Einschatzung der politisch-ideologischen Situation im 
Auslanderstudium, n.d. [ca. summer 1966], 10.
91 Xing-Hu Kou, Ein Chinese in Bautzen II and Wodka in Sektglasem, Boblingen, 1990 and 1993 
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of “yellow monkey”, he claims not to have been systematically subjected to racist 
abuse.
Many students also suffered at the hands of their own governments during the 
period. As Vietnamese communism veered towards Maoism, the country’s students in 
the GDR were instructed on the fallacy of peaceful coexistence. In talks with other 
students, the Vietnamese condemned the fact that there had never been a revolution in 
Germany and called for partisan warfare with West Germany.92 A number of 
Vietnamese students who openly opposed this ideological repositioning were denigrated 
and ostracised by their compatriots as a result. One such student described the 
precariousness of his situation in a letter to a lecturer: “My friends are not as persecuted 
as I am [...] I’m vulnerable [...] They want to attack me more and more. In particular, 
our party secretary is like a criminal investigator. He uses police methods.”93
In an effort to stamp out this dissent, in early 1964 the North Vietnamese 
government ordered all its students to return to Vietnam for the purposes of political 
education. Although the embassy claimed this was a temporary measure, the dissident 
students feared it would entail their “physical liquidation”. They successfully appealed 
to the East German authorities for help. In March 1964, the MfS helped two Vietnamese 
students (including the author of the letter quoted above) to go underground: they were 
provided with new identities as Thai citizens and jobs in a factory in Karl-Marx-Stadt. 
When the Vietnamese embassy attempted to forcibly repatriate the remaining dissidents 
in June, a special commission set up by the Politburo and chaired by Erich Honecker 
decided to grant political asylum to a further twelve students.94
In their attempts to regulate all aspects of foreigner’s recreational time, 
functionaries invested considerable effort in attempting to control the interaction 
between foreign and GDR students. Bringing foreign students in contact with 
“progressive” GDR students and members of the public proved a difficult task, despite 
(or indeed precisely because of) the attempts undertaken by functionaries to systematise 
it. In the early 1950s, the SAL instructed colleges to establish a system of Betreuung or 
peer supervision, which involved pairing up a foreign and an East German student 
Betreuer or minder. The system was never effective, mainly due to the unwillingness of
92 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/1. Zur Lage unter den auslandischen Studenten, n.d. [ca. Jan. 1964], 7.
93 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/469. Schreiben des vietnamesischen Studenten TT, 28 Dec. 1963.
94 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/469. BeschluB 20/64 des Politburos v. 16 June 1964. For MfS 
documents on the case, see: Michael Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten undArbeiter in der DDR und ihre 
Beobachtung durch das MfS, Magdeburg, 1999, 23-28. The 14 were granted DDR-Staatsbiirgerschaft in 
1976, see: BArch, DO 1/8.0/51100. Verleihung der DDR-Staatsbtirgerschaft an vietnamesische Burger, 8 
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one or both partners to go along with this charade of friendship. Indeed, as the HI 
pointed out, it was common for foreign students to reject minders as spies, intent on 
regulating and supervising their free time, a “misconception” encouraged by “hostile 
and Western” elements.95 It was anything but a misconception. In Magdeburg, college 
authorities encouraged minders to confiscate any unlicensed foreign publications 
circulating among foreign students and to do so “in the interests of the foreigners 
themselves”.96
The development of normal and healthy contact between international and GDR
students was greatly hampered by the attempts of functionaries to organise friendship.
Reports were uncharacteristically candid about relations between international and GDR
students. Some reports acknowledged the inevitable tendency of international students
from particular countries to associate amongst themselves, as was reportedly the case
with Soviet students at the KMU in 1973. In an effort to overcome difficulties “in the
establishment of personal friendly relationships”, the university decided to house Soviet
and GDR students together in the same students’ hostel. Yet, this brought with it a
series of new problems, an official noted, resulting from the “different habits” the two
groups of students, as well at their “incomplete familiarisation” with each other.97
Only occasionally were the opinions of foreign students on the issue reported
verbatim, such as in a 1965 report from the TH Magdeburg. Guinean students claimed
that they got on well with all Germans in the college except German students. Others
pointed to the superficiality of contact with GDR students and their insensitivity
towards cultural differences. Iraqi students maintained that:
There are some students who don’t want to understand us. But one has to consider that we are 
accustomed to completely different climatic conditions (we sleep in the afternoons) and have to 
adjust to things slowly. The German students are envious o f our opportunities to take holidays in the 
West, our better canteen food etc. At a superficial level, the relations are good. But examined more 
closely, there are really no friendly relationships.
Their Bulgarians colleagues saw matters similarly:
The German students only see us from their perspective and don’t put themselves in our position. 
They make no attempt to understand us. There are no fights between us but real friendly 
relationships are lacking.98
According to another report, some international students were more disparaging in 
their views of their German classmates. It recorded that Cubans and Algerians saw their
95 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/467. Form der Arbeit mit auslandischen Studenten in der 
auBerunterrichtlichten Zeit, n.d. [ca. 1963], 10.
96 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/3. Protokoll der Betreuerbesprechung am 3 Apr. 1963.
97 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV B 2/9.04/136. Zur Arbeit mit den sowjetischen Studenten an der Karl- 
Marx-Universitat, 14 Apr. 1973, 7.
98 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Berichte der TH Chemie, Magdeburg, 5 May 1965.
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GDR fellow students as “gentrified” and furthermore that “a large part of the Latin 
American students, generalising excessively, tends to view all East German citizens as 
Spiefier, as people totally lacking in revolutionary elan”.99 Alternatively, many East 
German citizens only encountered international students in the most superficial political 
contexts. This was particularly the case with the Vietnamese, who were subjected to 
strict controls on social contact from the mid-1960s by their embassy. Vietnamese 
students at the IS in Wismar only encountered locals at meetings of the National Front, 
Jugendweihe preparations or at FDJ meetings in schools. Similarly, Vietnamese 
studying at the IS in Glauchau were paired up with “suitable families” to mark the 
GDR’s twentieth birthday in 1969.100
Foreign students in 1950s and 1960s East Germany faced a number of challenges in 
adapting to East German society. While the greatest problems, such as language and 
academic performance, were (and are) universal difficulties facing all international 
students, other problems were due to the particular political and economic situation 
pertaining to the GDR. The SED saw the provision of third-level education as a 
contribution to its diplomatic efforts and international standing and as such it was not 
attuned or receptive to the individual needs of students, who although in receipt of 
grants paid by the GDR, were nevertheless exposed to the many contradictions of 
socialist society. These, along with the determination of the authorities to limit the 
scope of interaction between international students and East Germans and the failure to 
deal with the existence of racism, discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, 
served to undermine the GDR’s credibility among students on the left and right of the 
political spectrum. In many ways, the experience of international students and the 
state’s ways of dealing with them were a precursor to the experiences and treatment of 
contract workers in the 1970s and 80s. It is to this period that we know turn.
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This thesis estimates that at least 210,000 foreign contract workers were employed in 
East German factories from 1967 to 1989. For the SED, the issue of foreign labour was 
a problematic one and, like so many of its policies, was never subjected to open debate 
in the GDR. Nervous that the system of foreign labour could attract comparisons with 
the West or even the Nazi and imperial regimes, the SED was at pains to stress the 
unique “socialist” nature of the labour exchanges, maintaining persistently that they 
helped other socialist countries develop an industrial workforce essential for the 
building of socialism.
Yet, even as the titles of the bilateral labour agreements demonstrate, the training 
aspect was of secondary importance to the issue of work. All referred to either 
“temporary employment” or “employment”, which was to be accompanied under the 
terms of the Hungarian agreement (1967) by the “acquisition of practical training 
experience” but nothing according to the titles of both Polish agreements (1971 and 
1988). The Algerian and Cuban agreements (1974 and 1978 respectively) were more 
specific, referring to the “simultaneous imparting of professional experience as well as 
qualifications during the process of productive work” in the first case and “simultaneous 
qualification during the process of productive work” in the second. The title of the 
Mozambican agreement (1979), which referred to the “simultaneous imparting of 
practical professional experience during the process of productive work and 
professional training and advanced training within the framework o f adult education” 
(emphasis added), spelled out the primacy of work over training, which was clearly not 
to take place during regular working hours. The three final agreements, signed with 
Vietnam (1980), Angola (1985) and China (1986), were headed in very vague terms, 
and referred simply to the “qualification” of workers.
The inclusion of a reference to training was a semantic ploy to disguise the real 
economic nature of the agreements. This was spelled out in a letter written in July 1973 
by Horst Sindermann and sent to Erich Honecker. It reveals that the SED saw the 
agreements as primarily economic in character. Sindermann, then deputy chairman of 
the Council of Ministers, pointed out that the title of forthcoming GDR-Algerian 
agreement would have to be worded carefully for political reasons. He warned 
Honecker that: “We must not appear as a ‘guest worker country’ to the UNESCO.
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Hence we can only conclude an agreement on the ‘training and qualification’ of 
Algerian workers”. As Sindermann pointed out, the agreement would supply the GDR 
with unskilled Algerian workers, who he anticipated could be employed in jobs that 
required no practical or theoretical skills, specifically mentioning brown coal mining 
and rail track repairs, which caught the particular attention of Honecker according to his 
marginalia.1 Ironically, the Algerian side was hoping that its dealings with the GDR 
would represent a fundamental change from the types of labour agreements it had 
signed with “imperialist” France and Belgium in the past.2 It took the training aspect 
seriously and over the years had to remind the GDR of its commitment to train the 
workers.
This chapter seeks to explore how contract workers viewed their jobs, workplaces, 
and workmates and questions whether the working environment represented the central 
focus of social activity as envisaged by the authorities. Was the workplace the key 
forum for interaction between foreigners and the East German population? It also 
addresses the accommodation of workers in hostels, a topic afforded extensive but 
nevertheless superficial attention in the secondary literature, as well as the issues of 
wages and training opportunities.
Although there are some similarities in the treatment of international students and 
contract workers by the authorities -  the most obvious being the fact that both lived in 
collective accommodation -  some clear differences are also distinguishable. As the 
programme of international studies formed an instrument of foreign policy, this granted 
foreign students a certain level of immunity from the rigours of state sanction. As mere 
producers, contract workers were not seen as future propagators of a positive image of 
the GDR abroad and as such never enjoyed the same levels of immunity as international 
students. Yet, as this and subsequent chapters will show, contract workers were not 
completely vulnerable and could rely on individual and collective strategies to defend 
their interests against challenges emanating from a number of quarters.
Adjusting to their new surroundings was not without its problems for the majority 
of contract workers. Arriving in the GDR was a difficult experience for many and 
specific groups had specific problems. Some arrived as teenagers, having left the close- 
knit familiarity of extended families for the first time. Among the Vietnamese and 
Cuban workers were many mothers, who had to leave their children in the care of other
1 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7030. Sindermann to Honecker, 24 July 1973.
2 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7030. Information tiber eine Beratung von Vertretem der DDR und DVRA zur 
Vorbereitung eines Arbeitskrafteabkommens, 4 July 1973. This document claims that Algeria had first 
proposed a labour deal in a diplomatic note issued on 1 Feb. 1973.
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3 »T"»family members. The majority of the Polish Pendler or transit workers too were 
mothers and the double burden of factory and house work was exacerbated by the time 
involved commuting to and from the workplace. Many Algerian men were married with 
children and as such were often the sole breadwinners for their immediate and extended 
families. An insight into how one particular group of workers experienced the GDR in 
the first few weeks after arrival is provided by Rainer Plesse’s 1988 diploma 
dissertation on Vietnamese workers employed at the Ludwigsfelde car factory. 
Indicating that contract workers faced many of the problems typically encountered by 
migrants elsewhere, he noted the “permanent stress” of the newly-arrived Vietnamese. 
87 percent saw the language barrier as a major problem, while 81 percent had problems 
with the climate. Just over half had difficulty with the food, while eleven percent 
complained of the early rises and homesickness.4 While all migrants faced such 
problems, GDR procedures exacerbated what was already a difficult situation for many. 
In an effort to keep costs down, for example, foreign workers were flown in during the 
low season winter months, which Helga Marburger has suggested was a particular 
shock for workers from warmer climates, who often arrived with no winter clothing. 
She also referred to the experience made by an East German pastor who learned that 
many of the workers came from cultures which identified darkness with evil spirits, 
serving as an additional burden.5
Compounding these difficulties was the fact that the factory officials who had daily 
contact with the workers received little in the way of training or preparation for this 
task, as a number of former “minders” (Betreuer) have pointed out.6 The system was 
not designed to learn from past mistakes which ensured that many errors were repeated. 
In many cases, the behaviour of foreigners failed to correspond to the idealised 
preconceptions of East Germans. This can be seen in the reactions of factories to the 
first cohort of Algerian workers who came in 1974. A SAL report noted satisfactorily 
that: “All factories report unanimously that the Algerian citizens are mannerly and 
unassuming in public and are striving to conform to GDR habits”, adding that “the 
inclusion of the Algerian workers in social life occurs through the work brigades and 
the mass organisations in the factory”. The Algerians were encouraged to join the
3 Halina Hackert-Lemke & Heidrun Unterbeck, .. .das war in der DDR so festgelegt... ’ Betreuerinnen 
erinnem sich an auslandische Vertragsarbeiter”, in: Harry Adler et al. (eds), Zwischen Raumen. Studien 
zur sozialen Taxonomie des Fremden, Berlin, 1999, 87-104, here 90. Also: Irene Runge, Ausland DDR. 
Fremdenhafi, Berlin, 77.
4 Quoted in Hackert-Lemke & Unterbeck, “Betreuerinnen”, 90.
5 Quoted in ibid.
6 Ibid., 90.
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FDGB and 170 did so within a few weeks after arriving.7 Within a short period, 
however, attitudes changed and at a meeting in February 1975 to arrange the second 
deployment of workers, the SAL demanded that the Algerian side refrain from 
delegating any more workers with criminal convictions or those who had worked in the
Q
West. Yet, there is little concrete evidence to suggest that Algeria was sending such 
workers. The only problem with the first group of Algerian workers was the excessive 
drinking of some, hardly evidence of criminality or an expression of Western 
decadence, but which had resulted in the deportation of 15 workers.
Clearly, not only did the contract workers have some problems in accommodating 
to GDR society, but GDR officials also had difficulty accepting that they had particular 
needs and weaknesses. Some officials proved themselves less capable than others. After 
a violent row broke out in March 1981 between Mongolian apprentices who were being 
trained in a Cottbus textile factory, police noted that factory officials had failed to 
recognise or consider a number of “specific problems [...] such as their instable 
personalities owing to their youth, the transplantation to totally new living conditions, 
which involves massive geographical and lengthy separation from familial structures, 
mentalities [and] traditions”.9
As in the case of students, the authorities favoured housing contract workers 
collectively in hostels. Up to 1980, the official stated policy was that foreign workers’ 
accommodation was to meet East German norms. Yet lack of investment and planning 
ensured that the GDR was never in a position to provide sufficient or adequate 
accommodation for its foreign workers.
One of the earliest training agreements, signed with Iraq in April 1959, stipulated 
that apprentices’ accommodation was to be communal and to match “local standards”.10 
Similarly, the planned foreign labour programme of 1961/62 envisaged that the foreign 
workers would live in “closed collectives” in existing dormitories, housing blocks, and 
holiday homes. Only in the construction industry was their accommodation to be in 
“wooden or solid-structure huts” of the Aufbaustufe III type, which were customary for
7 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Bericht [des SAL] tiber Ergebnisse des probeweisen Einsatzes von 500 
algerischen Werktatigen, 13 Dec. 1974, 4f.
8 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7030. Information tiber den AbschluB einer Regierungs-Abkommen zum 
Einsatz algerischen Werktatigen im Jahr 1975, 7 Mar. 1975.
9 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46778. BDVP Cottbus, Bericht zu eingeleiteten EVs gegen Btirger anderer Staaten 
und Einwohner, 6 Jan. 1982, 3.
10 BArch, DE 1/21882, fos. 8-12. § 7 o f the Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der 
Regierung der Republik Irak tiber die berufliche Aus- und Weiterbildung von Btirgem der Republik Irak 
in Betrieben und Einrichtungen der DDR, 1 Apr. 1959.
70
East German construction workers. Foreign specialists on the other hand were to be 
provided with single rooms or apartments.11
Although the 1961/62 labour programme failed to materialise, the agreement with 
Hungary, signed in 1967, incorporated many of its conditions. It stipulated that the 
collective accommodation was to meet the “normal customs” of Hungary and the GDR. 
This was open to interpretation, as a classified directive authorised by the Council of 
Ministers and issued by the SAL some months later made clear. It ruled that four to six 
workers were to share a room with each worker having a minimum of 4.5 square meters 
of personal space.12 Problems in the recreational sphere led to a modification of hostel 
regulations in July 1974. The maximum number of workers per room was now reduced 
to four, while the minimum amount of personal space per worker was increased to five 
square meters. In addition, “educators” or Heimerzieher were to be appointed to hostels 
with more than 150 residents to provide for the “general human and moral education” as 
well as for the “purposeful leisure-time activities” of the workers.13
Subsequent labour agreements contained the general standards set out in the revised 
Hungarian agreement. Significantly, however, new guidelines issued by the SAL in 
1980 dropped the clause that the accommodation had to meet German norms. It was 
uncharacteristically vague on accommodation conditions, merely suggesting that 
contract workers were to be afforded “living space appropriate for communal 
accommodation”. In response to the growing numbers of women contract workers -  a 
characteristic of the post-1978 labour agreements -  the guidelines also called for gender 
segregation.14 Again, standards were open to interpretation, suggested by the fact that 
two years later the SAL felt it necessary to state in a revised set of guidelines that 
foreigners’ hostels were to be of a solid construction and not “huts” or prefabs.15 These 
new guidelines added that factories were to practise the “most stringent thrift” in 
furnishing and fitting the hostels and to this end it provided at itemised list of what
11 BArch, DE 1/9408. fo. 95. BeschluB des Presidiums des Ministerrats tiber die Verbreitung der 
Aufnahme von Werktatigen aus sozialistischen Landem, n.d. [ca. Sept. 1961].
12 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. § 9 des Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der 
UVR tiber die zeitweilige Beschaftigung junger ungarischer Werktatiger zur Erwerbung praktischer 
Berufserfahrung im sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR, 26 May 1967. See also the SAL Direktive zur 
Durchfuhrung des Abkommens, 18 Jan. 1968.
13 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. Vereinbarung DDR-Ungam zur Durchfuhrung des Abkommens, 12 July 
1974.
14 Rahmenrichtlinie [der SAL] zur Durchfuhrung von Regierungsabkommen zwischen der DDR und 
anderen Staaten tiber die zeitweilige Beschaftigung auslandischer Werktatiger in Betrieben der DDR, 1 
July 1980. Reproduced in: Eva-Maria & Lothar Eisner, Zwischen Nationalismus undIntemationalismus, 
Rostock, 1994, 140-65.
15 Richtlinie [der SAL] fur die Unterbringung auslandischer Werktatiger in Gemeinschaftsunterktinften 
vom 8 Feb. 1982. Reproduced in Andreas Mtiggenberg, Die auslandischen Vertragsarbeitnehmer in der 
ehemaligen DDR, Berlin, 1995, 99-102.
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every worker was entitled to (from beds and blankets down to the individual pieces of 
cutlery). This was an indication that the SAL was attempting to force thrifty factories 
into providing a minimum of standards and to rein in the more generous ones. As it was 
the duty of factories to decorate and furnish the hostels, living conditions could vary 
from hostel to hostel or even within the same hostel, which gave rise to complaints from 
the workers. A hostel in Bad Langensalza, for example, housed Vietnamese and Cuban 
workers. The former, employed by the local VEB Schuh- und Lederwaren, enjoyed 
better furnishings than the latter, who worked at the VEB Westthuringer 
Kammgamspinnerei in nearby Muhlhausen.16
Other sources point to the fact that many workers enjoyed far more than the 
minimum standards outlined in official agreements and directives. As an Algerian 
newspaper reported in 1979, Algerian workers in Schonebeck lived in a purpose-built 
hostel close to the factory and each room was furnished with beds, tables, closets and 
fridges. Tulips and Algerian postcards adorned the rooms, where the contract workers 
relaxed listening to their radios and, in some cases, hi-fis. Communal facilities consisted 
of a kitchen, television room, laundry, and showers. In Hoyerswerda, conditions were 
even better. Algerians had an apartment block to themselves with six workers sharing 
three-bed roomed flats, each equipped with a kitchen and a bathroom.17 It is possible 
that SAL state secretary Horst Rademacher had such conditions in mind when, at a 
meeting of the central task force on contract workers in 1979, he called for an end to 
what he saw as the overgenerous treatment of contract workers by some factories which 
he claimed misused state funds in presenting workers with gifts. In doing so the 
factories helped
impede the integration o f these citizens in their native countries because the drop in living standards 
appears all the more extreme. Such difficulties are apparent in the Algerian workforce and the first 
indications are also appearing among the Cuban workers.18
The Mozambican workers employed at the Fajas factory in Suhl from 1980 lived in 
their hostel two to a room. Previously the same rooms had slept six German apprentices. 
Views on the hostel varied among the Mozambican workers as well as Germans. A 
visual insight into conditions and life in this particular hostel is provided by the award-
16 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 17. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung zum Stand der politisch-operativen 
Sicherung auslandischer Werktatigen im Bezirk Erfurt, 9 Mar. 1988.
17 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. SAL translation o f Algerian newspaper article by Abdelaziz Sebaa in 
Algerie actualite, 14-20 June 1979, 10 [of translation].
18 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41613. Protokoll fiber die Beratung der zentralen Arbeitsgruppe zur Leitung des 
Einsatzes [...] auslandischen Werktatigen am 16. Mai 1979, 23 May 1979,2.
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winning photo series entitled “Solidarity” produced by the Suhl camera club Kontrast.19 
Some of the photos display tidy rooms adorned with posters of women or the hunting 
weapons produced by the factory, trophies, and in one case a radio. However, the 
countenances of most of the workers betray a sense of tiredness, if not boredom and 
resignation. Perhaps they had just come back from work. On the other hand, some 
workers are fashionably dressed and seem ready to go out.20 In 1982, an East German 
girlfriend of a Mozambican worker described the atmosphere in the hostel as bare and 
lifeless, devoid of any privacy. Twenty years later, a former resident, who remained in 
Suhl after the Wende, recalled the overheating in the hostel which he felt contrasted 
with the utter lack of emotional care provided for its residents. In a damning 
comparison, he likened the building to those provided in South Africa for Mozambican 
workers during the Apartheid era. Yet another former resident, who returned to 
Mozambique after his contract expired, expressed a totally different retrospective view. 
On a brief return visit to Germany in 2002, he was amazed and saddened to see that the 
building had been demolished and exclaimed that: “We’d have been happy to have had 
such homes in Mozambique.”21 The hostel clearly represented a marked improvement to 
what its residents had previously been accustomed. These differing opinions show that 
perceptions are always subjective, involve a comparison with a particular norm, and are 
strongly influenced by retrospective influences.
Official regulations envisaged “continuous” and “strict” supervision of contract 
workers in the hostels and the workplace. This was the responsibility of a number of 
East German and foreign personnel. Wardens (Heimleiter) were responsible for 
supervision in the hostels. In ensuring that the terms of the labour agreements were 
implemented in the factories, foreign supervisors (Beauftragten), who were usually 
appointed by the embassy of the country providing the labour, liaised with East German 
supervisors (Betreuer), who were selected by the employing factory.
However, just as the ability to provide suitable accommodation often failed owing 
to a lack of preparation and resources, so too did the system of control in the hostels and 
the workplace. Wardens were not always up to the task of implementing stringent rules 
and regulations on everything from the registration of visitors, to implementing lights 
out, to the maintenance of order and cleanliness. Contract workers were able to take
19 Consisting of 32 black and white prints o f varying size arranged into four thematic sequences (living, 
working, politics, and learning), it was a gold medal winner at the 19th Arbeiterfestspiele in 1982.
20 See Fotografie, 37:4 (1983), 128f. My thanks to Dr. Josie McLellan for alerting me to this source.
21 Landolf Scherzer, Die Fremden, Berlin, 2002, 21, 55, 63, and 11.
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advantage of these shortcomings. Vietnamese workers, for example, consciously took
00advantage of the inability of wardens to distinguish them from one another.
An analysis of police situation reports from a number of Bezirke over a two year 
period (from 1977 to 1979) indicate that official regulations were not being enforced 
thoroughly in many Algerian, Hungarian and Polish hostels. An Algerian hostel in the 
small village of Lippendorf (Bezirk Leipzig) was representative of many. Wardens were 
only on duty on weekdays from 7am to 10pm. In addition, the influence of the Algerian 
supervisor was minimal as he had moved out of the hostel some time previously and 
rarely visited the place to carry out his responsibilities. This, the police complained, left 
“the Algerian citizens to themselves not only after work but on Sundays and public 
holidays”, adding that trips to drinking establishments in the village and in nearby 
towns kept the workers occupied, as did the “increasing visits of females to the hostel”. 
The situation in Lippendorf had been developing since the previous year when workers 
began developing contacts with “very impressionable criminal women who, officially 
and unofficially, often spend days in the hostels, indeed travelling from all parts of the 
GDR to do so”.23 Similarly, the lax standards of supervision in a Hungarian hostel in 
Freital (.Bezirk Dresden) enabled “asocial” women to stay overnight24 Little progress 
was made by local police in rectifying the situation and a report four years later 
bemoaned the impossibility of imposing “order and security” in the Hungarian and the 
Yugoslav hostels 25
The supervisors appointed by the labour-delegating countries were also expected to 
perform controlling and disciplinary functions. According to a SAL directive issued in 
1975, Algerian supervisors were to assist the factory director in “political-pedagogical 
work” in order to “encourage the development of collectives” and to “influence the 
strengthening of workplace discipline” among Algerian workers.26 Foreign supervisors 
were also expected to assist the hostel wardens in maintaining discipline. However, the 
quality of this work varied considerably. In Halle in 1977 the GDR and foreign 
supervisors were not numerically strong enough “to present the norms of socialist 
society adequately to the workers during their relatively short stay and to get them
22 Michael Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten undArbeiter in der DDR und ihre Beobachtung durch das 
MfS, Magdeburg, 1999,44.
23 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattung zu eingeleiteten Ermittlungsverfahren, 18 
Jan. 1979,10.
24 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 5 July 1979.
25 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46778. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 10 Feb. 1982.
26 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Ordnung uber die Aufgaben, Rechte und Verantwortung der staatlichen 
Beauftragten der DVRA in Betrieben der DDR, n.d. [30 Apr. 1976].
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oninvolved in it”. Another common problem was the reluctance of many supervisors to 
live in the same hostels as their workers. Paid higher wages than the workers and often 
enjoying good contacts in their respective embassies, some supervisors were less than 
enthusiastic about spending their time in the workers’ hostels and sought out better 
accommodation elsewhere, in some cases moving in with East German women they had 
befriended. This left hostel residents with just a German warden to contend with, as was 
the case in the Cuban and Algerian hostels in Schwerin in 1982. The result, police 
claimed, was excessive drinking in the hostels and in surrounding public houses and 
workplace absenteeism.28
In the factories, “minders” or Betreuer (sometimes also referred to as Beauftragten) 
were responsible for the workers on a day to day basis. The number of minders in a 
factory depended on the total numbers of contract workers. In larger factories where 
there was more than one minder, a head minder was appointed to coordinate their work. 
The minders were often a key figure for workers, and served not only as a disciplinary 
instance. Minders listened to the needs of their workers, as noted by an MfS officer in 
1977:
The minders have great influence on the Algerian workers with whom they are in permanent contact. 
They are acknowledged as advisors on legal problems and are the first people to hear about the 
difficulties and annoyances o f the Algerian workers. Therefore it is necessary to ensure that there is a 
close working relationship with the head minder in order to contribute to state security.29
Minders were vital to helping the workers adjust to their new surroundings, 
although their popularity depended on whether they perceived themselves as 
representatives of the state or of the workers. Strict implementation of official rules and 
directives meant for poor relations between the minder and the workers. Blatant 
advocacy, on the other hand, resulted in the minders being reprimanded by their own 
superiors. As some former women minders recalled, the most difficult issue for them 
were the regulations on pregnancy (see chapter six). Naturally they sympathised with 
the workers concerned and wanted to help them but they faced disciplinary action if 
they failed to report cases to factory management.
Georg Mantel, the minder for the Mozambican workers at Fajas in Suhl, was not 
overtly sympathetic to his charges. His levels of cultural understanding were minimal,
27 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Halle, Periodische Information, 1 June 1977.
28 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46778. BDVP Schwerin, Informationen zu eingeleiteten Ermittlungsverfahren 
gegen Biirger anderer Staaten, 10 Feb. 1982, 3.
29 BStU, JHS, MF, VVS 001-339/77. Bemd Thiemann, DieAufgaben der Kreisdienststelle bei der 
politisch-operativen Kontrolle der zeitweilig in der DDR tatigen Auslander aus nichtsozialistischen 
Staaten und Gebieten, und die sich daraus ergebenen Erfordemisse fur das operative Zusammenwirken 
mit anderen Organen, 15 Aug. 1977, 18. See the bibliography for a list o f all MfS theses on foreigners.
30 Hackert-Lemke & Unterbeck, “Betreuerinnen”, 97.
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criticising the workers for their loudness, dress code, cuisine, punctuality and growing 
materialism. He had no special training for the job, and as he noted himself, the factory 
provided nothing in terms of care for the workers in times of emotional crisis, such as a 
relative’s death.31 The minder for Cuban workers employed at the Elektro-Apparate- 
Werke in Berlin, Ludwig, was more progressive and drew up his own induction 
programme for new workers, which involved shopping, using public transport, and a 
visit to a restaurant. In addition, he organised regular tours, but more importantly, he 
arranged sex education classes for his Cuban women workers. Similarly, Ana, a 
Mozambican supervisor at Fajas, earned the nickname “the pill mother” for her efforts 
in encouraging her compatriots to take contraception.33 As discussed in chapter six, 
such assistance was of vital importance as the Cuban, Mozambican and Vietnamese 
governments summarily ordered the repatriation of any worker who became pregnant 
during their contracts.
As a number of officials at the Fajas factory in Suhl argued, the rules and 
regulations outlined in central directives were impractical and even counterproductive in 
an everyday context. The prohibition of alcohol in the hostels, for example, led only to 
more public drinking, which the personnel manager (a former military officer) had also 
experienced in the NVA. Thus, he refrained from applying the ban. Likewise, the rules 
on cleanliness in the kitchens were just as unenforceable in hostels occupied by contract 
workers as by Germans.34 Other accounts suggest that pressure from the workers 
resulted in a relaxation in the ban on cohabitation. The Cuban workers O. and R. were 
partners, who like other couples in the same building, had won the concession to share a 
room soon after arriving even though this was officially forbidden. Although they 
shared the room with another Cuban woman, they created a private sphere of sorts for 
themselves by means of a curtain partition which they erected.
Hostels were not always purpose-built and workers were frequently housed in 
apartments designed for East German families. As the police in Halle noted with 
concern in 1977, the “objective conditions” of hostels largely determined the level of 
enforcement of “order and security” in them. A workers’ hostel in Buna had six 
entrances but only one porter’s desk which enabled Cuban contract workers to avoid 
visitor controls. In addition, the fact that they shared the building with German women
31 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 89-95.
32 Runge, Ausland DDR, 71 f.
33 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 125.
34 Ibid., 40f.
35 Runge, Ausland DDR, 40.
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workers only served to complicate matters further, police claimed. Indeed, in some 
areas suitable buildings were not available to accommodate foreign workers 
collectively. In Leipzig, for example, Algerian workers employed by the VEB GISAG 
foundry were dispersed throughout the city in a number of hostels.37
The assertiveness of contract workers served to limit the authority of their 
compatriot supervisors, who had to thread a careful line between fulfilling official 
requirements and representing the aspirations, expectations and demands of the workers. 
Algerian supervisors were often elected by their fellow workers, and depending on the 
strength of the workforce, continued to work alongside them. As such, Algerian 
workers expected their supervisors to represent their interests and resorted to a variety 
of traditional methods such as social ostracism or even physical violence in dealing with 
unpopular supervisors. In some cases, such pressure led to the sacking of the supervisor 
and the appointment of a new one.39
At the Fajas factory in Suhl, the authority of the supervisors and wardens declined 
gradually owing to the assertiveness of the Mozambican workers. In the weeks 
subsequent to their arrival in the hostel, Fabian, the supervisor (who was a functionary 
in the FRELIMO youth wing) was in control, maintaining discipline by means of 
regular drills, parades and political meetings. Yet, these manifestations were quickly 
abandoned according to a disappointed but observant East German neighbour and 
replaced by loud music, late nights, and the unwelcome whiff of garlic chicken, a 
Mozambican speciality. The will of the workers also impaired the authority of the East 
German warden, who had to issue any formal requests to the workers via Fabian, whose 
own authority and writ was increasingly limited. Indeed, workers even refused to 
present identity cards to the warden when entering the building, claiming that their 
“black skin” was their badge of identity.40 Greatly outnumbered, the supervisor and 
warden undoubtedly had little choice but to seek an accommodation with the workers. 
At this level, administrative authority did not equate with social authority and officials 
had to adopt a pragmatic approach in order to avoid generating dissent and conflict. In
36 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Bericht zum Einsatz kubanischer Werktatiger, 24 Sept. 1979.
37 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattung zu Straftaten und Vorkommnisse mit 
Burgem anderen Staaten, 15 July 1977, 5.
38 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. §3 o f  the Protokoll zur Erganzung und Anderung des Abkommens v. 11. 
Apr. 1974, 21 Mar. 1976.
39 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. Bericht iiber der aufierordentlichen Kontrollbetratung im WBK Erfurt, 
28 Feb. 1983.
40 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 12, 90, 129.
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the late 1980s, some Mozambican supervisors were not much older than the workers
which served to greatly limit their authority.41
As the numbers of workers trebled between 1986 and 1989, the authority of the East
German wardens, supervisors, minders and foreign supervisors suffered accordingly. In
one Berlin factory in late 1989, twenty minders had to cater for the needs of 650
contract workers from four different countries 42 In cases like this, management were
simply unable to provide an adequate number of supervisory staff owing to labour
shortages and demands to increase production. Authority in the hostels also decreased.
According to the Erfurt MfS in 1988, hostels were run in a manner far removed from
the targets set by central government:
Largely due to the unsatisfactory application o f visitor and overnight stay regulations in the hostels 
the accommodation issue creates problems for the DVP. In the vast majority o f [hostels] there is no 
effective control o f people’s movements, enabling foreigners and GDR citizens to stay overnight 
illegally as well allowing the resident foreign workers take long-term absences unchecked.43
The following year, wardens in Erfurt were complaining that residents confronted them 
with the “threat and use of force” if they tried to prevent them inviting friends and 
“dubious female GDR citizens, well known to the police” to the hostel. Only in the 
Mozambican hostels in Erfurt was there some semblance of “order and security” owing 
to “permanent and targeted” control44 The same month, MfS Main Department XVIII 
reported that the authority of wardens in Vietnamese hostels had effectively collapsed, 
necessitating frequent raids by police, customs and factory officials to combat what they 
saw as illegal activities and customs infringements.45 Yet, such raids were often 
frustrated by the actions of contract workers. In Erfurt, for example, they installed in 
locks and other security devices to prevent the police from confiscating their 
possessions.46 These were not the first cases of contract workers frustrating police 
activity and protecting their hostels. In 1979, police officers investigating a violent 
attack by Polish on Cuban workers in Guben were unable to interview the main suspects 
after the Polish “stewards group” (Ordnungsgruppe) “requested” them not to enter the 
hostel, claiming it would sort out the matter.47 Similarly, in 1982 Libyan apprentices
41 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 5. Generalmajor Schwarz, Information tiber aktuelle Probleme beim 
Einsatz auslSndischer Arbeitskrafte, 11 Sept. 1989.
42 Runge, Ausland DDR, 74.
43 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 16. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988.
44 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 4. Schwarz, Information, 11 Sept. 1989.
45 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 28. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung zur politisch-operativen Lage unter 
den auslandischen Werktatigen, 7 Sept. 1989.
46 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 17. Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988.
47 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47851. Sachstandsbericht zum Vorkommnis, 13 June 1979. Ordnungsgruppen, 
composed of handpicked contract workers, had been set up in a number of towns in an effort to reduce the 
number o f incidents with East German youths.
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employed in the railway engineering works at Halberstadt disputed the right of the DVP 
to search their rooms (as part of an investigation into a rape allegation) on the grounds 
that the hostel represented Libyan “national territory”.48
The MfS too had difficulty in penetrating the hostels. As the Erfurt MfS admitted in 
1988, its infiltration of contract worker communities was anything but elaborate and 
failed completely to meet “present and future requirements”. None of the 5,100 contract 
workers in the Bezirk had been recruited as unofficial informers, leaving the MfS 
dependent on the secondary information provided by German informers. Although the 
workers’ supervisors and minders were in the best position to provide information, the 
Stasi had only begun to tap these channels in the same year and only in the Kreise of 
Eisenach, Nordhausen, and Amstadt. Yet, only a total of four unofficial informers had 
been recruited from the wardens and technical staff in the eighty hostels in same three 
areas. In only one Kreis, Langensalza, did the Stasi feel it was well informed on the 
activities of the Vietnamese workers. This information was provided by a GDR worker 
who had spent time in Vietnam which equipped him with the linguistic and social skills 
necessary to engage with and win the confidence of the workers 49
The workplace was not the “most important area for contact” between contract 
workers and GDR citizens, as has been suggested.50 Rather, as chapter six argues, 
contact was far more extensive beyond the workplace environment and was not 
dependent on or a consequence of successful social integration in the factory. As Riedel 
has convincingly argued, recreational interaction between Algerians and East Germans 
was more intensive in non-workplace contexts.51 This assertion is supported by the 
findings of a survey carried out in 1990 by the Cologne Institute for Social Research 
and Social Policy and commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social 
Affairs. Although two-thirds of the foreigners surveyed found their German workmates 
“cooperative” (compared to fifteen percent who described them as negative), only a 
third claimed that these contacts extended beyond the factory and after working hours. 
Contact with non-work related friends was much higher. 77 percent of the foreigners 
questioned claimed to have had such contact, two-thirds of this number on a regular
48 BStU, ASt Magdeburg, KD Halberstadt, 739, fo. 47. Mundliche Information IMS Bemd Schulze, 16 
Apr. 1982.
49 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fos. 10-12, 34. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988.
50 Dennis Kuck, ‘“Fur den sozialistischen Aufbau ihrer Heimat’? Auslandische Vertragsarbeiter in der 
DDR”, in: Jan Behrends et al. (eds), Fremd undFremd-Sein in der DDR, Berlin, 2003, 271-281, here 276.
51 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus, spate Adoleszenz und Protest. Algerische Vertragsarbeiter in 
der DDR”, in: KZSS, 53:5 (2001), 76-95, here 92.
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basis. In addition, a quarter of foreigners claimed they spent their free time almost 
exclusively with East Germans.52
The discrepancy between workplace and non-workplace social contact was always 
apparent, as illustrated by the experience of some Algerian workers in the early 1960s. 
Although the FGDB bemoaned that the Algerians were “barely” involved in “internal 
factory life”, what it effectively meant was that they were not being exposed to the 
correct type of “political education and development”. The same report contained 
implicit proof that contact was taking place, but as it had developed outside of the realm 
prescribed by the authorities, it was portrayed in the worst possible terms. It referred to 
the alleged womanising and drinking of foreign workers, adding that some Algerians 
living in Bitterfeld refused to work and had no income but could rely on the financial 
support of some East German women they had befriended in the locality.53 This type of 
behaviour contrasted with the kind encouraged by the authorities, who wished to 
regulate binational contact and use it for political purposes. As one critical Indian 
student remarked in 1956, this led to foreigners being paraded “like show horses” at 
factory meetings and at political events.54 Foreigners became a regular component at 
stage-managed party and trade union political manifestations, as captured in one report 
from late 1953: “Our Korean friends have been invited with great enthusiasm to many 
societal events. Everywhere they are greeted as the daughters and sons of the heroic 
Korean people.”55
It was the existence of uncontrolled social interaction rather than the social isolation 
of foreigners that forced the FDGB to draw up its first “guidance programme” in May 
1961, which incidentally coincided with the SED’s move to legalise the international 
students’ associations (see the previous chapter). The directive called for the 
appointment of a Betreuer or minder for every worker, instructed factory trade union 
branches to organise social and recreational activities, and encouraged the signing of 
“friendship contracts” between German brigades and foreign workers.56 Friendships 
were not to develop autonomously and freely but were to be pre-arranged and managed.
52 The results were published by Wilhelm Breuer (ed.), Auslanderfeindlichkeit in der ehemaligen DDR. 
Studie zur Ursachen, Umfang und Auswirkungen von Auslanderfeindlichkeit im Gebiet der ehemaligen 
DDR und zur Moglichkeiten ihrer Uberwindung, Koln, 1990. Quoted in: Eisner, Eva-Maria & Lothar, 
Zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalism s, Rostock, 1994, 61.
53 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/354, fos. 134-37. Deubner (FDGB) to Rohner (Abt. Int.
Verbindungen, SED), 21 Mar. 1961.
54 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/639, fos. 89-95, here 91. Report on Tag der Auslandsstudenten, 20- 
21 Jan. 1956.
55 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/640, fo. 52. Bericht [der SHF] tiber das Studium der koreanischen 
Studenten in der DDR, 24 Nov. 1953.
56 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8297. Beschlufi (S 329a/61) des Sekretariats zur Betreuung der auslandischen 
Arbeiter in der DDR, 29 May 1961.
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Guidelines of this type were not a recipe for success and could not prevent foreigners
interacting as they pleased with East Germans. From 1968 to 1970, the Sudanese trainee
Ibrahim Omar Ahmed was the only foreign worker in the Makarenko factory in Weida.
Although his factory-appointed “sponsor” and the factory director were keen to invite
him to their homes, he chose to make his own friends in the town and also had extensive
contacts with compatriots studying in Magdeburg.57 Neither did the guidelines do much
for foreign workers who had difficulty in making friends and who felt isolated in the
GDR. In a letter written in early 1962 a Laotian worker living and working in
Frankfurt/Oder described his predicament to a Belgian friend and fellow refugee thus:
I no longer have a father, and I have no friends. No one cares for me. Sometimes I wander totally 
alone through the streets, in the cold or go rambling in the countryside. Then there are moments 
when I’m led astray by my emotions: why continue living? But then I think and say, do nothing 
foolish, I have to live, every worker is my friend and the entire working class is my fatherland and 
then my loneliness is over. You and I are struggling for the same thing. [...] For the dispossessed 
like me, it will take a long time to build a new life for myself in this new society where there is no 
exploitation or injustice.58
Needless to say, the levels of interaction between foreigners and East Germans 
depended on local conditions, the inclinations of the communities in the factories and 
towns where the foreigners lived, and ultimately on the foreigners themselves. The 
presence of foreign workers or apprentices offered East Germans the chance to progress 
beyond the anonymity of collective proletarian internationalism and solidarity to more 
individual and personal forms of friendship. But as two examples demonstrate, the 
FDGB hierarchy was often suspicious of grass-roots initiatives to help foreigners. This 
was the experience of Nguyen van Lam, who came to the GDR as a “sick child” and 
who returned to Vietnam as a qualified glass blower in 1964. He seems to have been 
received well by his East German colleagues in Dobem and WeiBwasser where he 
worked, studied and qualified. One colleague recalled “our little friend Lam” as a “hard 
working, ambitious and intelligent young man” who frequently volunteered to keep the 
glass ovens going at nights and during the weekends. After his return to Vietnam, he 
kept up correspondence with some of his former colleagues. In one letter, dated October 
1966, he described graphically the effects of the US aerial bombardment of his native 
city Haiphong, adding that he was forced out of need to sell the moped he had taken 
back with him from the GDR. Moved by his appeal, his former workmates organised a 
collection to buy him a new moped. Although the workers requested the assistance of 
the FDGB in Berlin in sending the bike to Vietnam, it took just under a year for this to
57 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8337. Leistungseinschatzung, 22 Jan. 1970, 2f.
58 BArch, DO 1/34.0/32179. Notes o f conversation with Alfons Rondeu about Sopha Sissane, 17 Apr.
1962.
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take place.59 In another case, a group of five Congolese trade unionists and supporters of 
the murdered prime minister Patrice Lumumba, who had come to the GDR to study at 
the HSDG at Bemau but who feared repression at the hands of the new regime in 
Kinshasa if they returned home, spent two years working in factories while the FDGB 
deliberated on whether or not to deport them. According to the scant archival material 
available, the workers seem to have settled in well in the towns where they were sent. 
Two got work in a detergent factory in Genthin and were involved in a local dance 
group. Another was given a job as a crane operator in a steelworks in Groditz, attended 
night school in the hope that he could study economics at university and even won the 
support of his factory for his plans. Yet, the FDGB’s International Department 
instructed the factory to refrain from doing anything that would prolong his stay in the 
GDR.60
Some foreigners’ testimony shows that relations in the factories were in no way 
homogeneous and indicates that the attitudes of East Germans towards foreigners were 
generally determined by a number of factors, such as their position in the factory 
hierarchy (management, foreman, skilled or unskilled worker), gender, and age. Equally 
important was the fact that contract workers were generally employed in the lower-tier 
jobs in production, worked unconventional shifts, and with time came to form the 
majority in particular work collectives in many factories. Increasingly, foreigners found 
themselves working alongside the less-skilled, less-successful and less-educated East 
German workers. Many of these East German workers found an easy target in contract 
workers for their pent-up frustrations.
The Vietnamese worker H., employed in a Brandenburg factory, enjoyed the rare 
opportunities he had to work with Germans as it enabled him to improve his German 
language skills. He was on good terms with his forewoman and had received a few 
invitations from East German colleagues to visit their homes. In general, he claims he 
got on better with the older workers as he found his younger, East German women 
colleagues particularly irritable and unfriendly. The opposite was the case for O., a 
Cuban employed in a Berlin textile factory, who hated the loud and contemptuous way 
older workers addressed their younger colleagues, regardless of nationality. On the 
other hand, she described her younger East German colleagues as “passive”. Although 
most Cubans had been invited to a German home at least once for a visit or for a
59 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/13/130/2043. Lam to Frau Kubaschk, 7 Oct. 1966 and other documents.
60 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8355. This file contains correspondence on case, dating from 25 Apr. 1965 to 
11 Nov. 1968. Although the five left in April 1966, they returned to the GDR that December but were 
deported a second time four months later.
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birthday party, there was little interaction at the weekends and Cubans and East 
Germans rarely went out to discos together. Her boyfriend on the other hand got on very 
well with a colleague’s son and they trained in boxing and karate together. Overall, O. 
claimed, she got on best with the Polish workers, who had invited her and many more 
Cubans to visit their homes in Poland.61
As Scherzer’s interviews carried out in 1982 in the Fajas factory in Suhl show, 
foreigners encountered a wide spectrum of the East German public in the workplace. 
Some workers were hostile, while others were sympathetic. 19-year-old Carmen Dietz 
typified the latter. She worked in the “Kacomba” brigade and although she knew the 
term had something to do with Mozambique, was unsure of what it meant. She spoke 
out in favour of allowing her Mozambican colleagues attend the brigade party, had no 
problem sitting beside them in the factory canteen, and felt like punching those who 
argued that they were responsible for the filthy state of the factory. She claimed that her 
attitudes, although shared and supported by some of her friends, were rejected by many 
of her colleagues, men in particular.62
Other sources portray a more miserable climate in the factories. In a glass factory in 
Oschatz in 1979, an Algerian worker was punched on the ear by his foreman for taking 
a long break, while another, who was poorly educated, was taunted by his foreman for 
not taking skills training.63 In late September 1989 after a strike by Cuban workers in a 
synthetics factory in Wittenberge {Bezirk Schwerin), an investigation into conditions 
uncovered the widespread abuse of contract workers. Not only had management 
transgressed a number of labour regulations regarding working hours, sick pay and 
holiday leave, but East German workers had made Cubans clean up after them and 
referred to them as “Neger”.64
The attitudes of contract workers towards work and the workplace varied widely 
just as they did among the East German workforce. Attitudes were often influenced by 
the specific terms and conditions set out in the different labour agreements, their 
implementation by the employing factory, as well as the personal, social and economic 
needs of individual workers. Crucial in this regard were the opportunities made
61 Runge, Ausland DDR, 45. Rohr also notes the hospitality o f Polish transit workers employed along the 
Oder-Neifie border, who invited German colleagues to their homes. However, such visits were not 
possible during the political disturbances in the early 1980s. Hoffiiung. Hilfe. Heuchelei. Geschichte des 
Einsatzes polnischer Arbeitskrafte in Betrieben des DDR-Grenzbezirks Frankfurt/Oder 1966-1991, 
Berlin, 2001, 182, n. 194.
62 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 112 and 115.
63 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Info der SAL iiber Anzeichen eines Arbeitskonflikts, 19 Jan. 1979.
64 Sandra Gruner-Domic, Kubanische Arbeitsmigration in die DDR 1978-1989. Das Arbeitsabkommen 
Kuba-DDR und dessen Realisierung, Berlin, 1997, 32-37.
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available to the workers to purchase consumer goods and to send these or cash 
remittances home. There were considerable differences in this regard. Polish contract 
workers could take home 80 percent of their wages in goods. Vietnamese workers on 
the other hand could bring home goods valued at 50 percent of their total net income 
earned over five years. Remittance rates also varied. While Algerians could send home 
40 percent of their net wages,65 Cuban, Mozambican and Vietnamese workers could 
only transfer 60 percent of their net earnings exceeding 350 or 360 marks in 
remittances. In the Mozambican case, this money was misappropriated to help repay 
Mozambique’s debt with the GDR without the consent or knowledge of the workers.66
Not surprisingly, early reports on the norm fulfilment of Algerian refugees in the 
early 1960s demonstrate that there was no standard work pattern among foreign 
workers. At the Sachsenring car factory in Zwickau, officials noted that “when it comes 
to work, the Algerians are in no way inferior to their German colleagues”. Similarly, 
Algerians working in a garage in Werdau were held in high esteem by their German 
colleagues, many of whom had contact with them outside of working hours. Only a 
paper mill in Floha was unhappy with its seven Algerian employees, who only managed 
50 to 60 percent of the norm. Yet, as a visiting functionary implied, the German 
workforce was less than exemplary according to East German standards, consisting 
mainly of returnees from West Germany and former convicts.67 Foreigners who failed 
to fulfil work norms faced expulsion from the country. Of the 202 Algerians granted 
asylum by 1960, for example, an eighth were subsequently expelled after proving 
themselves to be “work-shy and asocial elements, unable to take their place in society” 
according to police.68
Unfamiliar with the reality of an industrial society, foreigners sought to maintain 
their customary daily habits for which officials had little understanding. In 1960, for 
example, Egyptian workers in Halle were unwilling to work more than four hours a day 
during the summer,69 which made total sense in the warmer Egyptian climate. Similarly, 
thirty years later, Vietnamese workers in a Berlin factory returned to their hostels for
65 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Bericht [des SAL] tiber Ergebnisse des probeweisen Einsatzes von 500 
algerischen Werktatigen im Jahre 1974, 13 Dec. 1974, 3.
66 Hans-Joachim Doring, ‘Es geht um unsere Existenz Die Politik der DDR gegeniiber der Dritten Welt 
am Beispiel Mosambik und Athiopien, Berlin, 1999, 230-239. The majermanes, as the Mozambicans who 
worked in the GDR are known, are currently involved in a campaign in Mozambique to have this money 
repaid to them.
67 BArch, DO 1/34.0/29099. Aufnahme von Auslandem in der DDR, 23 Nov. 1959 and subsequent 
Bericht liber eine Dienstreise im Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt, 24-27 Nov. 1959.
68 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41383. Einschatzung, 10 Jan. 1960.
69 Ibid. Festlegungen von MaBnahmen zur Verbesserung der Arbeit mit den Auslandem, n.d. [ca. June 
I960],
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naps after their midday meal only to return to work later. Although she tried for years,
their East German supervisor claimed she could not get them to drop the habit.70
Clearly, East German officials and workers suffered from propaganda which tended to
glorify particular nations and nationalities as heroic, disciplined and self-sacrificing.
Shortly after the arrival of Cuban workers in Halle, for example, the BDVP reported:
The Cuban workers are not used to the life o f an industrial worker. This gives rise to problems 
regarding work discipline, attitudes to learning, and recreational behaviour. This is expressed in 
unpunctuality, leaving the workplace during working hours, disregard for the workplace smoking 
ban, and inattentiveness during class. GDR citizens, especially in the factory collectives, had 
reckoned with exemplary, military-disciplined Cuban workers. Although their expectations have 
failed to materialise, no negative attitudes towards the Cuban workers can be ascertained.71
Clearly, the Cubans did not see the factory solely as a place of production. Neither did 
many East Germans for that matter but this was of lesser concern to officials. When 
contract workers attempted to express themselves in the factories, they overtaxed the 
cultural limits of their German supervisors and colleagues, as captured in the disquiet of 
Ludwig, a minder for Cuban workers at the Berlin Elektro-Apparate-Werke in the late 
1980s:
The Cubans tend to conduct themselves in a loud manner, which the [German] colleagues find 
annoying. They are carefree. They used to sing and even drum during breaks. O f course, they’ve the 
feeling for rhythm and when the punching machine is pounding away, they beat along with the time, 
which the Germans don’t like. We had many talks about this, which inhibited them and got them to 
stop.72
Foreign employees were often the best workers in particular plants. In some Erfurt 
factories in 1988, Vietnamese workers were reportedly using every available 
opportunity to maximise their income. Especially in light industry, Vietnamese 
productivity was above-average, while Cuban and Mozambican workers averaged at 
fifty percent of the norm.73 Indeed, it was the hard work, diligence, and self-discipline 
of the Vietnamese -  rather than their alleged laziness -  that aggravated German 
workers. As the same report noted, “the readiness of the [Vietnamese] to carry out 
special shifts, to work on Sundays and public holidays, as well as shift work, is the 
cause of the growing problems in the cooperation with GDR workers”.74 The presence 
of hard-working foreign workers served at times to expose the low productivity levels 
of GDR workers. Indeed, a report the following year noted that Vietnamese workers 
who were fulfilling the norm by 130 percent in the Erfurt textile factories Modetreff in
70 Runge, Ausland DDR, 77.
71 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Bericht zum Einsatz kubanischer Werktatiger, 24 Sept. 1979.
72 Quoted in Runge, Ausland DDR, 70.
73 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 6. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988.
74 Ibid.
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Amstadt, Cottana in Miihlhausen, and Nadelwerk in Ichtershausen were condemned as 
“norm breakers” by their GDR colleagues.75
At the Fajas factory in Suhl, the performance of the Mozambicans on the assembly 
lines stood in stark contrast to that of many of their East German colleagues. 
Accommodating the desire of the contract workers to maximise their wages and to 
overcome the effects of low productivity on the part of East German workers, foreman 
Rudi Gradtke (b. 1921) allowed them to work up to 160 hours overtime a month, 
although this was illegal under the labour laws. The East German assembly line workers 
were an undisciplined and uneducated “pack of hoodlums” (Sautruppe) he believed, 
pointing out that they spent their shifts drinking in a nearby bar. Gradtke, who proudly 
defined himself as a proletarian, admired the ability of the Mozambicans to identify the 
contradictions of socialist society, questioning the levels of waste on the part of GDR 
workers, for example.76 They reconfirmed his belief that socialism could work, 
something he claimed to have believed in passionately since entering Fajas shortly after 
the war.
In Erfurt in 1988, Mozambican workers only averaged fifty percent of the norm but 
a year later the MfS noted a marked improvement in their “attitude towards work and 
willingness to work special shifts”. In addition, none had been involved in workplace 
accidents and they were less likely than East Germans to be sick or involved in 
disciplinary transgressions. The factories only complained about the poor quality of the 
products produced by the Mozambicans.77 As most Mozambicans had never worked in 
an industrial environment before coming to the GDR, their improved performance can 
undoubtedly be attributed to their gradual adjustment to factory life. In addition, the 
decision to reduce the compulsory wage transfer from sixty to forty percent in May 
1989, which saw an increase in the actual wages of Mozambican contract workers, may 
also have helped boost performance. While personal motivation ultimately determined 
the willingness of workers to fulfil the norms, some factories resorted to disciplinary 
measures to compel contract workers into producing more. In an effort to cut down on 
absenteeism, for example, officials at the VEB Elektro-Apparate-Werke in Berlin 
threatened to withhold the separation allowance from Cuban workers or to prohibit 
them from taking motorbikes purchased in the GDR back to Cuba.78
75 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 9. Schwarz, Information, 11 Sept. 1989.
76 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 78-82.
77 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 1. Schwarz, Information, 11 Sept. 1989.
78 Runge, Ausland DDR, 44.
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Contract workers were thus in a precarious position. They harvested the resentment 
of the East German workforce if they worked too hard and the condemnation of officials 
if they produced too little. By never spelling out publicly the contribution made by the 
contract workers to the economy or their work rates, East German officials left the issue 
open to rumour and confusion. Only in March 1989 did some newspapers publish norm 
rates in what was undeniably part of an SED media offensive, kicked off some days 
previously by Egon Krenz’s claim to the Volkskammer that contract workers were 
“creative partners for the common good”.79
The attitudes of contract workers towards training were also complex. If foreigners 
wished to acquire training and take on an apprenticeship, they faced considerable 
difficulties and burdens. The most prominent obstacle was language: contract workers 
first had to acquire an adequate standard of German before they could attend training 
classes. The short language course provided to incoming workers after their arrival in 
the GDR, which lasted only a few weeks, was often not enough to allow them take up 
training.80 There was also a crucial difference between the pre- and post-1978 
agreements. In the former, training was provided by the factories on site, albeit outside 
of working hours. In the latter, however, training was mainly on offer though the regular 
adult education system. The low levels of language proficiency and education as well as 
the fact that the workers were employed in a three-shift system frustrated their 
attendance at such courses. Workers did want to learn, however, but demanded that 
classes not encroach on their free time. Indeed, one of the demands of an Algerian strike 
in Neustadt in December 1975 was for German and maths classes to be held during 
working hours.81 As one German teacher reported to the Algerian newspaper El 
Moudjahid in the same month, some workers argued that they learned more German 
from their East German girlfriends than in his two-hour a week evening class.82 Social 
activity took priority over training for some workers. Four years later, another Algerian 
newspaper reported how a minority of Algerian workers were too exhausted to attend
79 Cubans fulfilled 105.3 percent o f the norm, Vietnamese 101.9, and Mozambicans 101.5 percent. 
Sachsische Zeitung, 10 Mar. 1989. A similar article entitled “Valuable strength in the factories” appeared 
in the CDU paper Neue Zeit two days previously. There is no need to dispute the figures and in 1989 the 
Berlin Elektro-Apparate-Werke factory noted no real discrepancies, with Cubans working 99.5 percent of 
the norm, Runge, Ausland DDR, 72. For Krenz’ comments, ND, 4-5 Mar. 1989.
80 Edith Broszinsky-Schwabe, “Die DDR-Burger im Umgang mit ‘Fremden’ - Versuch einer Bilanz der 
Veraussetzungen fur ein Leben in einer multikulterellen Gesellschaft”, in: Sanem Kleff et al. (eds), BRD- 
DDR. Alte und Neue Rassismen im Zuge der deutsch-deutschen Einigung, Frankfurt a.M., 1990,18-46, 
here 25.
81 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6453. Information tiber die Arbeitsniederlegung algerischer Werktatigen im 
VEB Fortschritt Neustadt, 15 Dec. 1975.
82 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7030. Translation o f Algerian newspaper article entitled “Im Einsatz in der 
DDR: Gastarbeiter nicht wie moglich”, El Moudjahid, 27 Dec. 1975, 9 [of translation].
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evening class owing to their propensity to stay out at “dance bars until four in the 
morning”.83
The frequent reference in police reports to the “misunderstandings” between 
foreigners and East Germans suggests that the language proficiency of contract workers 
was not always optimal. Surprisingly, or perhaps tellingly, the files contain few 
references to workers’ proficiency levels. Undoubtedly, as the numbers of foreign 
workers grew, as was the case with Vietnamese workers in the late 1980s, this added a 
further disincentive to learn German.
Another impediment towards skills acquisition was the low educational standard of 
a minority of workers, particularly among the Algerian, Mozambican, and Angolan 
cohorts. Algerians came from the most varied social milieus, ranging the urban to the 
rural, encompassing near illiterates to qualified personnel. Of the first Algerian cohort, 
8.5 and 9.5 percent had only three or four years schooling respectively, while 82 percent 
had five or more years of schooling.84 Thus, close on 20 percent would have found 
learning German and taking on an apprenticeship a difficult task. Interestingly, in 1979 
Algerian participation in language and theoretical classes in a factory in Schonebeck 
reflected a similar statistical breakdown: a fifth of the Algerian workforce stayed away 
from class, while the attendance rate of the remainder vacillated between 30 to 120 
percent.85 In 1979, Rademacher of the SAL claimed that experience had shown that 
contract workers found it extremely difficult initially to adapt to life in the GDR, 
anticipating that factories would have to delay the deployment of new Mozambican 
workers to the production lines in order to allow them catch up on their “elementary 
education”.86
On the other hand, workers were often disinterested in training as they already had 
qualifications. Up to 60 percent of Hungarian workers, for example, were already 
qualified before coming to the GDR. As they were generally not employed in positions 
analogous to their skills, many chose to return to Hungary.87 Similarly, many 
Vietnamese contract workers employed under the terms of the 1980 labour agreement,
83 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. SAL translation o f Algerian newspaper article by Abdelaziz Sebaa in 
Algerie actualite, 14-20 June 1979, 4f. [of translation]. For the recollections o f Algerian workers o f East 
German nightlife see, Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus”, 84.
84 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Bericht [des SAL] tiber Ergebnisse des probeweisen Einsatzes von 500 
algerischen Werktatigen im Jahre 1974, 13 Dec. 1974, 2. See also: Algerie actualite, 14-20 June 1979, 6.
85 Algerie actualite, 14-20 June 1979, 4f.
86 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41613. Protokoll tiber die Beratung der zentralen Arbeitsgruppe zur Leitung des 
Einsatzes [...] auslandischen Werktatigen am 16. Mai 1979, 23 May 1979.
87 This was recorded in Nepszabadsag, the central Hungarian Communist Party paper, on 18 & 21 Jan. 
1968, see Sandor Kiss, “Ungarische Gastarbeiter in der DDR”, in: Osteuropaische Rundschau 16:1 
(1970), 16f., here 17.
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had already received training in the GDR under previous training and education 
agreements. In addition, under the 1987 agreement revision, the Vietnamese 
government agreed that half of all future cohorts would consist of workers already 
equipped with a GDR craft certificate.88 This explains why the proportion of skilled 
workers among the Vietnamese workforce was relatively high, even though the labour 
exchange agreement did not envisage the provision of training as a priority. In the 
Ludwigsfelde car factory in the late 1980s for example, a small number of Vietnamese 
workers were master craftsmen while 60 to 65 percent were skilled workers.89 The fact 
that so many Vietnamese workers were already qualified may explain why one East 
German minder felt that her Vietnamese workers had little regard for training, lacked 
foresight and were preoccupied with day-to-day culture.90 As the following chapter 
examines in more detail, economic collapse and mass unemployment in Vietnam 
pushed contract workers from there to focus on wage maximisation and material 
acquisition rather than on apprenticeships that were of little benefit in Vietnam.
Irrespective of their nationality, contract workers tended to prefer particular skills 
and trades over others, sensing that these would stand in their favour upon their return 
from the GDR. Thus, almost all the Algerian workers in Schonebeck in 1979 wanted to 
become mechanics, welders or electricians in the belief that only these trades 
guaranteed a job and a good income in Algeria.91 This led to tensions with the 
authorities, who generally showed little understanding for the individual training needs 
of workers. In the early 1960s, five Nigerian engineering apprentices employed at the 
semiconductor plant in Frankfurt/Oder complained that the training on offer was 
unsuited to their needs, while factory officials retorted that they had “muddled views” 
on the nature of the job and were ignorant of the need for “systematic” training 
methods.92 The difficulties were clear: the Nigerians, who had no previous work 
experience, had to learn German, attend theoretical and practical classes, and were 
expected to frequent themselves with Marxism-Leninism, and all this within a few 
years. Similarly, in the late 1980s, the MfS in Erfurt noted that Mozambican workers 
were unaware of the “political-ideological” necessity of acquiring skills in order to help 
in the development of their country upon return. Only the Wohnungsbaukombinat
88 Gruner-Domic, “Beschaftigung statt Ausbildung. Auslandische Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen in der DDR 
(1961-1989)”, in: Jan Motte et al. (eds), 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik - 50 Jahre Einwanderung. 
Nachkriegsgeschichte als Migrationsgeschichte, Frankfurt a.M., 1999, 215-40, here 221.
89 Edith Broszinsky-Schwabe, “Die DDR-Burger im Umgang mit ‘Fremden’”, 26.
90 Runge, Ausland DDR, 76.
91 Algerie actualite, 14-20 June 1979, 3f.
92 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/1647. Einsatz ausl. Genossen und Kollegen im Halbleiterwerk Franfurt/Oder, 
10 Dec. 1962.
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(WBK), a state-run construction company, was relatively successful in encouraging its 
Mozambican workers to take up a trade.93 Clearly workers were reluctant to waste time 
on acquiring apprenticeships for which there was no immediate need in Mozambique. 
Construction skills were an exception and were always a valuable asset, particularly in 
neighbouring South Africa, the traditional destination for Mozambican migrant labour. 
Neither did the labour ministries of the delegating countries pay much attention to the 
personal wishes of workers. As a 1979 Algerian press article emphasised “workers have 
to accept the job assigned to them because on the one hand both [governments] have 
already agreed to this and on the other they were informed of the facts before their 
departure to the GDR”.94 This effectively left workers with little choice but to withdraw 
from the labour exchange programme and return home if they disagreed with conditions 
in the GDR. The most common way to do this was to remain in Algeria while on 
holiday leave from East Germany. Hungarian workers did the same and the statistics 
suggest that up to a quarter of the Hungarian workforce in the GDR left their contracts 
prematurely as they were dissatisfied with pay and conditions.95
Despite all the obstacles, many workers were serious about obtaining a trade in the 
GDR, some even going on strike to force the authorities into fulfilling the training 
aspect of the labour agreements. At the Fajas plant in Suhl in 1977, for example, half of 
the sixty-strong Algerian workforce staged a walk out in a disagreement over training. 
The SAL believed they had a case and instructed management to facilitate their 
demands.96 It is perhaps due to the insistence of the Algerian workers and their 
government that the qualification rate among them was relatively high, as the following 
table demonstrates:
Table 2. Total percentage o f  Algerian workers trained under 1974 agreement 
(1974-1984) as well as specific data fo r  the second cohort (1975-1979)91
Total contingent 
1974-81 (in percentages)
2nd cohort 
1975-79 (in percentages)
Total number o f workers 7,720 3,257
Craft certificate 51.8 43.8
Master craftsman’s certificate 5.2 7.4
No qualifications/semi-skilled 16.8 21.9
Deported/voluntary return to Algeria 26.2 26.9
93 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 2. Schwarz, Information, 11 Sept. 1989.
94 Algerie actualite, 14-20 June 1979, 5.
95 Dirk Jasper, “Auslanderbeschaftigung in der DDR”, in: Marianne Kruger-Potratz, Anderssein gab es 
nicht: Auslander und Minderheiten in der DDR, Munster, 1991,151-190, here 158.
96 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6459. SAL, Information tiber eine Arbeitsniederlegung algerischer 
Werktatigen im VEB Fajas, 24 Oct. 1977.
97 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Information [des MR] tiber die Durchfuhrung des 
Regierungsabkommens mit der DVRA, 17 May 1979, and Sieber und Ehrensperger [Abt. Internationale 
Verbindungen bzw. Planung u. Finanzen des ZK] to Mittag, 29 Aug. 1981.
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Despite the relatively low social status of contract workers in the workplace, they 
were not entirely helpless and could employ a number of strategies to protect their 
interests, and in some cases, win concessions from the authorities. Some protests were 
barely noticeable. Rather unobtrusively, Cuban workers, particularly women, employed 
at the Elektro-Apparate-Werke factory in Berlin feigned sickness out of protest at being 
shouted at by German tool setters.98 Protest also included the more ostentatious and 
traditional forms such as strikes, go slows, and absenteeism.
The first strike uncovered by this research was in January 1959 and involved three 
Syrian trainees embarking on a short hunger strike in protest over poor accommodation 
and training conditions in Magdeburg, where they were employed at the VEB 
Schwermaschinenbau Karl Liebknecht." Apart from this early example, this research 
has found evidence of 23 labour strikes, which took place between 1968 and 1989, 
involving more than a thousand workers from seven different countries (Yugoslavia, 
Poland, Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, Mozambique and Angola). The strike demands 
reflected the issues of concern to the workers. The main bone of contention was the 
issue of wages (raised in 17 disputes), followed by the issue of training and qualification 
(raised in three). The poor quality of accommodation was only raised once: in early 
1989 by Mozambican workers in a number of areas. While the vast majority of strikes 
did not always end with the demands of the workers being met, they alerted the SAL 
officials at central level to particular problems within factories which could lead to 
improvements. Involvement in a strike did not necessarily result in the expulsion of the 
workers involved. Although alleged “ringleaders” were expelled in a number of cases, 
these appear to have been workers who wished to return home in any case or those with 
a poor disciplinary record.
A successful protest was the strike in 1968 by 84 Yugoslav builders, employed in 
the construction on the prestigious Oberhof hotel in Thtiringen, who staged a three-hour 
protest for higher wages and a reduction in work norms. Taking advantage of the 
absence of most of the GDR site management, who were in Berlin for a meeting, they 
forced the Yugoslav site officials to agree to their demands. Later the Yugoslav officials 
told their incensed East German colleagues when they returned from Berlin that that 
was how workplace conflicts were dealt with in Yugoslavia.100 Less successful was the 
strike carried out by 23 Poles at a factory in Karl-Marx-Stadt in 1973. They demanded a
98 Runge, Ausland DDR, 72.
99 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8349. FDGB, Bericht, 12 Jan. 1959. The following month, all 60-odd Syrian 
trainees were withdrawn for “schooling” purposes to the Baltic resort o f Kuhlungsbom and returned to 
their factories and colleges two months later.
100 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41383. BDVP Suhl, Sofortmeldung, 11 Sept. 1968 and subsequent documents.
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minimum monthly wage of 720 marks, two more additional paid holidays to Poland, 
and free transport between their hostel and workplace. Factory officials refused to meet 
these demands, pointing out to the strikers that the desired minimum wage was within 
their reach if they worked hard and long enough. The previous month, few had made 
this amount however. Eleven had been out on sick pay, while five had been reported for 
absenteeism and thus were docked the monthly separation allowance of 120 marks. In 
addition, norm fulfilment was low owing to a lack of qualifications. Interestingly, the 
strike ended after the German workforce “made an appearance” but whether this 
involved the German workers encouraging or threatening the Poles to return to work is 
not clear.101
Algerian contract workers were most prepared to strike in pursuit of their demands. 
Between 1974 and 1984 there was a minimum of 15 Algerian strikes, involving more 
than 800 workers. In what could be described as an autumn of discontent, six of these 
strikes took place between October and December 1975, involving close on 17 percent 
of all Algerian workers employed in the GDR at that time. Wages dominated Algerian 
concerns, reflected by the fact that the strikes took place in the more labour-intensive 
but low-wage industrial sectors. In some cases it was the different remuneration of the 
various contract worker groups that led to the protests. In the mid-1970s, some 
Algerians were annoyed that Polish “specialists” made considerably more than them. 
Indeed, as an SED report subsequently pointed out, the labour agreements were to 
blame for much of the unrest among contract workers as they contained different 
specifications on remittance levels, social security payments and child benefits.102 The 
cause of the first Algerian strike, involving 23 workers at the cement works in Karsdorf 
(Bezirk Halle) in November 1974, was not directly related to working conditions but 
was a consequence of a French bank strike. As this delayed the transfer of remittances 
to Algeria, tensions flared as wives wrote complaining to their husbands that they were 
unable to feed themselves and their families. In the case of one worker, his wife claimed 
she had to work as a prostitute in order to feed her children.103
The most significant strike in terms of the numbers involved, the demands made, 
and the duration and outcome was staged in the key Gaskombinat Schwarze Pumpe 
(GSP) plant which lasted for six days in October 1975.104 It involved 185 workers, who 
had arrived in the GDR some months previously as part of the second cohort of workers
101 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6422. Info, zur Arbeitsniederlegung polnischer Werktatiger, 11 May 1973.
102 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6453. Ehrensperger to Krolokowski, 28 Jan. 1976.
103 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6422. Information tiber erste Erfahrungen beim Einsatz algerischer 
Werktatigen, 27 Nov. 1974, 3.
104 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7030. The strike wave is covered in detail by this file, passim.
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from Algeria. They demanded changes in wages, training, accommodation and 
recreational conditions, as well as the removal of the existing Algerian trade union 
secretary in the factory. Significantly, the GSP strikers were still in the training-in 
period and as such were guaranteed a minimum monthly wage of 482 marks. While the 
SAL claimed that 90 percent of the 1974 cohort of Algerian workers found these wages 
sufficient to provide for them and their families, the 1975 cohort argued that they were 
earning less than they had been promised in Algeria.105 The GSP workers may have 
been aggravated in the knowledge that many of their compatriots employed in other 
factories were earning higher wages, as the following table demonstrates. It shows that 
the average gross monthly wage earned by Algerians in October 1975 was 620 marks, 
or 530 marks in net terms.
Table 3. Average gross earnings o f  Algerian workers in the GDR in October
1975™6
Gross monthly wage Number o f  workers
901 marks and over 174
701 to 900 marks 632
501 to 700 marks 957
351 to 500 marks 153
Up to 350 marks 58
At the GSP, there was no evidence to suggest that the Algerians were earning less 
than GDR workers. Rather, the minimum wage afforded to the Algerians -  amounting 
to 482 marks -  left them slightly better off than many of their East German co-workers. 
For example, the 900 East Germans in wage bracket or Lohngruppe four earned 456.14 
marks working at 155 percent of the norm. Germans in wage bracket five made 494.58 
marks working the same norm. Importantly, Algerian wages were supplemented by a 
monthly food and children’s allowances valued at 42 marks and 20 marks per child 
respectively.
Led by an elected fifteen-member strike committee and supported by the head of 
the ONAMO in the GDR, Zamoun, the united resolve of the workers resulted in victory. 
In a move that later enraged the East German factory management and workforce and 
crucially Erich Mielke, Horst Sindermann (as chairman of the Council of Ministers) 
granted Horst Rademacher of the SAL full powers to reach a settlement.107 Rademacher 
decided to grant the workers an additional separation allowance worth 120 marks per
105 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Bericht [des SAL] tiber Ergebnisse des probeweisen Einsatzes von 500 
algerischen Werktatigen im Jahre 1974, 13 Dec. 1974, 3.
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6453. Ergebnisse (der Planung u. Finanzen des ZK) und 
Entscheidungsvorschlage aus dem Lohnvergleich zwischen algerischen Werktatigen und Werktatigen 
unserer Republik, n.d., [ca. Jan. 1976].
107 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Sindermann to Dickel, 21 Oct. 1975.
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month (which was in line with the entitlements of Hungarian and Polish workers) as 
well as allowing them more opportunities to work overtime and weekend shifts. The 
SAL was even prepared to allow all Algerians to move up to wage bracket five, but 
factory management flatly refused to support this. Another significant concession 
granted to the Algerians was the right to leave the free onsite “accommodation huts” or 
Wohnbaraken, which also housed 900 German workers, for normal apartments outside 
the factory grounds. Significantly, the strikers suffered no immediate repercussions. 
Although the SAL later tried to deport five workers for their involvement in the strike, 
this was opposed by the ONAMO which correctly pointed out that they had been
singled out owing to their previous involvement in petty crime and disciplinary
108transgressions.
The Algerians were delighted, returning to work in a victorious mood, and 
according to a report that was clearly sympathetic to the German workers, they boasted: 
“We went on strike and won, now you see what you’ve to do to get a wage increase”, 
“If we’re not on a 1,000 marks by December, then we’ll strike again”, and “Now we’ve 
more money for drink and the pub”.109 German workers were incensed, arguing that the 
Algerians had been effectively granted a pay rise without any obligation to increase 
productivity. In telegraphed petitions to Sindermann and Stoph, they pointed out that 
the compromise left Algerian workers with a monthly wage of 642 marks, which was 
more than what German workers in wage bracket six earned (572 marks). In protest, 
106 Germans (four of them SED members) resigned from the FDGB. Functionaries 
who tried to calm the situation among the East German workers reported that this was 
impossible owing to their “nationalist views and arrogant behaviour” as well as their 
lack of “class perspective [and] fidelity to party policy”.
Undoubtedly spurred on by the success of the GSP workers, Algerians in other 
factories followed suit despite threats made by the SAL and ONAMO to deport any 
further strikers without hesitation. The strikes that took place in Oschatz, Riidersdorf, 
Bleicherode, Erfurt, Neustadt, Waltershausen, and Boxberg were dominated by wage 
concerns. This wave of Algerian industrial unrest was largely pacified by the decision of 
the GDR authorities to grant all Algerian workers the monthly separation allowance of 
120 marks from May 1976. Hungarian and Polish workers had always received this 
payment, which in effect was a disciplinary instrument as the sum was halved if a
108 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6453. Information tiber die Riickfuhrung algerischer Werktatiger, 3 Dec.
1975.
109 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7030. Information tiber die Lage im VEB Kombinat Schwarze Pumpe, 27 
Oct. 1975, 3f.
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worker missed one shift without legitimate reason and cancelled altogether for any 
additional absences. A year later, the children’s allowance paid to Algerian workers was 
increased from 20 to 25 marks. Algerian wage strikes became less frequent and 
subsequent protests resulted mainly from disagreements over qualifications and 
training.
Shaken by the wave of Algerian strikes, the authorities deferred the planned intake 
of new Algerian workers for 1976 until the following year, arguing the situation 
required stabilisation. The state initiated a number of measures to reassert its authority 
and to increase the surveillance of foreigners. The Algerian government was requested 
to delegate so-called “state supervisors” to factories employing Algerian labour.110 In 
addition, in June 1976, the MfS established the interdepartmental “Working Group for 
Foreigners” (AGA), whose goal was the “central coordination of political-ideological 
work to prevent foreigners abusing residency in the GDR”.111
The late 1980s also saw some contract workers go on strike over wages and 
working and living conditions. While some were successful, most were not. In 1987, 54 
newly-employed Cuban construction workers in Leipzig staged a walkout over low 
wages. The authorities reacted by deporting two “ringleaders”, cancelling the separation 
allowance as well as the bonus paid for carrying out work in atomic power stations.112 
Dissatisfaction among Mozambican workers over wages and accommodation gave rise 
to a small wave of strikes in early 1989. This was not surprising considering that 60 
percent of their earnings over 350 marks were compulsorily deducted from their pay 
packets to pay off Mozambique’s debt to the GDR. The workers’ actions may have 
resulted in encouraging the GDR to finally agree to the appeal of the Mozambican 
government to reduce the compulsory transfer sum from 60 to 40 percent from May 
1989.113 A series of strikes, this time carried out by Vietnamese construction workers on 
a number of building sites across the GDR in the spring of 1989, also bore success. The 
SAL accepted that the Vietnamese were unsuited to the work owing to their “weaker 
constitution”. It also agreed that the training-in period, during which the workers were 
paid a relatively low basic wage, was too long. As a result, they were given new jobs 
and allowed to move up the pay scale. As was typical in many other disputes, the
110 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6423. Abt. Planung und Finanzen, Information uber die Parteikontrolle zur 
Durchfuhrung des Beschlusses des Politburos des ZK der SED von 10 Feb. 1976, 5 Apr. 1976.
111 BStU, ZA, BdL, 5566. E. Mielke, Befehl 12/76 zur Bildung einer nichtstrukturellen Arbeitsgruppe 
Auslander, 1 June 1976.
112 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6528. Ehrensperger to Mittag, 15 Apr. 1987.
113 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 30. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 7 Sept. 1989.
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authorities attempted to save some face by deporting a few alleged ringleaders who,
they claimed, had made “unacceptable demands”.114
By the late 1980s, there was evidence to suggest that foreigners could capitalise on
their economic and productive power which accrued from their numerical dominance in
some factories. By September 1989, almost all foreign workers were employed in
production, three-thirds of them as shift workers.115 Indeed in first nine months of 1989
alone, as the FDGB noted critically, 18,000 German workers abandoned shift work
while 28,000 contract workers took it up.116 The authorities initially welcomed this
trend in the workplace. In March 1988, Department XVIII of the Erfurt MfS reported
that contract workers, “enticed by supplementary wages”, were “employed in carrying
out work that is labour-intensive or unhealthy”.117 By and large, it was in favour of the
concentration of foreign workers in particular sectors as it
leads not only to the prevention o f  conflict with GDR workers but to a possible increase in work 
productivity and also supports the endeavours o f delegating countries, in particular Vietnam, to 
isolate their citizens in the GDR.118
Yet, this analysis ignored the flipside of the increasing over concentration of and 
over dependency on foreigners in industry. Arguably, conditions in the late 1980s 
served to enhance the collective strength and internal solidarity of contract workers that 
had always been evident but which ironically the socialist state had been very slow to 
appreciate. In the late 1960s, for example, half of all Hungarian workers failed to return 
to the GDR punctually from their holiday leave in Hungary. There were no mass 
sackings however and factories had to request the assistance of the Hungarian 
authorities to arrange their return.119 And as has been shown, Mozambican workers at 
the Fajas factory in Suhl refused to accept instructions from their East German 
supervisors unless they came via their own group leader whose own authority was 
limited.120
Their strength in numbers and indispensability in guaranteeing production targets 
served to empower foreign workforce even more. A tannery in Hirschberg, which was 
unable to get East Germans to take up the physically-demanding and dirty jobs at the 
factory, became totally dependent on Cuban and Vietnamese labour, a situation which 
the workers took advantage of. Sick rates were high and the Vietnamese produced more
114 Ibid., fo. 29.
115 Ibid., fos. 22-26.
116 Report o f the FDGB on foreign workers and talks with the SAL, 22 Sept. 1989. Quoted in Eva-Maria 
& Lothar Eisner, Zwischen Nationalismus und Intemationalismus, Rostock, 1994, 191.
117 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 7. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988.
118 Ibid., fo. 6.
119 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. Vermerk, 25 May 1970.
120 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 90.
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in moonlighting activities than during regular working hours.121 Given the unavailability 
of alternative labour sources, there was arguably little the factory could do to enforce 
discipline. In its last “annual report on the political-operative situation among foreign 
workers in the GDR”, complied in September 1989, Stasi Main Department XVIII 
noted that “Vietnamese workers in particular are displaying an ever greater level of self- 
confidence in the way they enforce their interests and often transgress legal basics and 
societal norms”. For example, in retaliation for a raid by customs officials investigating 
export limit transgressions at the Stem-Radio factory in Berlin, the Vietnamese workers 
produced less, with norm fulfilment dropping from 113 to 80 percent. Similarly, when 
officials attempted to investigate 15 cases of alleged theft by Vietnamese workers at the 
Fortschritt menswear factory in the same city, daily production norms plummeted to 35 
percent. Under pressure to meet production targets and with no alternative labour 
available, the report noted critically that factory and state officials “retreated” from 
challenging such activity.122
Shift work may have helped empower contract workers outside of the workplace 
too. A minder for Vietnamese workers in Berlin, who was positively predisposed to her 
charges, claimed the unconventional hours worked by the Vietnamese left them with
1 73ample time during the day to locate and purchase the consumer goods they desired. 
This gave them an advantage over East German workers, who increasingly worked 
more regular, daytime hours. In general, the attitudes of the contract workers to shift 
work are difficult to ascertain as their views were not recorded in any great deal by 
functionaries. Nor is the available testimony of workers particularly informative in this 
regard. H., a Vietnamese employee in a Brandenburg factory, claimed to have had little 
problem with the two-shift system in operation in his factory and actually preferred the 
three-shift rota that was previously in operation. Although he failed to explain why this 
was the case, at the same time he alluded to the difficulties this caused for workers like 
himself and his colleagues who shared rooms but worked three different shifts.124 In his 
testimony, H. may have been sidelining the negative aspects of working life in the 
GDR, a tendency Riedel has established was common among Algerian workers. 
Although they were dissatisfied with working conditions while working in the GDR, 
they tended to play down these negative aspects in retrospective interviews.125
121 BStU, ASt Gera, KD Schleiz, 1508. Lederfabrik Hirschberg, n.d. [ca. Autumn 1988].
122 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fos. 26 and 28. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 7 Sept. 1989.
123 Runge, Ausland DDR, 78. According to a Betreuerin for Vietnamese workers, who alleged that the 
Poles did the same but for profit!
124 Ibid., 36.
125 Almut Riedel, Erfahrungen algerischer Arbeitsmigranten in der DDR, Opladen, 1994, 14-16.
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How did the conditions for contract workers in East German factories then fare in
the wider, European comparative perspective? In a recent book, Hans Bentzien, a
former East German culture minister and last director of GDR state television, has
revived the disingenuous argument that there was something fundamentally unique
about the East German approach to foreign labour:
In contrast to the FRG there were no targeted recruitment campaigns to bring millions o f ‘guest 
workers’ from particular countries like Turkey, Portugal or Greece to work in labour intensive 
positions or in poorly-paid jobs in the service sector.126
Far from representing a unique chapter in the history of European migration, the GDR 
example fitted the mould in many ways. In both systems, migrant workers formed an 
underclass or sub-proletariat, serving primarily the economic interests of the host states. 
Invariably, they were provided with positions that the native labour force was either 
unwilling or unable to fill. Rising living standards, state-sponsored continuous worker 
education programmes and labour shortages wooed East German workers out of the 
less-attractive, labour-intensive jobs in production. Penal reform in the late 1970s, 
which ended the deployment of prisoners in industry, exacerbated labour shortages at 
the bottom-end of the job market.127 Contract workers proved crucial in plugging these 
gaps in the workforce.
What made the GDR unique in comparison was the strict adherence to a number of 
guiding principles that had originally informed Western migration policy but which 
were increasingly discarded in the 1970s and 1980s. Workers could not bring their 
families to the GDR and had no freedom of job choice or domicile. The rotation 
principle, also common in the West, was implemented far more rigorously in the GDR. 
Contract workers were also subjected to a number of forms of official discrimination. 
Regulations existed barring foreigners from promotion, assuming particular positions or
i 2©
from working in particular factories on grounds of security. Contract workers were 
subjected to limits on remittance transfer, purchase controls, and the export of consumer 
goods. Although the rents paid by contract workers appeared low in comparison to 
Western rates, they did not benefit from the same levels of subvention enjoyed by East 
German workers. Contract workers paid up to 30 marks per month for a bed and a 
minimum of five square meters personal space in rooms that accommodated up to four
126 Hans Bentzien et al. (eds), Fragen an die DDR. Alles, was man uber den deutschen Arbeiter-und- 
Bauern-Staat wissen mufi, Berlin, 2003, 26.
127 Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten und Arbeiter, 39-41.
128 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 6. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988. The instrument was 
entitled Richtlinie des Ministerrats zur Gewahrleistung der staatlichen Aufsicht, Sicherheit und Ordnung 
beim Einsatz auslandischer Burger in Betrieben und Einrichtungen der DDR v. 1971. BArch, DR 3/2. 
Schicht/B 868. Similar regulations also applied to foreign students and in 1968 Ulbricht ordered the 
removal o f all foreign students from the FSU Jena on security grounds.
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workers, while the average working class East German family paid 52 marks monthly 
for a 63 square meter two-roomed modem flat.129 Indeed, this exploitative practice had 
the full support of the Politburo. Although it authorised a massive increase in the 
numbers of workers from Vietnam in early 1987, it also mled that they were not to be 
housed in apartments already “earmarked” for East Germans.130 Indeed, the grossest 
form of exploitation was the GDR’s policy of creaming off a substantial portion of the 
wages earned by Mozambican contract workers in lieu of debts owed to it by the 
Mozambican government. This occurred without the knowledge of the workers, who 
were led to believe that the deductions would be paid out upon their return to 
Mozambique.
Contract workers were more vulnerable to disciplinary sanction than their East 
German counterparts and could be deported for a variety of workplace and social 
transgressions. In marked contrast to international students, whom the GDR envisaged 
as a form of diplomatic-political investment which would ensure the propagation of a 
positive image of the state abroad, contract workers had little chance to denigrate the 
GDR if they were fired and deported. According to the terms of the labour agreements, 
the approval of the embassy of the delegating country was required if a factory and the 
SAL wished to fire a worker. Yet, in cases involving “severe” transgressions of the 
“socialist work ethic or the norms of societal coexistence”, the GDR authorities could 
act unilaterally.131 In neither case was the worker given the right to appeal. Indeed, if he 
or she refused to leave voluntarily, the police could apply to the courts to have them 
taken into “deportation custody” under the 1979 foreigners’ law. Yet, so-called 
Ruckfiihrungen, in effect extrajudicial repatriations ordered and carried out by factory 
officials, were far more common than police deportations. In 1987 in the Bezirk Erfurt 
for example, the courts ordered the deportation (Ausweisung) of three contract workers 
(two Cubans and a Mozambican), while factories requested the repatriation of 70 
workers (56 Cubans, 20 Poles, 2 Vietnamese and one Mozambican) on the grounds of 
deficient work ethic and discipline.132 Although it is difficult to put a figure on the total 
percentages of workers deported or repatriated, figures exist for the Algerians. Of the
129 Nguyen van Houng, “Die Politik der DDR gegeniiber Vietnam und den Vertragsarbeitem aus Vietnam 
sowie die Situation der Vietnamesen in Deutschland heute”, in: Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), Materialien 
der Enquete-Kommission, Baden-Baden, 1999, 1301-1363, here 1328, n. 93. Also observed by Helga 
Marburger, quoted in Hackert-Lemke & Unterbeck, “Betreuerinnen”, 9 If.
130 Resolution submitted by Willi Stoph to the Politburo, 27 Mar. 1987. Reproduced in Miiggenberg, Die 
auslandischen Vertragsarbeitnehmer, 56-61.
131 See 6.17.3 o f the Rahmenrichtlinie zur Durchfuhrung von Regierungsabkommen, 1 July 1980. 
Reproduced in: Elsner/Elsner, Zwischen Nationalismus undIntemationalismus, 140-65.
132 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 33. Ubersicht liber Fluktuation ausl. Werktatiger 1988.
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3,257-strong cohort which arrived in 1975, a staggering 27 percent were deported or
repatriated within four years, costing the SAL 450,000 marks in flight tickets, a sum it
subsequently deducted from the social security contributions it was obliged to transfer
to the Algerian government.133 O f the 108 Algerians who began work at the Riidersdorf
cement works in 1974, 36 were repatriated within three years. Yet, as the breakdown
suggests, some of these departures were voluntary. Ten workers applied to return to
Algeria for personal reasons, while two left on health grounds. Yet, in the majority of
cases, the return of the workers to Algeria was hardly voluntary. Four were sent back
for involvement in criminal offences, ten for “brawling and negative behaviour”, and
eight for “loitering in the workplace”.134
According to some statistics, workers from particular countries were more likely to
be deported than others. O f the 774 contract workers deported for disciplinary
transgressions in 1989 for example, 369 were from Mozambique, 303 from Cuba, 95
1
from Vietnam and seven from Angola. This must not be taken as evidence of greater 
wrongdoing on the part of the Mozambican and Cuban workers, however, but as a 
consequence of the prevalent racist attitudes in the GDR which were primarily directed 
at black contract workers. As chapter seven discusses in greater detail, a number of MfS 
reports in the late 1980s noted that the East German public reacted with particular 
disquiet at perceived disciplinary transgressions carried out by black, especially 
Mozambican, workers.
Although there can be no doubt that deportations rates were greatly influenced by 
the personal attitudes of factory officials, who were effectively allowed to decide on 
what constituted unbecoming behaviour, the presence in the GDR of agents sent by the 
state security or interior ministries of the labour delegating countries also played a role. 
They worked covertly in the background with the knowledge of only a few MfS 
officers. In 1985, for example, two such agents operated in the south-western Bezirke, 
disguised as employees of the foreign trading companies Polservice (Poland) and 
Cubatechnika (Cuba). The MfS praised the “sound Chekist” work of the Polish officer, 
a 62-year-old general. In contrast, the Cuban, a major, was dismissed as a “night owl”, 
unable to adapt to GDR “living conditions” and who had crashed his car while drunk. 
Despite his own personal shortcomings, the Stasi noted that his guiding principle was
133 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Information tiber die Durchfuhrung des Regierungsabkommens mit der 
DVR Algerien, 17 May 1979, 7. The Algerian government found the rate of repatriations far too high 
although the ONAMO agreed in every case.
134 BStU, JHS, MF, VVS 001-339/77. Thiemann, Die Aufgaben der Kreisdienststelle, 15 Aug. 1977, 30. 
Some of the expulsions may have followed a strike by the Algerian workers in 1975.
135 Runge, Ausland DDR, 116.
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the protection of Cuba’s good name, and to this effect, he demanded the immediate 
repatriation of any worker involved in problems of any kind.136 This helps explain why 
the number of Cubans repatriated at the request of factories in Erfurt was 
disproportionately higher -  representing 80 percent of all deportations -  compared to 
workers from other countries.137 In the late 1980s, Vietnamese Interior Ministry 
officials were deployed at regional level to guide the Vietnamese supervisors in the 
factories.138
This chapter has attempted to show that the everyday reality for contract workers in 
the hostels and the workplace was far more complex than has been suggested in the bulk 
of the secondary literature. Clearly, the levels and systems of control in the workplace 
and hostels envisaged by the authorities were overambitious and never fully effective. 
This was in no small part due to the will of the contract workers as well as to 
inefficiencies in terms of planning and personnel. Although conditions in the workplace 
were difficult and demanding, contract workers could and did resort to strikes and, more 
commonly, more discreet forms of protest to demand changes. The GDR therefore 
meant more for contract workers than the sweat and toil in menial positions and the 
narrow confines of communal housing blocks and as the subsequent chapters will argue, 
the position of foreigners in East German society cannot be measured solely with 
reference to their living and working conditions.
136 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fos. 12f. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988.
137 Ibid., fo. 33. Ubersicht iiber Fluktuation ausl. Werktatiger 1988.
138 Vietnam’s senior security official in the GDR was named Minh. See Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten 
undArbeiter, 74.
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Chapter 5. Foreigners beyond the factory and college walls
Much of the discussion on the social interaction and activities of foreigners in the 
existing literature has sought to measure this exclusively by focusing on their 
interaction with the majority population. Not uncommonly, many studies claim that as 
foreigners had little or no contact with the GDR population, especially in the factories, 
their level of social interaction was minimal. This argument ignores key aspects of the 
everyday experience of foreigners in East Germany such as the fact that they spent 
much of their time interacting with each other and pursuing their own interests. While 
the reserved attitudes of the German population undoubtedly contributed to this 
situation, so too did the wishes of the foreigners. For many, it was logical, natural, and 
convenient to spend time with those who spoke the same language and who shared 
similar political, cultural, and social backgrounds. Group cohesion was accelerated 
among foreign students and workers owing to their common classification as foreigners 
by East German society as well as by virtue of their command of supranational 
languages, such as English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Arabic. Meaningful social 
interaction did not always have to involve Germans. In 1969, for example, a KAS report 
noted the tendency of foreign students to “deliberately cut themselves o ff’ from German 
colleagues, who for their part, showed little interest in getting to know their foreign 
classmates.1 Yet, for many commentators, this self-sufficiency and interdependency in 
the sphere of social interaction was a result of state-orchestrated ghettoisation. This line 
of argument tends to view state policy, and especially its housing policy, as the most 
powerful determinant of foreigners’ behaviour and ignores the ability of foreigners to 
subvert and circumvent state measures in the pursuit of their own everyday social and 
recreational agendas.
As the previous chapters have argued, student and workers’ hostels did not isolate 
foreigners completely from the surrounding environment, not least owing to the 
determination and ability of their residents to subvert and evade authority and control. 
The lax levels of supervision in many hostels gave their residents a certain level of 
autonomy in their day to day activities. In addition, the often meagre and monotonous 
conditions in the hostels encouraged residents to explore the surrounding social and
1 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/1V A 2/9.04/513. Analyse der Arbeit im Bereich des Auslanderstudiums an 
Hoch- und Fachschulen der DDR im Studienjahr 1968/69, 15 Oct. 1969, 20.
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recreational environments. In Dresden in 1977, for example, police noted that the failure 
of factory officials to have the faulty television sets and radios in the hostels repaired 
left the workers with nothing to do but drink.2
Apart from Almut Riedel’s study, which has observed that former Algerian contract 
workers fondly recall their recreational exploits in the GDR, the bulk of secondary 
literature has given the impression that foreigners, particularly contract workers, 
suffered from widespread social exclusion and marginalisation.3 This chapter examines 
the wide variety of everyday recreational activities foreigners engaged in and how these 
conflicted with East German expectations of “purposeful” recreational activity, paying 
close detail to activities frowned upon and even suppressed by the GDR authorities, 
such as drinking, consumerism, travel to the West, and religious pursuits. Rejecting the 
argument that foreigners lived an isolated and uneventful social existence, it suggests 
rather that they were empowered and capable of defining their own recreational 
activities. For many, working and studying in the GDR represented the first break from 
the traditional bonds of family and social convention, making East Germany an arena 
for the exploration of lifestyles and social activities inaccessible or forbidden in their 
native countries. In addition, East German shops were relatively well-stocked compared 
to home and many foreign workers preferred to spend their free time expanding their 
material possessions than availing of conventional recreational activities. Although their 
pursuit of particular recreational activities and material goods at times elicited negative 
and aggressive reactions from the public on the one hand and attempts at criminalisation 
and suppression by the authorities on the other, foreigners relied on their own systems 
of retributive action in attempting to combat these.
Official GDR perceptions on how foreigners were to spend their free time were an 
eclectic mix of paternalism, racism, and paranoia clothed in the ubiquitous socialist 
moralising tones of self-improvement and self-sacrifice. GDR officials always stressed 
the importance of ensuring foreigners pursued “purposeful recreation” in their spare 
time. What they meant were cultural and recreational activities endorsed by the party 
and which exposed foreigners to prescribed political, ideological and cultural norms. No 
form of recreational activity was innocuous according to this mentality, which is best 
encapsulated in all its aspects in a text prepared in the early 1960s by Prof. Katharina 
(Kathe) Harig, director of the Herder Institute in Leipzig:
2 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 17 June 1977, 7.
3 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus, spate Adoleszenz und Protest. Algerische Vertragsarbeiter in der 
DDR”, in: KZSS, 53:5 (2001), 76-95, here 83.
103
Encouraging our [foreign] students to spend their free time constructively and discouraging them 
from sauntering about, wasting time and taking unhealthy long naps, is a complicated pedagogical 
task requiring a lot o f patience and pedagogical tact to acquaint them with the strict daily timetable 
that best suits our climatic conditions. The motto o f the Herder Institute is ‘Wherever we are not lies 
the enemy’ which makes it necessary to keep a watchful eye on whom students spend their spare 
time with. We have to combat a number o f influences which we do not approve of, such as 
acquaintances with petty-bourgeois thinking people who try to associate with the foreigners, easy 
girls, and spending nights in unsuitable dance and late bars. Furthermore, we have to create a study 
milieu that reflects the healthy lifestyle and the broad cultural progress of our people in the GDR.4
Accordingly, foreigners not only had to be protected from themselves but from sections 
of the population which the SED perceived as hostile. Harig was influenced in her 
approach by the model set by the Moscow Lumumba University, the international 
students’ college established in 1960. In 1961 she observed: “Naturally one can sense 
the enemy’s work in the Lumumba University [which] separates itself from destructive, 
incapable and deceitful elements within days.”5 Likewise in the GDR, nothing was 
considered too harmless by officials. When a lecturer of the TH Dresden took it upon 
himself to organise conversation circles in order to help Chinese students practise their 
spoken German, he was criticised by the college SED branch for enabling the students 
to come in contact with a “whole series of indefinable old ladies and others”.6 To this 
end, officials sought to ensure foreigners associated with “progressive workers”. 
Unregulated social contact served to undermine what the students were told in class 
about life in the GDR, as leading FDGB functionary Rolf Deubner outlined to the 
academic council of the HSDG in late 1960:
I don’t want people to get the impression that we think they [the African students] should be treated 
like children. They need to be included in cultural life because the conversations that they have 
outside the classroom are, as you know, totally different to the ones inside class. These talks need to 
be evaluated more because they clearly indicate the kind o f problems [the foreigners] have difficulty 
with.
In agreement was Dr Felgentreu, deputy head of the HSDG, who pointed out that 
experience had shown him that enabling an African student to share a room with a 
German student, to visit his home and to accompany him on holidays ensured the 
omnipresence of “our influence” and prevented “all attempts to import other 
influences”.7
Never too far beneath the surface of these arguments was the belief that the GDR 
had a civilising mission. In its first “supervision programme” for foreign workers
4 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/467. K. Harig, Direktorin der HI, Form der Arbeit mit 
auslandischen Studenten in der auBerunterrichtlichen Zeit, n.d. [ca. 1963], 2.
5 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1649. Bericht uber meine Reise nach Prag zur Eroffnung der Universitat des 17. 
November am 9. Nov. 1961, 5f.
6 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Bericht uber die Teilnahme an der Parteigruppensitzung des Lektorats 
Deutsch an der TH Dresden am 13.4.1959.
7 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/2123. Protokoll der Tagung des Wissenschaftlichen Rates der HSDG am 23 
Nov. 1960, 14-16.
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(1961), the FDGB argued that the development of “highly-qualified, class conscious 
and skilled workers and friends of the GDR” was best achieved by enabling foreign 
apprentices to work in the “best trade union cells or socialist collectives” as well as 
being encouraged to make contact with “progressive German families”.8 A 1966 
revision of the programme instructed factory trade union officials to help foreigners 
maintain their country’s cultural traditions, to celebrate national holidays, and to 
participate in factory cultural groups in order to acquaint them with “socialist culture” 
and “purposeful leisure time”. In addition, officials were to promote after work contacts 
between foreigners and “German families”, although the programme no longer 
mentioned that the latter were to be of the “progressive” type.9 The belief that foreigners 
could improve themselves by associating with suitable German families remained 
constant. Bemoaning the proclivity of workers to spend their spare time drinking 
heavily in bars and dance venues, a Dresden police official wrote in 1982 that more 
effort was needed to bring the contract workers together with GDR workers which 
would enable the former to “learn and acquire the best traditions of the German working 
class”.10
Foreigners were not the only objects in this debate on “purposeful recreation”. The
discourse on regulating the social activities of foreigners was similar in tone and content
to broader debates on youth culture taking place in the GDR and as such should be seen
as part of a wider generational conflict. It is also important to point out that some
foreign students supported the view that social interaction required regulation. In 1962,
for example, the Cypriot students’ group submitted a report to the SED arguing that the
cooperation of the authorities was essential to enable students spend their spare time
sensibly and with the right people. It warned that:
The lack o f  recreational opportunities for foreign students and the resulting isolation leads to 
recreational time being spent in pubs and dance bars o f the most varied kind. Here, the foreign 
students mostly find those people who have nothing good to say about socialism, the government, or 
the party, and who have a negative effect on them.
The Cypriots claimed foreign students were often confused and disappointed when 
confronted with actual conditions in the GDR, making them likely to return home as 
anti-communists. (The opposite was the case they claimed with foreign students who 
studied in the West -  they returned home as communists). Thus, they proposed the
8 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8297. BeschluB (S 329a/61) des Sekretariats zur Betreuung der auslandischen 
Arbeiter in der DDR, 29 May 1961, 3.
9 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8297. Schlufifolgerungen fur die politische, kulturelle und soziale Betreuung, 
19 Jan. 1966.
10 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46778. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 10 Feb. 1982, 9.
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establishment of a central cultural centre for the city’s foreign students as a way to 
ensure better provision and supervision of recreational activity.11
What did the GDR in the mid-1960s have to offer international students in terms of 
“purposeful free time activity”? The Herder Institute in Leipzig, which prepared all 
foreign students in the German language and other subjects before they moved on to the 
regular universities, claimed that its students could take advantage of a variety of 
cultural and recreational activities, such as art, music, theatre, concerts and sports. Some 
older students learned to swim, while African students went skiing. Students could also 
take courses in sailing, driving and motor sports organised by the Society for Sport and 
Technology (GST). Students were also encouraged to present papers on the political 
situation in their native countries to internal college seminars. Tours to various cultural, 
historical, industrial sites and collective farms around the country were on offer, and the 
Herder Institute claimed that “there are barely any foreign students for whom the names 
of the major industrial plants of Schwarze Pumpe, Eisenhiittenstadt, Hettstadt, Leuna, 
Sosa dam, and Wamow dock mean nothing”. During their summer holidays, students 
could go on work experience or participate in summer camps.12 Yet as the Cypriot 
students claimed, the situation changed radically once students were dispersed from the 
familiarity of the Herder Institute to the regular universities and colleges, where there 
was often no system of organised or supervised recreation. This resulted in some 
students in their fifth or sixth year of university never setting foot in the Leipzig Opera 
or the Berliner Ensemble, the Cypriots claimed, adding pessimistically that apart from 
the singular efforts of some students themselves to organise cultural activities, students 
were generally left to their own devices. This, they concluded, left students exposed to 
the perilous morals of pubs and the dangerous political doublespeak of GDR medical 
students.13
The Cypriot perspective was valid in some points. The activities organised by the 
Herder Institute were undoubtedly popular with its students, who were generally in their 
first year in the GDR. As they progressed to regular universities and colleges, boredom 
seems to have been a feature of college life for some students, especially in the colleges 
located in smaller, provincial towns. In 1971, for example, the social and recreational 
activities in Ilmenau were so limited that the Soviet Higher Education Ministry made a 
formal complaint to the GDR authorities. The Soviets were acting on feedback from its
11 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/624, fos. 93-103, here 95 and 98. Bericht der Hochschulgruppe 
der zypriotischen Studenten, n.d. [ca. Feb. 1963].
12 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/ IV A 2/9.04/467. Harig, Form der Arbeit mit auslandischen Studenten, n.d.
[ca. 1963], 4.
13 See n. 11.
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students, who complained about the lack of a theatre in the town (the nearest was in 
Weimar) and the “monotonous” weekend atmosphere in the town’s youth clubs owing 
to the tendency of East German students to travel home for the weekends. The situation 
was compounded by the lack of books, lectures and sporting facilities, with no 
equipment available for winter sports.14
In the 1970s and 1980s, foreign workers had to rely chiefly on their own initiative 
in organising free time activities as the ability and willingness of factories to do so 
could vary considerably. Some factories organised just the bare minimum stipulated by 
the labour agreements, such as organising national holiday celebrations for their 
workers.15 Others, like the VEB Kunstseidenwerk in Pima did nothing, allowing the 
hostel to descend into a hive of “criminal activity” according to the police.16 Ultimately 
it was the enthusiasm of the East German supervisors or minders allocated to the 
workers that dictated the type and frequency of factory-sponsored events on offer. 
However, workers did not always appreciate or understand the nature of the activities 
organised for their benefit as a minder for Vietnamese contract workers experienced. In 
an interview she recalled how she made a great effort to secure tickets for a 
performance of Swan Lake at the State Opera in Berlin only to find that none of her 31 
Vietnamese workers turned up. Cultural and linguistic incompetence on both sides led 
to some confusion. The minder failed to anticipate that the meaning and significance of 
the terms Swan Lake and State Opera would not be immediately evident to the 
Vietnamese.17 Similarly, officials of the Fajas factory in Suhl were shocked that the 
Mozambican workers they had taken on a visit to Buchenwald laughed in the grounds
i o
of the former concentration camp.
There were also recreational outlets available outside of the factory environment. In 
Rudersdorf, where Algerians were employed in a local cement works in the late 1970s, 
the local MfS claimed that there were plenty of sporting and recreational activities on 
offer and Algerians could even join the soccer, judo and even philatelic associations in 
the town.19 Whether the workers availed of these facilities is unclear. Significantly, 
however, foreigners were not allowed to form sporting clubs of their own under local
14 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/1V A 2/9.04/513. Information uber einen an der TH Ilmenau durchgefuhrten 
Besuch, 5 Mar. 1971.
15 The Vietnamese T6t festival for example. Irene Runge, Ausland DDR. Fremdenhafi, Berlin, 1990, 38.
16 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 17 June 1977, 7.
17 Hackert-Lemke & Unterbeck, “Betreuerinnen”, 100.
18 Landolf Scherzer, Die Fremden, Berlin, 2002,128.
19 BStU, JHS, MF, VVS 001-339/77. Bemd Thiemann, DieAufgaben der Kreisdienststelle bei der 
politisch-operativen Kontrolle der zeitweilig in der DDR tatigen Auslander aus nichtsozialistischen 
Staaten und Gebieten, 15 Aug. 1977, 25.
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government regulations. In addition, in a September 1974 ruling, the DTSB debarred 
teams comprising solely of foreign workers from participating in sporting championship 
events which progressed to national level. The timing of the decision was hardly 
accidental and coincided with the arrival of the first cohorts of Algerian workers. The 
relaxation of the ruling two years later allowed foreigners to participate in competitions 
as individuals or in teams up to Bezirk level providing they had the endorsement of an 
existing sporting club.20 The policy against contract workers forming their own 
associations was also enforced by other organisations. In the late 1980s, for example, a 
Vietnamese cultural group was refused affiliation to the Berlin Kulturbund on the 
grounds that the existing forty Kulturbund workgroups in the city adequately provided 
for the cultural needs of the Vietnamese.21 Although contract workers faced restrictions 
in participating in competitive sporting meetings, they nevertheless formed their own 
informal sporting teams and cultural groups. In Hoyerswerda, Algerians set up a 
number of musical groups and teams in volleyball, soccer, and boxing, which were
99subsidised by the recreational fund of their employer, Schwarze Pumpe.
By and large, workers had to rely chiefly on their own initiative to organise 
recreational activity. Typically, the mass of this activity took place beyond the gaze of 
factory officials and the police and as such does not feature in state-generated historical 
records to the same extent as some of the more problematic aspects of recreational 
activities of foreigners. Likewise, the sheer normalcy of most aspects of everyday 
recreational activity means that it does not stand out in any significant way in the 
retrospective memories of the foreigners themselves. Characteristically, workers’ free 
time was taken up with a range of internal hostel activities and external recreational 
pursuits. In 1989, the everyday social activities of Vietnamese workers, employed in a 
Brandenburg factory, and Cubans working in a textile factory in East Berlin were 
remarkably similar. In the Cuban case, the factory had long ceased providing social 
activities which had taken the form of museums visits, boat trips and the factory 
birthday celebration. In the hostels, the Vietnamese occupied themselves with table 
tennis, while the Cubans played volleyball on a pitch located onsite. Both hostels staged 
discos, which in the Vietnamese case were attended by German women. The workers 
from both countries also ventured out to a nearby disco -  but never alone, as one
20 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Richtlinie der SAL fur die Einsatzbetrieben zur Durchfuhrung des 
Abkommens DDR-Algerien, 1 Aug. 1979,47.
21 Runge, Ausland DDR, 99.
22 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. SAL translation o f  Algerian newspaper article by Abdelaziz Sebaa in 
Algerie actualite, 14-20 June 1979, lOf. [of translation].
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Vietnamese worker commented.23 In addition, the Vietnamese played host to and visited 
compatriots living in other hostels as well as making the occasional trip to the cinema. 
The other pastimes mentioned by the Cubans were dominoes, shopping, television, and 
a music group, which was funded by their embassy. Trips to local bars, while 
considered expensive by some, were also part of the Vietnamese and Cuban recreational 
repertoire.24
The tendency for contract workers to socialise amongst themselves and within their
hostels should not be taken simply as the product of state-orchestrated ghettoisation.
While conditions may not have been the best in the hostels, foreigners enjoyed and
appreciated the familiarity they afforded. Indeed, the post-Wende calls made by well-
intentioned East Germans to have the hostels closed and their residents provided with
regular accommodation were not endorsed by all contract workers, as recalled in an
interview in 1990 by the GDR’s leading independent advocate of foreigners’ issues,
Rev. Christfried Berger of the Berlin Okumenisch-Missionarisches Zentrum (OMZ):
O f course ghettoisation is one o f  many causes o f xenophobia. But when we [the OMZ] discussed our 
catalogue o f demands openly with foreigners, they did not take on board this demand unanimously. 
You know, they absolutely wanted to live in a community o f their own compatriots, where they 
could cook, live, dance and sing to their own tastes and they would feel really confined if  they had to 
live in nothing but two or three-bed roomed flats somewhere amongst Germans.25
Not all recreational activity, however, took place within the familiar confines of the
hostels. Foreigners had always sought out recreational pursuits unavailable in their own
countries, ignoring and rejecting in the process the many attempts of officials to
organise “purposeful” recreational activity. Two reports from the criminal police
department in Halle, dating from 1977 and 1979, are exemplary not only for the
weaknesses of official attempts at recreational regulation but also the determination of
foreigners to avoid it.
Particular difficulties and problems arise from the fact that the different characteristics, mentalities, 
religious and family bonds o f  citizens o f other states and nationalities are partly unknown and 
accordingly disregarded. This shortcoming affects among other things the purposeful cultural care of 
these citizens suited to socialist conditions.26
Two years later, the same department reported:
The three-shift rota on the one hand and the still unsatisfactory selection o f cultural themes 
appropriate to national peculiarities on the other represent objective difficulties in organising 
recreational activities for these citizens. This results in the citizens spending their time in bars, 
overindulging in alcohol, and committing crime.27
23 Runge, Ausland DDR, 37-39.
24 Ibid., 43-46.
25 Quoted in: Ibid., 101.
26 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Halle, Periodische Information, 1 June 1977.
27 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Wortbericht, n.d. [ca. Jan. 1979].
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Evidently, the fact that workers came and left the factory and hostel at all hours
frustrated factory plans, which were not appreciated by the workers at any rate.
Although the latter report failed to spell out what was meant by suitable “cultural
themes”, it is unlikely that Algerians would have had much interest in such, especially
when rendered by East Germans officials. Algerian workers appreciated the GDR for
what it had to offer, and in Halle and elsewhere they were engaging in and enjoying an
activity -  drinking -  which was frowned upon but not illegal in Algeria. Riedel
describes the Algerians behaviour as a form of “delayed adolescence” and it was this
“noncommittal sampling of different lifestyles and leisure” that made their time in the
GDR so unique and unforgettable.28 It was not just an Algerian phenomenon and could
be found in all groups. In 1982, police in Dresden reported that:
The majority o f foreigners spend their free time in bars and at dances, where alcohol is taken in great 
amounts, resulting frequently in bodily injury, rowdy behaviour and other disturbances. In the 
majority o f criminal offences, overindulgence in alcohol plays a decisive role. This applies 
especially to the workers from Mozambique, who almost without exception never touched alcohol 
before arriving in the GDR. It now seems apparent that they realise the effects o f alcohol but yet in 
many cases, they are incapable o f  controlling the consumption to appropriate digestible amounts.29
Foreigners took to the bars of the cities and towns they worked in, which as police 
in Gera bemoaned in 1977 with reference to Polish and Algerian workers, had no 
qualms in serving them copious amounts of alcohol.30 Bars and restaurants became 
focal meeting points for workers. In Leipzig in the late 1970s, for example, it was 
common for Algerian, Polish, and Hungarian contract workers to congregate in and 
around the Mitropa restaurant at the central train station, particularly on Fridays nights, 
while the Burgkeller was another popular venue. Undoubtedly, these central locations 
allowed workers living in different hostels throughout the city and its hinterland to meet 
at the start of the weekend to discuss the past week’s events and happenings. Some 
years later, contract workers had appropriated new centres in the city’s suburbs. In the 
south-eastern part of Leipzig city in 1982, the Probstheida and Kronenquelle were 
where the Cuban, Mozambican and Hungarian workers “agglomerated”, while the 
Lindenhof and Alte SalzstraBe in Leipzig-Griinau were popular with the Algerians, 
Cubans, and Mozambicans.31
Clearly, foreign workers wanted their own social space where they could meet up 
and socialise, a desire which in a small number of towns was recognised by factory
28 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus”, 77.
29 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46778. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 10 Feb. 1982, 7.
30 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Gera, Bericht zu Ermittlungsverfahren, 16 June 1977,4.
31 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843 and 46778. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattungen zu eingeleiteten 
Ermittlungsverfahren, 18 Jan. 1979 and 9 Feb. 1982, 7. Alte SalzstraBe was a relatively new venue, 
opened in 1981.
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officials and the police. In 1979 in Halle-Neustadt, a “Club of the Hungarian People’s 
Republic” was founded, which officials hoped would stop the violent attacks of 
Hungarian workers on the police and the East German public.32 In the same year and for 
the same reason, an Algerian cafe was opened in the town of Bischofswerda, where a 
number of sporting and cultural initiatives were undertaken to reduce the alleged unruly 
behaviour of the contract workers. On the anniversary of Algerian independence, the 
factory awarded the best 15 Algerian workers with bouquets, certificates and more 
importantly, cash premiums. Algerians were also encouraged to participate in factory 
sports events with their German co-workers, taking first and fourth place in the 1981 
works soccer tournament. In addition, officials worked to end the long-running feud that 
had broken out in 1979 between Algerian and Cuban contract workers. After an initial 
“friendship meeting” held in July 1981, the Cubans attended the Algerian national 
holiday celebrations that November and invited the newly-formed Algerian music group 
to perform at their festival in Dresden the following month. A joint Algerian-Cuban 
sports day was also planned. Even in this relatively successful case, however, the GDR 
officials did not shy away from using force to maintain order. In 1977 they oversaw the 
establishment of an Algerian “stewards group” consisting of handpicked workers to 
supervise the behaviour of their compatriots at discos and other events. Despite the 
advances above, factory officials ordered the deportations of over 16 Algerian workers 
for disciplinary misdemeanours in 1981/82 on the grounds that they could ill afford to 
have their successes “destroyed by negative forces”.33
The attempts by officials to organise recreational activity were by their very nature 
self-defeating as they were based on the presupposition that the authorities knew what 
was best for the workers. The yearly sporting and recreational plans drawn up by 
factory bureaucrats found little resonance with workers more interested in the low brow 
range of recreational and cultural activities unavailable in their own countries and who 
were accustomed to spontaneity when it came to occupying their spare time. After the 
Mozambican workers at Fajas in Suhl took up playing football on their own accord 
around the hostel in the early 1980s, factory officials appointed a football trainer. Yet, 
none of the workers turned up for his training sessions.34 Arguably, the Mozambicans 
were doing nothing more than protecting their private sphere against unwelcome 
encroachments by authority. By September 1989 not much had changed and the Stasi in
32 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Bericht, 16 July 1979, 2.
33 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842,47843, and //8.0/51098. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Informationen, 17 
June 1977, 8, 5 July 1979, and 29 July 1982; SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Bericht zur Arbeit mit den 
algerischen Werktatigen, 16 Nov. 1981, 5.
34 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 128.
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the Bezirk Erfurt noted that although Mozambican workers were interested in sport, they 
were reluctant to participate in organised matches or avail of the sessions booked for 
them in sports centres. The admission made in the same report that the needs of 
Mozambican workers had been “given insufficient consideration” in the planning of 
recreational activities came far too late.35
Cultural activity in the form of religious observation and culinary pursuits also 
occupied the free time of workers. Unlike in the case of the students, where the 
authorities were wary of challenging religious expression for diplomatic reasons, 
religious workers enjoyed far less sympathy from the authorities. Particularly in the 
1980s, religious practice performed a cultural and social function and helped bring 
contract workers into close contact with sympathetic East German Christians, who 
before and after the Wende did tremendous work in defending the interests of foreigners 
in an increasingly hostile environment. Notably, reference to religion in files of state 
and party provenance is more notable by its absence. For example, none of the reports 
on Polish or Hungarian workers surveyed for this study contain any reference to 
religion. This is not to say that the workers were not interested in religion and as Rohr’s 
detailed regional study on Polish workers in the Frankfurt/Oder border region notes, 
albeit fleetingly, in the 1960s Polish women transit workers demanded time off on 
Catholic days of obligation, for example.
It was in dealing with Algerian workers that the issue of religion first surfaced in 
any significant way in internal reports. Diet was important for the Algerians and as 
Riedel has noted, they were more observant of Islamic dietary practices, such as the 
fasting rules during Ramadan and abstinence from pork, than of the rules on daily 
prayer and temperance.37 The East German authorities seemed to have picked up on this 
and in internal guidelines published in 1976, two years after the arrival of the Algerians, 
the SAL pointed out to factory officials that they had to take into account that the 
workers “come from a foreign cultural group and that their habits differ from ours”. The 
guidelines made specific reference to religion:
35 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 4. Schwarz, Information, 11 Sept. 1989.
36 She provides no indication on whether the workers were successful however. Rita Rohr, Hoffnung. 
Hilfe. Heuchelei, Berlin, 2001, 86.
37 Almut Riedel, Erfahrungen algerischer Arbeitsmigranten in der DDR, Opladen, 1994,61. Recently, 
Riedel republished some o f  her findings on the religious and cultural outlook o f Algerian workers under 
the title: “Wer guckt auf uns? Muslime Migranten in der DDR”, in: Horch und Guck 40 (2002), 42-45.
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Most Algerian workers are Mohammedans [sic]. This gives rise to a number o f specific problems, 
such as the observance o f religious customs and holidays, dietary differences. These problems must 
be afforded understanding and empathy.38
Similarly, as an MfS thesis written in 1977 about the Algerian workers in 
Riidersdorf indicated, state security believed it was its duty to safeguard the “national 
peculiarities” of the workers by facilitating their religious observance during Ramadan 
and by ensuring that they were provided with mutton for feast days.39 The willingness 
of factories to serve ethnic cuisine to their foreign workers varied from place to place 
however. At the Fajas factory in Suhl, management made the effort while at the same 
time taking care to explain to German workers that the Algerians were not getting 
something better but just something different. According to Rev. Christfried Berger, 
director of the OMZ, this ensured that the “Algerians felt they were accepted and the 
German workers were informed and involved in a small way in the situation of their 
new colleagues”. Clearly, the provision of special diets for workers had the potential to 
irritate German workers. Factories that made no special effort to provide customary 
food to Algerian workers such as Leuna and Schonebeck, Berger continued, had more 
social problems.40 Indeed, as an Algerian newspaper report commented, only one 
worker was able to make couscous in the Algerian hostel in Schonebeck, making him 
extremely popular on days off when his colleagues attempted to prepare traditional 
dishes 41 This state support and understanding for religious practice, uncharacteristic for 
the GDR in general, was brief and all reference to religious and cultural distinctions was 
dropped in a 1979 revision of the SAL guidelines on Algerian workers.42 Three years 
later, a further SAL directive stipulated that contract workers were responsible for 
buying their own food and preparing it in the hostels.43 Thus, in the early 1980s the Suhl 
Fajas factory only provided its Mozambican workers with ethnic cuisine for a number 
of weeks upon arrival after which they had to adapt to German food. Yet, the 
Mozambicans were not entirely helpless. The pragmatic local barwomen, Roswitha 
Menz, spiced up the traditional German dishes of Eisbein, Jagerschnitzel, and 
Feuerfleisch in order to suit the tastes of her Mozambican punters. More commonly, the
38 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Richtlinie fur die Einsatzbetrieben zur Durchfuhrung des Abkommens 
zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der DVRA, 15 Apr. 1976,4.
39 BStU, JHS, MF, VVS 001-339/77. Thiemann, DieAufgaben der Kreisdienststelle, 15 Aug. 1977,28.
40 Quoted in: Runge, AuslandDDR, 102.
41 Algerie actualite, 14-20 June 1979, 10.
42 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Richtlinie der SAL fur die Einsatzbetrieben zur Durchfuhrung des 
Abkommens DDR-Algerien, 1 Aug. 1979.
43 Section I (7) o f the Richtlinie [der SAL] fur die Unterbringung auslandischer Werktatiger in 
Gemeinschaftsunterkunften vom 8 Feb. 1982 stipulated that factories were required to ensure that hostels 
had one hotplate for every three residents. Reproduced in Andreas Miiggenberg, Die auslandischen 
Vertragsarbeitnehmer in der ehemaligen DDR, Berlin, 1995, 99-102.
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Mozambicans prepared their own specialities, such as garlic chicken, in the hostels and 
the resulting aromas greatly annoyed local Germans.44 The failure of factories to 
provide contract workers with suitable meals had negative consequences elsewhere. As 
foreign workers tended to buy up particular foodstuffs already in short supply in the 
shops, such as rice, they were a convenient scapegoat for the East German public who 
blamed them rather than the planned economy or its political architects for the empty 
shelves.
Although Algerian workers generally observed fasting and dietary customs, Rev. 
Christfried Berger believed that living in the GDR allowed them to place formal 
religious observance “on ice”, a process which was facilitated by the absence of any 
Islamic clergy. In order to rectify this situation and acting on the suggestion of an 
Algerian Catholic bishop, Berger proposed that an imam be sent to the GDR to attend to 
the spiritual needs of the workers. Although the suggestion enjoyed the support of the 
Grand Mufti in Damascus, it was rejected outright by the East German authorities and 
enjoyed lukewarm support from the Algerian workers. Yet, officials were more 
amenable to religious issues when hard currency was involved. In the 1980s, for 
example, the hostels housing fee-paying Libyan apprentices were furnished with prayer 
rooms.45 Muslims, however, were not dependent on clerics or other structures in 
observing their religion and in 1982 Prof. Heidom, deputy minister at the MHF, told a 
KAS meeting that “certain religious views (Islam, supporting the Muslims [sic]) are 
being openly supported by some Arab students”.46
Understandably, adherents of Christian denominations were better catered for by 
existing religious structures in the GDR. Contract workers from Vietnam, Cuba, 
Mozambique, and Angola, many of whom were Christians, were attracted to the 
churches. As one church activist recalled, the “socialist” labour agreements 
paradoxically and ironically introduced “God -  black, singing and dancing” into “our 
parishes and towns”. The range of church-based activities organised for foreigners 
throughout the GDR was extensive. East German parishioners attended discussion 
meetings entitled “foreigners as friends” and classes in Portuguese were also laid on. 
Courses in sewing, photography, English and driving were provided for the workers, as 
were retreats and weekend seminars in Portuguese on topics as diverse as church 
history, art, and baptism and confirmation preparation. At the behest of the 
Mozambicans, bilingual joint prayer services with East Germans gave way to
44 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 67, 70 and 94.
45 Runge, AuslandDDR, 102.
46 SAPMO-BArch, DY 13/3056. Aktennotiz zur 4. Beratung des KAS am 7 Apr. 1982.
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autonomous ecumenical Mozambican parishes administered by their own parish 
councils. In addition, Mozambicans established church choirs which participated in 
regional competitions. The Berlin OMZ (established in 1985), the network of Cabana 
foreigner clubs (from 1988) and a number of church publications, especially the 
magazine Nah & Fern (from 1989), all contributed to this effort.47
However, not all East German churchgoers were supportive of the work carried out 
with foreigners as demonstrated by the experience of Rev. Eberhard Vater and his wife 
Christina in Suhl. While the couple helped local Mozambican contract workers in a 
number of ways, in some parishes prayers were offered up that the Vaters might return 
to the “right track” and cease their involvement with the migrants. They were also 
subjected to gossip and name-calling, with some visitors to their own home expressing 
amazement that they allowed their Mozambican guests use their towels 48
Reflecting this broader public disapproval of church work with contract workers 
was the hostility of the MfS. In July 1987, the head of the MfS cross departmental 
working group on foreigners claimed that particular elements in the church were 
automatically drawn to foreigners in the belief that they were “anti-socialist” 49 In 
March 1989, Department XVIII of the Erfurt MfS called for increased measures to 
combat church activity with the workers as was the case in Eisenach.50 There Dean 
Heino Falcke was outspoken in their defence.51 In one area, the authorities discouraged 
a churchman from contacting foreign workers on the grounds that they already enjoyed 
adequate contact with their East German colleagues in the factories, which was not the 
case however.52
The opposition towards church involvement with foreigners was also supported by 
some of the labour delegating countries, in particular Vietnam. At a meeting with MfS 
Main Department XVIII in July 1988, the chief of the Vietnamese Interior Ministry task 
force in the GDR, comrade Minh, expressed the opinion that Western-based church
47 Runge, AuslandDDR, 100-106, also, Dagmar Henke, “Fremde Nahe -  Nahe Fremde. Ein Beitrag zur 
Auslanderarbeit der Kirchen in der ehemaligen DDR”, in: Berliner Theologische Zeitschrift 9:1 (1992), 
119-132, 125f.
48 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 43-53.
49 Quoted in: BStU, JHS 21495, fo. 9. Olaf Wiede, Zur weiteren Qualifizierung derpolitisch-operativen 
Aufklarung und Kontrolle von Auslandem, 31 Mar. 1989.
50 BStU, ASt Erfurt, Abt. XVIII, 192, fo. 26. Diskussionsbeitrag des Leiters der Abt XVIII zur 
Spionagekonferenz der Bezirksverwaltung, 29 Mar. 1989.
51 See Marianne Kruger-Potratz, Anderssein gab es nicht: Auslander und Minderheiten in der DDR, 
Munster, 1991, 52.
52 Petra Vogelsang, “Gute Kinder -  schlechte Kinder. Freundbilder und Feindbilder im Osten”, in: 
Wolfgang & Ute Benz (eds), Deutschland, deine Kinder. Zur Pragung von Feindbildern in Ost und West, 
Miinchen, 2001, 68-81, here 68.
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groups were attempting to gain influence with his workers.53 Some members of the
Vietnamese community were equally dismissive of church activity. A long-term
Vietnamese resident, who was otherwise supportive of contract workers becoming more
culturally involved in GDR society, questioned church interest in his compatriots on the
on the grounds that most of them were not Christians.54
By 1989, however, the attitudes of state authorities towards church involvement
with foreigners were no longer homogeneous. Main Department XVIII continued to
argue that the church was simply capitalising on the “existing shortcomings in the
guidance of the Mozambican workers” to “gain influence”. It held up the example of the
pastor of the Dresden Kreuzkirche, who organised a service for Mozambican workers
whom he claimed felt “alienated”. Sixty workers attended the ceremony and two were
baptised.55 Yet other reports compiled during the same period were not all so cynical
and some officials began to recognise that church involvement was not simply the
product of a missionary or proselytising zeal but was rather a legitimate attempt to fill a
social void left by state policy. One sign of this was the decision of the SAL to send a
participant to a meeting on contract workers organised and hosted by the OMZ in June
1989. Significantly, the SAL representative admitted to the existence of xenophobia in
GDR, but attributed this to “alcohol abuse” and “occasional hooliganism” on all sides.56
This new conciliatory approach was evident in other quarters. In an internal report
compiled three months later, the regional chief of the Erfurt Stasi, major general Josef
Schwarz, uncharacteristically commended the engagement of the church. Citing the
examples of Eisenach (where a Portuguese language church service took place
fortnightly), Erfurt (where the church hosted afternoon tea for contract workers) and
Blankenhain, he argued that:
The church has been greatly influential in the social integration of the Mozambican workers. The 
church displays none o f the reserve mentioned above [referring to xenophobia] and without any 
prejudice, its representatives reach out successfully towards these people. It has been shown that the 
work o f factories, neighbourhoods, and state and mass organisations is not enough to integrate 
foreign workers. The factories have no one with whom workers can talk about personal problems.57
Significantly, one of the last MfS theses on foreigners, submitted in March 1989, 
suggested that the MfS could avoid unnecessary “operational investigations” on
53 Minutes o f meeting between MfS HA XVIII and Vietnamese security officers, 28 July 1988. Quoted in 
Michael Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten und Arbeiter in der DDR und ihre Beobachtung durch das MfS, 
Magdeburg, 1999, 74-77.
54 Quoted in Runge, AuslandDDR, 99.
55 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 30. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung zur politisch-operativen Lage unter 
den auslandischen Werktatigen, 7 Sept. 1989.
56 Imke Commichau, “Auslander in der DDR -  die ungeliebte Minderheit”, in: DA 23:9 (1990), 1432- 
1439, here 1433. Also: Henke, “Fremde Nahe”, 126.
57 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fos. 5f. Schwarz, Information, 11 Sept. 1989.
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foreigners by appreciating that the “thought and behavioural patterns” of many 
foreigners, whether they perceived themselves as religious or not, were influenced by 
“certain dogmas”.58 Although the authorities certainly did not realise it at the time, the 
recognition that the formal and informal religious activity of contract workers was not a 
conscious attempt to undermine the state had come far too late.
Many of the activities popular with foreign students and workers were not 
recreational from the conventional East German perspective. Nevertheless, they were of 
major importance to the students and workers, perhaps surpassing sporting or cultural 
interests. For so many foreigners (and their immediate and extended families), a period 
of study or employment in the GDR presented a unique chance for economic and social 
advancement upon return. In the post-Wende rush to identify all that was lacking in the 
social and recreational conditions for foreigners in the GDR, commentators have 
ignored this crucial aspect of foreigners’ experience.
The GDR exposed many international students and contract workers to a level of 
consumerism that they were previously unaccustomed to. As early as 1956, officials 
complained that students from socialist countries were misusing their scholarships to 
amass “a range of GDR technological products”.59 As the party projected its own ideals 
onto particular groups of foreigners, portraying them as selfless and heroic 
revolutionaries, functionaries and indeed members of the East German public found it 
difficult to accept that foreigners from certain countries had material interests or could 
develop these. Thus, the interest expressed by contract workers in material advancement 
challenged the paternalistic, idealised and ideological notions on what foreigners ought 
to be. The North Korean students and war orphans taken in by the GDR in the 1950s are 
an early case in point. In 1953, a report from the Workers’ and Peasants’ Faculty (ABF) 
of Leipzig University praised the “exemplary outlook of the Korean students in moral, 
political and educational matters”, adding that this stood in stark contrast to the “selfish 
and politically-destructive attitudes” of their fellow German students.60 Similarly, a 
report on North Korean apprentices contrasted their attitudes with their German 
workmates. As an official at a coal refinery works in Senftenberg noted in 1961: “Their
58 BStU, JHS 21495, fos. 23f. Wiede, Zur weiteren Qualifizierung, 31 Mar. 1989.
59 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/639, fos. 89-95, here 93. Report on Tag der Auslandsstudenten, 20- 
21 Jan. 1956.
60 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/146. Bericht der SAL uber die Uberfuhrung der ABF an der Uni. Leipzig, 10 
Mar. 1953, 5.
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eagerness to learn and their discipline often leads to them to serve as an example for
their German trainees”.61
Yet, the North Korean students and trainees were more like their fellow Germans
than these projections suggested. Behind the mask of collective uniformity encouraged
by the Korean authorities, individual traits were at hand. In 1954, for example, Leipzig
university officials demanded more “proletarian modesty” from the Korean (and
Bulgarian) students who were developing a growing proclivity for consumer goods,
parties and making costly trunk calls home. The poor levels of “care” and “upbringing”
provided for them since they came to the GDR, officials argued, pushed some of the
students down the “dangerous road of arrogance”.62 Clearly and inevitably, the Korean
students were adapting to their new environment in the GDR and taking advantage of
what it had to offer. As a report informed Kurt Hager in 1957, the Koreans more than
any other group were “most heavily affected by the influences around them” which left
them unwilling to return to Korea. The report continued:
The standard o f living in the GDR is naturally better than that in Korea and as a rule the younger 
Korean students draw the conclusion that it would be personally more advantageous to live under 
these conditions forever or at least for a long time.63
The GDR did not only appeal to students from repressive Stalinist states. In August 
1960, for example, the SPK noted that many of the Arab and African trainees who had 
come to the GDR on the basis of inter-governmental agreements were reluctant to leave 
as they felt conditions were better in the GDR.64 Some months after Algerian 
independence, about a quarter of the 201 Algerian refugees in the GDR refused to 
follow the call of the Algerian trade union (UGTA) to return to Algeria, issued in May 
1962. They based their refusal on the grounds that they were married to GDR women, 
or that they wished to complete their apprenticeships, or that they “simply wished to 
remain in the GDR”. Indeed, some of those who had already left for Algeria 
subsequently returned to East Germany after finding that the Algerian repatriation 
offices in Paris, Koln and Italy had run out of funds to pay for their way home.65
61 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.05/119, fos. 11-44, here 16. Abschlufibericht des Min. fur Volksbildung 
iiber die Ausbildung und Erziehung koreanischer Kinder und Jugendlicher in der DDR, n.d. [ca. 15 Mar. 
1961].
62 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/639, fo. 14. Bericht uber die Arbeit der ABF, Abteilung 
Ausl&nderstudium, 27 Jan. 1954.
63 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/640, fos. 56f. 3 June 1957. Abt. Wissenschaften to Hager, 
Koreanische Studenten in der DDR. TU Dresden reported similar tendencies in the early 1960s, see: 
BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Ausldnderstudium, n.d. [ca. 1959/60].
64 BArch, DE 1/21381, fo. 59. Konzeption fur die Ausbildung nationaler Kader der okon 
unterentwickelten Nationalstaaten duch die DDR, 18 Aug. 1960.
65 Ibid., put the number o f Algerians in the GDR at 215. By 30 Aug. 1962 only 52 remained. See 
SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/1647. Einschatzung uber den Verlauf und den Stand der Riickkehr der 
algerischen Arbeiter, 30 Aug. 1962.
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Clearly, the Algerians felt that remaining in East Germany best served their needs and 
saw little future in returning to France (which had banned Algerian labour after its 
defeat in the Algerian war) or indeed to Algeria.
There is also some evidence to suggest that students from the Eastern bloc utilised 
their free time to earn money in the GDR by taking on jobs in factories. The TH in 
Dresden reported in 1958 that Bulgarian students had taken on factory jobs to make 
pocket money, with one student regularly travelling from the city to Bitterfeld for this 
purpose.66 In 1972, the Soviet Ministry for Higher Education complained to its GDR 
counterpart that Soviet students in Leipzig were entering paid employment.67 As these 
international students were already in receipt of generous scholarships funded by the 
GDR, it is likely that the students worked in order to increase their spending power.
Contract workers were more determined to use their free time to acquire material 
goods. While the GDR market did not facilitate the realisation of what one Algerian 
newspaper referred to as the “classical expectations” of migrants, which was to return 
home with a car after a period of working abroad, there were other goods keenly 
sought after by workers. These included motorbikes and mopeds (hugely popular modes 
of transport in countries like Cuba and Vietnam), white and black electrical goods, as 
well as spare parts, textiles, clothing, and foodstuffs.
Before examining in detail the significance that the acquisition of material goods 
played in the everyday lives of foreigners in the GDR, it is important to stress that they 
also sold goods they imported from abroad, usually in contravention of East German 
custom regulations. As such, they acted as purveyors and suppliers of consumer and 
cultural goods, a fact generally ignored in the literature on foreigners’ consumerism in 
the GDR.69 In her research on Algerian workers, Almut Riedel claimed that Algerian 
workers compensated for their low workplace status in two main ways. On the one 
hand, they took advantage of the perception common among some East Germans that 
they were in possession of “Western attributes”. On the other, they indulged in 
“conspicuous consumption” or ostentatious spending in order to impress others in the
66 SAPMO-BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Niederschrift der wichtigsten Probleme der Aussprachen 
beim Besuch der THD, 30 Sept. 1958.
67 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV B 2/9.04/136. Aktennotiz uber das Gesprach mit Gen. Seliwanow, Min. fur 
Hochschulbildung der UdSSR, 15 Dec. 1972.
68 Algerie actualite, 14-20 June 1979, 7f. [of translation]. As the article made clear, the Algerians believed 
the GDR compared poorly with France, from where it was possible to return with a car. Not surprisingly, 
the contract workers were not impressed by the journalist’s counterargument that potatoes and bread were 
cheaper in the GDR.
69 See for example Jonathan Zatlin, “Race and economy in Soviet-style regimes: the East German case”, 
in: Ankunft -  Alltag -  Ausreise. Zeithistorische Forschungen zu Migration undInterkulturalitdt in der 
DDR-Gesellschaft, Ms., Potsdam, 2004, 46-63.
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social and recreational sphere.70 Although most Algerians had only tenuous links with 
the West, they had some access to Western goods owing to the existence of an “ethnic 
network” which encompassed Algerians living in the West.71 Taking a typically 
negative view of the same phenomenon, the MfS observed in 1977 that Berlin’s 
Alexanderplatz had become a central meeting place for Algerians from both the GDR 
and the West. This forum allowed for “‘dealings’ in drug-like substances, hunting 
knifes, and other goods” smuggled from West Berlin.72 Indeed, other groups of 
foreigners, such as the Vietnamese, could rely on similar networks much to the 
consternation of their own embassies.
As many international students had far greater access and exposure to the West than 
the Algerians, it arguably follows that their “Western attributes” were far more potent, 
which similarly helped compensate for the loss of familiar structures and social status in 
the GDR, and enhanced their standing in the eyes of some East Germans. Foreign 
students with valid passports were entitled to leave the GDR and West Berlin was the 
most popular and convenient travel destination. As such, trips to the West formed an 
important part in the recreational repertoire of these students, attracting both the 
curiosity and envy of the East German bureaucracy and public. Although the erection of 
the Berlin Wall in 1961 did little to prevent this traffic -  a 1962 Interior Ministry 
internal order ruled that all foreign residents of the GDR in possession of a valid 
passport had the right to travel to West Berlin at all times -  it did allow the authorities 
to keep this movement under greater surveillance.73 While the authorities sought 
unsuccessfully to dam this traffic by means of verbal intimidation and a series of 
college regulations over the years, a KAS meeting in 1972 reconfirmed that there was 
simply no law on the books to prevent foreign students visiting “capitalist foreign 
countries” and that the only real means available to prevent Western travel was 
“political-ideological” work with the students.74
These trips were often necessary and, especially in the years of diplomatic non­
recognition, foreigners had to travel to the West in order to renew their passports for 
example. Indeed, the East German authorities had a major interest in ensuring that 
foreigners did so because in the event of a passport expiring, foreigners effectively
70 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus”, 85. The term “conspicuous consumption” was coined by 
Thorstein Veblen in his The Theory o f  the Leisure Class: An Economic Study o f  Institutions, New York 
(Macmillan), 1902, pp. 68-101.
71 Ibid., 89.
72 BStU, JHS, MF, VVS 001-339/77. Thiemann, Die Aufgaben der Kreisdienststelle, 15 Aug. 1977,31.
73 BStU, JHS, MF, 540. Theo Dudek, Einige Besonderheiten bei der Werbung von operativ geeigneten 
Auslandern mit standigem Wohnsitz in der DDR fur die Abwehrarbeit des MfS, n.d. [ca. 1966/67], 9.
74 BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/B 1247a/2. Protokoll der Sitzung des KAS vom 15 Feb. 1972, 5f.
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became stateless persons, who under GDR law could not be deported.75 In addition, 
some students availed of the peculiar perception among officials that visiting the West 
strengthened rather than weakened their faith in socialism. Icelander Fylkir Thirisson 
travelled from Mittweida to West Germany in 1965 to participate in the Easter peace 
marches and gave a talk on his experiences upon his return.76 An MfS thesis written the 
same year argued that trips to the West were not necessarily all that bad for foreign 
students, claiming that the “clarity of the contrast” between the two systems reinforced 
the anti-imperialist standpoint of the majority, who the thesis’ author believed possessed 
a strong “sense of justice”.77
This comparative freedom of movement allowed foreign students to move with 
relative ease between both systems. They could enjoy the benefits of both societies and 
they were not completely dependent on what the GDR had to offer in recreational or 
material terms. In 1965, the MfS estimated that on average 43.3 percent of the 11,216 
citizens of non-socialist countries resident in the GDR visited West Berlin.78 Four years 
later, the KAS was aware that 16.4 percent of students from non-socialist countries 
visited the West, with Indians, Nigerians and Guineans being most prominent.79 As 
most students did not bother to inform the authorities of their impending trips, the 
proportion of students visiting West Berlin was undoubtedly much higher. It is also 
important to note that travel to West Berlin was not just the preserve of citizens from 
non-socialist countries and in 1965 one college complained that Cuban students were 
visiting the enclave.80
Trips to the West gave foreign students access to Western markets and made them 
key purveyors of consumer goods to the East German economy of shortages. Foreign 
trade unionists enrolled at the FDGB’s academy at Bemau near Berlin, for example, 
made regular trips to West Berlin, despite official discouragement. As one report from 
August 1962 suggested, visits to the enclave were frequent and at times had commercial 
or political purposes. The envy of the reporting functionary, the academy’s director Dr. 
Karl Kampfert, was evident as he listed the names of the students in possession of
75 BStU, JHS, MF, 540. Theo Dudek, Einige Besonderheiten, 12.
76 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Analyse der nationalen Fachschulgruppen, n.d. [ca. 1965].
77 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Werner Paulsen, Einige Probleme der Verhiitung von Staatsverbrechen, die 
durch in der DDR lebende Auslander nichtsozialistischer Staaten begangen werden konnen, 5 Dec. 1965, 
23.
78 Ibid., 27. Of this group, 30 percent travelled regularly to West Berlin, with the Italians (9.3 trips per 
person) the most frequent visitors, followed by Holland (9.2 percent), Austria (8.8 percent), and Spain 
and Sweden (7.8 each).
79 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Analyse der Arbeit im Bereich des Auslanderstudiums an 
Hoch- und Fachschulen der DDR im Studienjahr 1968/69, 15 Oct. 1969, 15.
80 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Kubanische Studierende, n.d. [ca. 1965].
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“Western” coats, soaps, and toothbrushes. Based on his information, exaggerated as it 
was, the foreign students were importing and selling Western goods to the local 
population, who as former “border crossers” (East Germans who worked in West Berlin 
before the construction of the Wall) had reserves of hard currency. In addition, they 
helped maintain contact between friends and families divided by the Wall.81 In May 
1966, university officials reported similar transactions in Leipzig, where Arab and 
African students (denigrated as “Trotskyites” and enemies of the USSR) travelled 
regularly to West Berlin, returning with clothing and other goods intended for their 
personal use and for “speculative trading”.82
Even from towns located considerable distances from West Berlin, visits by foreign 
students were frequent and popular. Algerian students at the Freiberg Mining Academy 
enjoyed West Berlin for its “nightlife”.83 Dresden TU reported in early 1964 that its 
international students were “fascinated” by the advances in the West, with most 
travelling there during their term holidays. Students in receipt of a supplementary grant 
paid to them in deutschmarks by their governments, such as the Guinean, Indian, 
Malian and Ghanaian students, or hard currency remittances from their families, were at 
a particular advantage.84 The East German authorities found it difficult to discourage 
such trips. In the mid-1960s, for example, college authorities bemoaned the fact that the 
Association of Iraqi Students and Workers in the GDR had no policy against its 
members visiting West Berlin or taking holidays in the West. Needless to say, both 
were popular.85 Even into the 1980s, international students were still travelling to the 
West, with one source in 1984 suggesting that the rate lay between a “100 and 150 
percent [sic]”.86
Although contract workers did not enjoy the same travel freedoms as international 
students from non-socialist countries, they had access to external goods and markets 
which they used to their advantage in the GDR. This was particularly evident among 
Polish and Hungarian workers, and especially from the late 1980s, Vietnamese workers. 
Unlike East German citizens, who had to wait until 1972 before they were allowed to
81 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/458. Kampfert (HSGD) to FDGB, 1 Aug. 1962.
82 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Schreiben der Abt. IV an die Abt. Wissenschaften, 6 May 
1966.
83 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41383. Bericht tiber die Bildung von Organisationen auslSndischer Studenten und 
Facharbeiter in der DDR, 25 July 1963.
84 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/1. Zur Lage unter den auslandischen Studenten, n.d. [Jan. 1964]. Also: 
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Analyse der Arbeit im Bereich des Auslanderstudiums an 
Hoch- und Fachschulen der DDR im Studienjahr 1968/69, 15 Oct. 1969 ,15f.
85 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. IS Mittweida, Verband der irakischen Studenten und Arbeiter in der 
DDR, n.d. [ca. 1965].
86 SAPMO-BArch, DY 13/3058. Beratungen mit Leitungen von ausl. Studentenverbanden vom 10 bis 15. 
Dez. 1984.
122
travel without visas to Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungarian workers employed in the 
GDR were free to visit these countries and, according to police reports, frequently did 
so at the weekends. Trips home were also popular and in 1970, Hungarian contract 
workers returning to East Germany from visits home were reportedly in possession of 
“beat material” in the form of “jumpers, shirts, records and books” which they sold to 
GDR youths. At the end of the decade, police reports claimed Hungarians were selling 
similar products of Western provenance.87
Likewise, throughout the 1970s Poles were major purveyors to the GDR black 
market and police reports provide an insight into the palette of Polish contraband, which 
included cosmetics, jewellery, woollens and jeans ware, chewing gum, lollipops, photos 
of “beat formations” (i.e. of Western bands), stars and stripe badges, halogen lamps, real 
and imitation leather jackets, drills, fan heaters, and radio and television valves.88 By the 
late 1970s in Leipzig, the black market was no longer a discreet phenomenon, with 
police estimating that up to sixty Poles were involved in illegal trading around the city’s 
main train station at any given time. When the DVP and customs officials confiscated 
contraband from one Pole in early June 1979, they were surrounded and attacked by 
forty of his incensed compatriots who managed to pull the goods from the police 
vehicle.89 The GDR market was a lucrative one and according to one police report, a 
Polish couple managed a turnover of 20,000 marks in two years selling ladies pullovers 
at 50 marks a piece.90 As the Polish economy collapsed in the early 1980s, much of this 
trade evaporated, not least owing to the GDR’s decision to impose strict controls on its 
border with Poland. In 1981 the number of Poles and Czechs convicted of smuggling 
and illegal trading offences in the GDR was at its lowest point since 1975.91 GDR 
goods, in particular foodstuffs, were increasingly coveted by Polish contract workers. In 
1982, the SAL (at the behest of customs and with the support of the Polish embassy) 
expelled 55 Polish workers for “repeated and gross” transgressions of customs 
regulations. Large amounts of foodstuffs such as pepper, chocolate, gelatine, peanuts, 
mints, chewing gum, and baking materials had featured predominantly in the car boots 
of these Polish workers.92
87 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. Information zur Lage auf dem Gebiet der Ordnung und Sicherheit im 
Zusammenhang mit dem zeitweiligen Aufenthalt junger ungarischer Werktatiger in der DDR, 25 Sept. 
1970; and DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 5 July 1979.
88 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842 and 47843. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Informationen, 17 June 1977; 14 
Dec. 1977, and 5 July 1979.
89 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattung, 17 July 1979, 3.
90 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 17 June 1977,2 and 7.
91 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46780, fo. 676. Kriminalistische Registierung von Auslandem, 17 Mar. 1982.
92 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6485. Ehrensperger to Mittag, 19 Nov. 1982.
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Perhaps more than any other group of migrant labour, Vietnamese workers were 
determined to use their time in the GDR to increase their own and their families’ wealth 
and were less inclined to use it to explore new recreational pastimes. This had its causes 
in the precarious economic situation in Vietnam, which in the 1980s was crippled by 
massive inflation, material shortages, and chronic unemployment. This served to 
generate intense competition for the limited number of contract worker positions and it 
was common for applicants to bribe their way through the recruitment procedure. In 
some cases doctors demanded considerable payments before issuing the certificate of 
clean health required for all applications. As such, contract workers were a family’s sole 
source of income and hope, and given the widespread corruption involved in the 
application process, represented a costly investment. Internal prQ-Wende Vietnamese 
and East German reports estimated that contract workers could spend up to 8,000 marks 
in bribing officials in order to get to the GDR. Applicants raised this capital with the 
help of their fellow villagers or borrowed it from “Chinese usurers” allegedly at an 
interest rate of 60 to 80 percent. This meant that in the GDR the Vietnamese worked 
two years to pay off their debts, two years to make some money for their families, and 
one year for their own personal benefit. As unemployment was a certainty upon 
returning to Vietnam, families expected returning workers to have enough savings to 
last them eight years.93
The internal economic situation in Vietnam, thus, greatly determined the 
avocational activities of the Vietnamese workers in the GDR. Their priority was wealth 
creation rather than recreation in a leisure sense. In July 1987, MfS Main Department 
XVIII observed that the behaviour of the Vietnamese was characterised “primarily by 
material interest and ideological disinterest”.94 In late 1988, GDR customs claimed that 
it took little time for most workers to begin with the “selective purchasing of articles” 
after arriving in the GDR.95 As Broszinsky-Schwabe has claimed, whenever she asked 
Vietnamese workers about their recreational activities, she was told that “We’re here to 
provide for our families at home and we don’t forget that for one minute” 96 Her 
observations are confirmed by other sources. H., a Vietnamese worker employed in a
93 BStU, ASt Erfurt, Abt. XVIII, 203. Ruckinformation zu aktuellen Problemen beim Einsatz 
auslandischer ArbeitskrSfte, 5 May 1989, 3f.
94 Konzeption fur eine Beratung mit dem Mdl der SRV im August 1987, 8 July 1987. Quoted in Feige, 
Vietnamesische Studenten und Arbeiter, 84-86, here 85.
95 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. Zollverwaltung, Information uber die Ein- und Ausfuhr von Waren und 
ttber Verletzungen zoll- und divisenrechtlichen Bestimmungen durch Burger der SRV, 26 Sept. 1988,2.
96 Edith Broszinsky-Schwabe, “Die DDR-Burger im Umgang mit ‘Fremden’ - Versuch einer Bilanz der 
Veraussetzungen ftir ein Leben in einer multikulterellen Gesellschaft”, in: Sanem Kleff, et al. (eds), BRD- 
DDR. Alte und Neue Rassismen im Zuge der deutsch-deutschen Einigung, Frankfurt a.M., 1990,18-46, 
here 28f.
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Brandenburg factory, pointed out that the GDR enabled him to support his war-
widowed mother and his two siblings to whom he regularly sent goods parcels. Like
many of his co-workers, he was pragmatic about living and working in the GDR,
remarking that: “If things gotta be, they gotta be.”97 Economic need led Vietnamese
workers to put up with the often less than opportune conditions in the GDR. Not only
would a premature repatriation represent a wasted investment but it would destroy one’s
prospects of securing a job and an apartment back in Vietnam.98 Many Vietnamese
workers were preoccupied by the situation in Vietnam, as described by a Vietnamese
citizen who had moved to the GDR in the 1970s:
The other [older] Vietnamese have barely any contact with GDR citizens. They mostly speak poor 
German, and often it often doesn’t interest them as they only spend time amongst themselves and 
think o f home all the time. I’ve noticed that the 18-year-olds, who are just out o f school, are more 
open about this country. And the older ones, they just simply think about home and put up with 
things here."
Owing to its sheer scale, the Vietnamese labour transfer accentuated the 
consumerist trends which had been evident among earlier groups of contract workers, 
making these more evident to the security forces and, more importantly, to the public. 
The number of Vietnamese workers rose rapidly from 8,459 in 1986 to 20,776 in 1987, 
reaching 50,998 in 1988, and peaking at 59,686 in 1989. Thus, by September 1989, 
Vietnamese workers formed 61 percent of the total contract workforce in the GDR.100 
The social composition of the Vietnamese labour was also different in many ways to 
previous groups of contract labour. Whereas the first Vietnamese workers were young, 
poorly-educated and often demobilised soldiers, the workers sent in the late 1980s were 
older and often equipped with secondary, and in a few cases, third-level education. 
Many had already spent more than the four to five years working in the GDR, retained 
by factories that resisted the official labour rotation policy in the face of growing labour 
shortages. Indeed, the 1987 revision of the 1980 GDR-Vietnamese labour agreement 
allowed for the recruitment of Vietnamese citizens who had already worked in the 
GDR. With the massive increase in numbers, a critical mass was reached, allowing for 
the development of a Vietnamese contract worker community that was experienced, 
numerically strong, educated and equipped with a variety of skills which the workers 
used to achieve their economic goals in the GDR. Unlike other groups of contract 
workers, the gender balance was by and large normal with women representing a 
significant portion of the total Vietnamese workforce. The presence of married couples
97 Quoted in Runge, AuslandDDR, 38.
98 Ibid., 51.
"  Quoted in: ibid., 96f.
100 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 27. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 7 Sept. 1989.
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was another factor which enhanced this internal social coherence, lessening the need or 
the will to seek out social interaction with the majority population. Vietnamese hostels 
were more socially and culturally autarkic than others, representing nodes within a 
larger network of communities, encompassing not only the GDR, but Czechoslovakia 
and Bulgaria (which both employed Vietnamese labour), and according to the MfS, 
West Germany, France and the USA.101
In their attempts to increase their incomes and, as a consequence, their purchasing 
power in the GDR, Vietnamese workers displayed remarkable levels of determination, 
self-initiative and business acumen. These efforts brought them into conflict with the 
authorities and the public. The former generally viewed unregulated economic activity 
with disdain and suspicion for ideological reasons. But even when the Vietnamese 
utilised legal means to increase their wages by taking on overtime, weekend and 
nightshifts for example, they attracted the odium of the German workforce for doing so, 
as the previous chapter has shown. In contravening East German law, the Vietnamese 
(and other) contract workers did not believe they were breaking any moral law, rather 
they felt they were pushed into illicit activities by the dictates of the planned economy. 
The peculiarities of the GDR system made it necessary, if not logical, for foreign 
workers to engage in activities that the state branded illegal. As an internal, 
inconvertible currency, East German marks were worthless outside the GDR and indeed 
it was illegal to bring them out of the country. Sending home remittances was also 
unpopular given the rampant inflationary character of the dong and other currencies. 
This led workers to do everything possible to convert their hard-earned wages into 
products or hard currency that would help safeguard their futures upon return to their 
native countries. The methods they employed to do so reflected the complex attempts of 
the GDR authorities to limit the export of consumer goods out of the country.
In 1988, MfS Main Department XVIII observed that the Vietnamese treated their 
time in the GDR as a “supply mission” on behalf of their families which drove them to 
use all “legal and illegal means to acquire money and consumer goods”. In this effort 
they enjoyed the full support of the Vietnamese government which came to view the 
contribution of its workers in the GDR as a “strategic aspect of foreign trade”. 
Consequently, in 1988, it dropped all import restrictions and custom levies for returning
101 Notes o f meeting between Zollverwaltung and Vietnamese Vietnamese embassy trade representative 
on 26 Nov. 1987, quoted in Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten und Arbeiter, 87-91; BStU, ZA, Abt. X, 
112, fo. 109-110. Information tiber die Beteiligung von Burgem der DRV am Schmuggel und an der 
Spekulation, 25 Sept. 1987; and BStU, ZA, HA XVIII, 8880, fo. 8-11, Ruckinformation zu operativ 
bedeutsamen Problemen, 7 Feb. 1989.
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contract workers.102 Significantly, the official Vietnamese Communist Party newspaper, 
Nan Dhan, supported the demands made by Vietnamese contract workers for a more 
generous allowance in the amount of goods they could send home in the post. This 
demand was expressed at a meeting of the Vietnamese youth movement in Sofia in 
October 1988, attended by contract workers from across the Eastern bloc. In addition, 
the delegation of Vietnamese workers from the GDR called for the provision of more 
cultural and sporting activities, improved accommodation conditions, and greater 
freedom of movement to visit compatriots employed in other Eastern bloc countries.103
The economic activity of Vietnamese workers took a number of forms. Most 
commonly, workers manufactured clothing during their spare time in their hostels, 
selling the produce of this “cottage” or hostel industry to East Germans. In addition, 
some workers organised the importation of commodities from abroad, which they 
subsequently sold to East Germans. Using the cash generated by this activity, the 
Vietnamese purchased particular consumer goods during their stay in East Germany 
which they intended to send abroad to Vietnam.
The indigenous production and selling of clothing and textiles was carried out by 
even the first cohort of Vietnamese workers. A wide assortment of garments, in 
particular jeans ware and shirts, were tailored according to the newest Western fashions 
and were much sought after by East Germans. As has been shown, the enforcement of 
rules and regulations in the hostels was often lax and this allowed the Vietnamese to use 
them to their own advantage, effectively moonlighting in order to boost incomes. In 
May 1986 at the steelworks in Groditz near Riesa, disgruntled East German workers 
complained that the Vietnamese workers stayed up the whole night in the hostels 
producing clothing only to rest during regular working hours.104 In September 1989, the 
MfS in Erfurt claimed that the failure of factory and hostel officials to enforce the 
regulations prohibiting avocational activities had enabled the Vietnamese to turn their 
hostels into “workshops”. Sewing machines were essential in this enterprise and the 
Vietnamese workers used the classified columns of the regional SED-run newspaper, 
Das Volk, to buy them.105 Such adverts had been freely appearing in the columns of the
102 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 27. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 7 Sept. 1989.
103 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. A day after the article appeared in Nan Dhan on 17 Oct. 1988, an 
ADN-Info referred to the article. In a letter to Mittag a day later, Beyreuther (SAL) rubbished the 
complaints.
104 BStU, ASt Dresden, AKG-Pi, 128/86, fo. 7. Information iiber Verhaltensweisen vietnamesicher 
Arbeitskrafte im VEB Stahl- und Walzwerk Groditz, Riesa, 20 May 1986.
105 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 9. Josef Schwarz, Information, 11 Sept. 1989.
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paper since 1986, if not earlier. Among the many buy and sell adverts inserted by East 
Germans for goods of all kinds and provenance, the following was typical:
Sewing machine sought. Tran Thi Kim Doan, Clausewitzstr. 66/48, Erfurt 5080.106
The business acumen of the Vietnamese was evident elsewhere. Vietnamese 
workers employed at the VEB Lederfabrik in Hirschberg (Bezirk Gera) bought a 
hundred mainly second-hand sewing machines from GDR citizens, which they posted to 
their families in Vietnam or used to produce clothing in the GDR. Shirts produced 
privately with these machines were sold to German workers in the factory for between 
80 to 120 marks each.107 In addition, Vietnamese workers also sold their produce on the 
streets, at tourist attractions, in front of department stores, at flea markets as well 
through the second-hand A&V {An- und Verkauf) shops.108
The East German market was the most important and convenient source of goods, 
despite the state having erected a number of bureaucratic hurdles designed to limit the 
purchasing activity of contract workers. Although the government introduced a 
regulation in 1982 which required foreigners (including contract workers) to present 
their identity cards when purchasing certain products that were in short supply,109 
Vietnamese workers took advantage of the inability of many East Germans to 
distinguish their faces. Between 1986 and 1987, the reported misuse of identity cards 
increased fivefold while the value o f goods and currency confiscated from Vietnamese 
suspected of minor misdemeanours jumped from 140,000 to over 460,000 marks.110 In 
one case, a Vietnamese worker employed in the GDR since 1982 made 10,000 marks 
profit over a three month period in 1985 as the result of what officials deemed 
“speculative trading”. Equipped with the identity cards of some co-workers who had 
returned to Vietnam and financed with some hard currency provided by an Algerian 
friend, he managed to purchase 37 record players in the Intershops for 439 
deutschmarks a piece only to sell these later through the second-hand A&V stores for 
2,788 marks each.111
106 Das Volk, 2 May 1986, 6.
107 BStU, ASt Gera, KD Schleiz, 1508. Lederfabrik Hirschberg, n.d. [ca. Autumn 1988].
108 BStU, ZA, Abt. X, 112, fo. 8 If. Information fiber den Missbrauch von Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen 
durch Auslander, 10 Dec. 1987, BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 8. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 
Mar. 1988; BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 10. J. Schwarz, Information, 11 Sept. 1989; SAPMO- 
BArch, DY 30/7027. Zollverwaltung, Information tiber die Ein- und Ausfuhr von Waren durch Burger 
der SRV, 26 Sept. 1988, 5.
109 Mentioned in Edith Broszinsky-Schwabe, “Die DDR-Burger im Umgang mit ‘Fremden’”, 38.
110 BStU, ZA, Abt. X, 112, fo. 8 If. Information uber den Missbrauch von Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen 
durch Auslander, 10 Dec. 1987.
111 BArch, DO 1/8.0/51097. BDVP Dresden, Sofortmeldung, 8 Jan. 1986.
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Goods were also sourced in the West either directly by the workers themselves or 
with the help of others. According to MfS and police reports, foreigners dealt 
extensively in a range of Western goods, such as home electronics (especially hi-fi 
stereo players) and some Eastern European goods, such as Polish silverware, before 
expanding in 1987 into computers, electronic calculators, and car parts, and in 1988, 
video recorders and other home electronics. Western goods commonly were imported 
illegally with the help of so-called “privileged persons” or members of the diplomatic 
corps. According the MfS, over a six month period in 1989, a group of Vietnamese 
workers (mostly employed at the Berlin VEB Herrenoberbekleidung “Fortschritt” but 
including three workers who had avoided repatriation and had been living illegally in 
the GDR since 1987) managed to smuggle goods worth 1.5 million marks with the help 
of five African diplomatic passport holders. These goods, which included 1,800 car 
radios, 10,000 audio cassettes and other electronics, were then distributed to a wide 
circle of 40 Vietnamese middlemen and sold at markets, on the streets and through the 
second-hand A&V stores across the GDR, realising a total turnover of 2.3 million marks 
and 10,000 marks profit for each for the organisers. There is evidence to suggest that 
some Vietnamese workers were able to travel to West Germany owing to the inability 
of East Germans to distinguish Vietnamese faces. In 1989, a Vietnamese translator 
alerted the MfS in Magdeburg that his workers were borrowing the passports of 
Western-based Vietnamese exiles, who were visiting the GDR, to make short trips to 
the West.112 Another important source for goods was Vietnam. From 1988, GDR 
customs reported that approximately 30 to 50 percent of Vietnamese workers arriving to 
the GDR attempted to “smuggle” goods illegally for the purposes of “speculative” 
trading with kimonos, jeans ware, blouses, cosmetics, quartz watches, “plastic shoes”
1 t  o
and jewellery featuring predominantly. According to GDR customs, Vietnamese 
workers also used their visits to contract worker compatriots in Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
and Bulgaria, to import consumer goods to the GDR for “speculative” purposes.114
The total extent of these “smuggling and speculative” activities is difficult to 
ascertain, not least owing to the existence of wildly divergent and at times incredible 
figures complied by GDR customs, police and Stasi. According to GDR customs, illegal 
trading by contract workers resulted in a loss of 129,000 marks in revenue in 1984,
112 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 29. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 7 Sept. 1989.
113 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. Zollverwaltung, Information tiber die Ein- und Ausfuhr von Waren 
durch Burger der SRV, 26 Sept. 1988, 4.
114 Notes o f meeting between Zollverwaltung and Vietnamese embassy trade representative on 26 Nov. 
1987, quoted in Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten und Arbeiter, 87-91.
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rocketing to 3.2 million marks three years later.115 MfS Main Department VI claimed 
that between 1 January 1987 and 31 January 1988, 72 contract workers were suspected 
of illegally importing and selling goods worth a staggering 25 million marks in total.116 
In addition, customs also claimed that in the first half of 1988, 54 Vietnamese workers 
had been tried for their involvement in illegal foreign currency exchanges valued at 50 
million marks with Western “currency foreigners” (Divisenauslander).117
However, most Vietnamese workers were simply involved in the purchase of goods 
for their own personal use and benefit and their specific consumption pattern reflected 
the shortages of the Vietnamese market.118 A customs report of 1988 listed the most 
sought-after goods as mopeds and bicycles, accessories and spare parts, new and 
second-hand sewing machines, anoraks and cowls, cloth, soap, sugar and medicine.119 
The focus on these particular products brought them into conflict with the East German 
public, who blamed them for empty shop shelves, but also with the state, which 
installed a number of controls designed to reduce the amount of goods taken out of the 
country by the Vietnamese and other workers. At the most basic level, foreign workers 
faced controls at the point of purchase. A 1982 regulation required foreigners to present 
their GDR identity cards when purchasing particular listed goods, which enabled the 
authorities to keep track of the spending activities of individual workers.120 At another 
level, workers faced limits in the number and value of goods parcels they could send 
home. While Algerians were entitled to send one parcel home a month, Vietnamese, 
Cubans and others had the right to send one only every two months. In addition, the 
value of the contents could not exceed half of the worker’s wage earned in the same 
period.121
According to the various contract labour agreements, contract workers were 
allowed to take home goods worth 50 percent of their total net income generated during 
their time in the GDR. This meant, theoretically at least, that returning Vietnamese 
workers could take home goods worth anything from about 20,000 to 27,500 marks
115 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 8. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988.
116 BStU, ZA, Abt. X, 112, fo. 47-50. Information zu Erscheinungen des Schmuggels und der Spekulation 
durch auslandische Werktatigen, 15 Feb. 1988. Their nationalities were as follows: Vietnamese (51), 
Polish (16), Mozambican (3), Cuban (1) and Angolan (1).
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July 1988, quoted in Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten und Arbeiter, 77.
119 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. Zollverwaltung, Information uber die Ein- und Ausfuhr von Waren 
durch Burger der SRV, 26 Sept. 1988.
120 Edith Broszinsky-Schwabe, “Die DDR-Biirger im Umgang mit ‘Fremden’”, 28. Shops provided local 
criminal police department with bills o f  sale. See DO 1/8.0/41773,2. Information zu Problemen mit 
vietnamesischen Staatsbiirgem, n.d. [ca. Dec. 1986], 2.
121 Broszinsky-Schwabe, “Die DDR-Biirger im Umgang mit ‘Fremden’”, 28.
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according to MfS and SPK wage calculations for 1989.122 Yet, Vietnamese (and other) 
workers faced considerable bureaucratic hurdles in attempting to do even this. On the 
one hand, the East German authorities confiscated freight destined for Vietnam on the 
grounds that it was intended for commercial rather than personal use while on the other 
hand they imposed export quotas for particular goods.
Up to the late 1980s, export quotas only existed for motorbikes and mopeds while 
the export of cars was expressly forbidden. Contract workers wishing to export vehicles 
were required to secure relevant licences from the Ministry for External Trade. In a 
complicated procedure, workers had to submit licence applications six weeks in 
advance, which had to be accompanied by a sales receipt, a statement of net income and
i 23an export form. This served to complicate the procedure, which was undoubtedly the 
desired effect. The export allowances of workers from difference countries varied, 
however: Algerians were entitled to two motorbikes or mopeds while Vietnamese 
workers were mostly limited to only one motorbike or moped each.
Although the workers were legally entitled to buy and ship home what they wanted 
before the official imposition of comprehensive export quotas in March 1989 (see Table 
4), GDR customs frustrated the export of Vietnamese acquisitions on the grounds that 
they were destined for commercial rather than personal use. As early as 1980, SAL 
guidelines stipulated that the purchases Vietnamese workers wished to take home were 
not to “bear the character of commodities in either type or amount”,124 a clause which 
effectively gave police and customs the freedom to confiscate at will. GDR customs 
also secretly and rigidly enforced its own internal limits before the formal imposition of 
export quotas in 1989. In the first eight months of 1988 alone, GDR customs intercepted 
4,700 mopeds in freight shipments destined for Vietnam, confiscating 700 of these and 
returning the remaining 4,000 to their senders. In the same period, they intercepted and 
prevented the export of goods not formally under any export restrictions, such as moped 
spare parts (600 engines, 1,500 frames, and 29,000 fan belts), bicycle spare parts
122 For the MfS calculation, see BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 27. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 7 Sept. 
1989. The SPK put the average gross annual wage o f Vietnamese workers at 12,520 marks, amounting to 
62,600 marks over five years. Vietnamese wages were subjected to a twelve percent income levy 
ostentatiously for the “construction and defence o f  the Vietnamese fatherland”. See SAPMO-BArch, DY 
30/7027. Schiirer to Mittag, 10 Apr. 1989, 6.
123 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Richtlinie der SAL fur die Einsatzbetrieben zur Durchfuhrung des 
Abkommens DDR-Algerien, 1 Aug. 1979. This procedure was based on § 16 der 11. 
Durchfuhrungsbestimmung zum Zollgesetz and was also contained in paragraph III. 3 (c) o f the 1980 
Rahmenrichtlinie.
124 Appendix 6, clause 3 o f the Rahmenrichtlinie [der SAL] zur Durchfuhrung von Regierungsabkommen 
zwischen der DDR und anderen Staaten fiber die zeitweilige Beschaftigung auslandischer Werktatiger in 
Betrieben der DDR, 1 July 1980. Reproduced in: Eva-Maria & Lothar Eisner, Zwischen Nationalismus 
und Internationalismus, Rostock, 1994, 140-65.
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(38,000 chains, 310,000 lamps, and 430,000 spokes), as well as 60 tonnes of sugar, 2.4 
tonnes of safety pins, 27 kilometres of cloth, 68,000 film rolls, and 39 kilometres of 
electrical cable. Customs officials were also busy in the postal sorting offices in the 
same period, intercepting and turning back 1,000 parcels filled with goods destined for 
Vietnam.125
Table 4. Export restrictions imposed on Vietnamese contract workers returning to 
Vietnam after completing their labour contracts -  in the GDR before and after 1 March
1989 and in the CSSR from 1985126
Informal limits pre 1 
March 1989
Official limits post 1 
March 1989
dsSR (from 1985)
Total value o f goods 50% o f  total wages 50% of total net
not to exceed (estimated at 15,000 wages (estimated at
marks) 20,000 marks)
Bicycles 3-5 5 1
Spare parts “reasonable amount” 10 tyres, 20 tubes; 10 1 rear or front hub,
ball-bearings 20 spokes & nipples,
2 pedals, 4 brake
blocks
Motorbikes/mopeds 1 2 2 (1 moped & 1
(total) motorbike or 2
motorbikes)
Chains “reasonable amount” 1
Sewing machines 2-4 2 1
(new or second hand)
Cameras 1
Radios 2
Anoraks 10 8
Cloth (total) 150m 150m 100m (excluding
lining and rayon)
o f  which lining 100m
Photo paper 50 pks
Film roll 50 pcs
Soap “a few hundred” pcs 300 pcs 20kg
Sugar 150kg 100kg
Hand cream 40 pcs
Sewing needles 200 pcs
Thread 5kg
Toothpaste 50 pks
Hacksaw blades 150 pcs
Handkerchiefs 120 pcs
Glossary: pcs = pieces, pks = packs
In addition, there may have been more surreptitious methods to prevent goods 
reaching Vietnam, as illustrated by a scathing letter sent by a concerned East German 
industrial manager to the TV programme Prisma in early 1989. She pointed out that
125 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. Zollverwaltung, Information uber die Ein- und Ausfuhr von Waren 
durch Burger der SRV, 26 Sept. 1988, 3.
126 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. Zollverwaltung, Information uber die Ein- und Ausfuhr von Waren 
durch Burger der SRV, 26 Sept. 1988, 4 and 7f.; and SAL Ordnung [der SAL] zur Ausfuhrung von 
Waren durch Werktatige der SR Vietnam, quoted in Susanne Paul, “Inseldasein im fremden Land: der 
rechtliche und soziale Status der Arbeitsmigranten in der DDR”, in: Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes 
SED-Staat, 7 (1999), 59-67, 64. Also: BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 27. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 
7 Sept. 1989.
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freight destined for Vietnam, containing bikes, rugs, woollens and cloth belonging to 
returned contract workers, never left the GDR. At the VEB Fortschritt in 
Bischofswerda, she counted 120 crates o f cargo which had been lying about exposed to 
the elements for up to seven months. Although the workers had paid up to 3,000 marks 
in transport costs, the state-run shipping company, Deutrans, claimed there were no 
vessels available to ship the goods to Vietnam.127 The difficulty in shipping freight to 
Vietnam was in part due to the fact that there was no port facility capable of unloading 
container cargo ships in Vietnam, meaning freight had to be transported in wooden 
crates. There were also restrictions on air freight and returning workers were forbidden 
to take excess baggage aboard planes.128
In March 1989, the GDR introduced comprehensive export limits for Vietnamese 
workers (Table 4) in a unilateral move that was opposed by the Vietnamese 
government. The first signs that the GDR was planning to impose export quotas on 
Vietnamese workers was in September 1988, when, as chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, Willi Stoph requested the SAL and the SPK to look into the matter.129 
Ominously, at a meeting held in East Berlin a month later with Vo Van Kiet, deputy 
chairman of the Vietnamese Council of Ministers, the state secretary at the SAL, 
Wolfgang Beyreuther, did not disclose the plans to enforce export limits although the 
two agreed to revise a number of other contentious issues such as the pregnancy, 
citizenship, and marriage regulations (see chapter six). Indeed, the plans totally 
contradicted Beyreuther’s assurance to his Vietnamese interlocutor that the GDR now 
wished that the Vietnamese workers benefit from the “achievement of the unity of 
social and economic policy”.130 When the GDR eventually informed the Vietnamese 
government of its plans, at negotiations held in Berlin in December 1988, they were 
rejected out of hand by labour minister Nguyen Ky Cam on the grounds that they stood 
contrary to the policy of the Vietnamese government, which had dropped all import 
barriers on returning workers. Demonstrating how important these material remittances 
from workers in East Germany were for the Vietnamese economy, Nguyen Ky Cam 
demanded that the GDR not only facilitate workers in exporting consumer goods to 
Vietnam but that it send consumer goods in lieu of the social security and wages
127 Letter dated 24 Jan. 1989. Reproduced in: Ina Merkel (ed.), Wir sind dock nicht die Meckerecke der 
Nation!, Berlin (Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf), 2000, 130f. My thanks to Dr. Josie McLellan for bringing 
this to my attention.
128 Runge, AuslandDDR, 115. Also SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7265. Letter from U. Bruckner, Betreuerin, 
to Egon Krenz, 1 Nov. 1989, 2.
129 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. Zollverwaltung, Information liber die Ein- und Ausfuhr von Waren 
durch Burger der SRV, 26 Sept. 1988, 2.
130 Gesprachsvermerk, 6 Oct. 1988. Quoted in Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten undArbeiter, 113.
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transfers it was obliged to pay Vietnam under the terms of the labour agreement but 
which hitherto had been diverted to help reduce Vietnam’s balance of payments with 
the GDR.131
The Vietnamese workers in the GDR greatly resented the restrictions, although they
allowed for an increase in the number of bicycles and mopeds an individual could take
home and were more generous than what their compatriots in the CSSR enjoyed.
Importantly, neither the Vietnamese supervisors in the factories nor embassy officials
did anything to encourage the workers to adhere to the new rules. An activists’ meeting
held in Mittweida in May 1989 for contract workers and officials who were members of
the Vietnamese Communist Party heard that the imposition of export limits on
particular goods had caused workers “considerable moral conflict” given the
expectations of their families and friends in Vietnam.132 Indeed, the regulations seemed
to acerbate panic-buying among Vietnamese workers, who in their desperation, bought
as much as they could in the hope that at least some of the goods would make it through
to Vietnam. In September 1989, MfS Main Department XVIII was receiving reports
from all over the state that suggested that the:
Vietnamese worker hostels represent real warehouses. Apart from industrial goods, foodstuffs are 
being increasingly hoarded. Dismantled mopeds, including canisters full o f fuel can be found in 
rooms, on balconies and in the stairwells.133
Although it is doubtful that the Vietnamese workers were aware of their exact 
contribution to the East German economy, they must have been known that it was 
significant. Indeed in many cases they were buying the products that they had 
manufactured themselves. Confidential figures provide an insight into the remarkable 
productive output of contract workers, especially in consumer goods. In 1989, the SPK 
estimated that foreign labour produced the following annually: 30,000 cars, 11,000 
mopeds, 6,400 motorbikes, 15,800 bicycles, 60,300 washing machines, 62,000 cookers, 
185,900 fridges as well as 25.7 million items of underwear, 11 million items of 
clothing, 29 million tights, 5 million shoes, and 6.5 million square metres of curtain. 
They also made a significant contribution to the state’s building programme, 
constructing 186 million marks worth of buildings, and producing 180,000 tonnes of 
cement and 175 million marks worth of prefabricated elements.134
131 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. Information fiber ein Gesprach mit Nguyen Ky Cam, 12 Dec. 1988.
132 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 27. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 7 Sept. 1989.
133 Ibid., fo. 28.
134 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7027. G. Schurer to Mittag, Aufstellung der wesentlichen Erzeugnisse, die 
durch auslandische Werktatigen produziert werden (Anlage 1 eines Beratungsmaterials fiir die 
Wirtschaftskommission beim Politburo des ZK des SED), 10 Apr. 1989.
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Other contract workers faced greater difficulty in acquiring material goods. The 
Cuban and Mozambican governments authorised East German factories to 
automatically dock 60 percent of wages exceeding 350 marks from the pay packets of
135 _their workers. This seems to have encouraged Cuban workers to undertake measures 
to increase their real incomes by working overtime, in some cases choosing to do this in 
other factories to avoid the extra earnings being transferred to Cuba. In Berlin, some 
worked as gardeners during the weekends, while one enterprising worker made money 
by taking photographs at parties organised by Angolan workers.136 Although some of 
the Mozambican workers employed in the early 1980s at the Fajas plant in Suhl worked 
up to 160 hours overtime in a month,137 other reports, such as one compiled in 
September 1989 by Main Department XVIII, claimed that Mozambicans had had little 
opportunity to “develop materialist interests”.138 Perhaps the difficulty in sending 
freight to Mozambique compared to Cuba served to dampen the consumerist interests of 
the Mozambicans. On the other hand, Polish contract workers experienced the least 
difficulty in bringing goods home as they had the freedom to travel to Poland. In 
addition, they were entitled to take home goods valued at 80 percent of their total 
earnings upon completing their contracts.
Denying the majority of workers a fair opportunity to benefit from the fruits of their 
labour was perhaps the most discriminatory and exploitative characteristic of East 
Germany’s system of foreign labour and caused greatest resentment among the workers. 
Perversely, it was not unusual for MfS analyses to denigrate the workers (and other 
foreigners) as parasites. As early as 1965, the first MfS dissertation on foreigners, which 
was subsequently used as schooling material for MfS officers, claimed that many of the 
foreigners living in the GDR who had previously spent time in the West strove to secure 
“an easy and if necessary parasitical life”. In early 1988, MfS Department X referred to 
the “parasitical lifestyle” of foreigners engaged in what it deemed to be illegal trading. 
In two reports penned in 1989, Main Department XVIII continued the analogy. In 
February, it equated the “increasing materialist interests” of Vietnamese workers with 
the “glorification of western lifestyles (consumerism)”, while in September, it claimed 
that this “glorification of capitalist means” represented a “parasitical way of living”,
135 Cuba: Siebs (1993), quoted in HL 1999:1871; Sandra Gruner-Domic, Kubanische Arbeitsmigration in 
die DDR 1978-1989. Das Arbeitsabkommen Kuba-DDR unddessen Realisierung, Berlin, 1997,27-32. 
Mozambique: Hans-Joachim Doring, ‘Es geht um unsere Existenz ’. Die Politik der DDR gegeniiber der 
Dritten Welt am Beispiel Mosambik und Athiopien, Berlin, 1999,230-239.
136 Gruner-Domic, Kubanische Arbeitsmigration in die DDR, 32. Also Runge, AuslandDDR, 46.
137 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 79.
138 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 30. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 7 Sept. 1989.
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adding the caveat that this was what German workers were saying.139 Even as the GDR 
was in collapse, elements in the Stasi and the East German public were united in their 
negative and racist attitudes towards foreigners.
Valuable insights into the everyday activities of foreign workers and students and 
the specific problems they experienced in adapting to GDR society can be extracted 
from the abundance of police and MfS incident reports, which are also useful in 
reconstructing some of the aspects of everyday social interaction with the indigenous 
population. This section draws on such material in order to illustrate the types of trouble 
some Hungarian, Algerian, and Cuban contract workers found themselves in and also 
how this was viewed by the authorities and public. Admittedly, the use of police 
material is highly problematic as it invariably focuses on trouble (in the form of crime, 
fights, and assaults) rather than on the unproblematic everyday occurrences involving 
foreigners. As such, the portrayals contained in the incident reports are not fully 
representative of foreigners’ experience. Given the paucity of other accounts, however, 
they are an invaluable source which must be subjected to a high level of critical analysis 
in order to strip away the security organs’ subjective rendering of what they deemed to 
be criminal behaviour. The GDR was no different to other European countries of its 
time in that there was a tendency among police, party, and the general public to equate 
foreigners with crime and social trouble. Indeed, given the particularly paranoid outlook 
of police and state security and the lack of internal checks and balances on state activity, 
this tendency was perhaps more pronounced in the GDR.
Before examining the type of trouble foreigners encountered, it is important to point 
out that prior to the arrival of the contract workers, foreigners were for the most part an 
insignificant feature in GDR crime statistics. In 1964, for example, a HAPM report 
noted that foreigners were responsible for only 140 or 0.2% of all registered criminal 
incidents, with the vast majority of perpetrators being temporary visitors to the GDR 
and not its 29,000 foreign and stateless residents.140 The earliest crime statistics on 
international students were similar and during the 1965/66 academic year only 26 
undergraduate foreign students (out of a total of 2,889) were the subject of police 
investigations with half of these ending up in court.141
139 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Wemer Paulsen, Einige Probleme der Verhiitung von Staatsverbrechen, 5 Dec. 
1965,10. Also: Report o f Abt. X, BVfS Erfurt, 30 Jan. 1988, quoted in Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten 
und Arbeiter, 78ff; BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fo. 20. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung, 7 Sept. 1989; and 
BStU, MfS, ZA, HA XVIII, 88807, fos. 8-11. HA XVIII, RuckfluBinformation zu operativ bedeutsamen 
Problemen im Zusammenhang mit dem Einsatz der Volkswirtschaft der DDR, 7 Feb. 1989.
140 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27730. Konzeption zum Referat -  Auslanderkontrolle, 24 Mar. 1966, 2.
141 BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/4067. Statistik fur das Studienjahr 1965/66 (Studenten), n.d.
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The incidence rate among contract workers was much higher although strong 
variations existed among the different groups of workers and at different times. In the 
Bezirk Cottbus, where a total of 2,360 foreign contract and construction workers were 
employed in 1977, there were only 13 incidents involving 15 workers in the first six 
months of the year.142 Central police statistics for 1981 suggested that 5.4 percent of the 
Algerian, 2.8 percent of the Cuban, 1.1 percent of Mozambican workforces had been 
prosecuted that year. Bodily harm was the most common offence, with the Bezirke of 
Dresden and Halle having the highest incidence rates as well as the highest 
concentrations of foreign workers. 755 incidents gave rise to 478 preliminary court 
proceedings against 366 foreign contract and 112 East German workers. GDR citizens 
were more likely to be injured in such affairs: of the 522 people injured in violent 
altercations involving foreigners, 358 (69 percent) were GDR citizens while 164 (31 
percent) were contract workers. Significantly, in 97 cases involving fights between 
foreign workers and GDR citizens, the police decided not to press charges owing to a 
lack of evidence.143
Police statistics that suggest that foreigners were chiefly to blame for incidents need 
to be treated with some caution, however. As will be shown below, there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that many local police units discriminated against foreigners. There 
were a number of reasons for this. In the aftermath of incidents, Germans were more 
competent in getting their side of the story across to local police who, generally trained 
to believe that East Germany’s problems were external in origin, required little 
convincing that foreigners were more likely to be at fault. Safe in the knowledge that 
their views would be met with a favourable response, East Germans were therefore 
more likely to report matters to the police than their foreign adversaries, who in turn had 
to rely increasingly on their own forms of retributive action. Indeed, as the authorities 
slowly and grudgingly came to the realisation in the late 1980s that the GDR had an 
indigenous problem with racism and xenophobia, some reports revealed that foreigners 
were more likely to be the victims rather than the perpetrators of crime. In Erfurt in 
1987, for example, the MfS recorded that East Germans carried out 138 offences against 
foreigners, who in turn were responsible for only 43 incidents against Germans.144
142 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Cottbus, Bericht, 18 June 1977, 2.
143 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46778. Vorkommnisse mit Beteiligung von Bttrgem Algerien, Kuba und 
Mosambik, 26 Feb. 1982, 10. This document contains handwritten adjustment to the statistics, which 
point to a higher incidence rate. As it is not clear whether these figures apply to the year in question, this 
research has adhered to the original data.
144 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 8. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988.
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Yet, the dominant perception within the security organs was that foreigners were
more inclined towards criminality. In his 1965 thesis, the first MfS study on foreigners,
Paulsen argued that foreigners enjoyed special privileges owing to the reluctance of the
police, party and public to treat their legal misdemeanours with the same seriousness
and vigour as those perpetrated by East Germans. This was particularly evident, he
claimed, in cases involving defamation of the state. He also warned that foreigners
coming to the GDR via the West deserved the particular scrutiny of the authorities
owing to what he saw as the degenerate effects of the West. These negative influences
resulted, he argued, in the high rates of criminality among former “guest workers”,
particularly from Italy and Spain, who took up residence in the GDR:
The decay and corruption process o f  the imperialist camp has taken its toll on the [foreigners] 
concerned: the unscrupulousness in their choice o f methods to secure an easy or if  necessary 
parasitical living is a common ascertainable sign o f asocial behaviour.
Thus, in 80 percent of crimes carried out by former Gastarbeiter in the GDR, the 
MfS claimed to have established that they had been “failures” in their native countries 
and in the West and that their personal “deficiencies” led them to seek compensation by 
means of “speculative crime, womanising, and alcohol excess” in the GDR.145 In effect, 
Paulsen was suggesting that foreigners were particularly inclined towards crime and 
susceptible to bad influences. A HAPM report written three months later rested on the 
same assumption but claimed that the inevitable effect of living in the GDR and the 
concomitant process of “socialist re-education” resulted in the vast majority of 
foreigners adapting successfully to East German life.146 It was a convenient explanatory 
model which described non-European foreigners as easily-led and easily-influenced, as 
the willing or naive victims of the West, and whose only chance of moral and cultural 
salvation was through exposure to the social reality of East Germany.
However, this exposure brought with it its own set of problems, which mainly 
resulted from the complete failure of the authorities to appreciate the range of personal, 
emotional, cultural and other difficulties foreign students and workers experienced in 
the GDR. As Patrice Poutrus has noted in his study on Spanish communist emigres, the 
authorities did not expect or anticipate that they would encounter any difficulties in 
integrating into everyday GDR life. When problems inevitably occurred, these were 
invariably attributed by the authorities to the weak characters of particular individuals
145 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Wemer Paulsen, Einige Probleme der Verhiitung von Staatsverbrechen, 5 Dec. 
1965,1 ,8 , and 10f’
146 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27730. Konzeption zum Referat -  Auslanderkontrolle, 24 Mar. 1966.
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rather than on the shortcomings of SED asylum policy.147 Similarly, the conditions set 
out in the labour exchange programmes, the nature of factory life, as well as the social 
and economic conditions in the countries whence workers came also gave rise to 
specific social problems among contract workers in the 1970s and 1980s. These 
problems often resulted in the transgressions of GDR legal norms although the 
foreigners involved did not always believe they were doing anything untoward in a 
moral sense. Rather, they felt they were simply rectifying the legal, economic, and 
social inequalities they faced in the GDR.
The utter failure of the first contract labour agreement -  signed between GDR and 
Hungary in May 1967 -  to make any provision for the social and recreational needs of 
the workers led to a relatively high incidence rate of crime among the predominantly 
young single male workers. As police noted in 1970, the “inadequacy of cultural- 
political leisure-time activities” led to the workers spending their time in bars and 
overindulging in alcohol. In addition, they argued that Hungarians were oblivious to the 
East German traffic regulations. In 1968, police carried out a total of 38 investigations 
against Hungarian workers, which was an insignificant number of cases considering that 
the Hungarian workforce numbered 7,100 in the same year. 24 of these incidents 
occurred in the second half of the year and involved the following types of cases: bodily 
harm (14), resisting police arrest (five), rape (two), “rowdy” behaviour (one), joyriding 
(one), and theft (one). The Hungarian crime rate grew steadily in the following years. In
1969, police registered 135 incidents, and in 1970, 132 in the first half of the year alone. 
In the latter period, incidents such as assault (51 cases), drunk driving (19), resisting 
arrest (18), and theft (10) predominated. Significantly, 75 percent of all Hungarian 
perpetrators were drunk, acted in groups, and were in their first year of employment. By
1970, there were 13.4 incidents per 1,000 Hungarians in the GDR compared to 9.4 
incidents per 1,000 East Germans aged between 18 and 25 years old.148
Indeed, the statistics may have been higher was it not for the tendency of factories 
to summarily deport alleged troublemakers thus preventing the courts and the police in 
carrying out their functions. It was not until 1970 that police claimed that this “factory 
justice” of earlier years had ceased. Yet, the Hungarians were not entirely helpless in 
this situation and they devised strategies to protect themselves. As police reports
147 Patrice G. Poutrus, “Zuflucht im Ausreiseland -  zur Geschichte des politischen Asyls in der DDR”, in: 
Jahrbuch fiir historische Kommunismusforschung, 2004, 355-378, here 370.
148 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. Meldeweg bei Straflaten durch Burger der UVR, 10 Feb. 1969, and 
Information zur Lage auf dem Gebiet der Ordnung und Sicherheit im Zusammenhang mit dem 
zeitweiligen Aufenthalt junger ungarischer Werktatiger in der DDR, 25 Sept. 1970.
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bemoaned, the Hungarians tended to “self-regulate or cover up” incidents.149 This 
suggests that a high level of internal cohesion existed among the Hungarian workers, 
who socialised together and reacted collectively to external threats. Confronted with an 
overbearing state and an alien environment -  in political and linguistic terms at least -  
and devoid of familiar social structures such as family, school and the workplace, this 
delineation and self-regulation may have also been an attempt to compensate for the 
sense of disorientation they felt in the GDR for which they received little, if any, 
advance preparation.
In resorting to their own retributive systems, the Hungarian workers may have been 
compensating for the inability of the police to admit that racism existed in the GDR (see 
chapter seven). The 1970 government report on the Hungarian labour exchange only 
made the most circuitous references to the hostile attitudes of the East German public 
towards the contract workers, noting that the former had not been provided with the 
“requisite political-ideological preparation” in advance of the arrival of the latter to their 
neighbourhoods.150
The inability of the authorities to appreciate the difficulties encountered by the 
Hungarian workers meant they were incapable of offering any real solutions to the 
problems at hand. Clearly unable to recognise any faults in the specifications of the 
labour exchange programmes, a top-level police report suggested that the Hungarians’ 
misbehaviour resulted from their lack of knowledge of “GDR legal norms”, language 
difficulties, and above all, the failure to develop any meaningful contact with their 
company collectives. The response was a security one in which the GDR authorities 
attempted to get Hungarian officials more involved in disciplining their workers. To this 
end a disciplinary committee was established in the Hungarian embassy in late 1971 
which operated on a basis of a joint “disciplinary order” drawn up with East German 
officials. The SAL clearly called the tune as it organised quarterly schooling seminars 
for the members of the committee.151 Other measures followed and in 1974, the SAL 
and the Hungarian Labour Ministry agreed that Hungarian “hostel educators” 
(Heimerzieher) be appointed for hostels with more than 150 residents in order to
149 Ibid.
150 Ministerrat report, 7 Jan. 1970. Quoted in Sandra Gruner-Domic, “Zur Geschichte der 
Arbeitskraftemigration in die DDR. Die bilateralen Vertrage zur Beschaftigung auslandischer Arbeiter, 
1961-1989”, in: IWK  32:2 (1996), 204-230, here 209.
151 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. Information tiber Vorkommnisse mit Beteiligung ungarischer Staatsbiirger, 7 
Mar. 1973.
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supervise the “human and moral training” of the youths and to organise “sensible free 
time activities”.152
The Hungarian example contains many of the characteristics that would surface 
time and time again among subsequent groups of contract workers, albeit in a more 
exaggerated form in some aspects. Social disquiet was more common among newly- 
arrived workers and their status as easily-identifiable minorities served to magnify their 
social activities and legal transgressions in the eyes of the police and indeed the public. 
This affected non-European workers in a much greater way, but like the Hungarians, 
they devised strategies to compensate for their weak social, economic, and legal status 
in the GDR.
In popular East German memory, Algerian workers are perceived to have been the
most troublesome group of contract workers and often remembered in conjunction with
1knives and stabbings. The available statistics tend to support the perception that 
Algerians were more problematic than other groups of workers. From 1974 to 1979, for 
example, they were two and a half times more likely than Hungarians and five times 
more likely than Poles to come to the attention of the police. During the same period, 
981 preliminary court proceedings were initiated against Algerian workers. In 1978 
alone, when there were 4,740 Algerians employed in the GDR, police registered 696 
“special incidents” involving Algerian workers. Of these, 232 resulted in a court case, 
which represented an average of about twenty hearings per month.154
Yet, police files contain reference to only a few cases of stabbings by Algerians, 
two of which could be classed as self-defence. When two drunken Algerians were called 
to order on account of their unruly behaviour at a funfair in Zwickau in August 1978, 
one lashed out and stabbed three East Germans, wounding them seriously.155 In 
GroBenhain in December of the same year, a large group of East Germans attacked two 
Algerian workers on the street which resulted in one of the Algerians, a 23-year-old 
who had been working in the GDR for three years, inflicting near-fatal injuries on one 
of his East German attackers. In his defence, the Algerian argued that his use of the 
knife was necessary in order to compensate for the fact that he and his friends were
152 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. Vereinbarung DDR-Ungam zur Durchfiihrung des Abkommens, 12 July 
1974.
153 As expressed in many conversations with eastern Germans from a variety o f social and political 
backgrounds. For example, at a conference held in Berlin to mark the fiftieth anniversary o f the June 1953 
Uprising, a Halle-based historian and employee o f the LStU Sachsen-Anhalt told the author that “the 
Algerians caused us a lot o f  problems” (emphasis added).
154 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Information iiber die Durchfuhrung des Regierungsabkommens mit der 
DVR Algerien, 17 May 1979,6.
155 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Karl-Marx-Stadt, Periodische Information, 16 Jan. 1979.
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greatly outnumbered.156 This research has only managed to uncover one stabbing 
incident that resulted in a fatality. In October 1981 in Altenburg, a 27-year-old Algerian 
stabbed dead a 17-year-old East German who had earlier insulted him in a bar and 
persistently challenged him to a fight.157 Given the fact that incidents like these were 
never reported openly in the media but were nevertheless witnessed by many members 
of the public, they were the subject of intense speculation and gossip which has 
certainly contributed to the identification of Algerians with violence in the popular 
memory of East Germans.
An analysis of 35 incidents involving Algerians in the Bezirk Leipzig from early 
October 1976 to late March 1977 provides more evidence that knives and stabbings did 
not feature in the vast majority of incidents.158 The towns concerned -  Wurzen, Oschatz, 
Meuselwitz, Lippendorf, Bohlen and LauBig -  were relatively small provincial centres. 
The types of incidents fell into two main categories -  non-violent and violent. There 
were six cases in the former, involving theft, missing persons, and slander. The 
remainder fell into the latter category and mainly involved violence against the person 
and included five incidents of Algerians attacking Algerians, four of Germans attacking 
Algerians, and eleven of Algerians attacking Germans (including four allegations of 
rape and sexual assault). In the remaining four incidents, the available information 
suggests that both sides shared culpability. In the main, the violent incidents took place 
over the weekend, late at night and in or around bars, an indication in itself that 
Algerians were not an unknown quantity in the recreational and social fabric of the 
towns in which they lived and worked.
The response of the police and the state prosecution service to the incidents 
suggests that the punishment generally fitted the crime. Incidents, such as fist-fights, 
brawls, and even some stabbings, were classified as minor misdemeanours and the 
Algerians and Germans involved were subjected to fines or disciplinary proceedings in 
the factories. After one melee in a workers’ club in Bohlen neither the German nor the 
Algerian workers wished to press charges, an indication perhaps that both sides 
recognised their joint culpability in their affair and had no desire to see a weekend 
ruckus end up in court. Similarly, a mass brawl in and around the “cement workers’ 
club” in LauBig was treated as minor misdemeanour by police, even though the violence 
was sparked off by an Algerian slashing the hands of two GDR opponents with a razor 
blade.
156 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 10 Dec. 1978.
157 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. SAL to Mittag, 30 Oct. 1981.
158 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Leipzig, Auskunftsbericht, Anlage II, 12 Apr. 1977,passim.
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In three of the four cases involving violent or sexual assault against women, police 
decided against pressing charges on the grounds of insufficient evidence, or because the 
alleged victim was deemed to have offered her consent, or because the alleged victim 
was of unsound mind. The approach taken by the DVP towards rape allegations is 
typical of the difficulty women encounter in general in paternalistic societies in trying to 
prove rape allegations. In general, police were not impressed by GDR women 
complaining about the behaviour of Algerians. One woman, who was punched in the 
face by her Algerian boyfriend after she refused to let him into her flat, saw the case 
dropped owing to lack of evidence.
The sample also proves that GDR citizens who attacked Algerians could face 
prosecution. Indeed, in early 1976 in Bohlen four East Germans were sentenced to jail 
terms of up to a year for attacking three Algerians.159 What is also significant is that the 
police dropped assault charges against three Algerians accused of fighting on the 
grounds that they had been provoked by “insults regarding their membership of another 
nation”, which was about as far as police could go in recognising racially-motivated 
attacks.
The brief descriptions of the remaining cases suggest that it was the Algerian 
workers who attacked GDR citizens. Again, alcohol and bars featured in most fights, 
some of which involved disputes over women. It is important to note that Algerians 
faced greater sanction under the law when compared to East Germans in that they could 
be deported as well as having to face prosecution.160 Yet, as some of the more serious 
incidents suggest, prosecution, incarceration and deportation were not automatically or 
swiftly imposed by the police against foreigners accused of miscreant behaviour. 
Indeed, some accused were released pending trial. The threshold for deportations or 
remand was high enough to exclude most offences. Only in one exceptionally violent 
case did police explicitly call on the state prosecutor to support a deportation order. It 
involved an Algerian, arrested in October 1977 for assaulting an East German and 
fracturing his skull with a belt buckle. He was released, and the following January, he 
caused grievous bodily harm to two of his compatriots in a bar room brawl over a 
woman, smashing a bottle over the head of one and beating both with his belt buckle.
Releasing Algerians arrested for serious cases of assault was not uncommon, as 
demonstrated by the example of 22-year-old Abdelkader H., an employee of the 
Maschinenwerk Meuselwitz. In January 1977, during a row in the HOG Stadthaus in
159 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/6423. Information iiber die Parteikontrolle, 5 Apr. 1976, 5.
160 §59 o f the StGB directed that deportations could take the place o f a custodial punishment or follow it.
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Meuselwitz, H. attacked a number of GDR citizens with a broken beer glass. In 
February, he attempted to rape a woman, threatening to kill her or a member of her 
family if she reported the incident to the police. After she ignored his ultimatum he 
stabbed her brother-in-law a month later, almost killing him. Only at this point was H. 
taken into custody but was soon released and he returned to work. In early September 
1977, he and four Algerians attacked a GDR couple in the Klubhaus in Meuselwitz, 
beating the man and dragging the woman outside before raping her in a car park. H. was 
once again arrested.161
Despite these exceptions the sample suggests that incidents involving Algerians 
attacking Germans were far more likely to lead to a police investigation and come to the 
attention of the state prosecutor. For example, in the five incidents where the Algerian 
attackers were identified, four cases were passed on to the state prosecutor while one 
was classed as a minor misdemeanour. This contrasted sharply with police reactions to 
the four cases involving Germans attacking Algerians. According to the available 
information, only one resulted in charges being pressed. These were subsequently 
dropped however and the incident was referred to the relatively innocuous workplace 
“conflict commission”.
The discriminatory attitudes of local officials led contract workers to resort to their 
own retributive resources in dealing with their opponents. This was particularly 
apparent in LauBig, situated in Kreis Eilenburg, where senior regional police officers 
were sent in early 1978 in an attempt to explain the high rate of attacks carried out by 
Algerians on East Germans. According to the investigative team’s report, common 
attitudes among the Algerian workers were:
1. In the GDR you’ve got same distinctions in the treatment o f people as in Algeria.
2. Whoever is a GDR citizen or who carries a function always is always right.
3. Whoever doesn’t bow before authority suffers.
Crucially, the report also confirmed the suspicions of the Algerian workers that local 
officials had made “distinctions in the judgement and treatment of victims and also 
perpetrators” but it denied that local police were to blame for this. Rather it was the 
fault of the Algerian and GDR supervisors, who invariably tended to suppress or play 
up the role of Algerian workers in incidents. To counteract these inequalities, the report 
continued, the Algerian workers in LauBig resorted to “vigilante justice”. As a 
consequence, the state prosecutor’s office and the Algerians’ employer, VEB 
Betonwerk LauBig, implemented measures to ensure the maintenance of “socialist law
161 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattung, 16 Dec. 1977.
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and order”. While the nature of these measures is unclear, they had some success and in
the second half of 1978 the numbers of violent attacks carried out by Algerians in Kreis
Eilenburg sank to zero.162
What contributed to this relatively high incidence rate of crime among Algerians?
Through her interviews with former Algerian contract workers, Almut Riedel has
established that they saw physical violence as an acceptable and legitimate means to
solve disputes and to protect their honour. It was a view that they had taken with them
from Algeria, where insults and wrongdoings were commonly revenged using such
means.163 While the cultural reasons identified by Riedel certainly contributed to the
preparedness of Algerians to strike back at attackers and perceived adversaries, the
volatile political and economic situation in Algeria may have also played a role. The
government of Chadli Bendjedid, which assumed power after the death of president
Houari Boumedienne in 1978, was less enthusiastic about Algeria’s relations with the
GDR and the Eastern bloc.164 In addition, the decrepit state of the Algerian economy
meant that the majority of returnee contract workers, many of them newly qualified and
skilled, found it almost impossible to find work. Indeed, the fact that they had worked in
the GDR was now seen as a burden in the new political climate. The experience of one
worker, Mohand B., who was 27 and single, can be viewed as representative for many.
He had worked and qualified at the VEB Edelstahlwerk in Lugau, which he claimed to
have enjoyed immensely, before returning to Algeria in June 1979. Despite registering
with the regular labour exchange and the local ONAMO office, 18 months later he was
still without a job. In a questionnaire filled out for the Algerian Ministry of Labour, he
questioned the point in sending workers abroad to gain experience and qualifications for
non-existent jobs in Algeria. Workers faced a vicious circle upon return to Algeria, he
explained, before proposing some solutions to the problem:
You don’t find work. If you find a job, then you don’t have a flat. If you find a flat, then you can’t 
find a job. It would be better if  they allowed the workers remain abroad until retirement. [I call for 
the] foreign residency permits to be extended and for assistance for those who don’t have any work 
to return to the GDR until jobs and flats can be guaranteed in Algeria.165
A measure of this disquiet can be gained from the fact that many Algerians took the step 
of submitting petitions to Erich Honecker or wrote to the GDR embassy in Algiers
162 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattung zu eingeleiteten Ermittlungsverfahren, 18 
Jan. 1979,9.
163 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus”, 88.
164 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Bericht der SAL, n.d. [ca. 6/1981]; and Stellungnahme, 15 June 1981.
165 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Fragebogen, 20 Dec. 1980, [trans. by IBE, Ber. Okonomie]; the 
difficulties faced by returning workers were also noted in the FRG press, see ADN-Info, 5 Feb. 1981.
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complaining about their post-retum situation.166 It was inevitable that this dissatisfaction 
was communicated back to the Algerian contract workers in the GDR and indeed this 
was mentioned in a number of internal reports from 1979 to 1982.167 As the Algerian 
workers had always been told by their government that the 1974 agreement would 
benefit them personally and economically, the mood of the workers in the GDR swung 
to despondency as they realised that firstly, their GDR work experiences counted for 
nothing in Algeria, and secondly, that their marriages, relationships, friendships and 
parenthoods would come to an abrupt and arbitrary end once their labour contracts 
expired.
The Cuban experience was similar to the Hungarian and Algerian cases in that 
workers from the Caribbean island relied on their own retributive resources in conflict 
with East German adversaries. In September 1979, the BDVP Halle reported that since 
the previous January there were only 15 incidents among the Bezirk’s 538 Cuban 
residents, consisting of 460 contract workers, 75 apprentices and three students.168 As 
was the case with other groups of contract workers, the Cubans were at times victims 
and at times perpetrators of these incidents, which were similar in character to those 
involving Algerians and Hungarians. While many of these incidents were of minor 
significance, such as petty theft, one robbery deserves particular mention. It involved 
Cuban workers in Zeitz stealing 14,700 marks in cash from the room of their Cuban 
“group leader”. This fund represented the sum automatically deduced from the workers’ 
wages and which was intended for the Cuban embassy in East Berlin. As such, the theft 
may have been an attempt by workers to expropriate money which they believed was 
rightfully theirs.
There were also other types of incident, which on closer examination seem to have 
been interrelated. These were two rape allegations, a number of assaults, and three 
group fights between Cuban and East German youths which occurred over a six week 
period in the cities of Merseburg and Zeitz, located about 40km apart in the Bezirk 
Halle. Most tragically, one of these skirmishes in Merseburg led to the drowning of two 
Cuban workers. The incident led to a detailed police investigation and their transcripts 
of interviews held with a large number of East German youths are a most valuable 
contemporary historical source in reconstructing the reality of everyday social 
interaction between young East Germans and foreign workers, touching on the issue of
166 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Stellungnahme der Sektion Arbeitsokonomik, 15 June 1981.
167 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. SAL, Einschatzung der Moglichkeit der Verlangerung von 
Arbeitsrechtsverhaltnissen algerischer Werktatiger, 17 Mar. 1981.
168 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Bericht zum Einsatz kubanischer Werktatiger, 24 Sept. 1979, 
5, passim  unless otherwise indicated.
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racism, relationships, self-defence among foreigners, and police practices in dealing 
with incidents involving them. Although other chapters discuss some of these issues in 
more detail, the Merseburg and Zeitz incidents provide enough material for a case study 
and will be examined in full here.169
The available evidence suggests that the Cuban workers began arriving in Halle in 
early 1979 and by the summer numbered about 460 workers. The Cubans were not the 
first contract workers in the Bezirk and in June 1978 the region’s factories employed a 
total of 7,650 Hungarian, Algerian, and Vietnamese workers and trainees.170 As the 
police admitted in a number of reports, factory authorities did not enjoy full control over 
the recreational activities of the contract workers, who they claimed spent their time 
getting drunk in bars which led them into committing “criminal offences”.171 In 
addition, they also believed that the Hungarian workers were the most problematic 
group in terms of public order. In the city of Halle, they were regularly involved in 
street fights with East German youths and police, while in Bad Durrenberg near the 
town of Merseburg, they smashed up a bar and beat up six East Germans in what was 
described as a “groundless” attack. Indeed, as the police pointed out, there was very
little for foreign workers to do in Merseburg apart from drinking and most workers
110headed straight for the bars upon leaving work.
It was into this already problematic context that the Cubans arrived and within a 
short space of time according to police reports, they were engaged in much of the same 
problematic behaviour as the Hungarians. The incidents illustrate the complex and two- 
sided nature of Cuban interaction with the local population, as well as the ability of 
Cuban (and East German) youths to resort to their own resources in seeking retribution 
against their enemies. In Zeitz, the Cubans reportedly enjoyed a good rapport with some 
local youths, typically denigrated as the “particularly negative” variety by police, while 
simultaneously encountering trouble with other youths. Visits to local discos were a 
popular pastime in the town, as was the case in Merseburg. This brought the workers 
into contact with people of a similar age and, as police noted disapprovingly in Zeitz, 
relationships quickly developed between the Cuban men and East German women.
In Merseburg, the weekend discos held in the “Saaletal” bar were extremely popular 
with young East Germans, Hungarians, and Cubans. The venue was capable of 
accommodating about two hundred patrons, up to a fifth of which were Cubans on any
169 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47851 & 47852, passim unless otherwise indicated.
170 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Bericht, 14 June 1978, 2.
171 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Wortbericht, 15 Jan. 1979.
172 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Bericht, 16 July 1979,2.
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night. The discos enabled people from different countries to talk and dance with one 
another and for the formation of friendships. The disco held on Saturday, August 11, 
1979, was typical in this regard. On the evening in question, the venue was packed with 
young East Germans (including twenty uniformed but off-duty NVA soldiers), 
Hungarians, and Cubans. As some patrons later described, some East German girls were 
dancing with Cubans and in many cases Cubans and East Germans shared tables and 
engaged in conversation.
Some German youths in the hall were less enthusiastic about the presence of the 
Cubans, however, and had been involved in fisticuffs with the Cubans some weeks 
previously. At one stage in the evening, they took offence at the sight of one Cuban, 24- 
year-old Padro F., wearing an NVA cap he had snatched from one of the soldiers. 
Although these youths later claimed that Padro F. was trying to start fights with other 
patrons, another East German eyewitness dismissed the claim that he was in any way 
threatening but was simply dancing in a “lively” way:
I’d like to emphasise that I didn’t get the impression that he intended to pester other citizens by his
behaviour. I thought that he wished to demonstrate how people ‘move’ where he comes from.
One of those aggravated by Padro F.’s behaviour was Hansi B. (25), who stormed 
over and removed the cap from the Cuban’s head. Padro F. took this as a challenge to a 
fight and the two went outside to sort out their differences. Both were drunk and the 
fight failed to take place after the some other Cuban workers intervened and restrained 
their compatriot.
That was not the end of the matter and Hansi and up to ten friends (including some 
Hungarians) agreed to randomly seek out and attack some Cubans later that night. They 
found a number of victims around the town and brutally beat them in what were clearly 
racially-motivated assaults. An eyewitness who viewed the attacks from her balcony 
recalled how she heard one of the youths shout: “The Neger must be here, he must have 
escaped down here, have another look, he must be here.” When he was found some 
moments later, she heard a youth scream: “Here he is, here he is, come on, beat him 
dead!” at which the youths surrounded and kicked him. In the early hours of the 
following morning, three Cubans were admitted to hospital as a result of these beatings.
Although the three injured Cubans reported the matter to the police the following 
morning, they and some of their compatriots nevertheless meticulously planned a 
revenge attack on their assailants. Later that evening (August 12), 23 Cubans left their 
hostel, equipped with leather belts and homemade whips (cut from electrical cable), and 
headed in the direction of the “Saaletal” where the last disco of the summer holidays
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was taking place. Marching in three groups, they were led by someone dressed entirely 
in white, who punched the air in front of him with his gloved fists as he walked. 
Encountering three East German youths on the way, the Cuban leader threatened them 
with a knife and spelled out his gang’s plans to them in broken German: “Yesterday 
three of us, now revenge comes.” When the Cubans reached the bar, most remained 
outside, while nine stormed the venue. Although Hansi B. was their main target, they 
indiscriminately whipped and beat other patrons, many of whom were fairly inebriated, 
as only bottles of wine had been served that evening owing to a shortage of beer. When 
the disco-goers sought to escape from the bar, they came under a volley of stones pelted 
by the other Cubans who had waited outside. In the ensuing melee, the German youths 
gave chase to the Cubans, who began to retreat back to their hostel which was located 
on the other side of the Saale. Although most of the Cubans managed to make it across 
the nearby bridge, a number of them had no other option but to take to the river in an 
effort to avoid their pursuers.
In the event, two Cubans -  Andres Garcia (21) and Delfin Guerra (19) -  drowned. 
One because he was unable to swim and the other after he was intentionally struck on 
the head with a bottle flung from the bridge above by a 21-year-old East German 
woman, Sabine M. She had been hit on the head with a stone during the attack on the 
disco and obviously seeking revenge, aimed and threw the bottle at the struggling 
Cuban below shouting: “You pigs, here’s some more drink for you!” She was not the 
only one throwing objects at the Cubans and other bystanders had been pelting stones. 
Racist abuse was also hurled at the Cubans by the angry crowd, and Hansi B., who had 
organised the attack on the Cubans the previous night, shouted: “Pigs, you black dogs 
deserve to be killed!” Although it was clear to most people on the bridge that the 
Cubans had drowned, no one bothered to inform the police of this fact when they 
eventually arrived on the scene. Indeed, most people were unperturbed at what they saw 
and later made their way to other bars and discos in the town to continue drinking. Only 
one East German bystander, Lothar M. (18), was brave enough to dive into the river in 
an attempt to rescue the Cubans. Another had considered doing the same but was afraid 
of the reactions of his peers. After police recovered the bodies of the two Cuban 
workers from the river some days later, they found in the trousers pocket of one a 
handwritten note containing the name, address and telephone number of an East 
German woman. They had obviously met previously and this is a poignant example that 
anti-Cuban hostility was not shared by all.
149
Although local police carried out extensive investigations into the incident and
pretty much established who was involved and their culpability, they took no further
action. On the contrary, the whole incident was covered up and whitewashed. Neither
Sabine M., who eventually admitted to throwing the bottle intentionally, nor any of the
East Germans or Cubans involved in the incidents of August 11 and 12 were charged. In
addition, police described the initial assault by East Germans on Cubans on August 11
as motiveless, although they were aware that some of the attackers shouted racist abuse
as they kicked their victims. The involvement of Hungarian workers in the chain of
events was also concealed from the final police report provided to the Cuban embassy.
This was on the explicit orders of the Mdl in Berlin which instructed that:
Our foreign minister is to be provided with a final report on the two unnatural fatalities, which will 
comment on the sequence o f  events on August 12 without describing the level o f involvement of 
individuals. He will provide this report to the Cuban embassy if  necessary.
What is also worthy of note is the approach taken by Cuban officials to the affair. In 
a meeting with the police in Merseburg on August 15, they requested that the six 
Cubans arrested on the night of the fracas be kept in custody in order not to make the 
situation in the Cuban workers’ hostel worse. Police had to turn down this request on 
the grounds that “according to GDR legal principles this would represent an intrusion 
into the rights and freedoms of Cuban citizens in the territory of the GDR”.
In resorting to attacking the Saaletal bar, the Cuban workers demonstrated their 
complete rejection of the police and conventional legal procedure. Previous negative 
experiences with the DVP may have encouraged this type of action. By covering up the 
drowning incident and its causes, the police and the Cuban authorities in effect 
confirmed the Cubans’ suspicions of conventional justice. Indeed, the majority of the 
Cuban workers refused point blank to cooperate with the police inquiry into the chain of 
events. Even those identified as having been involved in the attack on the disco denied 
outright that they had been near the premises on the night in question. The Cuban 
workers continued in their attempts to take the law into their own hands. Three weeks 
later, a Cuban worker wrought his revenge on one of the East Germans who lead the 
counterattack on the Cubans from the Saaletal on August 12, stabbing him in the loin 
during a scuffle on a bus.
The methods used by Cuban workers in Magdeburg to protect themselves and their 
interests were not unique. Ten days after the attack on the Saaletal, Cuban workers in 
nearby Zeitz carried out a retaliatory attack on East German youths that closely 
resembled the Merseburg attack in strategy, which strongly suggests that the Cuban 
workers in both towns were in close contact. After a mass brawl broke out in a bar
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between Cuban and East German youths, the Cubans left the premises and lay in wait
for their GDR opponents to leave, pelting them with stones and injuring four people in
the process. Two rape allegations, registered with the police earlier that day, had led to
the bar brawl. One of the alleged rapes had been committed six weeks earlier, the other
a fortnight previously, and involved East German victims who shared the same hostel as
the Cuban workers. Clearly and for different reasons both sides involved were furious at
the allegations. The GDR youths were outraged when they heard of the rape allegations,
while the Cubans were enraged that they were made in the first place. In any case, the
police in Zeitz shelved the rape investigation on the grounds the victims had engaged in
“sexual relations with the suspects either before or after the reported crime”. This may
have been the reason for a subsequent fight in mid-September in Zeitz which left a
dozen GDR and one Cuban citizen with injuries. In both incidents, the DVP decided in
favour of neither side, dropping all charges for violent assault and imposing fines on
some of those involved.173
In the same year, other areas witnessed similar clashes and the determination of the
Cuban workers to take the law into their own hands. A premeditated attack by Cubans
on Algerian workers in a hotel in Bautzen in March 1979 was motivated, police
claimed, by the sincerely-held belief among Cubans that they “had to take revenge” for
an attack carry out by Algerians on a Cuban worker which took place a week earlier.
Like in the Magdeburg and Zeitz cases, the Cubans ignored conventional legal avenues
completely. After the incident, police noted that
Cuban citizens are in no way prepared to name compatriots who might be in a position to make a 
statement on the facts o f  the case in question or who were involved in the violence. They would 
rather take all the blame personally.174
The experiences of Hungarian, Algerian, and Cuban contract workers demonstrate a 
number of common features. All groups were deeply suspicious of authority, especially 
the uniformed police, a suspicion that the Algerians took with them from home. In 
conflict with each other and with East German youths, contract workers felt their 
interests were best served by their own methods of retribution and punishment. 
Although internal divisions naturally existed among workers from the same country, 
these differences were put aside when members of the group were targeted by others. 
Whether it was in response to physical attacks by East German youths or raids by police 
and customs in the search for goods, workers could and did resort to collective 
solidarity as a way of defending their interests.
173 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Bericht zum Einsatz kuban. Werktatiger, 24 Sept. 1979.
174 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47851. BDVP Dresden, Zwischenbericht, 3 Mar. 1979,12.
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The similarities in the Hungarian, Algerian, and Cuban experiences should serve to 
dispel any “culturalist” assumptions that would purport that workers from non- 
European countries (Algeria or Cuba) or from countries informed by Islamic culture 
(Algeria) would have experienced more difficulty in adapting to GDR life than their 
fellow contract workers from Europe (the Poles and Hungarians). Faced with many of 
the same problems of living and working in the GDR, the workers reacted in much the 
same way. However, there are some crucial differences, especially in how the different 
nationalities were viewed by the East German public. While no evidence exists in the 
files consulted to suggest that Hungarians were subjected to racist abuse, the opposite 
was the case in the Cuban and Algerian contexts. Indeed, as the Merseburg incident 
showed, some Hungarians participated in the beating of black Cubans on the night of 
August 11.
This chapter has attempted to present a more nuanced insight into the recreational 
activities of foreign workers than has been provided in the bulk of the existing literature 
on the subject. Workers and students did venture beyond their hostels, seeking out and 
indulging in a wide variety of free time activities, encompassing sports, games, religion, 
consumerism, dancing and socialising in bars. Frequently, the types of activities 
engaged in by foreigners did not match East German perceptions of organised 
recreational activity. Mirroring the deficits of official youth policy in the GDR, the 
system proved unable to adapt to or accept the particular needs and aspirations of the 
predominantly young, mainly male workers and students. On the one hand there was the 
paternalistic apprehension towards unregulated and intimate social activity, while on the 
other there was the unwillingness to allow foreigners participate as equals in the 
consumers’ market. Were the authorities to devise and implement policies more tailored 
to the specific needs of foreign students and workers, this would have depended on the 
ability of the system to undertake fundamental revisions of key principles. However, the 
system displayed no evidence that it was capable of such an approach, rather it 
persistently attempted to regulate and prescribe behaviour, criminalising and 
suppressing particular activities in the process. This was also apparent in the state’s 
approach to personal relationships between foreigners and East Germans, which is the 
focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 6. Positive interaction with the East German public
The perceived “otherness” of foreigners did not necessarily lead to their marginalisation 
in GDR society. On the contrary, it was an aspect that in many cases facilitated greater 
interaction. Foreign students and workers were a link to the outside world for those East 
Germans whose horizons did not end at East Germany’s borders. Although international 
students and contract workers had contact with East Germans in the universities and the 
workplace (discussed in earlier chapters), interaction also developed beyond these 
confines and beyond the gaze of the authorities. Indeed, as research carried out in 1990 
suggested, foreigners were more likely to have had contact with East Germans who 
were not their co-workers than with their East German workmates.1
The GDR authorities were generally suspicious of and hostile towards any contact 
between East German and foreign citizens that took place beyond the organised and 
supervised forms and forums envisaged for the purpose. Indeed, the authorities 
persistently denigrated East Germans who associated with foreigners, classifying them 
as women of ill repute or rowdy youths. In Schwerin in 1960, for example, the three 
Algerians employed as transport workers in a city factory reportedly had a large circle 
of GDR friends, aged between 17 and 22, who regularly visited their flat. The police
•y
however classified these youths as troublemakers and city centre loiterers. Similarly in 
Zeitz in 1979 police claimed that is was precisely the “negative youths” who sought out 
contact with locally-employed Cuban workers.3 This reflected the general practice of 
the authorities to equate non-conformist behaviour with political hostility and moral 
degeneracy, which was not always the conscious intention of the disaffected youths 
concerned. Arguably, for many East Germans, contact with foreigners represented a 
chance to break free from the humdrum of everyday life, a motivation which the 
authorities were incapable of appreciating.
The secondary literature has also been slow in acknowledging such contact, placing 
greater emphasis rather on the racism and discrimination endured by foreigners. While 
foreign workers and international students were undoubtedly confronted with and
1 The results were published by Wilhelm Breuer (ed.), Auslanderfeindlichkeit in der ehemaligen DDR. 
Studie zur Ursachen, Umfang und Auswirkungen von Auslanderfeindlichkeit im Gebiet der ehemaligen 
DDR und zur Moglichkeiten ihrer Uberwindung, Koln, 1990. Quoted in Eva-Maria & Lothar Eisner, 
Zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalism s, Rostock, 1994, 61.
2 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41383. Einschatzung, 10 Jan. 1960, 4.
3 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Halle, Bericht zum Einsatz kuban. Werktatiger, 24 Sept. 1979, 5.
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subjected to various forms of racism and discrimination (discussed in the following
chapter), interaction with parts of the population was also a feature of everyday life in
the GDR. Granted, the majority of the population was passively indifferent towards the
foreigners living, studying, and working in their midst, a reaction captured in Irene
Runge’s recollection in 1993 that:
Whoever didn’t work in the textile, chemical, foodstuffs, engineering or other productive sectors; 
whoever didn’t have a ‘home’ in a flat in the easily-recognisable high rises on the outskirts o f towns; 
whoever evaded the barracks where these young and alien people were billeted in over a thousand 
places in the country, didn’t know much about these foreigners.
In the main, she continued, it was only “every now and again on the street [or] in 
the morning rush hour” that most East Germans encountered foreigners, “who called to 
one another in foreign languages and different tones, using unknown gestures”.4 In 
Runge’s opinion, the scope for interaction with foreigners in the GDR was severely 
limited, confined to those who worked or lived alongside contract workers. As the 
previous chapters have argued, however, the perception that foreigners were holed up 
and cut off from society in barrack-like accommodation is somewhat exaggerated and is 
derived from an overestimation of the potency of state regulations and a corresponding 
underestimation of the ability and determination of foreigners to surpass them. This 
thesis argues that the arenas of contact were not as limited as has been suggested and 
that the presence of foreign workers and students in the GDR produced personal, 
private, and intimate binational relationships, which were seen as something completely 
natural by those involved.
Apart from the universal reasons that bring people together, there were particular 
factors that encouraged binational relationships in the GDR, where international 
students and contract workers were, for the most part, young, male and single. In the 
1965/66 academic year, for example, only 11.3 percent of foreign students and 
postgraduates were married and living with their spouses in the GDR.5 Significantly, the 
1967 Hungarian labour agreement specified that only single workers were to be sent to 
the GDR, while the Cuban and Mozambican agreements expressed a preference for 
single workers.6 Only in the Polish, Cuban and Vietnamese worker contingents were 
women a significant factor in numerical terms. Other groups reflected a crass gender
4 Quoted in: Halina Hackert-Lemke/Heidrun Unterbeck, .. .das war in der DDR so festgelegt... ’ 
Betreuerinnen erinnem sich an auslandische Vertragsarbeiter”, in: Harry Adler et al. (eds), Zwischen 
Raumen. Studien zur sozialen Taxonomie des Fremden, Berlin, 1999, 87-104, here 87.
5 BArch, DR 3/2. Schicht/4067. Statistik fur das Studienjahr 1965/66 (Studenten), n.d. In 237 cases, the 
spouse was an East German, in 107 a compatriot, and in 32 o f another nationality.
6 Sandra Gruner-Domic, “Beschaftigung statt Ausbildung. Auslandische Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen in 
der DDR (1961-1989)”, in: Jan Motte et al. (eds), 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik - 50 Jahre Einwanderung. 
Nachkriegsgeschichte als Migrationsgeschichte, Frankfurt a.M., 1999, 215-40, here 235.
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imbalance: in 1979, only 19 of the 3,249 Algerian adults (of which the vast majority 
were contract workers) living in the GDR were women. Similarly, in 1989, only 55 of 
the 1,439 Mozambican workers in the Bezirk Erfurt were women.7
The political nature of the state encouraged many East Germans into seeking 
contact with foreigners. Writing in 1991, a former Polish student recalled that in the 
1970s, foreigners were the objects of friendly interest because they helped liven up the 
monotonous atmosphere of actually-existing socialism. Indeed young East Germans 
even considered it cool to attend discos in foreigners’ company.8 Similarly, Riedel notes 
that Algerian workers in the 1970s attracted the “particular curiosity” of the East 
German population. Indeed, their perceived otherness allowed them a certain level of 
success in forming personal relationships.9
However, for a considerable section of the East German population (regardless of 
age, gender, or proximity to the regime), binational contacts, romances and relationships 
were something sinister and abnormal and the result of any number of ulterior motives 
but rarely of the attraction or love of two individuals. Given the demographic 
composition of foreigners in the GDR -  overwhelmingly male and single -  it was 
inevitable that binational relationships tended to involve East German women rather 
than men, a phenomenon that aroused the paternalist ire of state and society. East 
German women who dated foreign men were confronted with the chauvinistic and 
underlying racist attitudes of the public and the male-dominated state and party 
bureaucracy in particular.
What fuelled the opposition of East Germans to binational relationships and 
marriages? Owing to the considerable paper trail in the form of archives, it is much 
easier to chart the opposition of functionaries in the police, party, and state apparatus. 
However, as the political and functionary class was part of society and not isolated from 
it, its views are broadly reflective of wider social and moral attitudes and may be taken 
as a benchmark of general opinion. Although there was no formal ban on binational 
marriages as such, functionaries deployed a number of arguments in opposing them. In 
doing so, functionaries rarely resorted to explicit racist arguments. East Germans, and in 
particular functionaries, were aware of the official self-perception of the state as an anti­
fascist paradise of proletarian internationalism and were adept at expressing written 
criticism within the bounds of official discourse. Yet, functionaries could vent their
7 DO 1 /8.0/50196 and BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 1. Generalmajor Schwarz, Information fiber 
aktuelle Probleme beim Einsatz auslandischer Arbeitskrafte, 11 Sept. 1989.
8 Andrzej Stach & Saleh Hussain, Auslander in der DDR. Ein Riickblick, Berlin, 1991, 18.
9 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus, spate Adoleszenz und Protest. Algerische Vertragsarbeiter in der 
DDR”, in: KZSS, 53:5 (2001), 76-95, here 76.
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racism indirectly, by adding the caveat that their reports were reflecting the opposition
of the public towards binational contacts for example. In the main, however,
functionaries used more conventional arguments to oppose binational relationships. For
some, they represented the first steps towards Republikflucht. Others believed they had
a duty to protect citizens from what they saw as the inevitable moral and social
degradation involved in moving abroad. There was also the argument that relationships
and marriage could contribute to the brain drain of the developing world.
First and foremost, officials claimed that binational marriages represented nothing
more than an attempt of East German citizens to escape from the GDR or of foreigners
to gain residency rights. In 1983, the head of the MfS department XX in the Bezirk
Magdeburg claimed that there was a growth in the tendency of:
foreign students, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa, trying to remain in the GDR through 
love affairs with GDR female citizens, and GDR female citizens deliberately entering into love 
affairs with the intention o f  being able to leave the GDR through marriage.10
In 1985, police in RoBlau and Halle noted how two women, who had married men from
Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone and who had moved to those countries, ended up in West
Germany.11 As Gruner-Domic’s interviews with Cuban contract workers in East Berlin
in 1989 established, some “entered into sham marriages in order to remain on [in the
GDR] for another few years, for as long as it took them to reach the desired economic
standing”.12 Although there is some evidence to support this claim, it is impossible to
estimate the ratio of genuine to paper marriages and the files provide countless
examples of genuine marriages and relationships which the state nevertheless tore apart.
The arguments used by functionaries often disguised a more deep-rooted
paternalistic desire to control women, as demonstrated by a dispatch from the GDR
embassy in Moscow sent in 1958 to the MfAA in Berlin:
A particular problem is the issue o f relationships between young boys and girls and the related 
marriage question. Recently we have had to deal with this issue in Leningrad. Leading comrades 
only intervened after some particularly unpleasant incidents occurred there. It involves the behaviour 
of young girls in their first year o f  studies who enter into really reckless, superficial and rotating 
relationships, especially with other foreign students, which has led to two second-year girls getting 
pregnant. Talks with the two failed to result in any change in their behaviour. After this question was 
dealt with [...]  before a sitting o f  the national students’ committee, both girls were sent back to the 
GDR.
By marrying of their own free will, the embassy contended, the “girls” were breaking 
“the obligation they undertook, namely that upon the completion of their studies they 
would place their acquired skills at the service of their state, the German Democratic
10 BStU, ASt Magdeburg, Abt. XX, 4143, fo. 140. Stand und Ergebnisse der politisch-operativen 
Sichemng, 31 Aug. 1983.
11 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. VPKA RoBlau and VPKA Halle to HAPM, Feb. 1985.
12 Irene Runge, Ausland DDR. Fremdenhafi, Berlin, 1990,47.
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Republic”.13 Officials saw binational marriage as reneging on an unwritten contract 
between citizen and government. Twenty years later, the GDR consulate in Kiev 
reported that women students were in regular transgression of state regulations on 
relationships, which called for “demarcation” from other students.14
When it came to regulating the relationships of international students, GDR 
university educators could look to Soviet examples for inspiration, as demonstrated by 
the observations on Moscow’s Lumumba University made by Prof Kathe Harig, 
director of the Herder Institute (HI) in Leipzig. It was run on strict lines, as Harig’s 
report observed: “Girls are not allowed to visit dormitory rooms. Students however can 
entertain every kind of visitor in the clubroom.” The report suggested that African 
students were particularly interested in relationships and noted that many of them had 
been “shamelessly swindled by Western embassies” to abandon the USSR for West 
Germany where they were promised “single rooms” and “great opportunities to 
establish contacts with women”. This led one SHF functionary to make a handwritten 
note on the margins alleging that the foreign students “definitely weren’t disappointed 
in that regard”.15
Officials also deployed the equally paternalistic argument that East Germans, 
particularly women, needed to be protected from foreigners for moral and political 
reasons. At the College o f Engineering in Eisleben in 1975, a functionary purported that 
the “pronounced levels of intimate contact” between Algerian and East German students 
was taking its toll on the “class awareness” of the women involved.16 The first MfS 
thesis on foreigners, submitted in 1965, warned that as all foreigners were potential 
“couriers” for Western “human trafficking organisations”, it was essential for the MfS 
to place their interaction with the GDR population under “operational attention” in 
certain circumstances. Foreigners, the thesis noted, used “foodstuffs, semi-luxury and 
consumer goods” to encourage East Germans, particularly professionals, to leave the 
GDR. In addition, it claimed (without providing any corroborative evidence) that the 
majority of East German women who married and emigrated “could not find work
)3 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/624, fos. 56f. Schreiben die DDR-Botschaft in Moskau an das 
MfAA, n.d. [ca. Jan. 1958]. The embassy also demanded that the MfAA approach its Soviet counterpart 
with a request that East German students be denied abortion services in the USSR on the grounds that this 
was illegal in the GDR.
14 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV B 2/9.04/134. Generalkonsulat der DDR-Kiew, Analyse der 
Zusammenarbeit mit der KPdSU und dem Leninistischen Komsomol an den Hochschulorten der Ukraine 
und Moldawiens, 22 Mar. 1976, 9.
15 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1649. K. Harig, Bericht tiber meine Reise nach Prag zur Eroffhung der 
Universitat des 17. November am 9 Nov. 1961, 5f. The Lumumba University opened its doors on 17 
November 1960 and was exclusively devoted to the third level education o f students from the developing 
world. In its first year, it attracted 48,000 applications for its 600 places.
16 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/vorl. SED/18017. Information ttber besonderes Vorkommnis, 11 Dec. 1975.
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according to their qualifications in their partners’ native countries and in extreme cases
even ended up in real danger situations and social risk”, mentioning climate, social
conditions and prostitution in this context.17
Functionaries also argued that the interests of foreign states were best served by
preventing a brain and body drain of qualified and trained personnel. In this regard, the
GDR saw its strict application of the rotation policy, which aimed at the eventual
repatriation of all international students, trainees and workers, as the defining difference
to the policies applied by Western countries. In order to ensure that foreigners remained
psychologically prepared for the inevitability of repatriation, functionaries saw it as
their duty to prevent the alienation or deracination of foreigners from their native
cultures or homelands. In 1967, an FDGB functionary urged vigilance to ensure that
foreigners did not overstay their welcome:
Under no circumstances can we allow our foreign guests to continue doing course after course here 
in the GDR, which allows them on one hand to lose contact with their homelands and on the other to 
acclimatise to our conditions to such an extent that they lose sight o f the real purpose o f their 
presence here, which is to support their own people.18
By 1989, some official viewpoints on binational marriage reflected opinions that
would not have seemed out of place in the manifestos of contemporary Western
European far-right parties. An MfS thesis, which opened by praising the levels of
integration of foreigners in the GDR, went on to argue that foreigners had the potential
to “directly or indirectly” threaten GDR society, specifically mentioning marriage in
this context. The reasons used to support this claim, listed incoherently in the thesis and
quoted verbatim below, reflected the belief that there were fundamental cultural
differences distinguishing foreigners from East German citizens:
Conflict situations, which are brought from foreign countries and regions and carried out in the 
territory o f the GDR (e.g. Iraq-Iran).
Concentration o f people o f  the most varying citizenship, who use what are for them convenient 
conditions for personal gain (for example marriage with GDR citizens to secure residency in the 
GDR), and connected with criminal deeds.
Other attitudes to life and mentalities, which when heaped up [sic] can critically shape a particular 
territory.
Ideological problems (for example close ties to religion, petty-bourgeois ways o f thinking and 
behaving).19
Preventing relationships and marriages was a key component in ensuring foreigners 
returned home after their studies or work contracts and police, state security and the
17 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Werner Paulsen, Einige Probleme der Verhiitung von Staatsverbrechen, 5 Dec. 
1965, 33 and 39. ’
18 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/7298. Aktennotiz fiber die Aussprache mit dem Koll Bwalya, David, Zambia, 
7 Mar. 1967.
19 BStU, JHS, 21514, fo. 17. Dirk Teichert, Zur weiteren Qualifizierung der Erarbeitung perspektiwoller 
Ausgangsmaterialien fur die Suche und Auswahl vom IM-Kandidaten unter Auslandem zur Arbeit im 
und nach dem Operationsgebiet, 31 Mar. 1989, 17.
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mass organisations all played a major role in this effort. In 1963, immigration officials 
of the BDVP Magdeburg claimed that it intended to take action against the relationships 
between Greeks and Arabs and Germans in cooperation with the criminal, constabulary, 
and the permits police departments.20 Foreign students who wished to stay in the GDR 
for whatever reason attracted the same level of suspicion from the authorities as GDR 
citizens who expressed a desire to leave it. Indeed, in 1969 the KAS implied that it was 
the “political-ideological diversionary activities” of the “class enemy” which 
encouraged foreign students, especially those “who are at least supporters of destructive 
opinions”, to remain in the GDR.21 International students were also expected to uphold 
this obligation to party and state. In 1985, the FDGB reminded a Columbian student 
who wished to marry his GDR girlfriend and take up residency in the GDR that it was 
his “duty as a comrade [...] to return to his homeland after completing his [party] 
mission in the GDR in order to take his place in the struggle of his people”.22
In its determination to impede binational marriages, the state attempted to break up 
relationships directly or relied on a complex bureaucratic system to refuse marriage
' j ' y
licences. Although the GDR abolished the paragraph of the 1913 citizenship law 
which stated that German women automatically lost their German citizenship upon 
marriage to foreigners, its replacement -  the 1954 Order on the Equality of Women in 
Citizenship Law -  enhanced the authority of the state rather than the rights of women 
citizens 24 Whereas the 1913 law prevented foreign males acquiring German citizenship 
by marriage, the East German variation effectively prevented German females from 
using marriage to non-East German citizens as a means to leave the GDR. Although 
women were no longer stripped o f their German citizenship automatically upon 
marriage to a foreigner, the new law did not give them choice to acquire their husband’s 
citizenship if they wished. Subsequent laws, which were designed to complicate and 
frustrate the licence application procedure for binational marriages, further strengthened 
the hand of the state. While the departments of internal affairs at county level were 
nominally empowered to decide on applications, the police and state security were the 
real arbiters. A 1957 law gave officials at Kreis level the power to seek the opinion of
20 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41383. Einschaatzung der im Bez Magdeburg nach §4 der Meldeordnung gemeldeten 
AuslSnderund Staatenlosen, 19 Jan. 1963.
21 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Analyse der Arbeit im Bereich des Auslanderstudiums an 
Hoch- und Fachschulen der DDR im Studienjahr 1968/69, 15 Oct. 1969, 15.
22 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/13001. Aktenvermerk, n.d. [ca. Feb. 1985].
23 Heidrun Budde, Voyeure im Namen des Sozialismus. Ehe Ost-Westnach 1972, Berlin, 1999.
24 Anordnung tiber die Gleichberechtigung der Frau im Staatsangehorigkeitsrecht, 30 Aug. 1954. ZBl. 
1954,431. It replaced §6 o f  the Reichs- und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz, 22 July 1913, RGB! 1913/1, 583- 
593. ’
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officials in an applicant’s native country on his or her marriage application and to refuse 
them if permission was not forthcoming.25 From 1964, local authorities were even 
obliged to solicit the opinions of factories and mass organisations on individual 
marriage applicants.26 A further tightening of the internal regulations in 1977 gave 
officials the power to refuse applications for reasons that had absolutely no basis in East 
German law. One file, covering refusals from 1979 to 1984, shows that applications 
were turned down because applicants had elderly parents to support, were previously 
divorced, had children from previous marriages, had family in the West, were deemed 
of bad character or “foolish”, had too many boyfriends in the past, or because their 
parents or siblings opposed the application. In one case in Pima, police refused a 
German-Algerian application because there was “no state interest” in the proposed 
marriage.27
Convincing foreign students and workers that they treat their time in the GDR as a 
temporary and transient biographical episode proved a difficult task, especially 
considering that the GDR sought to promote itself as a harmonious and peace-loving 
state, devoid of the social, political and economic contradictions of the West and 
elsewhere. In addition, foreigners were constantly reminded of the relative 
backwardness of their homelands and of the long and arduous struggle required to free 
them from the vestiges of colonialism. These conflicting messages led many foreigners 
to question whether their futures were best served back home or in Europe. The SED 
aimed to produce foreigners prepared to place their individual abilities at the service of 
the greater collective in their own countries. What the SED often got were cohorts of 
foreigners primarily interested in defining their own lives and only too aware of the real 
situation in their homelands.
Rejecting GDR forms o f organised friendship, international students inevitably 
carved out their own personal relationships. The earliest MfS theses on foreigners 
accepted that they had little problems in establishing relations with East Germans, 
whose openness towards foreigners was typically attributed to ulterior and selfish 
motives. The first such thesis, completed in 1965, observed critically that East Germans 
“approach foreigners [...] independently, in order to start up or re-establish purchasing, 
speculative, or negative contacts with West Berlin”. Even in jails, it argued, convicted 
foreigners were the “focus of attention for a range of GDR prisoners [...] who see in
25 §10, Abs. 1 o f the 1. Durchfuhrungsbestimmung zum Gesetz tiber das Personenstandswesen, 7 Jan.
1957, GBl. 1957/1,77-79.
26 This procedure was laid down by Mdl Dienstanweisung 50/64. See cases in BArch, DO 1/34.0/32833.
27 BArch, DO 1/34.0/49371. The new powers were granted by Ordnung 0118/77 o f 8 Mar. 1977. See also 
Heidun Budde, Voyeure, 76ff.
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them the possibility of establishing a variety of contacts with West Berlin after their
release from prison”.28 As the latter demonstrates, the MfS (and police) were at pains to
denigrate the types of people they believed were naturally inclined towards foreigners.
In a similar fashion, a subsequent thesis noted that
upon entering public spaces, foreigners, particularly those who appear to come from non-socialist 
states, often make quick contact with GDR citizens, especially with those circles who in any case 
have a negative attitude towards the GDR.
Significantly, the same thesis stressed that foreigners were engaged in the 
“glorification of western lifestyles (consumerism)” in “thought and deed”.29 Although 
the author did not attribute foreigners’ popularity to their Western habits, there was a 
clear link between the two as Almut Riedel’s research years later with former Algerian 
contract workers has suggested. She credited the popularity of Algerian workers among 
East Germans to their more imagined than real “access to Western attributes” as well as 
their “conspicuous consumption”.30
The possession of real or imagined Western attributes was not a prerequisite for the 
development of relationships, as demonstrated by the example of young North Korean 
trainees and students in the 1950s. Spread out in small groups across the GDR, a strong 
measure of acculturation and the forging of intercultural relationships were inevitable. 
For the German and Korean authorities this was an unwelcome development and one 
report even referred to such contact as “fraternisation” (Verbruderung). A report to Kurt 
Hager, submitted in June 1957, described how Korean students in Dresden “in the main 
have contacts with German girls” and are “strongly influenced by them as a 
consequence”.31 These contacts lessoned the interest of the youths in returning to Korea, 
which prompted the embassy to crackdown on everything it felt did not psychologically 
prepare the youths for repatriation. This resulted in the “flight” of five Korean students 
to West Berlin during 1957. The SED believed that “through a lack of class 
consciousness, alienation from their homeland, fraternisation and illusionary 
expectations on the ‘freedom’ of the imperialist West, [some youths] were pushed into 
betraying their socialist homeland”.32 There can be little doubt that the embassy’s 
radical decision that autumn to repatriate 94 apprentices, which represented almost a
28 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Wemer Paulsen, Einige Probleme der Verhiitung von Staatsverbrechen, 5 Dec. 
1965,4and 33.
29 BStU, JHS, MF, 540. Theo Dudek, Einige Besonderheiten bei der Werbung von operativ geeigneten 
Auslandern ... fu r die Abwehrarbeit des MfS, n.d. [ca. 1966/67], 14 and 22.
30 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus”, 85.
31 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/640, fos. 56f. Abt. Wissenschafiten to Hager, Koreanische Studenten 
in der DDR, 3 June 1957.
32 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/638, fo. 106. Die weitere Entwicklung des Auslanderstudiums in der 
DDR bis 1965, n.d. [ca. I960].
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sixth of the total number o f Koreans apprentices in the GDR, for “disciplinary
transgressions” was motivated by similar concerns.33
Characteristic for early reports is the outright condemnation of any sexual contact
involving Africans and Arabs and East German women. As many of the reports
discussed below show, much of the evidence on relationships was derived from gossip
circulating among members of the East German public and were as such undoubtedly
the product of continuing stereotypical assumptions based on race and ethnicity, which
made Africans and Arabs into an object of fascination and envy and which viewed them
as predatory and prolific sexual subjects. The 13 Guineans employed at a factory in
PoBneck in 1960, described otherwise as diligent and disciplined workers, found their
private after-work activities subjected to the intense observation of factory officials.
Reports noted their alleged lack of thrift, their habit of sleeping on bare mattresses
despite the regular provision of clean sheets, and most particularly, their womanising.
One functionary wrote:
According to our observations there are dozens o f acquaintances with girls and women that often 
extend into intimate relations. The local population are talking about these. Some o f the women 
involved are under the supervision o f  the local health authority but intervention by the organs o f the 
state or the school management is not really possible. For their part, the women have provided 
evasive answers or have trivialised such relations in discussions.34
As the report made clear, the Guineans were not dependent on official intercession
in order to interact with locals and they resisted the attempts made by factory officials to
“create” personal relationships, arguing that such manufactured efforts were a
“limitation of their freedom of movement”. Other reports were similar in their obsession
with the alleged nocturnal activities o f foreign workers. In the same year, the SED party
secretary at the VEB Sachsenring in Zwickau reported on the alleged frequency of
sexual contract between four Algerian employees and East German women:
In the sexual field the complaints are even more serious. It is not unusual for the Algerians to sleep 
with up to three different women within a fortnight. Their neighbours have complained repeatedly to 
us for this reason.35
A number of reports from a Magdeburg diesel motor factory, where three Syrians 
were in training since November 1958, also stressed the apparent ease at which they 
could strike up relationships. As the FDGB noted, the decrepit conditions of their 
hostel, which they shared with younger GDR apprentices, meant that the three spent
33 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/640, fo. 56. Abt. Wissenschaften, Information an Genossen Hager, 3 
June 1957.
34 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/57, fos. 48-52. Letter from Betreibsberufsschule Heinz Kapelle, 
Pofineck, to Abt. Internationale Verbindungen, ZK o f SED, 28 Sept. 1960.
35 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/355, fos. 44f. Letter from VEB Sachsenring Automobilwerke 
Zwickau, to Abt. Internationale Verbindungen, ZK o f SED, 1 Feb. 1960.
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“every evening in cafes where they make the most varied acquaintances”.36 A year later,
factory officials called for the deportation of one of the group, a 38-year-old Syrian
trade unionist and apprentice mechanic, on the grounds of his absenteeism and
disinterest in learning. The factory doctor lent his support, claiming that he was unable
to bear the German climate and “way of life” and because “his extensive intercourse
with women” was taking a toll on his health.37 Again, the alleged womanising of
foreigners was seen as something un-German and physically unhealthy. In another case,
the FDGB believed a visiting Algerian trade unionist was in need of therapy owing to
his alleged erratic behaviour with women:
L. tries to drink more than he can hold, and he is particularly easily aroused by female charm. This 
was evident in how he wanted to drag the woman pianist off to his bedroom ... He even tried to get 
64-year-old Kollege B. o f the Central Council o f the Land and Forest Trade Union up to his room. 
He claims that his chances with women are ruined by D .’s [another foreign trade union 
representative] age and peaceful disposition. Other details provided by D. have led us to the 
conclusion that Kollege  L. may even be sexually obsessed by inclination, which has an intense 
nervousness as a natural consequence.38
On the other hand, there is also some evidence to suggest that foreigners were
overwhelmed by the relative level of sexual freedom in the GDR. As the example of a
number of Syrian apprentices suggests, some took advantage of this while others were
more critical. The Syrians came to the GDR in the late 1950s under the terms of an
official training agreement, and many of the trainees were from wealthy and influential
Syrian families and spoke English or French fluently. Unbeknown to them, a small
number of their compatriots were members of the Syrian Communist Party. A mere five
weeks after their arrival in the GDR, one of these covert communists discussed the
activities of the group with a GDR functionary, who in a subsequent report recalled:
Comrade B. then turned to the issue o f  sex, which occupies an important role for them here as 
foreigners. The observations that they have made to date have not been the best. He talks o f our Arab 
friends finding it easy to meet many girls while out having a stroll and that these girls are 
immediately ‘all for it’. To date, not one genuine relationship has developed from these 
acquaintances. He agrees that through German families, good contact can be made with young, 
progressive German girls.39
As the quotation suggests, some foreigners were unable to appreciate the signs given 
out by East German women. What the women possibly saw as friendliness or innocuous 
flirtation was interpreted as sexual promiscuity by “comrade B.” Undoubtedly, social 
norms in East Germany contrasted radically with those of Syria, where it was generally
36 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8349. FDGB, Bericht, 12 Jan. 1959. In January 1959, the three went on hunger 
strike in a dispute over their training.
37 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8349. Report o f  the factory trade union leadership, 16 Jan. 1960. He was later 
deported.
38 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/458. Heilbehandlung des algerischen Burgers L., Amar, 14 Nov. 1963.
39 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8349. Notes o f  a meeting with Syrian student Abdelnur Bricho, n.d. [Jan.
1959], 3.
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unacceptable socially for women to go for walks unaccompanied or to chat up male
strangers. In the opinion of Vijoy Batra, otherwise so critical of the GDR, women were
exceptionally friendly towards particular foreigners:
Now and then it appeared to me that girls showed maybe too much o f a liking for men with dark 
skin. The communists use this to their own advantage by delegating loyal FDJ girls to befriend us. 
It’s their duty to accompany us to the theatre or to dances, to influence us in a ‘positive’ way, and to 
make us happy with society. The outcome is a string o f illegitimate children fathered by foreigners. 
But if  the foreigners want to marry these girls, they’re told at the registry office that ‘marriages 
between German girls and foreigners from enemy countries are forbidden’. One just wonders 
whether the Afro-Asian countries are enemy or befriended countries.40
While Batra may have been writing from experience, his analysis needs to be taken 
cautiously as his publisher, the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs, was keen to 
portray the GDR population as innocent victims and communists as evil perpetrators. 
Given the socially-conservative climate of West Germany of the early 1960s, his 
assertion that SED policy invariably led to teenage pregnancies involving foreign men 
was bound to shock readers.
Statistics for binational marriage in the GDR are fragmentary and were first collated 
by police in the mid-1960s. Between 1963 and 1966, for example, more than 645 East 
Germans married citizens (mainly students) from non-socialist states. Marriages to 
citizens of the socialist bloc states were more common, amounting to 276 such unions in 
1965 alone.41 The number o f relationships was obviously much greater and the statistics 
provide no indication of the number of marriage applications turned down by the 
authorities. One source claims that in Leipzig practically all of the thirty applications 
submitted by international students during the first half of 1965 in Leipzig were 
granted 42 Yet, in a 1962 report, the Union of African Students and Workers in the GDR 
(UASA) noted that its members were “getting into great political conflict as a result of 
the unclear, differing and administrative treatment of marriages between African men 
and German women”. While the UASA agreed that registry officials were entitled to 
request foreigners to submit written proof that applicants were single, it failed to 
understand why they were also obliged to obtain the written support of their 
governments for the marriage. The strict rules on marriage the GDR, the UASA 
purported, contrasted totally with Western European norms and served to turn students 
against the GDR.43 In other cases, officials informed foreigners that they could only 
submit applications for marriage and residency from abroad, a ruse designed to
40 Batra, Studium bei Freunden?, 10.
41 BArch, DO 1/8.0/35339. Statistik zur Riickkehrer, Zuziehende und AuslSnder, n.d. [ca. Dec. 1966].
42 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Werner Paulsen, Einige Probleme der Verhiitung von Staatsverbrechen, 5 Dec.
1965,39.
43 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/56, fos. 35-50, here 44. Bericht ttber eine Beratung des 
Exekutivkomitees der UASA und der DAFRIG, 7 Dec. 1962.
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encourage foreigners to leave the country. In the event, applications sent from abroad 
were rarely accepted.44 A possible explanation for the varying procedure from place to 
place was due to the fact that in the 1950s and 1960s, officials at Kreis level were 
entrusted with responsibility in this area. It is also not beyond possibility that officials 
took a more favourable attitude towards applications submitted by citizens from 
particular countries, especially those on which the GDR was focusing its diplomatic 
efforts.
Although most applications were accompanied with applications for exit visas, the 
statistics from the period provide no indication whether these were granted in all 
cases.45 It is highly unlikely that this was the case, however. In 1965 in Leipzig, a 
hundred foreign students protested in support of the right of an East German woman to 
leave the GDR with her Congolese husband, who was facing deportation after he was 
expelled from the HI. Although an SHF official had attempted to dissuade her from 
leaving owing to the existence o f “cannibals” in the Congo, the Mdl eventually granted 
the woman an exit visa.46 Referring to this and other incidents, one MfS thesis 
questioned the sense in allowing marriages on one hand but refusing exit visas on the 
other. Indicating that the author believed that an all out ban on intermarriage was the 
best way to remove this discrepancy, he pointed out that: “For some unknown reason 
(maybe because this is not possible) foreign students are not discouraged from marrying 
during their studies.”47
Clearly, a ban would have had immense negative consequences for the GDR’s 
standing internationally and would have laid it open to the charge of institutionalised 
racism. Internal preventative procedures were preferable, and as the GDR opened up in 
the 1970s, it intensified these procedures, with the result that relationships came under 
the increasing surveillance o f the police and MfS. In 1972 in Leipzig, the MfS claimed 
it was necessary to keep the binational romances under observation as “it is not 
uncommon for these relationships to develop to the point where the GDR citizen in 
question applies to leave the GDR legally on the basis of marriage” 48
The case of a Mauritian apprentice, Louis Jose P., shows clearly that state 
intervention to prevent the emergence of relationships between foreigners and East
44 BStU, JHS, MF, 540. Theo Dudek, Einige Besonderheiten bei der Werbung von operativ geeigneten 
Auslandem mit standigem Wohnsitz in der DDR f i r  die Abwehrarbeit des MfS, n.d. [ca. 1966/67], 17f.
45 BArch, DO 1/8.0/35339. Statistik zur Rtickkehrer, Zuziehende und Auslander, n.d. [ca. Dec. 1966].
46 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Informationsbericht tiber die Situation unter den auslandischen 
Studenten, insbesondere in Auswertung von Vorfallen in der Offentlichkeit, 4 Feb. 1965, 7f.
47 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Werner Paulsen, Einige Probleme der Verhiitung von Staatsverbrechen, 5 Dec.
1965,39.
48 BStU, ASt Leipzig, Abt XX, 145/05, fo. 76. Bericht des Hpt. Leopold, n.d. [ca Autumn 1972].
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Germans served only to exacerbate broader racist prejudices and stereotypes. P. was the 
only foreign worker in the VEB Werkzeugmaschinenkombinat in the southern 
provincial town of Plauen, where he began an apprenticeship in 1970. The town had 
some experience with foreigners in the past: it once had an apprentice school for 
foreigners in the late 1950s and, in the 1960s, the local VEBs, Plamag and 
Sachsendruck, occasionally trained African apprentices. P. had little success in making 
friends among his East German workmates. On the one hand, he was somewhat older 
than they were, while on the other he felt that they excluded him from the workplace 
collective. However, P. was more successful in establishing contact with women outside 
of the workplace, which attracted the attention and criticism of factory officials and 
townspeople alike. One report noted that:
His contact with girls the same age has grown in scope. The resulting immoral behaviour was the
subject o f  discussions between him, the director o f the factory’s apprentice school and his minder.
[...]  There has been absolutely no improvement in this regard as a result o f these discussions. Indeed
the opposite is true in that his immoral behaviour has worsened.
Although the factory tried to have him transferred to a town where there were more 
foreigners, P. managed to remain in Plauen and formed a relationship with Brigitte S., a 
young skilled co-worker, who gave birth to their child in March 1971. Although her 
family had no problem with P., the relationship generated immense public censure 
inside and outside the factory. As P. later wrote, “they even said to [my girlfriend] that 
she’s going out with Neger as if  that’s something disgusting”. Rather than deal with the 
racism of the workforce, factory management unsuccessfully repeated its the demand to 
the FDGB in Berlin that P. leave Plauen. As his apprenticeship neared completion, 
officials were adamant that P. would return home, arguing that his “current relationship 
with a GDR citizen, the mother of his child, naturally does not entitle [him] to remain in 
the GDR”. In April 1972 he was put on a plane back to Mauritius from where he 
unsuccessfully appealed to the FDGB to allow him return to the GDR and to his 
daughter. The functionaries were unsympathetic and made handwritten notes on his 
letters in an effort to discredit his character, mentioning his “immense circle of friends, 
especially with young girls who came from places like Stralsund, Rostock and Leipzig 
to spend the night with P. in the workers’ hostel”, his “scandalous behaviour in public 
disco bars”, and his “unique temper and arrogance”. Another allegation mooted after his 
departure, which like most of the other accusations curiously found no mention in 
contemporaneous reports written while he was in Plauen, claimed that he had got 
another young woman pregnant who later had an abortion.49
49 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/10538. This contains numerous documents relating to P.
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P.’s experience shows how social and state opposition to such relationships were 
symbiotically interdependent. Functionaries could always justify their opposition to 
binational relationships as an expression of popular will and as a measure necessary to 
protect the women involved. In breaking up binational relationships, which were just as 
prone to the trials o f any, the authorities ensured that popular misconceptions on their 
inadvisability were confirmed. State policy ultimately deprived women of husbands and 
partners, and children of fathers, which in turn had the potential to reinforce racist 
stereotypes that “miscegenation” was wrong and that foreigners were unwilling and 
unable to assume parental responsibility.50
Importantly, East German officials opposed and broke up relationships even in 
cases where there was absolutely no evidence or suggestion of any purported “immoral” 
or untoward behaviour on the part of foreigners, demonstrated by the treatment of an 
Upper Voltan apprentice named Pierre Joseph Poda, a qualified car mechanic who came 
to the GDR in 1968. After spending some time learning German at the HI branch in 
Radebeul, he began training at the Reichsbahn rail depot in Greifswald where he 
received his master craftsman’s diploma in 1973. Poda was described as enthusiastic 
and studious by his supervisors and in his spare time attended adult education classes to 
catch up on his schooling. During his time in Greifswald he met and was engaged to a 
woman from Malchin, who gave birth to their child in early 1973, just some weeks 
before he was due to complete his course. Although they submitted a marriage 
application when the child was bom, it took the local council until the end of the year to 
turn it down. In the intervening period, the FGDB and DVP placed Poda under immense 
pressure to return home but he insisted that they allow him to remain in the GDR until 
his application was processed. When this was turned down, the FDGB spelled out to 
Poda that in order for it to “fulfil [its] commitment to the trade union of Upper Volta”, 
he would have to “return to serve the interests of his trade union and the progressive 
development of his country”. However, in a passionate plea to the FDGB, Poda claimed 
that his duty was primarily to his family and found the prospect of having to leave them 
behind unbearable:
I cannot avoid getting the impression that in decisions involving marriages between GDR female 
citizens and citizens o f developing countries there are huge differences for which I understandably 
do not have a nor can find an explanation. As this is my vested interest, I most politely request that 
you to show some fresh interest in my life; I am a human being and have feelings and cannot 
contemplate this darkest day when I’ll have to leave everything behind that I hold dear; that would 
break my heart.
50 On the experiences o f  binational children in the GDR, see: Josefme Janert, “Hauptsache, unsichtbar”, 
in: FAZ, 6 Feb. 2001, 15, and Nicola Laure al-Samarai, Unwegsame Erinnerungen: Auto/biographische 
Zeugnisse von Schwarzen Deutschen aus der BRD und der DDR, MS.
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The FDGB was unmoved, claiming that it did not have the power to intervene in the
marriage authorisation process. Given little other choice and faced with deportation if
he refused to leave, Poda returned to Upper Volta in early January 1974 but continued
to write from the capital Ouagadougou where he had found a job at an electricity works.
In a clear attempt to impress the FDGB in Berlin, he claimed that as most of his fellow
master craftsmen had been trained in West Germany, he had “to stay on the ball in order
not to let the name of the GDR down”, adding that he had been offered but declined the
position of deputy works director. He begged for some resolution to the marriage issue,
for which he was prepared “to fight tooth and nail” and to adopt East German
citizenship. Although he had the support of his partner, the FDGB was unmoved.
Indeed, in a reply to Poda which ignored the marriage issue, the FDGB berated him for
having turned down the job promotion, exclaiming that: “Your skilled knowledge,
ability, and political-societal experiences which you acquired from us, should really
help you to promote the political and economic development of your country.”51
In 1968, a Polish newspaper feature touched on the issue of relationships in a
lengthy and detailed article on the Polish workers employed on the construction of the
“Friendship” oil pipeline between Schwedt and Rostock. As the article noted, the Poles
made considerably more in the GDR than in Poland and enjoyed spending their wages
at the weekends. They evidently made more of an effort to impress the opposite sex
than local youths and while they were rewarded with some success, they generated the
resentment of East German youths in return:
They impress the girls with their white shirts and ties, and with the fact that ‘as husbands you surely 
wouldn’t tell your wives to polish your shoes’. They are gallant, are capable o f spending 20 marks 
on a dinner in a restaurant, kiss hands and all in all hold their own. Local boys often glower at them. 
They are simply jealous. They fear that the number o f Polish-German marriages might grow; there 
are already six o f them now.
Interestingly, the article also referred indirectly to the more traditional anti-Polish 
resentment encountered by the workers. It claimed that their involvement in such a 
prestigious construction project surprised and helped the older generation overcome 
their impressions of Poles made in “the pre-war times when Polish workers were 
coming in search of bread, a living, [and] to work in the fields”.52 As this article 
demonstrates, the media in labour-delegating countries was more prepared to talk about 
aspects of the everyday life of their workers than its East German counterpart.
51 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/10550. Contains numerous documents on Poda.
52 NA, FCO 33/277. Andrzej Bober, “On the Hundred Fortieth Kilometre”, in: Zycie Warszawy, 7-8 July 
1968, [trans. British embassy, Warsaw],
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In many ways, the Polish example serves as a model for the general experience of 
foreign workers in the area of relationships, which developed despite the intentions of 
GDR and foreign officials. According to the labour agreement signed in 1967 between 
the GDR and Hungary, the former undertook “not to grant residence to the Hungarian 
workers after they complete their employment” apart from in exceptional cases.53 Yet, 
in 1968, 24 Hungarian-German couples successfully applied for marriage licences.54 
Given the considerable bureaucratic hurdles in place -  marriages involving applicants 
from socialist countries were also subjected to restrictions -  the number of intercultural 
relationships must have been much higher. According to Mdl Directive 03/68, the 
deputy chairperson for internal affairs at Bezirk level had to authorise the issuing of 
marriage licences involving foreign applicants and in reaching his decision relied on the 
opinions of the DVP, MfS, factory, and mass organisations on the couple’s intentions.55 
In an attempt to complicate the procedure further, the regulations also stipulated that 
every application required the written consent of the Hungarian embassy, an 
endorsement that the GDR recommended to its Hungarian counterparts should only be 
issued in “exceptional circumstances”, such as in cases where the couple were expecting 
or already had a child.56 This cumbersome procedure ensured that applications could 
take months to process, which was the intended effect.
Once married, however, the binational couple faced yet another hurdle as marriage 
status did not automatically entail residency rights for either partner in either country. 
Depending on where the couple intended to reside, one of the partners had to seek an 
exit visa to leave his or her own country and a residency permit from the authorities in 
the other state. Of the 1,596 Hungarians who worked in the GDR from 1967 to 1970, 
217 (or 13.6%) married East Germans during their contracts and 67 children were bom 
to these couples. Two-thirds o f these married Hungarians wished to remain in the GDR 
and accordingly applied to the Hungarian embassy for permission to do so. With just 
two to three months to go before the workers were scheduled to leave the GDR, the 
embassy had only granted 30 applicants permission to remain, while a further ten had
53 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. § 4 des Abkommens zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der 
UVR iiber die zeitweilige Beschaftigung junger ungarischer Werktatiger zur Erwerbung praktischer 
Berufserfahrung im sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR, 26 May 1967.
54 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. EheschlieBungen zwischen Btirgem der DDR und ungarischen Staatsbiirgem, 
n.d. [ca. Dec. 1968].
55 Anweisung Nr. 03/68 des Mdl und CDVP iiber die Bearbeitung von Antragen auf EheschlieBung mit 
Burgem der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik, der selbstandigen politischen Einheit Westberlin und des 
Auslands, 15 Jan. 1968. See Heidrun Budde, Voyeure im Namen des Sozialismus. Ehe Ost-West nach 
1972, Berlin, 1999, 155.
56 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. EheschlieBungen zwischen Burgem der DDR und ungarischen Staatsbiirgem, 
n.d. [ca. Dec. 1968].
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their visas extended for a year. It turned down thirteen applications while the remaining 
89 awaited a decision.57 When the GDR-Hungarian agreement finally expired after 16 
years in 1983, over 40,000 Hungarians had worked in the GDR and approximately 
4,300 (10.75 percent) had married East German citizens. Mostly male (80 percent), the 
vast majority (4,000) choose to remain in the GDR, while the remainder decided to 
move to Hungary.58
The Hungarian example made it clear that workers sought out personal relationships 
with East Germans regardless of the existence of East German and Hungarian directives 
aimed at their prevention. The Algerian workers who came to work in the GDR from 
1974 were no different to their Hungarian predecessors in that they sought out personal 
relationships contrary to the intentions of the East German and Algerian authorities. 
According to an MfS source, Algerian officials had instructed the workers before they 
left for the GDR that under no circumstances were they to “tie themselves down to 
women” but were rather to devote all their attention on their work and training.59 The 
workers disregarded such instructions and sought to define their own recreational 
activities but in the process seem to have faced considerably greater opposition from the 
authorities. In the Kreise o f Triptis, Eberswalde, and Erfurt, Algerians encountered the 
open hostility of the police who subjected them to identification checks while out 
walking with their girlfriends.60 Interestingly, the workers in these areas had arrived 
four months previously, which shows how quickly relationships could develop despite 
linguistic, cultural, and social barriers. By mid-1975, the first binational children had 
been bom to East German-Algerian couples, who as a consequence demanded the right 
to marry and to live together.
At this early stage, the state organs were uncertain on how to respond to these 
developments and during the summer of 1975 the SAL and the DVP held discussions 
on the matter. The former proposed that Algerians who wished to marry be permitted to 
opt out of the labour contracts, continue working as regular workers, and be allowed to 
move in with their partners. The latter pointed out that such a change in working status 
would require the Algerians to apply for permanent residency permits which could only
57 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. Vermerk, n.d. [ca. Sept. 1968],
58 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41774. Press cutting entitled “40,000 junge Ungam haben sich in DDR 
weiterqualifiziert”, ND, 28 June 1983. It also noted that under the same agreement, 1,000 East Germans 
worked in Hungary, where some got married. 24 o f these (90 percent who were women) chose to take up 
residence in Hungary.
59 BStU, JHS, MF, VVS 001-339/77. Bemd Thiemann, Die Aufgaben der Kreisdienststelle bei der 
politisch-operativen Kontrolle der zeitweilig in der DDR tatigen Auslander aus nichtsozialistischen 
Staaten und Gebieten, und die sich daraus ergebenen Erfordemisse fur das operative Zusammenwirken 
mit anderen Organen, 15 Aug. 1977, 22.
60 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Vermerk, 16 Sept. 1975.
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be issued in cases involving “genuine relationships” (where a child was expected or had 
been bom) and where the proposed domicile was deemed “sufficient”.61 In early 
August, police chief and interior minister Friedrich Dickel wrote to Horst Sindermann, 
who as chairman of the Council of Ministers was officially responsible for the labour 
transfer programme, requesting his opinion on the matter but the correspondence went 
unanswered. That October, when the workers began a wave of strikes, the authorities 
realised that they could no longer ignore the matter (see chapter four). At Schwarze 
Pumpe, where the largest strike took place, seven workers had been demanding the right 
to move in with their girlfriends and the refusal of the authorities to accede to this 
request undoubtedly contributed to the strike. In an effort to diffuse the situation, on 
October 21 Sindermann instructed the Interior Ministry to allow Algerian workers to 
move into private accommodation in the Schwarze Pumpe catchment area if they 
wished. His decision had the support of the SAL and the MfS.62 As it applied only to 
workers in a specific area -  involving the Kreise Spremburg, Hoyerswerda and 
Weifiwasser -  the move had little to do with a policy of liberalisation. In the ensuing 
months, the state regained its authority by transferring a hundred Algerian workers from 
Schwarze Pumpe to new factories. In addition, the SAL cancelled the intake of Algerian 
workers scheduled for 1976 arguing that it required time to allow the situation to 
“stabilise”.
The authorities also introduced a more stringent marriage regulation. Under DVP 
Order 0118/77 of March 1977, the families of GDR applicants were now obliged to 
submit their opinions on the proposed marriage to the police. As Budde has shown, this 
gave the DVP countless reasons to reject applications. For example, police could reject 
an application on the grounds that the applicant had a duty to provide for his or her 
elderly parents even though GDR law contained no such obligation for parental care. 
Significantly, the order also instructed the authorities to issue refusals verbally.63 
Undoubtedly, the order was primarily an attempt to reassert state authority in the 
aftermath of the signing by the GDR of the Helsinki protocols, which necessitated the 
state to adopt more covert measures to prevent its citizens from leaving the state. It 
clearly had an impact on Algerian-East German relationships, which is discernible from 
the statistics. While there were 48 successful applications for marriage licences in 1976, 
in 1977 there were only 33. A much higher number of applications were submitted than
61 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Vermerk iiber ein Gesprach mit Gen. Schmidt (SAL), 25 July 1975.
62 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617 Sindermann to Dickel, 21 Oct. 1975.
63 Heidrun Budde, Voyeure, Berlin, 1999, 85 and 118.
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granted and in January 1978 alone, the authorities were processing 129 cases.64 Indeed, 
police and MfS applied a preventative approach designed to disrupt relationships. In
1977, an MfS officer outlined the policy as adapted in the Rudersdorf area where 
Algerians were employed at a cement works and who reportedly found little difficulty 
in establishing contact with the local population in the workplace and in the recreational 
sphere:
In carrying out our duties, the priority is to prevent marriages taking place between Algerian workers 
and [female] GDR citizens by using appropriate measures. In special cases marriages may be 
allowed, but as this gives rise to political-operational problems, we must ensure that marriage is not 
used [as a means] to abandon the Republic.
Similarly, the head of police immigration in the Bezirk Dresden claimed in 1978 that his 
department was deploying considerable operational resources for the “registration, 
control and surveillance of foreign citizens who have frequent contact with GDR 
citizens (women)”, adding that the university administration was an important source of 
information for his officers.66
The governments of a number of labour delegating countries also disapproved of 
binational relationships. The policy of the Algerian government hardened over the 
years, signalled by the comments made by the Algerian labour minister on his visit to 
the GDR in May 1978. Addressing the workers in a number of factories, he announced 
that the embassy would no longer consent to marriage applications, even in cases where 
the workers had fathered children. Interestingly, he cited the negative experiences of 
Algerians marrying French women as the reason for his government’s objection, which 
one SAL official ironically and hypocritically found discriminatory.67
The policy adopted by Vietnamese officials towards binational marriage was unlike 
any other. At a meeting with officials of the Consular Department of the MfAA in 
December 1984, embassy officials claimed that although the “Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam is in principle interested in the return of its citizens,” it could envisage 
marriage between Vietnamese and East German citizens provided the Vietnamese 
applicants fulfilled a number of conditions. These were considerable and were 
undoubtedly designed to frustrate applications. Firstly, the situation of the applicant 
worker’s family in Vietnam would have to be considered. Secondly, his or her employer 
or the delegating ministry in Vietnam had the right to have a say in the decision. In
64 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Untitled, n.d. [ca. Feb. 1978].
65 BStU, JHS, MF, VVS 001-339/77. Thiemann, Die Aufgaben der Kreisdienststelle, 15 Aug. 1977,22 
and 31.
66 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41619. Diskussionsbeitrag der BDVP Dresden zum Erfahrungsaustausch iiber die 
Kontrolle von Auslandem am 4 Mai 1978.
67 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Information for Schmidt, Abt. Planung und Finanzen des ZK, 10 July
1978. Also BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Untitled, n.d. [ca. Nov. 1978].
172
addition, applicants needed to submit a number of documents in support of an
application, consisting of a certificate of legal capacity from a local council, which had
to be imprinted with an apostil by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, and letters of
endorsement from the worker’s Vietnamese factory or university or from the
Vietnamese Interior Ministry. Significantly, Vietnamese embassy officials ruled out the
possibility of East German citizens moving to Vietnam owing to the “complicated
conditions in the country”.68
At a subsequent meeting held a year later, Vietnamese embassy officials clarified
their policy on marriage:
Citizens o f  the SR Vietnam studying in the GDR can only submit an application for marriage and 
permanent exit visa after they have left the GDR and have worked for some years in their homeland. 
Regarding SRV citizens who are in the GDR for the purposes o f vocational training [contract 
workers], the embassy is prepared to rule in favour o f the aforementioned applications if  the citizen’s 
relationship has produced a common child and the Vietnamese citizen has paid his training costs.
Thus, the embassy was prepared to allow one Vietnamese worker whose East German 
partner was expecting his second child remain in the GDR provided he followed the 
requirements and contacted the “Cooperation Department” of the embassy to allow for a 
“concrete examination process”.69 This process was primarily financial and workers 
were expected to pay considerable sums of money to win embassy support for their 
marriage intentions, a practice which the SAL noted as early as 1984 was being 
commonly referred to as “FreikauferC’ or buying freedom. In 1988, the “rates” were as 
follows: 5,000 marks for unskilled workers, 10,000 marks for skilled workers and 
15,000 marks for third-level graduates. Payment of this money secured the support of 
the embassy for the applicant’s intentions, and if the GDR factory and Mdl agreed, the 
worker was released from the terms of the labour contract and was reissued with his 
passport.70
Without exception, the organs of the state pigeonholed the East Germans who freely 
associated with foreign workers as the most negative types in society. Such reports were 
undoubtedly a product of the deep-rooted racist and sexist sentiment in East German 
society, which was scandalised by binational relationships. In particular, women 
suffered from this consensus between state and society and reports never described 
women as acting on their own free will and judgement. Police in Sebnitz and 
Bischofswerda dismissed the women who associated with Algerians as either 
“negative” elements or helpless victims lured into the hostels and forced into having
68 See reprodution o f minutes o f  meeting in Michael Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten und Arbeiter in der 
DDR und ihre Beobachtung durch das MfS, Magdeburg, 1999, 117.
69 Ibid., 116.
70 Ibid., 118f. In 1984 the SAL put the cost o f  this “ransom” for graduates at 24,000 marks.
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sex.71 A year later, the same officer reported that “asocial female persons” were staying 
overnight at the Hungarian workers’ hostel in Freital, while the Algerians in Sebnitz 
were offering “illegal quarters” to guests.72 In Bohlen, factory security described the 
girlfriends of Algerian workers as “women with previous convictions, loafers from the 
industrial schools (Jugendwerkhoferi) as well as escapees from institutions run by the 
health authorities,” adding dismissively that the Algerians working in the town divided 
their time between drinking and fighting over these women. Similarly, police in Leipzig 
denigrated the women who associated with Algerians as “providers of illegal quarters, 
the previously convicted, the criminally endangered and other negative persons”.73 In 
what was perhaps the most bizarre deployment of terminology, in 1977 an MfS thesis 
described the girlfriends o f Algerian workers as “smuggle-willing persons”,74 which 
reflects the commonly held belief that women entered into binational relationships with 
the sole intention of leaving the GDR.
Given the impossibility o f drawing neat dichotomies between state and society in 
the GDR, functionaries were undoubtedly expressing views widely held in East German 
society. Scherzer’s interviews carried out in Suhl in 1982 convey the attitudes of some 
East Germans towards binational relationships. As is to be expected, the interviewees 
who expressed racist ideas opposed them. Illustrating the intrinsic link between racism 
and paternalism, the bottom line for Mauer, who lived next door to the workers’ hostel, 
was “every tribe for itself’. Showing his contempt for the women who went out with 
Mozambicans, he dismissed one as “no oil painting” who had “divorced especially” for 
a Mozambican. The factory’s personnel manager, Seiler, claimed that he would throw 
out his own daughter if  she dated a Mozambican.75 Their views contrasted with those of 
the Rev. Eberhard Vater and his wife Christina, who established an alternative hostel in 
the early 1980s in the small town of Viemau, 20km outside of Suhl. The hostel 
generally accommodated those who felt ostracised by the regime and also provided East 
German women and their Mozambican, Cuban or Vietnamese partners an intimate and 
private space that was otherwise unavailable to them in the workers’ hostels, in the
76women’s homes, or in conventional East German hotels.
71 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 15 June 1978, 10.
72 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Dresden, Periodische Information, 5 July 1979.
73 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattung, 17 July 1979, 6f.
74 In German, “schleusungswillige Personen”. BStU, JHS, MF, VVS 001-339/77. Thiemann, Die 
Aufgaben der Kreisdienststelle, 15 Aug. 1977, 31.
75 Landolf Scherzer, Die Fremden, Berlin, 2002, 16, 22, and 43.
76 Ibid., 43f.
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Yet, opposition to binational relationships was not just racially motivated. Some 
disapproved of them claiming they were injurious for the foreigners. Foreman Rudi 
Gradtke, who favoured Mozambican above East German workers, argued that they 
needed to be protected from being “fleeced” by East German women. According to him 
(and others), some East German women took advantage of the Mozambicans’ 
generosity (who by all accounts showered their girlfriends with gifts) by talking their 
way into engagements only to ditch their naive fiancees later. This left the 
Mozambicans incensed who, according to their customs, demanded the return of their 
gifts and rings, and even sought legal advice on the matter from Gradtke who served as 
a juror in the local court.77
Women on the other hand questioned the wisdom of getting involved in 
relationships with Mozambicans on the basis that they had a predetermined shelf life. 
This was the view expressed by two women who were otherwise positively predisposed 
towards the Mozambican workers. As Roswitha Menz, a local barwoman, stated 
pragmatically: “O f course I wouldn’t marry a Mozambican, it’s not logical. They all 
have to go back sometime.” In a similar fashion, 19-year-old worker Carmen Dietz 
exclaimed: “But the Mozambicans are not allowed stay here, after four years they have 
to go back for good. And what is the point in me getting engaged to one, only to find 
everything’s over in four years.”78 They were not racists and each spoke out against the 
discrimination and marginalisation of Mozambicans; Menz in her bar and Dietz in the 
workplace (see the subsequent chapter). Dietz, however, feared the racist censure 
suffered by women who dated Mozambican men. Her friend, Angela, had a 
Mozambican boyfriend and when her brigade learned of this “all hell broke loose, they 
[especially the older women] treated her like dirt”. She was also called a “nigger’s slut” 
at a local disco. Given the pervasive climate of racism in Suhl, Dietz could not see 
herself ever marrying a Mozambican as she claimed that too many “people here are just 
too stupid to accept something like that”. And although she found it a good thing that 
“there were more half-casts [sic] about than before”, she was unsure whether they could 
cope with the teasing and gossip directed at them by the public.79 The views of the two 
women demonstrate how state policy and social pressure in the GDR served to 
intimidate those who saw nothing inherently wrong with binational relationships, 
“miscegenation”, or the presence of foreigners.
77 For the gifts, Scherzer, Die Fremden, 114.
78 Quoted in ibid., 67 and 114.
79 Ibid., 114-16.
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The outright condemnation by functionaries of almost all binational relationships 
means that the frequent allegations made in reports that Algerians and other contract 
workers were involved in underage sex or rape cannot be taken at face value. While 
there can be no doubt that some foreign men committed violent crimes of a sexual 
nature, it must be borne in mind that officials had an interest in criminalising binational 
interaction and tended to exaggerate the wrongdoings of a few foreigners to justify this 
policy. In 1984 Jena, for example, police staged a number of raids on an Algerian 
workers’ hostel after four o f the fifty East German women known to regularly visit it 
applied for exit visas to leave the GDR. The room searches in Jena and the 
discriminatory treatment o f Algerians in East Germany in general led the Algerian 
embassy to issue a complaint to the MfAA in 1984. When the MfAA in turn sought an 
explanation from the police in Jena, the latter admitted that they were illegal under the 
law and internal police regulations but claimed they were necessary because young girls 
had being staying at the hostel. One was a 15-year-old girl, who was on the missing 
persons register and a certified source of sexually transmitted diseases; another was a 
17-year-old absconder from an industrial school (Jugendwerkhof), while the third (17) 
claimed to have had sex with some Algerians and to have allowed them take nude
O A
photographs of her. Yet, although some of this may have been true, the police 
undertook the raids to combat regular and not underage relationships and only by 
chance discovered the presence of these girls in the hostel, which they in turn used to 
justify their raids retrospectively.
Testifying to the genuine nature of many of these relationships, it was not 
uncommon for former Algerian and other contract workers whose partners failed to 
secure exit visas to seek to return to the GDR and their wives, girlfriends and children, 
usually travelling on tourist or transit visas issued by GDR consulates abroad. While 
police picked up and deported most shortly after their arrival, a few managed to remain 
in the GDR for considerably long periods. In late 1980, 22 Algerians who had worked 
for four years at the Leipzig GISAG factory, returned to the GDR, and in most cases, to 
their wives and girlfriends. They were part of an 80-strong cohort of workers who had 
begun work at GISAG in 1976. Owing to the unavailability of a single workers’ hostel, 
the GISAG Algerians were housed in a number of hostels spread throughout the city, 
which police claimed made it difficult to “supervise” the workers, resulting in excessive
80 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/48451. Kontollauftrag in VPKA Jena, 20 Feb. 1984.
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drinking and rows with East Germans.81 In addition, police claimed that the Algerians 
maintained extensive contact with East German women, and in typical misogynist 
fashion, denigrated these as the “weak, criminal” variety who travelled from all parts of 
the GDR to stay “officially and sometimes unofficially” at their hostels.82 After 
completing their contracts at GISAG in July 1980, the workers returned to Algeria in 
order to take up employment in a steel foundry that the GDR was building in Tiaret. 
Finding that the factory was still under construction, 22 of them decided to return to the 
GDR. Back in Leipzig, seven moved in with their East German wives, seven with their 
girlfriends, while the remainder moved back into their old hostels. They also 
approached GISAG looking for their old jobs back. After police learned of the 
Algerians’ presence some months later, they insisted that the Algerian embassy arrange 
for the immediate return o f six former workers. Significantly, this number included four 
married men (two of whom were fathers) whose East German wives had been granted 
exit visas to leave for Algeria. The SAL and GISAG were prepared to allow the 
remainder stay in the GDR provided the Algerian embassy re-registered them as 
ONAMO contract workers and withdrew their passports accordingly.83 Although the 
embassy initially agreed to this proposal, it failed to act on it with the result that the 
police deported the men in June 1981.84 In going to such lengths to be reunited with 
their partners and families, these Algerians illustrated that relationships were strong, 
genuine and mutual and far removed from the negative portrayals contained in many 
police reports.
Some former contract workers were more successful in evading police attention 
after returning from Algeria to their wives in the GDR. In Hoyerswerda, two Algerians 
lived openly but illegally with their wives from 1979 to 1984, when police acting on a 
tip-off, arrested and deported the two. One was Ben A., who came to work in the GDR 
in 1974 as part of the first contingent of Algerian contract workers. In 1976, he met 
Edith U. and subsequently moved in with her to her flat in Hoyerswerda. After his four- 
year contract ended in August 1978, Ben A. had to return to Algeria even though his 
partner was pregnant. She gave birth to a daughter a short time later and both kept in 
contact by letter. A year later, he returned to the GDR on a one-week tourist visa and
81 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattung zu Straftaten und Vorkommnissen mit 
Burgem anderen Staaten, 15 July 1977, and Berichterstattung, 16 Dec. 1977.
82 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattung zu eingeleiteten Ermittlungsverfahren, 18 
Jan. 1979, 10.
83 Under the 1974 GDR-Algerian labour agreement, workers had to hand in their passports upon arrival in 
the GDR and received so-called ONAMO documents in return. This practice was explicitly designed to 
prevent the Algerians from making trips to West Berlin and the FRG.
84 BArch, DO 1/8.0/51098 contains correspondence on the workers’ case.
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after seeing his partner and, for the first time, his child, decided to remain in the GDR. 
For over four and a half years, he managed to live openly in Hoyerswerda, despite the 
Hausbuch regulations that required the registration of visitors in private homes. 
Although his partner supported him financially, he also worked privately on a building 
job for an East German. “Nobody took exception to this”, the DVP later established, 
which was also “due to the fact that there are many families with an Algerian spouse in 
Hoyerswerda”. Significantly, the Algerian embassy had been aware of his presence 
since 1979 but it had instructed the Algerian supervisor in Hoyerswerda that his case 
“was a matter for the GDR authorities”. Subsequent to his arrest and forced deportation, 
local police went through their records to check if any more Algerian “tourists” had 
overstayed their visas and found another, Azzedine F. He had also worked in 
Hoyerswerda from 1974 to 1978, during which time he met his partner Liselotte S. 
They lived together at her flat, which was prominently located over the Centrum 
department store in the city centre. Returning to Algeria after completing his contract, F. 
later came back to the GDR from Paris by car in August 1979 on a three-day holiday 
visa. He remained with his partner in the same flat until police picked him up and 
deported him five years later. While these cases are somewhat exceptional given the 
long period of time the two Algerians managed to evade police attention, police files 
contain many references to similar albeit shorter cases involving workers and students 
from a number of countries.85
Despite all the bureaucratic obstacles placed in their path by the East German and 
other regimes, some couples did succeed in securing both a marriage licence and the 
right of residency in the GDR. In March 1988, there were 1,200 former contract 
workers married to East Germans residing in the Bezirk Erfurt.86 During the 1980s, 
there was a slow increase in the overall number of binational married couples enjoying 
residency rights living in the GDR (Table 5). Significantly, over half of the total number 
of binational marriages with residency involved citizens from labour-delegating 
counties. Although the statistics do not relate solely to marriages involving contract 
workers, these formed the majority in most cases. In the Hungarian case, for example, 
they amounted to two-thirds of the total. This proportion was undoubtedly greater in the 
cases of Algeria, Vietnam, Cuba, Mozambique, and Angola, as citizens from these 
countries mainly came to the GDR as workers. Clearly, Poles and Hungarians found it
85 BArch, DO 1/8.0/2/95. BDVP Cottbus, Uberpriifiingsbericht zum ungesetzlichen Aufenthalt von zwei 
Algerischen Staatsbiirgem in der Stadt Hoyerswerda, 8 June 1984. See also DO 1/8.0/51097, BDVP 
KMS, Sofortmeldung, 27 Mar. 1987, for a Vietnamese man who lived illegally in GDR for 18 months. 
These were not isolated incidents.
86 BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL, 2029, fo. 9. Abt. XVIII, Berichterstattung, 9 Mar. 1988.
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much easier to marry East Germans than citizens from other countries, leaving no doubt 
that Angolan and Mozambican workers encountered far greater levels of institutional 
racism than other workers.
Table 5. Cumulative number o f  binational married couples residing in the GDR 
from 1980 to 1988 (including only countries with labour agreements with the G D Rf1
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Total (for all 
countries) 23913 25663 26676 26877 27714 27716 27960 28449 29254
O f which included a:
Pole 6926 7297 7493 7549 7609 7711 7762 7737 7737
Hungarian 6069 (No details) 6466
Algerian 26 43 62 69 104 139 172 178 156
Vietnamese 17 21 27 31 47 70 140 215 323
Cuban 22 30 33 45 61 71 81 243 414
Mozambican 2 1 2 4 6
Angolan 1 3 2
Total (for seven 
countries above) 13060 15104
Again, these statistics are not representative of the extent of binational relationships and 
exclude unsuccessful applications as well as cases where the couple took up residence 
abroad. For example, although sixteen Vietnamese citizens were allowed take up 
residence in the GDR with their wives in 1984, in the first six weeks of that year alone, 
38 marriage/residency applications had been submitted by Vietnamese citizens, six of 
which were granted.88
Just as East German women were victimised for their engagement with foreign 
men, women contract workers were subjected to far greater regulation in the sphere of 
relationships and reproduction. With the knowledge and support of the Cuban, 
Mozambican and Vietnamese governments, the GDR government excluded them from 
the many of the legal rights enjoyed by East German women. A supplementary 
agreement signed in June 1980 between the SAL and the Mozambican Labour Ministry 
was the first to enshrine this discrimination. In the document, the SAL agreed to 
repatriate immediately Mozambican contract workers found to be pregnant, a decision 
justified on the grounds they were not in a position to “fulfil the principles laid down”
89in the 1979 contract labour agreement in relation to work and training. Some days
87 BArch, DO 1/8.0/54483.
88 SAL report, 17 Feb. 1984. Quoted in Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten undArbeiter, 119.
89 Article 2 o f the Jahresprotokoll 1981 zum Abkommen vom 24 Feb. 1979, signed on 26 June 1980. 
Reprinted in Andreas Miiggenberg, D ie auslandischen Vertragsarbeitnehmer in der ehemaligen DDR, 
Berlin, 1996,99-102, 107f.
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later, the 1980 SAL Rahmenrichtlinie or Guidelines extended this principle to all non- 
European women contract workers.90
Yet, the threat of deportation did not prevent sexual activity or pregnancy. Perhaps 
by concealing their pregnancies, a small but growing number of Vietnamese women 
managed to give birth in the GDR (Table 6). As Nguyen van Houng has claimed, living 
in the GDR liberated Vietnamese workers from the “taboo of extramarital affairs” 
prevalent in their morally conservative homeland.91 In this regard, the experience of 
Vietnamese women in the GDR is analogous to what Riedel has identified for the male 
Algerian contract workers, namely that residency in the GDR allowed for the “free 
sampling of different lifestyles and leisure”.92 In July 1987, the SAL and its Vietnamese 
counterpart agreed that pregnant contract workers would be forced to decide between a 
free abortion or repatriation to Vietnam, while factory minders were instructed to issue 
workers with contraceptives, usually in the form of the pill.93 According to Nguyen van 
Houng, the free and uncomplicated availability of abortion and contraception served to 
further “legitimise the extramarital sexual relationships among the Vietnamese, who out 
of necessity had previously exercised restraint in their sex lives”.94
Table 6. Number o f  births to Vietnamese women in the GDR, 1980-198895
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Births 2 1 6 6 9 12 28 50 52
(Total number o f  
Vietnamese workers) 3508 5040 9600 10298 10641 10038 8459 20776 50998
This restrictive policy was officially relaxed somewhat in March 1989. In what was 
effectively a discretionary provision, the SAL instructed that pregnant Vietnamese 
women were no longer to be deported against their will or to be pressurised into having 
abortions. Rather they were to be advised on their options and allowed decide what was 
best for them. If they chose, they could remain in the GDR and were entitled to suitable 
accommodation and some of the benefits enjoyed by East German women, such as
90 Section 6.17.3 (b) o f the Rahmenrichtlinie [der SAL] zur Durchfuhrung von Regierungsabkommen 
zwischen der DDR und anderen Staaten iiber die zeitweilige Beschaftigung auslandischer Werktatiger in 
Betrieben der DDR, 1 July 1980. Reproduced in: Eisner, Eva-Maria & Lothar, Zwischen Nationalismus 
und Internationalismus, Rostock, 1994, 140-65.
91 Nguyen van Houng, “Die Politik der DDR gegeniiber Vietnam und den Vertragsarbeitem aus Vietnam 
sowie die Situation der Vietnamesen in Deutschland heute”, in: Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), Materialien 
der Enquete-Kommission, Baden-Baden, 1999, 1301-1363, here 1334.
92 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus”, 77.
93 Wemer Schmidt (SAL) and Nguyen Trong Thuy (Vietnam), Vereinbarung iiber die Verfahrensweise 
bei Schwangerschaft vietnamesischer werktatiger Frauen in der DDR, 21 July 1987. Quoted in Hanns 
Thoma-Venske, “Notizen zur Situation der Auslander in der DDR”, in: Zeitschrift fur Auslanderrecht und 
Auslanderpolitik 10:3 (1990), 125-131, 128.
94 Nguyen van Houng, “Die Politik der DDR gegeniiber Vietnam”, 1334.
95 BArch, DO 1/8.0/54483.
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pregnancy benefit, short-term maternity benefit, creches, and children’s allowance as 
well as social security benefits in kind. However, they were not entitled to the paid 
Babyjahr leave.96
Although Marburger has suggested that the state intended the revision of the 
pregnancy regulations to complement the granting of the franchise to foreigners in the 
local elections of May 1989, the decision had already been made the previous October. 
At a meeting held between Wolfgang Beyreuther, state secretary at the SAL, and Vo 
Van Kiet, deputy chairman of the Vietnamese Council of Ministers, the former 
proposed three major changes in order to allow foreigners benefit from what he saw as 
the “realisation of the unity o f economic and social policy” in the GDR. Firstly, East 
Germans and Vietnamese citizens were to be “freed from bureaucratic hurdles” in 
applying for marriage; secondly, it was to be made easier for Vietnamese workers to 
give up their Vietnamese citizenship in favour of GDR citizenship should they wish; 
and, thirdly, pregnant women were no longer to be repatriated against their will. 
Importantly, although the Vietnamese minister agreed to the changes, he warned that 
pregnancies were not to be “stimulated”, thus expressing the deep social conservative 
mindset of Vietnamese officials that had contributed to the restrictive regulations in the
i 97first place.
The change in policy had little to do with a process of liberalisation. Like the 
decision to enfranchise foreigners at local elections, it was nothing more than a window 
dressing exercise designed to deflect some of the criticisms of East German foreign 
labour policy. It can hardly be seen as an attempt to pacify the concerns of the contract 
workers as in the same month the government decided to impose export quotas on the 
amount of goods contract workers could take back with them to Vietnam. In practice, 
not all Vietnamese women workers were informed of their new rights.98 Indeed, in late 
August 1989, a Vietnamese worker sent a petition to Erich Honecker after her factory 
threatened to deport after she became pregnant. After the SAL intervened, the women 
was told she could give birth in the GDR, could spend her maternity leave in Vietnam, 
and could return to work out her contract “according to plan” if she so wished.99
Importantly, the pressure on women contract workers to avoid binational 
relationships was not exerted solely by the state and embassy officials and there is some 
evidence to suggest that male contract workers sought to control the activities of their
96 Helga Marburger, cited in Hackert-Lemke & Unterbeck, “Betreuerinnen”, 104, n. 37.
97 Gesprachsvermerk, 6 Oct. 1988. Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten und Arbeiter, 113.
98 As admitted by an SAL official. See Irene Runge, AuslandDDR. Fremdenhafi, Berlin, 1990, 117.
99 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7265. 21 Aug. 1989, Ehrensperger to Biiro Honecker.
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female compatriots in this regard. Although they saw it as natural to have relationships
with East Germans and to attend local discos, Cuban men at the Berlin Elektro-
Apparate-Werke were initially very opposed to Cuban women doing the same. Yet,
despite this pressure, the Cuban women won through, as recalled by Herr Ludwig, the
workers’ minder at the factory:
During the first few years the Cuban girls didn’t look at GDR [male] citizens, it was taboo for some 
reason. That changed though in the last few years. I’ve two or three Cuban girls who have got 
together with East German citizens. [ ...]  The guys were all against it at first, but it caught on.100
Cuban men were far more likely to be in a relationship and Ludwig knew of twenty
such marriages. The opposition of the Cuban men undoubtedly found the support of
their government. Like the Mozambican government, it allowed the GDR deport
pregnant workers, but unlike the Vietnamese, refused to allow their citizens have
abortions in the GDR. Thus, pregnancy for Cuban workers invariably meant repatriation
unless the women sought abortions without the knowledge of the embassy. In an effort
to prevent unwanted pregnancies, Ludwig, like many other minders, organised sex
education classes for his women workers. Given these conditions, Cuban women
workers were extremely anxious with even the thought of becoming pregnant, and as an
interview held during the summer of 1989 suggests, were resentful of the entitlements
of their Vietnamese colleagues.101
The policy on binational marriage in the GDR had tragic consequences for some
individual contract workers. In 1987, a 23-year-old Mozambican named Virgilio
Nhanombe committed suicide three months before his partner, Johanna R. (37), was due
to give birth to their child. In what is poignant testimony to the inhumanity of GDR
policy, she claimed later in a letter to the Mozambican supervisor that Virgilio had
taken the decision to kill himself after it had become clear that they would not be
allowed marry and live together. She wrote:
Both governments, our and your government, will have to consider that when young people come 
here to work, love will develop between people. Whether black or white, why can’t we live together? 
Virgilio is a victim o f  the governments’ measures. I’ll do everything possible to help Virgilio’s 
mother learn the truth so that she’ll know who her son’s murderers are.1 2
Characteristically, police rubbished her claims and purported that Virgilio killed himself
after hearing that his partner had been giving some Cuban workers the “advantage” of
late.
100 Runge, AuslandDDR, 7 If.
101 Ibid., 46.
102 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/3/94. BDVP Karl-Marx-Stadt, Mafinamhen im Zusammenhang mit dem Suicid 
eines auslandischen Burgers, 21 May 1987.
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State policy was geared towards the prevention of binational relationships. In 
tearing apart relationships and families, it made little distinction between married and 
unmarried couples. It resulted in the deportation of husbands and partners, who in many 
cases were fathers, effectively leaving their partners to raise their binational children 
alone in the GDR. State policy effectively drove women into single motherhood, which 
given social mores and underlying racism among sections of society, served to 
stigmatise binational relationships and legitimise opposition towards “miscegenation” 
even further.
Chapter 7. Racism in the GDR
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Some commentators have argued that the SED was a “party of xenophobia” whose 
policies nurtured xenophobic undercurrents in society while cynically appropriating the 
phrases of international solidarity and proletarian internationalism.1 Another article has 
claimed that the SED administered a system of “actually-existing apartheid”.2 These 
claims are clearly exaggerated as the SED was not a party in the mould of Western 
European far-right parties nor was the GDR a European South Africa.
A massive body of more serious literature exists on the xenophobia and racism in 
the GDR and the new Lander. These are mostly written from a sociological or 
psychological rather than a historical perspective, arguing for example that the 
authoritarian educational and childcare system and paramilitary training of youth in the 
GDR contributed to the disproportionately high levels of xenophobia.3 Undoubtedly, the 
stagnant and inadequate youth policy did lead to discontent, which was expressed in a 
variety of forms. Rightwing extremism was one of these, and as many studies 
demonstrate, the SED leadership stubbornly refused to recognise this growing 
phenomenon as a homemade one but sought rather to externalise its causes.4
In 2002, a ZZF research group produced a paper which argued that present-day 
xenophobia in eastern Germany had its roots in GDR developments and identified three 
contributing factors. Firstly, East Germans identified foreigners with the SED regime, 
which made them a convenient target for anti-regime resentment. Secondly, the GDR 
failed to devalue the exclusivist elements of its nationalist inheritance, and indeed 
encouraged these with its attempt to construct a homogenised socialist nation. Thirdly, 
societal tolerance could not develop given the absence of a public “culture of conflict” 
in the GDR.5 Rejecting a singular focus on psychological or historical developments in
1 Freya Klier, “Auslander rein! (Die DDR-Deutschen und die Fremden)”, in: Manfred Heftier (ed.), 
Zwischen Nationalstaat und multikultureller Gesellschaft. Einwanderung und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin, 1993, 231-38, here 235.
2 Carl Wechselberg, “Vertragsarbeiterlnnen -  Rassimus in der DDR”, in: Perspektiven. Zeitschriftfur 
sozialistische Theorie 10 (1993/94), 26-34, here 30.
3 An overview o f debates is provided by Anna Saunders, “Ostdeutschland: Heimat einer xenophoben 
Tradition?”, in: Berliner Debatte Initial 14:2 (2003), 50-59.
4 See Walter Sufi, Zu Wahrnehmung und Interpretationen des Rechtsextremismus in der DDR durch das 
MfS, Berlin, 1993, 33-39.
5 Jan C. Behrends, Dennis Kuck and Patrice G. Poutrus, “Historische Ursachen der Fremdenfeindlichkeit 
in den Neuen Bundeslandem”, in: Behrends et al. (eds), Fremd und Fremd-Sein in der DDR. Zu 
historischen Ursachen der Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Ostdeutschland, Berlin, 2003, 327-333. The theses 
were not entirely original. The second thesis resembled Konrad Weift’ March 1989 argument that the
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the GDR, Anna Saunders has argued that the political and social problems following on 
from unification were the catalyst for a radicalisation of processes that had already 
commenced in the GDR. The rapid arrival and imposition of the Western system left 
East German youths disorientated as their role models (family, neighbours, and friends) 
became unemployed or were exposed as Stasi agents.6
Yet, research on racism in the GDR has its deficits. Generally, it has viewed the 
issue solely from the perspective of the “host” society and focuses almost exclusively 
on the late 1980s. Furthermore, xenophobia has for too long been identified with youth 
and skinhead gangs, but not as a broad social phenomenon. Racism was not just a 
symptom of system collapse in the late 1980s nor was it the preserve of right-wing 
extremists. It was a much broader social phenomenon that featured throughout the 
history of the GDR. In this regard East Germany was arguably more part of the 
European mainstream than the SED suggested. This chapter seeks to outline the 
historical characteristics o f East German racism. It shows that the ideological 
foundation on which the state was built prevented functionaries from accepting that a 
problem existed on the one hand, while on the other it served to cloak their own 
prejudices. Indeed, the SED could resort to national stereotyping when it felt its 
legitimacy was under threat. The inherent failure of the system to accept the existence 
of racism meant that it could never be effectively combated, leaving racist prejudice to 
fester among the East German public. The chapter concludes by surveying foreigners’ 
own attitudes on racism, with particular attention given to historical and contemporary 
perceptions rather than the retrospective post-Wende views. Given that racism in the late 
1980s has been extensively covered in the secondary literature, this chapter focuses on 
East German racism in the 1950s and 1960s and shows how the trends which emerged 
in this period continued into the following two decades.
The opposition of the authorities towards unsupervised friendships and binational 
relationships was evidence of a more deep-seated racism and xenophobia in East 
German society. Despite its claim to be the embodiment of the best of German 
progressive traditions, the GDR as a German, a European, and a communist state 
inherited a mixed bag of racist and xenophobic traditions and mentalities. Unlike the 
landed estates, private industry and the old military, which the SED saw as the main 
contributors to fascism, popular expressions of racism proved difficult to abolish. The
failed attempts o f the SED to substitute internationalism for nationalism led to an identity void. Konrad 
Weifi, “Die neue alte Gefahr. Junge Faschisten in der DDR”, in: Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk (ed.), Freiheit 
und Offentlichkeit. Politischer Samisdat in der DDR 1985-1989, Berlin, 2002, 392-404, here 401. Weifi’ 
article was reproduced extensively in GDR, West Germany and Poland.
6 Anna Saunders, “Ostdeutschland: Heimat einer xenophoben Tradition?”, 53.
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constitution, laws and regulations may have helped banish open and aggressive racism 
from public view but did little to combat its more subtle forms. Socialist construction 
did not root out prejudice and hate. Indeed, by blaming fascism on the capitalist class 
and other enemies, the SED absolved the public from any complicity in the evils of the 
Nazi regime. Furthermore, it also deluded many East Germans into believing that there 
was no objective reason for racism to exist in the GDR. Thus, the inevitable recurrence 
and persistence of racism among the population could not be recognised for what it was 
and became a taboo.
Anti-racism and internationalism were central planks of SED ideology and on the
international stage the GDR was fond of parading itself as an anti-racist bastion in stark
contrast to the West. In 1970, for example, the MfAA argued that:
In agreement with the Potsdam Agreement and the UN Charter the GDR has from the very 
beginning condemned racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism in every form and has reflected this 
principle in its socialist constitution. The GDR, which gives the colonially and racially suppressed 
nations every possibly help, [ .. .]  demands that the West German Federal Republic [...]  end its long- 
lasting and extensive support for racist slaveholders.7
When it came to its own internal problem with racism, the GDR was in denial. The SED
reduced the issue of racism to simple misunderstandings and externalised its causes. At
best, functionaries saw racism as the preserve of an incorrigible, home-grown minority
of reactionaries and petit-bourgeois elements whose ideas were fuelled by the West
rather than history. In this regard, the SED viewed racism no differently to a range of
other unwanted social problems which it dismissed as West German imports. Even as
the situation deteriorated in the late 1980s, officials were extremely hesitant to refer to
racist incidents by name. In this regard, the aversion of officials towards even
mentioning the word racism may have resulted from what Walter StiB has referred to as
“mental blockages”, by which functionaries avoided any serious analysis of problems
by applying rigid explanatory models.8 Denying that the GDR had a racist problem has
continued in some quarters. Writing in 1993, a former leading functionary of the (East)
German-African Friendship Society (DAFRIG) claimed that:
The question o f competition for jobs with Germans never arose. Rather the legacy o f direct colonial 
rule in Africa was popularised to such an extent by the GDR media that individual Africans could 
always expect more sympathetic than disapproving attitudes wherever they went. They, particularly 
those Africans who graduated from the Herder Institute, spoke good German and could 
communicate with the public also. After all, some could speak excellent Saxon and could distinguish
7 Quoted in: Komitee fur die Kampfdekade gegen Rassismus und Rassendiskrimierung (ed.), Gegen 
Rassismus, Apartheid und Kolonialismus. Dokumente der DDR 1949-1977, Berlin, 1978, 167f.
8 Walter Sufi, Zu Wahrnehmung und Interpretationen des Rechtsextremismus, 46.
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Radeberger pilsner from other beers which is a small indication o f the extent o f the generally good 
relations with the GDR public in the 1950s and 60s.9
Yet, the experience o f foreign students in the 1960s exposes the fallacy of such claims.
While many students saw racism as an inevitable phenomenon of living in the West in
general, the existence of racism in a socialist country came as a shock to most. One
African student who left the GDR for West Germany told a US journalist in 1967:
If we go to the United States we know we may meet discrimination. We don’t like it, but it doesn’t 
surprise us. But we are taught there is no discrimination under communism. When we find out 
differently, it hurts.
Indeed, of the foreign, predominantly African students who dropped out of their 
university studies in Eastern bloc countries and left for the West, between 20 and 30 
percent claimed that racism had driven them to leave.10 Clearly, the GDR and its 
Eastern partners were victims o f their own propaganda. A 1959 draft prospectus for 
foreign students boasted that: “In the GDR all forms of racial discrimination are a 
punishable offence by law. The working population is proud to provide students from 
over fifty countries with an adopted country for their studies”.11 The reality was often 
different and on the evening of Mayday 1969 in Merseburg, two Sudanese students 
were attacked by three GDR assailants who screamed: “You black pigs. What are you 
doing here? You’re just studying at our expense!”12
The abundant evidence o f racism and xenophobia in the 1950s and 1960s does little 
to support the claim that racism first appeared after the arrival of Algerian workers in 
the 1970s or was a result o f the consumer shortages of the 1980s.13 The problems 
encountered by a Paris-based African troupe of performers, which toured the GDR in 
late 1951 and early 1952, provides an early example of the crude racism Africans could 
expect to encounter at the hands of the public and of the more subtle prejudices of 
functionaries. Demonstrating that Nazi propaganda still had currency in the early 1950s, 
the performers were attacked by small groups of 25 to 30-year-old students on more 
than one occasion in the prominent Berlin establishments of the Johannishof and Newa 
hotels. One student claimed he objected to the sight of “Jews” [sic] dancing with
9 Peter Sebald, “Volkerfireundschaft oder Auslandsinformation. Impressionen zum Wirken der Deutsch- 
Afnkanischen Gesellschaft”, in: Hans-Georg and Ilona Schleicher and Ulrich van der Heyden (eds), Die 
DDR und Afrika. Zwischen Klassenkam pf und neuem Denken, Hamburg, 1993, 79-94, here 8If.
10 Harry B. Ellis, “African students vault Iron Curtain”, in: Christian Science Monitor, 25 Feb. 1967, 9.
11 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/610, fo.164 (reverse) and 164. Entwurf eines Informationsblattes fur 
auslSndische Studierenden in der DDR, n.d. [ca. Jan. 1959]. Although this was tacit admission that a 
problem existed in the GDR, the final version o f the draft -  Hans von Oettingen’s Studium bei Freunden, 
n.p., n.d. [Berlin, 1959] -  contained no reference to racism at all.
12 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Storende und gegnerische Aktivitaten im Bereich des 
Auslanderstudiums der DDR, 2 June 1969, 8f. Four weeks later, Sudanese students were attacked by a 
group o f Germans who drank in the same bar.
13 Andrzej Stach & Saleh Hussain, Auslander in der DDR. Ein Ruckblick, Berlin, 1991, 18.
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German women. Even the troupe’s main guide and interpreter found it difficult to hide 
her own prejudices. In her opinion, the Africans failed to live up to communist 
projections of what Africans ought to be and were hypocritical, politically deceitful, 
materialistic, and ultimately to blame for the racist attacks committed against them. She 
remarked:
Apart from our friends’ unsatisfactory political consciousness and our failure to improve it, there 
was the Africans’ own mentality. Their sense o f racial inferiority, caused by colonial suppression, 
and their being spoiled in the GDR, fuelled their excessive self-confidence and hypersensitivity, 
which led to regular fights with the hotel staff and people on the street. Although the shows met with 
great applause and the friends were greeted wildly and were celebrated at receptions, compared to 
other groups the political consciousness o f our black friends was sadly not what we are accustomed 
to and which is to be expected from freedom fighters.14
In early 1954, officials at the Leipzig ABF diplomatically observed that the
relationships of the Nigerian students (the first foreign students in the GDR) with East
German women “aroused the displeasure” of the population. Rather than deal with this
public prejudice, college officials proposed better recreational supervision of the
Nigerians was the only solution.15
Preparations for the first planned deployment of foreign labour in GDR factories in
1961 demonstrated that while some institutions were aware of the existence of racism
among GDR workers, other bodies clearly opposed any reference being made to it on
political grounds. The FDGB anticipated that the employment of foreign workers would
not be without its problems:
It will have to be made clear to our German workers in the factories that these workers are coming to 
us as class brothers, as friends, who are going to help us complete the construction o f socialism. 
Therefore, it is our duty from day one to establish as a warm relationship that can only exist between 
friends and class brothers. There cannot be any reservations or ‘secrets’ at work. Even the smallest 
sign o f arrogance or prejudice against our friends must be opposed vigorously.16
In a subsequent document, the FDGB proposed that it would develop counter­
propaganda to combat the “possible nationalist manifestations of some GDR workers” 
as well as the “expected enemy rabble-rousing propaganda” which would attempt to 
make parallels with the “exploitation” of foreign workers in West Germany and revive 
the Ostarbeiterideologie. Interestingly, the FDGB wished to include its commitment in 
the agreements it expected to sign with its foreign counterparts in the event of the labour 
transfer occurring.17 However, as some reports suggested, East German workers did not
14 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/53, fos. 2-14, here 14. Fido Paschenda, Meine Erfahrungen als 
Dolmetscherin beim Afrikanischen Ensemble, 15 Feb. 1952.
15 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/639, fo. 14. Bericht iiber die Arbeit der ABF, Abt. 
Auslanderstudium, 27 Jan. 1954.
16 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/1647. Mafinahmeplan zur Betreuung der Arbeiter, die aus den sozialistischen 
Briiderlandem in die DDR kommen, 23 Oct. 1961.
17 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/1647 Vorschlage fiir die Vereinbarungen zwischen den Zentralraten der 
sowjetischen und bulgarischen Gewerkschaften und dem BV der FDGB — Anlage B, 7 Nov. 1961.
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need the West to remind them of the past, as one old worker and veteran communist 
demonstrated. Upon hearing about the plans to send foreign workers to the Leipzig 
engineering factory where he worked, he commented that: “It will be fine as we have 
some experience with Fremdarbeiter after all.”18 Yet, despite the concerns of the 
FDGB, the SED Central Committee’s International Department was against the 
proposed trade union agreements making any reference to these problems.19 While no 
reason was given, it may be assumed that the FDGB proposals went too far in admitting 
the existence of particular problems that the GDR officially denied.
When foreign workers eventually arrived -  in July 1965 the first Polish Pendler 
women began employment in factories in Gorlitz and Oppach (Bezirk Dresden) -  it 
became clear that the socialist system of full employment did not preclude the 
expression of hostility of indigenous workers towards migrant workers. As factory 
FDGB officials noted, East German women workers initially believed that the arrival of 
foreign labour inevitably spelt out the loss of their jobs and the ending of the 
recruitment of new German workers.20
Similarly, other ministries were aware of hostility towards foreigners but chose to 
do nothing. In 1960, the SHF admitted in an internal report that foreign students, 
particularly “coloured students” [sic], had voiced concerns about the “isolated cases of 
nationalist arrogance and discriminatory conduct” of East Germans towards them.21 In 
March 1961, an Algerian worker employed at the electrochemical combine in Bitterfeld 
was attacked in the local cultural centre and later found police unresponsive when he 
tried to press charges.22 In April 1963 in Halle, Algerian students were so frustrated at 
local officials incessantly ignoring the commonplace attacks on them by East Germans 
that they considered sending a delegation to the SHF in Berlin in protest.23 Later that 
year, the HI cavalierly and euphemistically referred to the “thoughtless conduct of 
German citizens towards foreigners” as one of many “side effects of the construction of
18 BArch, DE 1/9408, fo. 78. Bottger (Sonderbeaufitragter) to SPK, 25 Nov. 1961.
19 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/1647 Vorschlage fur die Vereinbarungen zwischen den Zentralraten der 
sowjetischen und bulgarischen Gewerkschaften und dem BV der FDGB — Anlage B, 7 Nov. 1961.
20 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8418. Information iiber die in unserem Bezirk beschaftigten polnischen Burger 
in den VEB Elektroschaltgeratewerken Oppach und Gorlitz, 30 Nov. 1965,4.
21 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/638, fos. 104 and 106 (rev). SHF, Die weitere Entwicklung des 
Auslanderstudiums in der DDR bis 1965, n.d. [I960].
22 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/1647. Aktennotiz iiber eine Aussprache zwischen dem Koll. Kroun (UGTA), 
Deubner (FDGB) and Fischer (HAPM), 11 Jan. 1961.
23 College officials had little to say on the claims, noting merely that the majority o f the students 
supported the Ben Bela government and the creation o f the United Arab Republic. SAPMO-BArch, DY 
30/IV A 2/9.04/469. Anruf des Gen. Kropitz, UPL Halle, 30 Apr. 1963.
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socialism”, fuelled by “temporary difficulties with the supply of certain goods”.24 
Interpretations such as these could not solve the problem, nor could they allay the 
legitimate concerns of foreign students.
The academic years of 1964/65 and 1965/66 were marked by a significant increase 
in racist incidents in Leipzig, Rostock, Leuna-Merseburg, Halle, and Mittweida. Below 
is a list of the known racist incidents that occurred in and around Leipzig (unless 
otherwise indicated) from April 1964 to February 1965. A general pattern is discernible: 
the attacks took place in public and were unprovoked, the perpetrators were GDR 
males, usually drunk, and from a variety of walks of life (students, restaurant staff, 
policemen and soldiers), while the victims were primarily black African students:
In April 1964 an Algerian student was insulted and assaulted by a GDR citizen. The 
following month, the owner o f the Baumgarten restaurant refused to seat two students 
on the grounds that his guests disliked Africans. Later in the same month, two Syrian 
students were assaulted by a GDR citizen, while on the same night at the HOG 
Parkgaststatte restaurant, a Nigerian student suffered an unprovoked verbal and physical 
attack at the hands of GDR citizens. In June, a Ghanaian student was subjected to the 
same treatment by an inebriated GDR citizen who punched him in the face. In July, a 
student from the Congo was insulted by a GDR citizen on a tram. In September a 
Malawian student was beaten up by three GDR veterinary students in an unprovoked 
attack. Later that month, a Nigerian was attacked by three GDR citizens. In October, a 
Congolese student was insulted by a member of the riot police in the Carola Casino. In 
late December in Wendisch-Rietz, a Moroccan apprentice was almost stabbed to death 
in an unprovoked attack while making his way home one night by two drunken 
assailants with previous convictions. Later that month in the Mitropa restaurant in 
FriedrichsstraBe in Berlin, a Malian customer was insulted and beaten by two 
intoxicated GDR guests who poured beer and spat on his plate. When he complained to 
management, the waiter tried to throw him out. He was later arrested by the transport 
police who tried unsuccessfully to force him to sign a statement claiming responsibility, 
which he refused. On New Year’s Eve, two South African students and their East 
German girlfriends were subjected to a torrent of racist abuse in a bar in Mittweida. 
After being deliberately ignored by the waiting staff and the bar manager, the four were 
insulted with the terms “nigger”, “back to the bush”, and “niggers’ sluts”. (Indeed, only 
some weeks previously one of the South African’s girlfriends was told in public that:
24 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A  2/9.04/467. Uber die Erziehungsarbeit am Herder-Institut der KMU, 5 
Oct. 1963, 15.
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Under Hitler we’d have shorn your head.”) In mid-January 1965, a student from 
Mozambique was attacked by two drunken GDR citizens. Some days later, two 
Sudanese students and their East German girlfriends were insulted by two NVA soldiers 
(a NCO and a lieutenant) who had “rudely demanded” the two women to dance with 
them. A fight broke out and other patrons encouraged the soldiers with one patron 
shouting “throw the blacks out!” while another took photographs.
While this racism clearly targeted African students, other groups also noted a rise in 
hostility. In early 1965 in Leipzig, for example, a Greek woman, whose husband had 
just entered a shop, was accosted and threatened by a number of GDR youths who 
warned her to keep away from foreigners. Around the same time, a Columbian 
professor who had spent a number of years researching in Leipzig noted how racism 
among the public had intensified. He had suffered the indignity of a German grasping 
his face to see if  his colour was “real”. In addition, he noted that in restaurants it was 
becoming a frequent occurrence for GDR guests to vacate their tables when foreigners 
were seated near them.25
The above list of incidents was a damning indictment of the GDR’s claim to have 
rid itself of racism and discrimination, hence its “strictly confidential” designation. 
Foreigners, especially Africans, were being subjected to racist attacks by East Germans 
from a variety of social classes and in the most public of places.
The “ever growing tensions” in Leipzig were the subject of a detailed memorandum 
written in early 1965 by Sheku S. Magona, the Sierra Leonean president of the Union of 
African Workers and Students in the GDR (UASA) and sent to a number of state and 
party officials.26 While composed in parts of standard SED terminology and analysis -  
typified by Magona’s warning that an escalation of the problem would only serve to 
fuel the anti-communist agenda o f the “imperialist press” -  the document referred to the 
problem as one of racism, unlike GDR analyses which persistently avoided referring to 
this word directly.
While Magona believed (like the SED) that racism was bound to disappear with the 
development of socialism, he suggested that it was far more widespread in East German 
public society than any SED account dared to claim. Racism was expressed not only by 
those still loyal to the “notorious Hitlerism”, he argued, but also by a much larger 
community imprisoned by a “historical and psychological” legacy. He complained of
25 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Informationsbericht iiber die Situation unter den auslandischen 
Studenten, insbesondere in Auswertung von Vorfallen in der Offentlichkeit, 4 Feb. 1965, 1-4. For the 
Wendisch-Rietz case, see: SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/7286. Bericht uber den Angriff auf den Marokkaner 
Abdellatif B. in Storkow am 29 Dez. 1964.
26 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41383. Abschrift eines Schreibens der UASA, n.d. [ca. Feb. 1965],passim.
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the daily unfriendly behaviour” of certain workers (such as sales staff, conductors, 
waiters, and postal workers) and in particular the “arrogance and envy if not also hate” 
of the members of the taxi union, many of whom refused to carry Africans if they were 
accompanied by German women. Singling out the DVP for particular mention, he 
argued that the “bias and brutality” of the police towards Africans had destroyed their 
trust in the GDR legal system. German “racial arrogance” took a number of forms, he 
continued. Firstly, there were those whose “feeling of superiority rooted in a bias of 
racial arrogance” led them to amuse themselves “at the expense of Africans”. Secondly, 
there were the “state-hostile elements” that targeted foreigners in an effort to discredit 
the GDR. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, there were the ostentatious “party 
comrades or good citizens”, who as he put it, “provoke us intentionally in order, firstly, 
to make us doubt highly-respected party morals and, secondly, to find support for their 
anti-foreigner rabble-rousing in a more refined way”.
Magona argued that East German perceptions were fuelled by the persistence of 
colonial stereotypes in the GDR media. He decried DEFA’s singular focus on the “evil 
of colonial barbarism” which presented German viewers with an antiquated picture of 
the continent and its people and which ignored developments since independence. Thus, 
it was not unusual for Africans to be confronted with questions such as: “So tell us, do 
you still live in trees at home?” or “do you eat people?” He proposed that a modem 
representation of Africa, contrasting for example the “miserable conditions” in Angola 
with university life in Ghana or Nigeria, “could show our German friends that Africans 
too do not live beyond the dialectical world”.27
Yet, Magona’s analysis did not spare some African students from criticism and in 
doing so, demonstrated how foreigners too could play down racism for political and 
ideological reasons. He claimed that many of his members suffered from the “historical 
and psychological” effects o f colonialism which resulted in deep “suspicion mixed with 
petulance”, adding that: “Regretfully, jokes touch on the sensibilities of some.” In 
addition, there was a minority of “black sheep” unable and unwilling to adjust to the 
German way of life. Their ignorance of German “customs and traditions” as well as of 
political developments in the East since 1945 meant they were unable to view the 
current class struggle with the necessary objectivity, leaving them “ideologically
27 Incidentally, at the celebrations to mark that year’s ‘international day o f youth and student struggle 
against colonialism’, African students at the IS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik Zwickau pointed out that the 
“Attitudes o f the public are being nurtured by the false lead given by radio and television. When a singer 
or a band o f people o f  black colour are introduced, for example, then it’s just the ‘negro singer’ or the 
‘negro band’ are playing or performing.” BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/2836. Schreiben der IS Kfz-Technik 
Zwickau an die SHF, 10 May 1965.
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unclear [...] which in turn leads them to be victims of provocation and other asocial
occurrences”. An even smaller group of reactionaries provoked East Germans in order
to vent their anti-socialism, he concluded.
The reaction o f the authorities to the racist attacks demonstrated the inherent
inability of the state to comprehend the problem. The SHF, for example, stated mildly
that the incidents did “not testify to a healthy relationship between parts of our
population and foreign students, in particular Africans”.28 The reaction of the SED
Central Committee’s International Department to Magona’s memorandum displayed the
two main characteristics of official GDR approaches to racism: racist incidents were
treated as the product o f “misunderstandings” and invariably blamed on the foreign
students themselves or on Western machinations. Thus, while the Department admitted
that the party needed to suppress the “remaining streaks of national arrogance and
prejudice of our citizens”, it was adamant that the dissatisfaction of the Africans was
encouraged by the “persistent attempts of the enemy to stir up trouble especially among
these citizens and to misuse them for political campaigns”.29
Ideally, the GDR hoped that the presence of foreign students, especially Africans,
would help underpin its claims to have eradicated of racism and discrimination as the
result of political and economic transformation. Thus, foreign students were paraded at
political meetings and in factories in support of SED policy, such as at a preparation
meeting held in advance o f the 1963 Volkskammer elections.
Speaking at a meeting in Dresden a student from Black Africa [sic] explained how at the start o f the 
century members o f his people were displayed as exhibits in Dresden Zoo and compared this to the 
current situation where numerous black students study with the same rights as their German friends. 
That was an enduring demonstration o f the great changes made in an issue as important as the racial 
problem [sic] that have been achieved under the leadership o f the working class and made a big 
impression on the conference participants.30
Away from the public gaze, however, foreign students who attempted to discuss the 
existence of racism in the GDR were met with a less enthusiastic response. An African 
studying at the Humboldt University who wrote about racial discrimination in the GDR
28 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Einschatzung der politisch-ideologischen Situation im 
Auslanderstudium, n.d. [ca. Summer 1966], 8.
29 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Informationsbericht iiber die Situation unter den auslandischen 
Studenten, insbesondere in Auswertung von Vorfallen in der Offentlichkeit, 4 Feb. 1965. Also: SAPMO- 
BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Information zu einigen Problemen der politischen Arbeit mit 
auslandischen Burgem, 9 Mar. 1965. It is highly likely that the UASA letter led to the first MfS thesis on 
foreigners, see: BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Paulsen, Einige Probleme der Verhutung von Staatsverbrechen, 5 
Dec. 1965’.
30 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/467. Inhalt, Formen und Methoden der Propagierung der 
marxistisch-leninistischen Theorie unter den auslandischen Studenten und ihre Heranfuhrung an die 
sozialistische Wirklichkeit, n.d. [ca. Oct. 1963], 9.
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in a college wall news-sheet in 1961, was expelled and deported by incensed officials.31
As one South African student claimed in a conversation with an FDGB functionary later
in the same year, Africans, who tried to make “critical reference to the attitudes of
several people” towards them, found the conversation broken off by angry functionaries
on the grounds that “such discussions undermined the reputation of the GDR”.32
Similarly, when the foreign students of the engineering college in Karl-Marx-Stadt
highlighted their own experiences of “nationalism and racial hatred” in the GDR on the
occasion of the international day of struggle of youth and students against colonialism,
the college director dismissed them as leftwing radicals who were simply over-reacting
to “disagreements” with GDR citizens.33 Indeed, as the legitimacy of the GDR was
intrinsically linked to the idea of anti-racism, this precluded any discussion on racism in
the GDR. Anti-racism was central in the SED’s attempts to legitimise its rule,
demonstrated by the following statement published to mark the tenth anniversary of the
Bandung Conference:
The GDR developed from the anti-imperialist struggle. It eliminated the political and economic 
power o f  imperialism in a part o f  Germany and forever destroyed the roots o f colonialism and neo­
colonialism and their manifestations -  racial hatred and the master race ideology 
[Herrenmenschentum] -  in its territory. For the first time there is a German state which has broken 
irrevocably with an imperialist policy based on the hatred o f nations and which has made the 
principle o f friendship with the nations o f  Africa and Asia its diplomatic policy and thus continues 
the good traditions o f  the German working class and o f German humanism.34
Thus, whenever problems emerged between foreigners and GDR citizens, the causes 
had to be external and most likely the fault of the foreigners themselves. Indeed, the 
first MfS thesis written on foreigners believed they suffered from a “very pronounced 
sense of justice”. Newly-arrived young African students were most problematic, the 
thesis continued, arguing that they often got involved in “fist-fights and hooligan 
offences” with the indigenous population owing to “disagreements” which it did not 
believe were “deliberately hostile”. For the author, Africans were far more likely to be 
racists. He argued that Africans’ acculturation to GDR standards was only “skin deep” 
and could simply “melt away” when exposed to the occasional heavy-handed and 
forceful tone of the police. All that remained after such encounters was the “age old, 
almost innate causal chain” which dictated that “the white man is the enemy of blacks, 
the white police is the enemy of blacks, [and] the police is the enemy of blacks”. More
31 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/638, fos. 118-128, here 121 (reverse). Informationsbericht, 28 Oct. 
1961.
32 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/2123. Aktennotiz uber die Aussprache mit dem Koll. H. (Rep. Sudafrika) am 
25 Nov. 1961.
33 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/2836. IS Werkzeugmaschinenbau Karl-Marx-Stadt to the SHF, 27 Apr. 1965.
34 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/8418. 10 Jahre Bandung. 10 Jahre an der Seite der Volker Asiens und Afrikas, 
n.d. [ca. 18 Apr. 1965].
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absurdly, the same thesis argued that African students who spoke out against racism 
were lacking in intelligence. The author wrote of the “less intelligent and political 
unclear or negative foreigners” who were often prepared to stage protests in response to 
the “rash reactions” o f the DVP. Their behaviour contrasted with the “politically clearer 
and intelligent” Africans who were more willing accept the inappropriateness of their 
behaviour following incidents and who were willing to apologise to the GDR citizens 
and police officers involved.35
The second MfS thesis on foreigners, written the following year, made similar 
arguments. It contended that most foreigners from non-socialist states were “alien” to 
the “norms of social cohabitation” owing to the fact that their “mental development [...] 
has been influenced in a sociological direction defined by the ruling capitalist mode of 
production”.36 In support o f this argument, the author quoted Marx’s third thesis on 
Feuerbach, which stated that: “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of 
circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it 
is essential to educate the educator himself.”37 The need to accommodate cultural 
difference was thus perceived as the duty of foreigners, who had to make an effort to 
abandon their “previous ways” upon arriving in the GDR on the grounds that most East 
Germans expressed “a lack o f understanding if  not objection on principle” towards such 
behaviour. This proved too much for many foreigners, the thesis continued, leaving 
them confused and leading them into criminal activity. They “glorified the western way 
of living” by constantly listening to Western radio channels, by making regular trips to 
West Berlin, and by circulating “junk and filth literature of western provenance” in the 
GDR, habits which guaranteed their appeal to the most anti-socialist elements of the
38East German population, the thesis concluded.
Perhaps more than any other documents, these theses demonstrate how 
functionaries could weave racist thinking into the political language of the day. Political 
acquiescence (and the preparedness to submit to the political and social order as 
envisaged by the SED) was equated with intelligence, whereas autonomous, refractory, 
and stubborn actions were seen as evidence of substandard mental ability. Thus, college 
officials in Ilmenau linked one Ghanaian student’s oversensitivity (“he always thinks in 
terms of discrimination”) with the fact that he was a former missionary school pupil and 
pious Catholic. This contrasted with his more political compatriot, who was chair of the
35 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Werner Paulsen, Einige Probleme, 5 Dec. 1965, 32-35.
36 BStU, JHS, MF, 540. Theo Dudek, Einige Besonderheiten bei der Werbung von operativ geeigneten 
Auslandem ...fu r die Abwehrarbeit des MfS, n.d. [ca. 1966/67], 14, 19-21.
37 Ibid., 19. English translation from: Marx/Engels. Selected Works, vol. I, Moscow, 1969, 13-15.
38 BStU, JHS, MF, 540. Dudek, Einige Besonderheiten, 19-21.
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Ghanaian students’ association in East Germany. He was a popular guest at 
Jugendweihe preparation classes and ceremonies, and by implication, happier and more 
content with the GDR.39
Clearly, the onus was on foreigners to adapt to the “social conditions” in the GDR
which also entailed accepting their treatment at the hands of the police and public. The
attitudes of the majority population were not for up for discussion, as a 1962 TU
Dresden report on students from sub-Saharan Africa indicated:
We have heard no complaints o f  their behaviour in public. Some spent far too much time on 
friendships with girls and women. While their attitudes to the population o f our republic are cordial, 
they are easily suspicious and in particular they cannot stand it when they are stared at on account of 
their dark skin colour.40
Similarly, in its assessment o f crime involving foreigners in the Suhl region in 1981, the 
regional criminal police bureau bemoaned that many public disorder incidents involving 
Mozambican workers resulted from them reacting “violently towards even the slightest 
or smallest derogatory comments made by GDR citizens”.41 When foreigners were 
attacked, officials tended to blame them for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
A Sudanese student enrolled at Merseburg, who was involved in a fight in 1961 in 
which college officials believed he was “not entirely innocent”, was simply told to 
“avoid certain restaurants”.42 The message from the authorities was clear: foreigners had 
to get to know their place and to avoid conflict by physically steering clear of trouble 
spots. Officials and the public were keen to jump on the slightest misdemeanours of 
foreigners as an incitement to racial hatred. In September 1989, for example, an MfS 
report ingeniously argued that the “deviant lifestyle” of contract workers and their 
“glorification of capitalist conditions” fuelled the xenophobic resentment of the East 
German population 43
The SHF’s reaction to the Magona letter not only listed incidents where foreigners 
were victims of attacks, but it also referred to ten incidents in which foreigners had 
caused “considerable moral damage” owing to their “improper behaviour in public”, 
thus insinuating they were in some way responsible for their own misfortune. The 
inclusion of three incidents involving fights among foreigners was more of this 
approach. As the list suggests, the majority of the cases involved the actions of drunken 
students, with little evidence of a racist motivation. In stark contrast to the factual and
39 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Bericht der TH Ilmenau uber die ghanaische Studierende im Studienjahr 
1964/65,n.d.
40 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/2. Studenten aus Schwarz-Afrika (auBer Ghana), n.d. [ca. 1962], 3.
41 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46778. BDVP Suhl, Bericht, 30 Dec. 1981, 2.
42 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1935/3. Analyse auslandischer Studenten per 15 Aug. 1962.
43 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fos. 22-26. HA XVIII/4 an ZAIG, Jahreseinschatzung zur politisch- 
operativen Lage unter den auslandischen Werktatigen, 7 Sept. 1989.
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uncritical listing of incidents involving attacks by Germans on foreigners, the report 
wrote of the “brazen” und often “impertinent” attitudes of many foreigners, expressed 
by refusing to follow police orders and by resisting arrest as well as in the tendency to 
lambaste East Germans as “Nazis or fascists”.44
In June 1964, a GDR woman was punched by a Tanganyikan student in a tram. She 
had been sitting behind him and was reading a children’s picture book with her child. 
He took offence after hearing her say “Look, there’s a teddy”. The following month, 
three eastern African students started a fight among themselves on the tram. Other 
passengers got involved and the conductor was punched in the chin. The same month, a 
drunken Somali student put his head through a tram window at Leipzig central station. 
In August, two Kenyan students started a fight in a cafe after two girls whom they met 
earlier “went over to” two GDR citizens. The same month, a Guinean student insulted 
other guests at the Orionbar by calling them “Nazis and fascists” and later resisted 
arrest. In September, in the Schauspielhaus bar, a student from Zanzibar punched a 
GDR woman repeatedly in the face after she refused to accompany him to another bar. 
In October, a Ugandan student kicked up a racket in the Tivoli cabaret after he was 
refused entry because he was wearing studded jeans. In November, an African student 
punched a waitress in the state-run restaurant Am Zoo because she had repeatedly 
requested him not to place used teabags on the table cloth. In early 1965, the leading 
dermatologist of the Leipzig outpatients’ clinics, Dr. Seiler, informed the HI that 
numerous doctors had been complaining lately of the “impertinent” attitudes of 
foreigners, many of whom were refusing to undergo compulsory examinations. In early 
February 1965, two Africans caused a seven minute delay on the Leipzig-Berlin express 
train. They had not bought the correct fare and refused to buy new tickets when 
requested to do so by the conductor, necessitating an unexpected stop in Bitterfeld 
where the two were arrested.45
Yet, the SHF’s attempt to legitimise the rise in attacks against foreigners by 
referring to foreigners’ transgressions was spurious. Statistics for the period show that 
foreigners were a negligible quantity in the crime figures: in 1964, for example, full­
time foreign residents were responsible for only 0.2 percent (a mere 140 incidents) of all 
crime in the GDR, with over a third of all such incidents concentrated in Berlin 46
44 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Informationsbericht uber die Situation unter den auslandischen 
Studenten, insbesondere in Auswertung von Vorfallen in der Offentlichkeit, 4 Feb. 1965, 4 and 7.
45 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Informationsbericht uber die Situation unter den auslandischen 
Studenten, insbesondere in Auswertung von Vorfallen in der Offentlichkeit, 4 Feb. 1965,4 ff
46 BArch, DO 1/8.0/27730. Konzeption zum Referat -  Auslanderkontrolle, 24 Mar. 1966.
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Very often, it was the reaction of foreign students to racist incidents rather than the
incidents themselves that became the issue for officials. For example, on Christmas Eve
1960, two Congolese students of the HSDG in Bemau were insulted and thrown out of
an East Berlin cafe by a number of youths and the manager on the grounds that they
were not wearing ties. Adamant that this was a racist incident, in a letter to the FDGB
the Africans questioned how citizens in a communist country could act in such as way:
We can understand very well that certain Germans in the East think they are superior in a way to us 
black people. In any case, the brazen and brutal way in which we were treated is enough evidence 
that Germans have an arrogance complex towards Africans [and] that the majority in the GDR are 
followers o f  the ideas o f  the famous Hitler despite the socialism that is constantly preached.
In its response, the FDGB criticised what it saw as the generalisations made by the two 
complainants, and in typical denial style, suggested that the offending German youths 
may have been West Berliners.47
In the main, officials found it much easier to refer to racism when discussing 
problems and tensions among the foreign students. As there were no “objective” reasons 
for the existence of racism in the GDR, its occurrence could only be explained owing to 
the “subjective” failings o f foreigners, or politically-wayward East Germans. In 1960, 
an SED Central Committee seminar on foreign students noted the existence of “racial
A Q
conflict” among the various students’ associations. This widespread tendency to view 
political disputes and problems between groups of foreigners as nothing more than 
tribal or racist quarrels easily fitted in with Marxist-Leninist jargon. Officials blamed 
the fight that broke out at the 1964 Christmas party at the Herder Institute on the “deep 
hatred” of many Africans (especially Zambians) towards Arab students 49 Indeed, in 
1969 the HI claimed that:
The ability to think in a historical-dialectical manner is barely developed among the majority of 
foreign students (Africans, Arabs). A class standpoint is often lacking completely with a tribal or 
racist viewpoint in its place.
Thus, officials liked to believe that a period of study in the GDR enabled the anti-racist 
development of foreign students. It allowed for a “development of awareness” which 
weakened the “nationalist ideas” of Arab students towards the “Jews of Israel” und the 
“racist reservations” of Africans towards “whites”, for example.50
47 SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/2123. Schreiben der kongolesischen Burger M. und B. an den BV der FDGB, 
25 Dec. 1960, und Aktennotiz iiber den Besuch an der HSDG am 18 Jan. 1961.
48 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41383. Aktennotiz uber eine Beratung im ZK am 17 Jun. 1960.
49 BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1937. Informationsbericht uber die Situation unter den auslandischen 
Studenten, insbesondere in Auswertung von Vorfallen in der Offentlichkeit, 4 Feb. 1965.
50 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/513. Bericht iiber die Situation am Herder-Institut Leipzig, n.d. 
[ca. 5 Feb. 1969], 3, and Analyse der Arbeit im Bereich des Auslanderstudiums an Hoch- und 
Fachschulen der DDR im Studienjahr 1968/69, 15 Oct. 1969,4.
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Marxism-Leninism, upheld as a universal truth with universal validity, served to
cloak older traits o f German arrogance. As socialist society represented the pinnacle of
development, all problems were caused by external factors. Foreign students,
particularly Africans, repeatedly found their opinions and perceptions on a wide range
of issues dismissed by GDR functionaries. In 1969, for example, the KAS complained
that African students exaggerated the distinctness of African society by arguing that any
political developments there needed to be attuned to local conditions and needs.51
Similarly, at the TU Dresden, the ideological commission of the university party branch
argued that while most African students sympathised with GDR socialism, their
interpretation did not correspond to that of “scientific socialism”.52
While the above examples demonstrate that racism primarily targeted sub-Saharan
African students, students from fellow socialist states in Europe and beyond were also
described in similar chauvinistic tones in internal reports. The political upheaval of late
1956 in Eastern Europe impacted on the lives of Polish students studying in the GDR,
for example, and at the expressed request of Kurt Hager, they were placed under special
surveillance. Many reports on the Polish students reverted to older, xenophobic
discourse and they were described invariably as nationalistic, anti-Soviet, pro-
American, politically immature, arrogant, somewhat treacherous, and at times, morally
reproachable. In October 1957, the SHF concluded that the Polish students in the GDR
were “still very weak politically”. The head Polish student at the TH Dresden seemed to
personify so many German anti-Polish stereotypes:
We suspect that he (like other students o f  the Technical College Dresden) travels regularly to West 
Berlin. C. is known by the students in Dresden for his extensive speculative dealings. It has been 
proved that he borrowed 1,500 marks for these deals and runs a thriving business in sunglasses, 
watches, typewriters, sowing machines, stamps, etc. These ‘trading activities’ enabled him to 
reconcile his debts and to purchase items unaffordable to the normal foreign student (for example, he 
bought a motorbike for himself). His academic discipline is poor. He travels home regularly, wastes 
a lot o f time hanging around with women, and loves alcohol.
(Only a few months previously, C. participated fully in the political activities of the 
foreign students in Dresden. On the Day of Foreign Students on 18 May, 1957, he 
signed two appeals (one o f which was published in ND) along with representatives of 
the Chinese, Soviet, Iranian and North Korean students’ associations calling for support
51 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/1V A 2/9.04/513. Analyse der Arbeit im Bereich des Auslanderstudiums an 
Hoch- und Fachschulen der DDR im Studienjahr 1968/69, 15 Oct. 1969, 17.
52 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466. Bericht uber das Auslanderstudium an der TU Dresden, 27 
Jan. 1966, 8.
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for the national reconstruction programme and condemning the activities of Western 
secret service agencies in the GDR.53)
When other Poles claimed that conditions in their country were better than in the 
GDR, or made demands that were seen to be above their standing, they earned the 
particular wrath of officials. The electrical engineering college in Ilmenau complained 
that three Polish women students were “very arrogant and immature”. Furthermore: “In 
their daily behaviour, some o f these Polish students could lead to the subversion of the 
student body of the college. They are making extraordinary and exquisite demands such 
as for the provision of single rooms with a bath and running water.” In addition, they 
were known to associate with members of the Junge Gemeinde. Also of concern for 
officials at the KMU was the “fraternisation” of Polish and Hungarian students.54
The Polish example shows that in times of political crisis, older resentment long 
obscured by ideological exigencies could make a political comeback. The GDR justified 
the decision to seal the border with Poland in October 1980 as a measure necessary to 
protect the economy from “speculators and smugglers” in goods, while the shortages in 
Poland were blamed on the Poles themselves rather than on socialism.55 In November 
1989, the Modrow government pursued a similar agenda by banning non-resident 
foreigners from purchasing certain goods in the collapsing state.56 This mixing and 
indeed deliberate confusing o f political and economic problems with immigration 
increased in the final years o f the GDR and reached a highpoint after the Wende.
The failure o f the GDR authorities to deal effectively with racism in the first two 
decades did not augur well for the 1970s and 1980s, which saw the same mistakes 
repeated again and again. Racism was denied, was dismissed as resulting simple 
misunderstandings, was equated with political deviancy or delinquency, or was blamed 
on the actions of foreigners themselves.
The state did deal with racist attackers but its heavy-handed approach did little in 
overcoming racism. Rather than attempt to devise programmes to deal with racist 
prejudice among youth, the authorities simply dismissed the phenomenon as yet another 
characteristic of “rowdy” behaviour. The authorities took no time in apprehending and
53 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/639, fos. 99f. Wir bauen mit! and Erklarung der auslandischen 
Studenten.
54 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/640, fos. 6, 13, 18, and 41f. Report o f Abt. Organisation o f the ZK 
to Ulbricht, Neumann and Matem, 28 Mar. 1957; Arbeit der polnischen Studenten an der HS fur 
Elektrotechnik Ilmenau, 12 July 1957; Bericht iiber die polnische Studentendelegation, 26 Aug. 1957; and 
report from Hartmann, SHF, 11 Oct. 1957.
55 Harry Waibel, Rechtsextremismus in der DDR bis 1989, Koln, 1996,124. As Stefan Wolle points out, 
with the removal o f Polish competitors, there was no real long term improvement in the supply of  
consumer goods. D ie heile Welt der Diktatur, Bonn, 1999, 94f,
56 A/D, 23 Nov. 1989.
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jailing the “rowdy youths” who attacked Algerian contract workers shortly after they 
began working in the gas combine “Schwarze Pumpe” in Bemburg.57 Reacting to a rise 
in violence and disorder among “negative-decadent, criminally-endangered persons 
with previous convictions” at discos and other public events, in early 1978 Mielke 
ordered MfS and police units to focus on factories where large numbers of GDR youths 
“come into contact with foreign workers, in particular those from the non-socialist
58 ,bloc”. The latter reference could only mean the Algerians, but it is not clear whether 
Mielke was calling for greater protection to be afforded to the contract workers or was 
suggesting that they were influencing GDR youth negatively.
Racism remained a taboo for the police, whose reports studiously avoided 
mentioning the word. In 1977, the criminal police department in the Bezirk Frankfurt 
claimed that it was the “inappropriate behaviour” of GDR citizens that elicited violent 
reactions from foreigners.59 The BDVP Karl-Marx-Stadt reported on the “unmotivated 
brawls, in which GDR citizens occasionally act provocatively, but which are also 
caused by communication difficulties”. Their colleagues in Suhl came to the exact same 
conclusion.60 Although the terms surfaced repeatedly in these and other police reports, 
no details were given to the nature of the provocative or unbecoming behaviour of the 
East Germans or the comprehension difficulties with foreigners.
As in the 1960s, the authorities found it much easier to identify racist or nationalist 
behaviour in the actions o f foreigners than among their own citizens. For example, in 
the mid-1970s the Magdeburg MfS claimed that a gang of Polish workers, which was 
responsible for a number attacks on East Germans and Algerians, had “obvious 
nationalistic motives” which in turn fuelled the rise of anti-Polish feeling.61 In Suhl, 
police claimed in 1977 that innocent GDR citizens were falling victim to the “violent 
pugnacity” of drunken Poles.62 Similarly, at a time when the MfS was blind to the 
racism of the GDR public, a 1984 study from Karl-Marx-Stadt identified the children of 
Soviet “German” repatriates as particularly beholden to nationalist ideas which was 
expressed in violent attacks on the city’s foreign workers.63
57 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Bericht [des SAL] uber Ergebnisse des probeweisen Einsatzes von 500 
algerischen Werktatigen im Jahre 1974, 13 Dec. 1974, 5.
58 BStU, ZA, BdL, 5581. Mielke to the heads o f  all departments, 14 Jan. 1978.
59 SAPMO-BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Frankfurt, Per Informationen, 15 June 1977, 3.
60 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Gera, Bericht zu Ermittlungsverfahren, 16 June 1977, and Bericht, 
20 Dec. 1977.
61 BStU, ASt Magdeburg, Abt. XX, 4140. Abt XV to Abt XX, VII and XV, Information, 29 Jan. 1976.
62 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47842. BDVP Suhl. Bericht, 20 June 1977.
63 BStU, JHS, 20131, fos. 23f. Steffen Rudiger, Diepolitisch-operative Bearbeitung von 
fibersiedlungsersuchenden Auslandem/Staatenlosen, 30 Mar. 1984.
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Racism was not just a problem in provincial areas nor did it exclusively target 
foreign workers and students. In 1975, for example, enraged Algerian diplomats in 
Berlin were refused entry to the prominent Cafe Moskau and a number of similar 
establishments.64 Three years later in the same city, a drunken GDR citizen “went on the 
rampage and shouted racist comments” at a delegation of local politicians from Guinea- 
Bissau who were dining at the HOG Jagerklasse. While the report uncharacteristically 
acknowledged the racist nature of the incident, it typically claimed that it was evidence 
of “enemy activity” .65
Crucially, the police and courts rarely classified such attacks as being racially 
motivated. While the media may have made reference to particular incidents, there was 
a systematic attempt to disguise their real nature. One example was an attack on six 
Mozambican workers at the spring festival in Dresden in May 1985. The workers, who 
were employed in a factory in Heidenau and aged between 23 and 27, had travelled into 
Dresden to take part in the festivities. Later in the evening, they were attacked by a 
dozen East German men after they tried to make conversation with some East German 
women. Although the East German men were responsible for the attack, when the 
police arrived they also arrested the Mozambicans for refusing to leave the scene. They 
were only released the following morning when the police established that they had 
been unable to understand their order. The dozen East German men involved were 
charged with riotous behaviour. Police information sheds some light on the social 
profile of the attackers, all o f whom, bar one, came from Dresden. While the oldest was 
28, seven were younger than their Mozambican victims, the youngest being 16. Most 
were single, although two were married and one was separated. Four had previous 
convictions for a multiple of offences, which ranged from rowdy behaviour, handling 
stolen goods, assault and resisting police authority. Half worked in the construction and 
energy industries in low positions, four in computer companies, one was a butcher while 
the youngest was in his tenth year at school.66 While the incident was reported in the 
Sachsische Zeitung some days later, the paper gave no indication as to the real nature of 
the incident, referring only to a “fight among citizens, some of whom were under the 
influence of alcohol” which led to four “persons” receiving slight injuries.67
64 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41617. Vermerk iiber ein Gesprach mit der Attache der Botschaft der DVRA, Herren 
Fodil Ali Khodja, im MfAA, 27 June 1975.
65 SAPMO-BArch, DY 13/3331. Bericht iiber das Seminar mit Kommunalpolitikem aus der Republik 
Guinea-Bissau und der VR Mocambique, 26 July 1978.
66 For the police account, see DO 1/8.0/51099. BDVP Dresden to Mdl and MfS, 17 May 1985.
67 My emphasis. Sachsische Zeitung, 18-19 May 1985, p. 2.
202
Although paragraph 140 of the state criminal code (StGB) made it an offence to 
cause insult on the basis of membership of another nation or race” (a conviction could 
result in a jail sentence o f up to two years, probation, a fine, or public censure), it was 
rarely availed o f by the police and the courts.68 This research has come across only one 
mention in the archives of a prosecution under paragraph 140. It involved a GDR citizen 
found guilty of insulting two staff members of the Egyptian embassy in Glauchau’s 
Hotel Lindenhof in 1979. He received a seven month jail sentence under paragraphs 140 
and 220 (covering public vilification) of the StGB.69 In addition, one of Scherzer’s 
interviewees, Fredi, claimed he received an 18-month jail term in 1984 for “racism” 
after he allegedly got in a row with a Mozambican worker in Suhl. Speaking in 2002, 
Fredi protested his innocence and claimed he had been victimised by the MfS.70
The legal and constitutional prohibitions of racism may have served to suppress the 
open expression of racist sentiment in particular public arenas but did little to 
deconstruct racism as a social phenomenon. Rather, the public became aware of what 
could be said and when. Indeed, as Lindenberger has claimed, the “extensive and basic 
distrust of outsiders in present day [eastern Germany], regardless of whether they are 
from neighbouring towns, tourists or foreigners” is possibly a sequel to this specific 
configuration of power in the GDR, in which the lowest tiers of society were 
empowered with chances for action owing to the ability to recognise the extent of state 
authority.71 Once the state collapsed, these ideas could be expressed openly and loudly 
with little fear o f state intervention.
The reluctance of the police to classify certain incidents as racist was certainly a 
product of the opinions of ordinary officers. As a number of reports compiled by senior 
police officers suggest, the lower echelons of the police were often biased and brutal in 
dealing with foreigners. In some cases, the offending officers were taken to account, 
while in others, the police and political authorities colluded to cover up some crass 
examples of institutional police racism.
68 For example, a study o f  neo-fascist activity in the GDR compiled by a criminal police task force in 
November 1989 only studied transgressions o f paragraphs 215/216 (hooliganism) and 220 (3) (public 
vilification) o f the state criminal code. This suggests that there were no paragraph 140 incidents to study. 
For the report, see Klaus Kinner, Rechtsextremismus und Antifaschismus, Berlin, 2000, 273-293.
69 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/47843. BDVP Karl-Marx-Stadt, Periodische Berichterstattung, 17 July 1979, 3.
70 Landolf Scherzer, Die Fremden, Berlin, 2002, 72 and 13Iff. His Mozambican friend Manuel agreed. 
The two had been friends and drinking partners since 1982. One night, Fredi decided to call on his ex- 
girlfriend Rita. She had left him and was dating a Mozambican named Augusto. When Fredi reached her 
flat, Augusto was waiting with a knife and a fight broke out. The DVP were called, and as there had been 
no bloodshed, decided not to press charges. Yet, Fredi claims the case only made it to court as Rita’s 
father was an MfS officer. There were no witnesses at his trial as Augusto had been deported home.
71 Thomas Lindenberger, “Die Diktatur der Grenzen. Zur Einleitung” in his edited volume Herrschaft und 
Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR, Koln, 1999,13-44, here 32.
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As has been shown, the African students in Leipzig made particular reference to 
police brutality in their 1965 memorandum on racism. Indeed, the relations between 
police and foreign students had deteriorated to such a degree in Leipzig that some senior 
police officers proposed in 1965 that only non-uniformed officers should intervene in 
rows and violent incidents involving foreigners.72 Foreigners complained persistently 
about police partiality, which was exacerbated in rural areas where it was common for 
local men to serve as part-time “police assistants”. In the village of Zielitz {Bezirk 
Magdeburg) in March 1969, for example, a row broke out at a dance between a local 
resident Gerhard D. and a Polish worker. D. happened to be a police assistant and 
member of the village council, and later that night, along with Horst E. (a fellow police 
assistant and village councillor) and two regular policemen (an ABV and a transport 
policeman), he went to the Polish workers’ hostel. The two drunken police assistants 
harassed and insulted the residents o f the hostel, beating three of them with batons. In 
this case, the reaction o f the police authorities was swift. The ABV was fired while 
charges were pressed against the two police assistants. The SED Kreisleitung was also 
mobilised to monitor the political situation in the village, while the GDR and Polish 
supervisors pledged that they would ensure that the incident would not affect the 
“friendly relations already in existence”.73
In 1972 foreign students (particularly from Palestine and Guinea-Bissau) studying 
at the Nordhausen agricultural college found local police so heavy handed that they 
compared them to the “colonial” police in their own countries. Although college 
authorities had complained repeatedly to the local police chief about the “huge bias” of 
police towards foreign students, no action was taken. In one case, an African, who had 
been involved in a brawl, was arrested with the help of a chain twister even though he 
had not resisted arrest. In another incident, a policeman refused to follow up a third-year 
Nigerian student’s claim that he had been discriminated and insulted in a local bar, 
where bar staff refused to serve him on the grounds that he was “too loud”. Later that 
day, the policeman fired a warning shot with his pistol after the Nigerian met him on the 
street and tried once again to have his complaint registered. In a subsequent 
investigation, a major of the criminal police of the BDVP Erfurt reported that he was 
“impressed” by the testimony of the students and promised to investigate all charges 
against local colleagues.74
72 BStU, JHS, MF, 528. Paulsen, Einige Probleme, 5 Dec. 1965, 35.
73 BArch, DO 1/8.0/41383. VPKA Wolmirstedt, Vorkommnis mit polnischen Biirgem, 31 Mar. 1969.
74 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV B 2/9.04/136. KAS, Information uber ein besonderes Vorkommnis an der 
IS fur Landtechnik Nordhausen, 15 Dec. 1972.
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In other cases, police officers colluded to cover up racism in the force, in one case 
with the knowledge and assistance of the MfAA. In a restaurant in Gotha in November 
1979, four Cuban workers complained to the restaurant manager after a waitress had 
told them that the table they had taken was reserved. The police were called because, in 
the words of the manager, “one of [the Cubans] had such black skin that I didn’t dare 
have a go at him”. When the police arrived, they assaulted and arrested the Cubans with 
the help of batons, dogs and drawn pistols. Down at the police station, the Cubans were 
beaten and kicked after refusing to stand spread-eagled against the wall and were 
referred to as “black pigs” and “shit made in Cuba”. When the Cubans sought to defend 
themselves, the members of the local fire brigade were summoned and joined in on the 
beatings. (The Cubans later equated the DVP with the American and Brazilian police). 
Although an internal inquiry into the incident found that the police in Gotha had 
overstepped their powers and violated the “socialist legal order”, none of the police 
officers involved were dismissed. In addition, the deputy minister for external affairs, 
Herbert Krolikowski, ordered that a sanitised report claiming that the workers were 
solely responsible be presented to the Cuban embassy.75
Similarly, in March 1982, an Algerian contract worker was arrested, beaten, 
detained, and robbed by transport police in Dresden central train station after he tried to 
report a GDR citizen for insulting him. Although a subsequent BDVP report established 
that the police had acted improperly, the Mdl sent a whitewashed report to the MfAA, 
which claimed the Algerian had injured himself by tripping in the police station.76 In a 
more serious incident in Rostock, three Algerians were arrested and badly beaten, one to 
the point of unconsciousness.77 These and other similar incidents enraged the Algerian 
embassy, which in April 1982 issued the MfAA with a verbal note protesting at the 
“rough maltreatment” of its citizens. In addition, the embassy claimed it could “no 
longer tolerate the DVP walking all over the dignity and rights of Algerian citizens”, 
adding that it would advise its government to “draw the necessary conclusions” should 
another case arise.78
The above cases demonstrate the difficulty foreigners had in reporting incidents to 
the police. Generally unable to express themselves in German and faced with the blunt
75 DO 1/0.5.0/47851 and 47852. The incident occurred on 24 Nov. 1979, which is covered extensively by 
these files.
76 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46780, fos. 397-401. BDVP Dresden, Uberprufung zum Vorkommnis mit einem 
Burger der DVRA, 4 June 1982.
77 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46780, fos. 390-395. Bericht iiber die durchgefuhrte Untersuchung zum Sachverhalt 
der Note der Botschaft der DVRA, 14 May 1982.
78 DO 1/0.5.0/46780, fos. 383-85. Algerian embassy to Abt. Nord- und Westaffika, MfAA, 12 Apr. 1982.
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arrogance of minor police officers, the fact that there were often no interpreters 
available compounded an already serious problem. In 1982, for example, there was only 
one Portuguese-language interpreter available in the whole of the Bezirk Leipzig, which 
at the time had 550 Mozambicans employed in 14 factories. This failure of state bodies 
and in particular the police to uphold the “legitimate entitlement” of Mozambican 
workers to “justice and security”, according to a senior police officer, pushed contract 
workers into self-defence and vigilantism, expressed by random retaliatory beatings of 
Germans in revenge for random racist attacks.79
It is important to note that the authorities could collude to cover up crimes 
committed by foreigners if they deemed this necessary for political reasons. In one 
shocking case, three Kuwaiti trade union functionaries on a GDR holiday sponsored by 
the FDGB evaded prosecution for a terrible crime. In 1983, they abducted and anally 
raped a 17-year-old East German woman and fellow guest of the FDGB holiday 
complex Pierre Semard in Potsdam. Although the police were in favour of pressing 
charges, the international department of the FDGB in Berlin requested the case be 
closed on political grounds as it feared that a conviction could lead to “complications 
between the Kuwaiti progressive trade union congress and the FDGB”.80 Although this 
and other incidents never made it to the courts, it is not beyond possibility that news of 
them spread by word o f mouth, thus fuelling a false perception that foreigners could act 
with impunity in the GDR.
While the files can illustrate clearly how police and functionaries perceived 
foreigners, it is more difficult to assess the views of ordinary East Germans. Arguably, 
there was little difference, especially at the lower tiers of society. Scherzer’s interviews 
in and around the Suhl Fajas factory in 1982 provide a rare insight into the more subtle 
forms of racist thinking among the public. Of his 13 East German interviewees, seven 
expressed attitudes that were generally favourable towards foreign workers. The 
remaining five (four men and a woman) were more negative, if not racist, in their 
outlook. While the men attributed the negative traits of the Mozambican workers either 
implicitly or explicitly to their “race”, the woman’s reserve was based on personal 
experience and the result o f relationships with a number of Mozambican men that had 
all failed, she claimed, as a result o f their infidelity.
As the example o f one interviewee showed, normative interaction did not 
necessarily lead to the deconstruction of racist stereotypes and prejudice but could
79 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/ 46778. BDVP Leipzig, Berichterstattungen zu eingeleiteten Ermittlungsverfahren,
9 Feb. 1982, 7 and 12.
80 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/48451. BDVP Potsdam, Information, 31 Aug. 1983.
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rather serve to confirm these. Herr Mauer (b. 1936), a fitter, was in daily contact with 
the Mozambicans as he lived next door to their hostel. He got to know many by name 
and even regularly invited two workers to his home, where they partook in birthday and 
Christmas celebrations and exchanged presents. With a strong trace of jealousy, he 
recalled that they once presented his wife with flowers and perfume, something he never 
thought of doing. His wife in turn knitted jumpers for them (albeit for payment). On one 
occasion he found himself comforting a young worker whose brother had died in 
Mozambique, and another who was suffering from homesickness. This interaction, 
however, did little to challenge Mauer’s racist prejudices, which had been forged years 
earlier. He believed that Mozambicans lay at the bottom of a racial hierarchy, below the 
“civilised” Vietnamese and Algerians, who had benefited from their colonial contact 
with France and European values. His sister once told him that black people were 
unable to work without the supervision of whites -  she had been told this by a white 
Namibian farmer. Indeed, he expressed his surprise at how quickly the Mozambicans 
“lost their fear of whites” upon arriving in the GDR. His observations over his garden 
gate led him to the conclusion that the “half-casts” among the Mozambicans were more 
adaptable and better behaved than their “black native” compatriots and that cultural 
salvation was only possible for those who could be successfully isolated from the pack. 
In an indication of where his cultural and racial boundaries lay, Mauer argued that it 
would have been far better had the Mozambicans been sent to Bulgaria where he 
believed the people were similar in character. As regards relationships with German 
women, his stance was “every tribe for itself’. Demonstrating that racism and 
paternalism are intrinsically linked, he expressed his contempt for women who sought 
such contact with the Mozambicans by remarking that one woman, who was “no oil 
painting”, had got “divorced especially” for a Mozambican. While it is impossible to 
surmise how representative Mauer’s views were, they show that fear and suspicion of 
the other were not easily overcome by interaction. In addition, they were contradictory. 
While in 1982, he felt that the hostels ought to have been situated in non-residential 
areas, far away from East German citizens, twenty years later he claimed to miss the 
workers.81
The personnel director o f the Fajas factory, Seiler (b. 1922), was openly 
hypocritical in his views of the Mozambicans. During his interview with Scherzer, he 
recited the SED jargon o f proletarian internationalism and solidarity, yet off the record 
he said that he would throw out his own daughter if  she dared date a Mozambican. Yet,
81 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 22.
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at the same time he claimed he was active in challenging many of the stereotypes 
circulating in the factory. He dismissed the claim that the Mozambicans were rapists by 
arguing that their alleged victims were partly to blame for such incidents and rubbished 
the assertion that their hostel was particularly dirty by pointing out that German workers 
treated their hostels just as badly if not worse. Indeed, as a former NVA officer, he was 
at pains to mention the pride the contract workers took in their rooms. Neither was it 
true that they drank excessively, he believed, but it was rather the ban on alcohol 
consumption in the hostels that led to drinking in public places, an insight he had 
learned as an officer trying to impose similar orders in NVA barracks.82
Strangely, Scherzer’s book contains no interviews with any young East German 
men. However one female interviewee, Carmen, related the views of some of them. She 
related that many men believed that the Mozambicans had a “particularly large sexual 
organ” which is how they explained the relative ease at which they managed to find 
East German girlfriends. Her fiance, Thomas, was hostile towards them, she pointed 
out: “He just can’t stand them. Why? He couldn’t tell you that himself. [...] Only 
Germans matter for him.” He was also against the USSR and refused to take holidays 
abroad. Yet, she claimed that after he recently bought and shared a bottle of schnapps 
with a Mozambican, he swore that he’d nothing against them.83 Regardless of how 
representative this young man was, his example shows how opinions could swing from 
the extremes. There was no middle ground and inebriated avowals of friendship were as 
hollow as the state’s maxims o f proletarian internationalism and solidarity.
One of Scherzer’s interviewees perhaps articulated the essence of East German 
xenophobia like no other. Angered that a social gap had developed between those 
Mozambican workers who allegedly had access to hard currency and those who had not, 
in a revealing outburst the Mozambican workers’ supervisor at Fajas, Georg Mantel, 
argued that:
They have become our mirror image. They imitate our lifestyle, especially the negative aspects. We 
see ourselves in them, find this difficult to accept, and criticise them for what they allow themselves 
to do. It’s easier to complain about them than about ourselves.84
Like East Germans, the Mozambican workers failed to live according to officially- 
prescribed ideals. They served to highlight the inherent shortcomings and contradictions 
of East German society and at the same time became a convenient scapegoat for East 
Germans frustrated at their society and their role in it.
82 Ibid., 43.
83 Ibid., 115f.
84 Ibid., 91. Emphasis in the original.
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Historical accounts of how foreigners perceived racism are few and far between. 
Foreigners’ views on the matter were never consulted (nor welcome) in the GDR. Yet, 
the available testimony of foreigners indicates that while they may have encountered 
racism, it was not the dominant feature of daily life. Rather, racism was seen as an 
inevitable part o f living abroad. Batra, in his otherwise bitter attack on the GDR, 
claimed he never “experienced any racist prejudices anywhere in the Zone, not even 
discrimination in this regard, excepting of course from those individuals who have 
certain sympathies and aversions”.85 Similarly, the interviews carried out by Runge and 
others in late 1989 and early 1990 produced similar statements. H., a Vietnamese 
worker in Brandenburg, mentioned racism only as a peripheral occurrence, which is 
perhaps more of an indication of the intimidating effect on its victims than on its 
prevalence. While he claimed he was “called something” on a tram once, he felt most 
people, especially the elderly, were friendly towards him.86 Another Vietnamese man, 
who had lived in the GDR for fifteen years, trivialised racist taunts as an inevitable part 
of living abroad:
Nothing happened to me apart from being called a ‘jungle negro’ [Buschneger] or ‘Chinese’ on the 
street. It did annoy me. But what am I supposed to do? Cry? You have to expect that when you live 
abroad.87
Cuban worker Os. was more critical and claimed that both black and white Cuban 
workers had encountered racism in discos, trams, and shops.88 Evidently less prepared 
to tolerate discriminatory treatment in the GDR were the foreign third-level graduates 
interviewed in Runge’s book. One, a Hungarian teacher who came to the GDR in the 
mid-1970s, recalled how a neighbour used to place rubbish in her pram and vandalise 
her letterbox. In the late 1980s, she felt a rise in anti-Polish and anti-Hungarian 
resentment, attributing this to the SED’s opposition to the political changes taking place 
in those countries. Iraqi Salah Hussain, a graduate of German and drama studies, 
criticised the “mothering” o f adult foreigners by the state and many GDR citizens. His 
was a bitter-sweet experience: on the one hand he got to know some people really well 
but felt there was a “wall” between foreigners and the majority of the East German 
public. While only a minority openly articulated racist views, he felt most East Germans 
made no attempt to make contact with foreigners.89 That the majority of East Germans 
were outwardly indifferent to the presence of foreigners in the GDR is largely supported
85 Batra, Studium bei Freunden?, 10.
86 Irene Runge, AuslandDDR. Fremdenhafi, Berlin, 1990, 31.
87 Quoted in ibid., 98. Interestingly, his East German wife spoke out more on the types o f verbal and 
physical racism she and her child and contract workers in general experienced.
88 Ibid, 48.
89 Andrzej Stach & Saleh Hussain, Auslander in der DDR, 62f.
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by the findings o f a 1990 postal survey which found that only five percent of foreign 
respondents (mostly long-term residents from Eastern Europe married to East Germans) 
believed that East Germans were hostile towards them in the GDR, while 42 percent felt 
that they were generally positive. O f the German respondents, only 13.8 percent 
claimed they had intensive contact with foreigners in GDR times.90
Almut Riedel’s research with former Algerian contract workers, carried out in the 
mid-1990s, made an interesting finding regarding their reception of racism in the GDR. 
In their narratives, they rarely recalled racism and focussed instead on positive 
memories of experiences in the social and recreational sphere. Indeed, the Algerians 
saw themselves as the perpetrators rather than as the victims of violence, meting out 
retribution on East German citizens who insulted their sense of honour with taunts. She 
also found that they made little reference to institutionalised racism, mentioning in this 
context the ban on the Schwarze Pumpe Algerian soccer team from taking part in 
official leagues, the partiality o f the police, and the difficulty in marrying East German 
women.91
As has been documented in detail in the secondary literature, the situation for 
foreigners deteriorated rapidly from 1987 onwards. The brief overview of developments 
provided below demonstrates the inability of the authorities to deal with the worsening 
situation on the one hand and they key role played by church circles in highlighting the 
problem on the other. In September 1987, two GDR church magazines spoke out on 
racism and the discrimination o f foreigners in the state. The following month, a group 
of neo-Nazis stormed a peace concert at the Zionskirche in Berlin. Although publicly 
the authorities claimed the attackers were from the West, internally the MfS admitted 
for the first time that a rightwing extremist skinhead scene had been in existence since 
the early 1980s, characterised by an “exaggerated national consciousness as Germans”, 
and “racial hate and xenophobia”.93 The following February, the Politburo for the first 
time addressed the problem of skinhead groups and their “brutality, violence, neo- 
fascism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia” but attributed their origins to the “class
90 The postal sample involved 327 respondents. See Siegfried Grundmann et al., “Auslander in 
Ostdeutschland”, in: BISS public, 1:3 (1991), 5-75, here 55f.
91 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus, spate Adoleszenz und Protest. Algerische Vertragsarbeiter in 
der DDR”, in: KZSS, 53:5 (2001), 76-95, here 88f.
92 The publications and authors were epd-Landesdienst, Berlin (Christfried Berger) and Glaube und 
Heimat, Thiiringen (Heino Falcke). See Marianne Kruger-Potratz, Anderssein gab es nicht: Auslander 
und Minderheiten in der DDR, Munster, 1991, 52f. and 199. These articles were possibly in response to 
an attack by skinheads on a Mozambican citizen in Dresden, which was registered by the MfS, Walter 
Siifi, Zu Wahmehmung und Inierpretationen des Rechtsextremismus, 1993, 91.
93 Ibid. (Siifi), 19f.
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enemy”. In July 1988, the Vietnamese embassy claimed that it had received numerous 
petitions from GDR citizens calling on it to “increase the discipline” of its workers.95 In 
February 1989, an internal study on rightwing extremism by the East German 
sociologist Loni Niederlander and which had been commissioned by the main criminal 
police department of the Mdl, dismissed the thesis that neo-fascism was a Western 
import. In addition, the study came to the conclusion that the perpetrators were mainly 
working class and from the social mainstream. The extremists saw foreigners as their 
prime target, believing that they deprived Germans of “living space” (Wohnraum), 
engaged in “speculative” trading, spread AIDS, “treated women like cheap prostitutes” 
and played “the big guys with their convertible currency”. Shocked at these findings, 
the Mdl withdrew funding for the project, the results of which only came to light after 
the Wende96 In March 1989 the Volkskammer heard Egon Krenz praise contract 
workers as “creative partners for the common good,”97 while the independent 
Umweltblatter reported on the racist verbal abuse hurled at Africans on Leipzig’s 
trams.98 At the GDR church congress in July 1989 in Leipzig, physicist Hilde Golde 
summed up the type of comments being made by the East German public on foreigners: 
“What are the foreigners doing here? They’re living in flats that we’re entitled to. 
They’re buying up everything to send back home. And they’ve hard currency.”99 In 
August, the GDR State Press Office instructed the bloc party newspapers not to report 
on xenophobic incidents,100 while the FDGB newspaper Tribune dismissed racism as a 
Western import.101 Yet, in one of its final analyses of the problem, the MfS reported in 
September 1989 that not only was “xenophobia” on the increase, but that it was longer 
the preserve of “politically negative” youths. GDR workers believed that they were 
“paying for the negative effects” of the contract worker programme, which had spun out 
of control. The population, it added, rejected foreigners on the grounds of their deviant 
lifestyle, criminality, laziness, eagerness to strike, arrogance, materialism, and support 
of capitalist conditions. Furthermore, it added ominously that the “hardening negative
94 Ibid., 20.
95 Minutes o f a meeting between MfS HA XVIII and Vietnamese security officers in the GDR, 28 July 
1988, quoted in Michael Feige, Vietnamesische Studenten undArbeiter in der DDR und ihre 
Beobachtung durch das MfS, Magdeburg, 1999, 76.
96 See Walter Sufi, Zu Wahrnehmung undInterpretationen des Rechtsextremismus, 33-39.
97 Quoted in ND, 4-5 Mar. 1989.
98 Umweltblatter, Mar. 1989, quoted in Annegret Schule, “Vertragsarbeiterinnen und -arbeiter in der 
DDR”, in: 1999 17:1 (2002), 80-100, 95.
99 Quoted in ibid., 84.
100 Neue Zeit, 19 Jan. 1990, quoted in Gunter Holzweifiig, Die scharfste Waffe der Partei, Koln, 2002,
243.
101 Tribune, 8 Aug. 1989, 3. Quoted in Annegret Schule, “Vertragsarbeiterinnen und -arbeiter m der 
DDR”, 84 .’
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attitudes were not only directed against foreigners but “but also against those 
responsible”, which could only mean the political leadership at the time.102
Thus, the crisis period of 1987 to 1989 exacerbated the problem of racism which 
had always been a feature in East German society. The economy was in decline, as was 
the strength of the regime’s legitimacy. The ideological bedrock of the SED was 
discredited given Gorbachev’s reform impulse and East German youth and other parts 
of the population grew increasingly disillusioned. On top of this, the number of contract 
workers increased rapidly in the period, a growth which was not matched by 
commensurate growth in the necessary infrastructure. Ironically, the rapid rise in the 
numbers of contract workers was a symptom of an economic crisis but not its cause. 
Yet, as in Western societies, foreigners were increasingly made scapegoats for the 
failings of the economy. However, the rise in xenophobia in the late 1980s was not 
simply a result of consumer shortages as the workers with the least resources available 
to engage in the struggle for consumer goods -  black workers -  suffered the brunt of the 
East German public’s anger. As chapter five has shown, owing to their low net wages, 
Mozambican workers were not in a position to engage in the same levels of consumer 
activity as other workers and, although their work record was generally positive, the 
MfS noted that the public were only too ready to jump on the smallest fault of the
1 OTMozambicans.
A report complied in September 1989 by the chief of the MfS in Erfurt, major 
general Josef Schwarz, described the deteriorating situation. Although the content of his 
report clearly indicated that racism lay at the root of the East German public’s 
discontent with foreigners and that black workers were the main target, the report like 
many others typically refused to refer to the root problem by name. According to 
Schwarz, factory supervisors were reporting an increase in “muted xenophobia” which 
was beginning to express itself openly and violently. In one factory, a racist leaflet was 
in circulation. In Eisenach and Weimar, restaurants, cultural centres, and youth clubs 
had imposed bans on Mozambican customers on the grounds that they did not have the 
space to accommodate them. The swimming pool in Weimar barred Mozambican 
workers after rumours began circulating that they had worms. Racism was also finding 
violent expression in Erfurt in the form of attacks on Mozambicans, some of whom 
refused to work night shifts after being ambushed by a “motorbike gang” a number of
102 BStU, ZA, ZAIG, 20646, fos. 22-26. HA XVIII/4, Jahreseinschatzung zur politisch-operativen Lage 
unter den auslandischen Werktatigen, 7 Sept. 1989.
103 Ibid., fo. 30 and BStU, ASt Erfurt, BdL-S, 227, fo. 2. Generalmajor Schwarz, Information iiber 
aktuelle Probleme beim Einsatz auslandischer Arbeitskrafte, 11 Sept. 1989.
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times on their way to work. The Mozambicans could expect little support from the 
police, who as the MfS pointed out critically, persistently sided with GDR citizens in 
disputes involving contract workers. Indeed, the Erfurt police favoured segregating the 
Mozambican workers in a single hostel (as opposed to three different buildings) in order 
to reduce their “public impact” in the city. Despite all the evidence that suggested that 
the Mozambicans were the victims of a rising climate of racism, rows were attributed to 
mutual “misunderstandings” which resulted from linguistic incompetence and ignorance 
of the customs, traditions and the social norms of the other. Although the report went 
further than many others in addressing the problem, it still sought to apologise for the 
hostility of the GDR public by claiming that this was not “generally directed at the 
foreigners [per se] but at their illegal dealings and negative forms of behaviour” before 
adding that “people often generalise”.104
Schwarz’ report proves without a doubt that racism was on the rise before the 
collapse of the Wall and German reunification. Yet he was unable to accept this. His 
inability to do so is characteristic for many East Germans, particularly from the 
communist elite, who sincerely believed that the GDR was anti-fascist. Like many 
others, Schwarz has since advanced the view that rightwing extremism was exclusively 
a product of the Wende. This of course was in complete contradiction to his own 
observances made as head of the MfS in Erfurt. His memoirs, published in 1994, show 
how his understanding of the phenomenon of rightwing extremism was political. “Neo- 
fascism” was for him an affront to the memory of his father and other communists who 
died fighting the Nazis and for which there was no “social basis in the GDR”. He went 
on to state that articles on the problem published in the GDR before the Wende were 
really about attacking the GDR. Indeed, he blatantly misrepresents Konrad Weifi by 
purporting that he published an article in an East German church magazine claiming 
that 500 skinheads held training camps in forests in Erfurt. Although WeiB wrote two 
powerful and widely-circulated articles on racism in the GDR in 1988 (which was 
banned) and 1989, they contained no such claim.105
Racial violence in the GDR occasionally resulted in deaths. What follows is not a 
comprehensive list, but presents the cases uncovered during the course of this research. 
As many of the cases were never investigated openly or fully, they undoubtedly 
remained the subject of innuendo and gossip among East Germans and foreigners alike.
104 Ibid. (Information), fo. 10.
105 Josef Schwarz, Bis zum bitteren Ende. 35 Jahre im Dienste des Ministeriums ju r  Staatssicherheit. Eine 
DDR-Biographie, Schkeuditz, 1994, 113. WeiB did write some articles for church magazines on racism in 
the GDR (see fn. 5) but these made no mention to mass training camps for skinheads.
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In October 1978 in Gera, an off-duty Soviet soldier randomly stabbed and killed 29- 
year-old Mohamed Bokefoussau, purportedly in revenge for an attack carried out by 
other Algerians a fortnight previously.106 In August 1979, two Cuban contract workers, 
Andres Garcia (21) and Delfin Guerra (19), drowned in the river Saale in Merseburg 
during a confrontation between GDR and Cuban youths. In January 1981, the Algerian 
worker Rabah Dahoumane was murdered by a GDR citizen in what police claimed was 
a sex attack.107 In March o f the same year in Jena, an off-duty NVA soldier was stabbed 
to death in an after-disco row between GDR youths and Mongolian apprentices.108 In 
October in Altenburg, an Algerian stabbed a 17-year-old East German dead who had 
earlier insulted him in a bar and who had repeatedly challenged him to a fight.109 In 
August 1984, a Yemeni army officer was killed in a fight between Northern Yemeni 
and NVA officers in a Rostock bar. In addition to the above, secondary sources refer to 
four further fatal incidents, which have not been substantiated by archival evidence. 
According to one such claim, an Angolan was hanged in a beer tent at the beginning of 
the 1980s.110 Another book has suggested that 19 people were stabbed in a huge fracas 
between Algerians and East Germans in Rostock. It also refers to another incident near 
Erfurt which ended with the death of an Algerian in broad daylight.111 A recent but 
unconfirmed claim refers to an incident on a train in late 1982 in which four 
Mozambican workers killed a NVA soldier.112
Racism was a feature o f life for foreigners throughout the history of the GDR. For 
ideological reasons, functionaries of the party and mass organisations were unable or 
unwilling to accept the fact, and tended instead to blame foreigners for the 
“misunderstandings” with the East German public or the West for exporting racist ideas. 
The dominant ideology prevented any meaningful debate (internal or otherwise) on the 
issue and served to cloak older stereotypes. Most problematic was the partial approach 
of ordinary officers o f the DVP, whose hostility towards foreigners was particularly 
acute. Although there were cases where regional police officers criticised the behaviour 
of lower-tiered police, there were also attempts at collusion to cover up racist incidents.
106 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/42630 contains a file entitled: Korperverletzung mit Todesfolge am 7-8 Okt. 1978 
in Gera.
107 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. Information zum Ableben des algerischen Werktatigen am 2 Jan. 1981.
108 BArch, DO 1/0.5.0/46778. Bericht zu den eingeleiteten Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Burger anderer 
Staaten und Einwohner, 1 Feb. 1982, 3.
109 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7029. SAL to Mittag, 30 Oct. 1981.
110 Antifaschistisches Broschurenkollektiv, 1995,4-5. Quoted in Gordon Charles Ross, The Swastika in 
Socialism. Right-Wing Extremism in the GDR, Hamburg, 2000, 92.
111 Almut Riedel, “Doppelter Sozialstatus”, 89. This author found no evidence o f the mass stabbing 
incident, but did come across a street fight where an Algerian was fatally stabbed by a member o f the 
GSSD in Gera on 8 Oct. 1978.
112 Scherzer, Die Fremden, 74.
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Towards the late 1980s, the approach of the DVP came under criticism from some 
regional MfS chiefs. The attitudes of functionaries provide an insight into the largely 
undocumented attitudes of the East German public towards foreigners. Radical and 
violent racism was a minority phenomenon, while passivity and indifference towards 
foreigners was the norm. As the GDR slipped into political and economic crisis, racism 
and xenophobia increased. Yet, it was the massive social upheaval that followed the 
Wende that transformed these tendencies into a murderous force.
Chapter 8. Conclusion
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This thesis offers a wide-ranging examination of the experiences of migrants in 
socialism, a topic grossly neglected in studies on migration and on the socialist states in 
general. The focus has been on the GDR and the two most prominent groups of 
foreigners who came to that state for defined periods of time, namely international 
students and contract workers. Their everyday experiences were characterised by far 
more complexity and diversity than has been suggested by previous studies and 
involved more than the sweat and toil in menial positions and isolated residency in 
communal housing blocks. Moving beyond the dichotomous totalitarian model implicit 
in much of the existing literature on the topic, it has approached the subject matter in a 
more nuanced way, exploring the variety of experiences encountered by the hundreds of 
thousands of foreigners who studied and worked in the self-styled German workers’ and 
peasants’ state. It has also sought to look at the interaction between foreigners, the state 
and the wider East German public. In doing so, it does not deny that foreigners were a 
particularly vulnerable social group in East German society. The party and state 
remained the ultimate arbiters over immigration and residency, meaning foreigners 
generally had to make greater reference (than East Germans) to authority in their 
everyday lives. In addition, they had to take into account the violent and passive racism 
of many East Germans. While these factors -  state attempts at control on the one hand 
and racism and xenophobia among East Germans on the other -  have been the key 
thematic focus in much o f the existing literature, this work has attempted to place these 
aspects within the overall historical context and to line them up with other features of 
foreigners’ everyday experience. International students and contract workers were not 
simply the objects of state-inspired systems of control and surveillance, nor were their 
everyday existences dominated by racism and xenophobia.
In addition, the thesis has attempted to move away from an analysis which views 
immigration primarily from the perspective of the “host” society and has attempted to 
view foreigners as “subjects o f social action” (Weber) in their own right, who were 
capable of reacting to and interacting with the particular social, political, and economic 
conditions prevalent in the GDR in their own personal and collective ways. Although 
diplomatic and economic self-interest fuelled East German policy, there were numerous 
push factors in the migrants’ home countries which made the idea of spending a number
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of years in the GDR very attractive. There was intense competition in many countries 
for the free third-level education provided in East Germany. In addition, there is no 
evidence to suggest that contract workers were coerced into going to the GDR. On the 
contrary, there was a high demand for places with prospective workers in some cases 
going to considerable financial lengths to ensure they were included on the labour 
exchange programmes. For many migrants, the GDR represented a rare opportunity to 
work and to gain experience abroad, to sample different lifestyles, and a chance to effect 
social and material advancement. Even though the objective conditions in the GDR 
were not always of the migrants’ choosing, their lives in East German society could 
nevertheless be endowed with subjective meaning. In order to capture the complexity of 
these experiences, the thesis avoided focusing on any one nationality of workers or 
students and, in doing so, has observed that the otherwise very heterogeneous (in social, 
geographical, and political terms) groups of foreigners reacted in similar ways to the 
problems presented by life in the GDR. In addition, some (but not all) of the 
experiences of international students in the 1950s and 1960s were repeated by contract 
workers in the 1970s and 1980s.
Broadly speaking, foreigners encountered the GDR in two major realms. The first 
was in the campus or factory environment where everyday life orbited around the pre­
determined mundane routines of study and work. In East German colleges and factories, 
foreigners faced many o f the typical difficulties encountered by migrants in other 
countries. These included the challenges of acquiring a new language and of adjusting 
to different cultural, educational and industrial ways and rhythms. Clear differences 
existed between students and workers, broadly reflecting the differences between these 
two social groups in any society but also the intentions of the SED. It envisaged 
international studies as having a long term function, representing an investment in 
diplomatic and export capital, with its beneficiaries expected to serve the propagation of 
a positive image of East Germany after graduation and subsequent return home. This 
applied particularly to those students coming from countries beyond the socialist bloc. 
On the other hand, contract labour served the short term needs of the East German 
economy. In addition, workers were exclusively recruited from communist countries 
(with the exception o f Algeria). Thus, contract workers were more easily dispensable, 
and faced greater levels of exploitation and discrimination than international students in 
the workplace, their field of vocational activity. International students occupied a higher 
status, achieved greater linguistic competence, and enjoyed more privileges than 
contract workers, who increasingly represented a form of sub-proletariat in the factories.
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International students and contract workers also interacted within the wider realm of 
East German society, beyond the confines of campus and factory. Recreation, 
interpreted here broadly to incorporate all the types of activities pursued by foreigners 
in their free time, is shown to have been far more complex than depicted in much of the 
existing literature. In their avocational time, students and workers sought out and 
indulged in a wide variety of free-time activities. These included pastimes already 
familiar to the workers and students from their native countries, such as sports, games, 
and cultural pursuits. Political activity, mainly concerned with events abroad, also 
featured in the free-time repertoire of foreigners, particularly students. But in addition to 
the activities already familiar to foreign students and workers from home, there was 
considerable interest in activities not so freely available or possible in their native 
countries. These ranged from the sampling of particular lifestyles and trends, 
consumerism and trading activities, as well as personal relationships. And setting them 
apart from the majority of their classmates, foreign students bearing valid passports had 
the “freedom” to visit the West.
The types of free-time activity engaged in by international students and contract 
workers reflected their own interests and needs and could provide their time in the GDR 
with an additional sense of purpose. This was particularly evident in the consumerist 
interests of workers. For many, a period of work in the GDR offered a rare chance to 
acquire particular material goods and, in some cases, to ascend the social ladder upon 
their return home. This was acutely apparent in the case of the Vietnamese contract 
workers, which suggests that despite all the problems involved in living in the GDR, 
such as overcrowded accommodation, difficult working conditions, racism, and 
attempts at control, workers sought to take advantage of the positive sides of what it had 
to offer. In their pursuit o f their own agendas, contract workers challenged the 
perceptions shared by the SED and many parts of the population that they were to serve 
the East German economy rather than benefit materially from it. Although these 
activities were not always invested with political meaning by their participants, they 
took on particular political significance in the East German context.
Interaction with the East German population also featured in the recreational 
repertoire of foreign workers and students. Contact was more likely to develop beyond 
the college or factory context and as such took place outside of the supervised forms 
envisaged by the authorities. Reflecting the gender composition of international students 
and contract workers, binational relationships in the GDR generally involved foreign 
men and East German women. Those involved saw them as legitimate and genuine
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relationships, a view not generally shared by the authorities and sections of the public. 
Indeed, various arms of the state and party attempted to disrupt relationships and 
prevent marriages between East German citizens and foreigners. In pursuing this task, 
which was never explicitly justified on grounds of race, the authorities made little 
distinction between married and unmarried couples. The policy, which oversaw the 
deportation of husbands, partners, and fathers, effectively drove East German women 
into single motherhood and deprived children of a parent. In strangling the few 
examples of actually-existing multiculturalism, the policies of the state conferred 
legitimacy to racist attitudes already festering among the population by stigmatising 
binational relationships and “miscegenation” even further.
A number of historical and ideological influences shaped East German immigration 
policy. Extremely restrictive in character, official attitudes towards immigration were 
informed by traditional communist paranoia towards outsiders but also, particularly in 
legal and bureaucratic terms, by older German police practice, which was carried over 
into the new police force almost in its entirety. Behind the facade of proletarian 
internationalism and solidarity, a system of registration and surveillance of foreigners, 
unashamedly referred to as Auslanderkontrolle by its overseers, was institutionalised 
and systemised in the GDR. The East German authorities, at times with the connivance 
of their counterparts in other countries, decided when foreigners arrived and left the 
state, where they lived, worked, and studied, and whether they could marry or have 
children in the GDR. Students and workers who challenged or questioned the 
fundamentals of East German immigration policy faced summary deportation. Thus, 
from the earliest years o f the state, foreigners were subjected to greater levels of 
controls and surveillance at the hands of the state, particularly the police, than the East 
German population.
Yet, while no genuine study on foreigners’ experiences in the GDR can avoid 
considering the attempts o f the state to control foreigners, an exclusive focus on this 
aspect -  only too evident in much of the secondary literature -  paints a misleading 
picture of what life was like in the GDR for migrants. As Mary Fulbrook has pointed 
out in the context of general GDR historiography, “the selective casting and the one­
way narrative structure” of approaches framed exclusively within the paradigm of 
totalitarianism theory “cumulatively serve to distort the way lives were actually lived, 
power experienced and enacted, characters formed and transformed, over forty years of
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history”. Another reason why a singular focus on party or state authority is misleading 
is the fact that migrants in the GDR also had to deal with the everyday racism of 
“normal” East Germans in a day-to-day context. Without being requested to do by those 
in authority, many “normal” East Germans saw it as their duty to ensure that foreigners 
behaved in a particular way. Migrants were not only subjected to violent and verbal 
abuse from these quarters but faced more subtle attempts to enforce control and 
submission. These East German citizens opposed binational relationships, reported on 
the “moral transgressions” o f migrants, challenged their right to purchase particular 
goods, or refused to sit next to them in restaurants. Indeed these challenges may have 
proved more immediate and problematic on a day-to-day basis than those exerted by the 
authorities, whose actions may have been easier for migrants to anticipate.
Notwithstanding these pressures from above (and also from their own embassies 
and governments in some cases) and from wider society, migrants were not subjected to 
total control, especially in the day-to-day contexts of the workplace, university, and 
hostel. The extent of authority was very often mitigated by those entrusted with its daily 
administration. Reports o f varying provenance repeatedly bemoaned the inefficient 
application of laws, rules, and regulations by police, state security, trade union and 
factory officials, down to the wardens in the students’ and workers’ hostels and college 
and workplace “minders”. Indeed, at this level officials were confronted with an array 
of social phenomena involving foreigners, for which they were not always equipped to 
deal with or prepared to counteract. In addition, there were always East German citizens 
prepared to engage socially with foreigners beyond the controlled spheres envisaged by 
the authorities. However, total control of migrants was ultimately frustrated by the 
actions and reactions of its intended objects, the international students and contract 
workers themselves. Regardless of restrictions and regulations, they formed friendships 
and relationships with East Germans, articulated a broad spectrum of political and 
religious opinion, engaged in refusals, protests, and strikes of varying intensity, 
practised the self-defence and self-regulation of justice, and pursued consumer interests. 
Arguably, the function of international studies and contract labour served to protect 
foreigners to some degree from any arbitrary actions of officials. As international 
students were expected to become future “multipliers” of a positive GDR image 
(especially in countries where such an image was lacking), the authorities had to take 
care that they did not graduate and leave hating it, a factor recognised and taken
1 Mary Fulbrook, “Approaches to German contemporary history since 1945: Politics and paradigms”, in: 
Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, online edition, 1:1 (2004), 
[www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Fulbrook-l-2004], 1-18, here 13.
220
advantage o f by many students. Similarly, contract workers could use their collective 
economic and productive power to their own advantage, especially in the factories 
where they formed a significant portion of the workforce and where some production 
lines relied almost exclusively on their labour. While international students and contract 
workers could not force a fundamental renegotiation of authority, they could 
successfully challenge aspects of the everyday administration of authority and attempts 
at social control by “normal” East Germans.
The history of migrants in the GDR needs to be incorporated into wider social, 
economic and diplomatic history. Although the numbers of international students and 
contract workers were relatively low in the overall East German context, they were a 
significant and visible feature in particular sectors, especially in third-level educational 
institutions, making up a tenth of the student population in some cases, and particular 
industries, forming the majority o f the workforce in several factories by the late 1980s. 
As foreign workers were deployed in the less-attractive and less-skilled positions, thus 
forming a new underclass, this had profound socio-economic implications for German 
workers, allowing for upward social mobility regardless of individual effort or ability. 
The injection of foreign labour into a system that had been perennially plagued by 
labour shortages also enabled German workers to leave unpopular shift work. 
Therefore, contract labour allowed for a significant adjustment in the daily working 
rhythms of German workers. In addition, contract labour was essential in maintaining 
the production of consumer goods destined for the East German and export markets and 
was thus vital in keeping Honecker’s increasingly insolvent system of “consumer 
socialism” on its feet, which Corey Ross points out “had made living standards and 
social spending the fundamental basis of the regime’s claim to legitimacy”.2 In an effort 
to ensure that the majority population and not the contract workers benefited from the 
productive output of contract labour, the SED leadership attempted to restrict the 
spending power of foreign workers and their access to infrastructural resources, in 
particular housing. In a way, therefore, the rapid increases in the numbers of contract 
workers in the late 1980s may be seen as symptomatic (but certainly not the cause) of 
East Germany’s overall economic crisis and the desperate attempts of the SED to shore 
up its legitimacy. As the system slipped deeper into economic and ideological crisis, 
foreigners, especially contract workers, represented a convenient, local and easily- 
identifiable scapegoat for those in authority as well as the mass of East Germans. Thus,
2 Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation o f  the 
GDR, London, 2002, 96.
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months before the Wende racism and xenophobia were well on the way to becoming 
mainstream.
Understanding the wider historical context in which study and labour migration to 
the GDR took place is crucial. In a convincing appeal to end what they refer to as the 
provincialism of much of the historical research on the GDR, Lindenberger and Sabrow 
have argued that: “Just as the case with West German history, at no stage since 1945 
was East German history self-explanatory. Its development was always the product of 
overlapping national and international developments and decisions.”3 The GDR was not 
the only European or Warsaw Pact state to employ contract labour or matriculate 
international students. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland employed foreign labour 
and universities across the Eastern bloc (particularly in Prague, Sofia and Moscow) 
hosted foreign students. While a detailed comparative analysis was not possible in this 
work -  owing to pressures of space as well as the paucity of research on immigration to 
other Eastern bloc countries -  the East German experience of immigration needs to be 
viewed within the broader European historical context in order to identify its unique and 
common features. Despite all the attempts of the SED to present its system of foreign 
labour as something radically unique in the German context, the characteristics of 
contract labour greatly resembled the early stages of the West German Gastarbeiter 
programme in that workers were recruited on the basis of bilateral agreements, had little 
say in where they worked or lived, and were expected to return home after completing 
their contracts. Indeed, the terms “contract worker” and the references to training in the 
labour agreements were deliberately designed to conceal the primary reason behind the 
labour exchange programmes, which was East Germany’s economic self-interest. The 
exploitation of some workers was arguably far greater than in the West, as shown by the 
example of Mozambican contract workers, who unknown to themselves, were working 
to reconcile their country’s debt with the GDR. East German policy was also extremely 
resistant to change or reform and a defining characteristic of the GDR’s policy on 
foreign labour was the steadfast refusal to abandon the rotation principle or to consider 
long-term or open-ended labour immigration. Such a move would have made economic 
sense, as employers in West Germany learned in the 1950s and 1960s. Labour rotation 
was costly and disruptive but the security and ideological principles upon which the 
East German state was built could never have envisaged or coped with any fundamental 
liberalisation of immigration policy.
3 Thomas Lindenberger and Martin Sabrow, “Das Findelkind der Zeitgeschichte”, in: Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 12 Nov. 2003.
222
The existence of racism in the GDR also places it within the mainstream of 
European history. Despite the SED’s repeated but erroneous proclamations that racism 
had been expunged from the GDR, East Germany was not unique in this regard in the 
broader European context. O f particular interest are the complex forms in which racism 
was denied and expressed throughout the forty year history of the state. At one extreme 
were the public and violent attacks on foreigners, at the other the covert institutional 
racism of bureaucrats at various levels. In between these two poles was the passive 
racist prejudice of wide sections of the population. Although officials rarely made use 
of explicit racist terminology in written correspondence, chauvinism was widespread 
and expressed within the parameters of discourse acceptable to the party. Thus, racism 
was often concealed behind “culturalist” arguments which essentialised cultural 
differences. Yet, unlike its modem variant, this “culturalism” in the GDR was not 
couched in religious terms but rather in the political and ideological language of the 
SED. Given the party’s tendency to equate the concept of socialism with concepts of the 
nation, national “traits”, patriotism and the “positive” inheritance of German (and 
Prussian) history, alleged anti-socialist behaviour on the part of foreigners could easily 
be construed as “un-German” conduct and vice versa.
This thesis has tried to make a small contribution to a deepened understanding of 
the history of migration in post-war Europe, taking East Germany as its focus. That the 
system of contract labour died with the GDR is a good thing. Yet, it is important to 
stress that the Wende impacted massively and disproportionately on the contract 
workers who remained in eastern Germany. Contract workers were the first to lose their 
jobs in the inevitable restructuring of the economy, and they became the targets of 
unprecedented levels of racial hatred as East Germans recovered from the honeymoon 
of unification. Greatly adding to their sense of vulnerability was the determination of 
the federal government to repatriate all remaining former contract workers. Many were 
deported and only after years o f uncertainty did the remaining Vietnamese receive long­
term residency permits.
The experience of migrants was a varied one, mirroring the complexities of GDR 
history in its totality. Foreigners were a feature of daily life in the GDR but restrictive 
state immigration policy, in particular the austere application of the rotation principle, 
prevented the emergence of stable and long-term migrant communities, frustrated the 
formation of binational friendships and relationships, and retarded the development of 
greater multicultural understanding. The SED never intended migration to be anything 
more than a temporary phenomenon and wide sections of the population adapted
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themselves to this reality. Yet, life in the GDR had its positive and negative aspects for 
international students and contract workers. Ideally, this work could have relied more 
on primary historical material produced by the migrants themselves but this material 
does not exist, however. Undoubtedly, an oral history project, particularly involving the 
students and workers who left the GDR before 1989, would provide a whole range of 
insights and views on life in the GDR that cannot be found in East German archival 
material. Yet, oral history is o f limited value unless couched within a broader historical 
framework, which this study provides.
Diagram 1. Statistical overview of the transit and contract workers in the GDR, 1966-1989
Poland Hungary Poland Algeria Cuba Mozambique Vietnam Angola N. Korea China
(transit) (contract) (contract) (contract) (contract) (contract) (contract) (contract) (contract) (contract)
1966-1991 1967-1983 1971-1991 1974-1984 1978-1989 1979-1990 1980-1990 1985-1990 1986-1989 1986-1989
1966
1967 2.447
1968
1969 4.000 7.100
1970 9.841
1971 3.318
1972 3.890 9.234 6.961
1973 6.506
1974 7.006 560
1975 7.270 3.820
1976 6.432 6.318 3.980
1977 3.980
1978 4.740 1.196
1979 3.287 3.593 6.900 3.300 4.112 447
1980 3.200 6.100 3.190 5.553 2.723 1.540
1981 3.200 5.200 3.539 5.725 5.707 5.040
1982 2.760 6.846 5.000 9.600
1983 2.060 6.586 5.349 10.298
1984 4.091 7.480 890 6.700 5.584 10.000
1985 9.557 4.742 10.038 312
1986 11.858 7.687 8.459
1987 3.330 7.478 12.492 10.300 20.776 500
1988 5.519 9.977 16.000 50.998 1.240 905
1989 2.500 3.500 8.317 15.495 59.686 1.656 870 905
Cumulative total: 
218,841 (est)
5,000 42,443 55,000 7,991 18,318 22,188 69,690 1,426 870 905
Note: The figures in italics are estimates of the total number of workers from the corresponding country to have worked in the GDR. These statistics have been compiled using numerous archival and
secondary sources.
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Diagram 2. International students in the GDR (1951-1991) and in eastern Germany (1991)
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Year
Source: Compiled using GDR statistical material from BArch DR 3/1. Schicht/151, /1484, /1847, /1936/1, /2836; DR 3/2. Schicht/4067,4068; and SAPMO BArch, DY 30/IV A
2/9.04/466.
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Diagram 3. Comparative geographical breakdown of international students in the GDR in percentages
(academic years 1959/60 and 1967/68)
■  1959/60
■  1967/68
Socialist states (in Europe, 
Asia, and Cuba)
Arab states America (ex. North 
America)
"Capitalist industrial" states Asia Africa (Sub-Sahara)
Source: BArch, DR 3/1. Schicht/1847 and 2836. Statistik der Studierenden, Stand vom 1 Jun. 1960 (1883 students) und 10 Dec. 1967 (3867 students).
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